Liberalism. The heart of liberalism is individualism. It emphasizes the reason and moral dignity of the individual and opposes political, economic, and social restraints upon individual liberty. In contrast, the military ethic holds that man is evil, weak, and irrational and that he must be subordinated to the group. The military man claims that the natural relation among men is conflict; the liberal believes that the natural relation is peace. Liberalism holds that the application of reason may produce a harmony of interests. For the liberal, success in any enterprise depends upon the maximum release of individual energies; for the military man it depends upon subordination and specialization. The liberal glorifies self-expression; the military man obedience. Liberalism rejects the organic theory of society. In contrast to the military view, liberalism holds that human nature is pliable and may be improved through education and proper social institutions. The liberal normally believes in progress and minimizes the significance of history. Man is more likely to find solutions to his political problems by consulting his reason than by examining his experience.
The military man emphasizes the importance of power in human relations; liberalism normally either denies the existence of power, minimizes its importance, or castigates it as inherently evil. Liberalism tends to assume the existence of that very national security which the military man considers to be continually threatened. Liberal thinking has been largely concerned with economics and economic welfare and has opposed large military forces, balance of power diplomacy, and military alliances. Liberalism believes that the way to peace is through institutional devices such as international law, international courts, and international organization. Liberalism has many pacifist tendencies, but the liberal will normally support a war waged to further liberal ideals. War as an instrument of national policy is immoral; war on behalf of universally true principles of justice and freedom is not. The liberal thus opposes war in general but frequently supports it in particular, while the military man accepts war in the abstract but opposes its specific manifestations.
Liberalism is generally hostile to armaments and standing armies. They are a threat both to peace and to constitutional government. If military organization is necessary, it must be military organization reflecting liberal principles. Civilian control in liberalism means the embodiment of liberal ideas in military institutions. The military professionals are held to be backward, incompetent, and neglectful of the importance of economics, morale, and ideology. National defense is the responsibility of all, not just a few. If war becomes necessary, the state must fight as a “nation in arms” relying on popular militias and citizen armies.
Fascism. The military ethic and fascism are similar in some respects but they have one fundamental difference. What the military man accepts as the facts of existence to be wrestled with as effectively as possible, the fascