A minister of war need not have a detailed knowledge of military affairs, and soldiers often make poor ministers. The military viewpoint will inevitably, of course, interact with the political objective, and policy must take into account the means at its disposal. Clausewitz voices the military warning to the statesman to note carefully the limits of his military strength in formulating goals and commitments. But in the end, policy must predominate. Policy may indeed “take a wrong direction, and prefer to promote ambitious ends, private interests or the vanity of rulers,” but that does not concern the military man. He must assume that policy is “the representative of all the interests of the whole community” and obey it as such. In formulating the first theoretical rationale for the military profession, Clausewitz also contributed the first theoretical justification for civilian control.
* The Protestant forces of the seventeenth century had many seeming similarities to nineteenth-century professional armies. In the New Model Army, for instance, discipline was strict; promotion was in part by seniority and in part by the recommendation of superior officers; purchase was excluded and politics drastically limited. This apparent professionalism, however, was rooted in a temporary intense ideological-religious fervor instead of being based on an expanding technique and functional differentiation. See Felix Pribatsch, Geschichte des Preussischen Offizierkorps (Breslau, 1919), pp. 5–6; Theodore A. Dodge, Gustavus Adolphus (Boston, 2 vols., 1895), ch. 5; John W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (London, 13 vols., 1899–1930), I, 279–284; C. Cooper King, The Story of the British Army (London, 1897), pp. 39ff.
* A partial exception was the Minister of War, who, after 1850, was responsible in some matters to parliament and in others to the Crown. The position of the minister at times became untenable, and this dual responsibility contributed to the decline of his office. See Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945 (Oxford, 1955), pp. 124–125, 223–225.
* The normal steps to officership for a Prussian gymnasium student, seventeen and a half to twenty-three years of age, about the middle of the century were: (1) nomination by the colonel of a regiment; (2) passage of the general examination in the liberal arts; (3) six months service in the ranks; (4) appointment as a Swordknot ensign (Portepeefiihnrich); (5) nine months training at division school; (6) special examination on military subjects; (7) acceptance by officers of the regiment; (8) commissioning as a lieutenant. The bulk of the students attending cadet school took the general examination at the ages of eighteen or nineteen and then followed the same procedure as those entering from the gymnasia. The entry procedure of the German Navy at the end of the century was modeled on this army system. See Archibald Hurd and Henry Castle, German Sea Power (London, 1913), pp. 160–164.
† Henry Barnard, Military Schools and Courses of Instruction in the Science and Art of War (Philadelphia, 1862), pp. 291–292, summarized the theory of the reforms as follows:
“1. The military profession, like every other, requires a general school education intended generally to cultivate the mind, distinct from the subsequent special and professional education for which the former is the necessary ground work.
“The former is tested in the examination for the Swordknot, the latter in the officers’ examination.
“2. The preparatory education required for a candidate for a Swordknot is the function of the ordinary schools of the country . . .
“3. The required previous training not only gives the candidate a more certain basis for his subsequent military education, but, as being the ground work for all professions, leaves him afterwards at liberty to cultivate the special knowledge requisite for any profession that he may prefer.
“4. The division schools are freed from a multifarious course of instruction in the scholastic sciences, a task beyond their power; the result of which was that the majority of scholars were little advanced in formal and general education, and but superficially grounded in the elements of the professional sciences, while they spent years in being drilled for an examination, instead of being educated for life.
“5. If the division schools have an able staff of military teachers, they can give a good professional education . . .
“6. By the amount of liberal education required in the examination for the Swordknot, the friends of those destined for the military profession are admonished to provide them an education equal to that received by the members of other professions . . .”
* Of 4,003 first appointments to the army between 1860 and 1867, 3,167 were by purchase and 836 without purchase. The opposition to educational requirements for officership was well expressed in the 1850’s by the Duke of Cambridge who attacked the Prussian system and insisted that in contrast the “British officer should be a gentleman first and an officer second.” Quoted in Roy Lewis and Angus Maude, Professional People (London, 1952), p. 31.
3
The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic
THE MEANING OF THE MILITARY MIND
The unique or functional aspect of the military has often been discussed in terms of the “military mind.” This chapter attempts to define this concept precisely enough so that it may serve as a useful tool of analysis. The military mind may be approached from three viewpoints: (1) its ability or quality; (2) its attributes or characteristics; and (3) its attitudes or substance.1
Writers employing the first approach have normally emphasized the low caliber of the “military mind.” The intelligence, scope, and imagination of the professional soldier have been compared unfavorably to the intelligence, scope, and imagination of the lawyer, the businessman, the politician. This presumed inferiority has been variously attributed to the inherently inferior talents and abilities of the persons who become officers, the organization of the military profession which discourages intellectual initiative, and the infrequent opportunities which an officer has actively to apply his skill. This general approach deals with one feature of the military mind, but it does not help to define the peculiarly “military” aspects of that mind. The mere fact that the military mind occupies a particular point on the intelligence scale says nothing about its distinctive characteristics. The point might well be the same one occupied by the engineering or dental minds.
The second approach holds that the uniqueness of the military mind lies in certain mental attributes or qualities which constitute a military personality. Military and civilian writers generally seem to agree that the military mind is disciplined, rigid, logical, scientific; it is not flexible, tolerant, intuitive, emotional. The continuous performance of the military function may well give rise to these qualities. Intuitively one feels that these descriptions, also intuitive, come close to the mark. But until more knowledge is accumulated about the personality traits of military men and other politically significant groups and also about the relation between personality, values, and behavior in social situations, this approach will not be very useful in analyzing civil-military relations.
A third and more fruitful approach is to analyze the substance of the military mind — the attitudes, values, views of the military man. This has customarily been done through one of two techniques: to define the military mind in terms of content, or to define it in terms of source. The former method describes certain values and attitudes as military in content, and then asserts that these values and attitudes are widely prevalent among military men. Emphasis has generally focused upon two sets of attitudes assumed to be characteristically military: bellicosity and authoritarianism. The military man is held to believe that peace is stultifying and that conflict and war develop man’s highest moral and intellectual qualities; he favors aggressive and bellicose national policies. He is also thought to be opposed to democracy and to desire the organization of society on the basis of the chain of command. Irrespective of whether these conclusions are accurate, the method used in arriving at them is both subjective and arbitrary. The a priori assumption that certain values are military and that mil
itary men therefore hold those values may or may not be true, but there is nothing in the procedure which requires it to be so.
An alternative approach is to define military values by source. This is to assume that any expression of attitude or value coming from a military source reflects the military mind. But the difficulty here is that everything which comes from a military source does not necessarily derive from its character as a military source. Military men are also Frenchmen and Americans, Methodists and Catholics, liberals and reactionaries, Jews and antisemites. Any given statement by a military man may not reflect his attitudes qua military man but may instead stem from social, economic, political, or religious affiliations irrelevant to his military role. This difficulty could be overcome if it were possible to cancel out these accidental characteristics of military men by surveying a broad, representative sample of communications from military men from all walks of life, all countries, and all times. The magnitude of such an undertaking, however, makes it desirable to find an alternative path to the military mind: to arrive at the substance of l’idée militaire by defining it as a professional ethic.
People who act the same way over a long period of time tend to develop distinctive and persistent habits of thought. Their unique relation to the world gives them a unique perspective on the world and leads them to rationalize their behavior and role. This is particularly true where the role is a professional one. A profession is more narrowly defined, more intensely and exclusively pursued, and more clearly isolated from other human activity than are most occupations. The continuing objective performance of the professional function gives rise to a continuing professional Weltanschauung or professional “mind.” The military mind, in this sense, consists of the values, attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the performance of the professional military function and which are deducible from the nature of that function. The military function is performed by a public bureaucratized profession expert in the management of violence and responsible for the military security of the state. A value or attitude is part of the professional military ethic if it is implied by or derived from the peculiar expertise, responsibility, and organization of the military profession. The professional ethic is broader than professional ethics in the narrow sense of the code governing the behavior of the professional man toward nonprofessionals. It includes any preferences and expectations which may be inferred from the continuing performance of the military occupational role.
The military mind is thus defined abstractly as a Weberian ideal type in terms of which the beliefs of actual men and groups can be analyzed. Obviously, no one individual or group will adhere to all the constituent elements of the military ethic, since no individual or group is ever motivated exclusively by military considerations. Any given officer corps will adhere to the ethic only to the extent that it is professional, that is, to the extent that it is shaped by functional rather than societal imperatives. Few expressions of the ethic by an officer corps indicate a low level of professionalism, widespread articulation of the ethic a high degree of professionalism. The professional military ethic, moreover, is “nondated and non-localized” just like the profession of which it is the intellectual expression. So long as there is no basic alteration in the inherent nature of the military function there will be no change in the content of the professional ethic. Simple changes in military technique, such as developments in weapons technology or the increased importance of economics in military affairs, do not alter the character of the military ethic any more than the discovery of penicillin altered medical ethics. The military ethic consequently is a constant standard by which it is possible to judge the professionalism of any officer corps anywhere anytime. For the sake of clarity, this ideal model may be referred to as the “professional military ethic.” The views actually held by a concrete group of officers at some specific point in history may be termed the “nineteenth-century German military ethic” or the “post-World War I American ethic.”
In the sections that follow an attempt will be made to elaborate the professional military ethic with respect to (1) basic values and perspectives, (2) national military policy, and (3) the relation of the military to the state. The accuracy of this definition of the ethic depends upon the extent to which the views stated are necessarily implied by the performance of the military function. These deductions as to the nature of the ethic will be illustrated by occasional references to typical expressions drawn from military literature. Since the historical evolution of the military ethic in the United States will be described in some detail in later chapters, the citations from American sources will purposely be limited. These references, moreover, are just examples; they do not prove that the views expressed are part of the professional military ethic any more than a completely contradictory statement from a military man would invalidate their inclusion in the ethic. The sole criterion is relevance to the performance of the military function.
THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHIC
MAN, SOCIETY, AND HISTORY. The existence of the military profession presupposes conflicting human interests and the use of violence to further those interests. Consequently, the military ethic views conflict as a universal pattern throughout nature and sees violence rooted in the permanent biological and psychological nature of men. As between the good and evil in man, the military ethic emphasizes the evil. Man is selfish. He is motivated by drives for power, wealth, and security. “The human mind is by nature one-sided and limited.”2 As between the strength and weakness in man, the military ethic emphasizes the weakness. Man’s selfishness leads to struggle but man’s weakness makes successful conflict dependent upon organization, discipline, and leadership. As Clausewitz said, “All war presupposes human weakness, and against that it is directed.” No one is more aware than the professional soldier that the normal man is no hero. The military profession organizes men so as to overcome their inherent fears and failings.3 The uncertainty and chance involved in the conduct of war and the difficulty of anticipating the actions of an opponent make the military man skeptical of the range of human foresight and control. As between reason and irrationality in man, the military ethic emphasizes the limits of reason. The best schemes of men are frustrated by the “friction” existing in reality. “War is the province of uncertainty,” Clausewitz said; “three-fourths of the things on which action in war is based lie hidden in the fog of greater or less uncertainty.” Human nature, moreover, is universal and unchanging. Men in all places and at all times are basically the same.4 The military view of man is thus decidedly pessimistic. Man has elements of goodness, strength, and reason, but he is also evil, weak, and irrational. The man of the military ethic is essentially the man of Hobbes.
The existence of the military profession depends upon the existence of competing nation states. The responsibility of the profession is to enhance the military security of the state. The discharge of this responsibility requires cooperation, organization, discipline. Both because it is his duty to serve society as a whole and because of the nature of the means which he employs to carry out this duty, the military man emphasizes the importance of the group as against the individual. Success in any activity requires the subordination of the will of the individual to the will of the group. Tradition, esprit, unity, community — these rate high in the military value system. The officer submerges his personal interests and desires to what is necessary for the good of the service. As a nineteenth-century German officer put it, the military man must “forego personal advantage, lucre, and prosperity . . . Egotism is beyond all doubt the most bitter enemy of the qualities essential to the officer-corps.”5 Man is preeminently a social animal. He exists only in groups. He defends himself only in groups. Most importantly, he realizes himself only in groups. The “weak, mediocre, transient individual” can only achieve emotional satisfaction and moral fulfillment by participating in “the power, the greatness, the permanence and the splendour” of a continuing organic body.6 The military ethic is basically corporative in s
pirit. It is fundamentally anti-individualistic.
The military vocation is a profession because it has accumulated experiences which make up a body of professional knowledge. In the military view, man learns only from experience. If he has little opportunity to learn from his own experience, he must learn from the experience of others. Hence, the military officer studies history. For history is, in Liddell Hart’s phrase, “universal experience,” and military history, as Moltke said, is the “most effective means of teaching war during peace.” The military ethic thus places unusual value upon the ordered, purposive study of history.7 History is valuable to the military man only when it is used to develop principles which may be capable of future application. The military student of history constantly tries to draw generalizations from his study. Yet the military ethic is not bound to any specific theory of history. While it rejects monistic interpretations, it also emphasizes the importance of force as contrasted with ideological and economic factors. The permanence of human nature makes impossible any theory of progress. “Change is inevitable. Progress is not inevitable.”8 Insofar as there is a pattern in history, it is cyclical in nature. Civilizations rise and fall. War and peace alternate, and so also does the supremacy of offensive and defensive warfare.9
NATIONAL MILITARY POLICY. The military view toward national policy reflects the professional responsibility for the military security of the state. This responsibility leads the military: (1) to view the state as the basic unit of political organization; (2) to stress the continuing nature of the threats to the military security of the state and the continuing likelihood of war; (3) to emphasize the magnitude and immediacy of the security threats; (4) to favor the maintenance of strong, diverse, and ready military forces; (5) to oppose the extension of state commitments and the involvement of the state in war except when victory is certain.
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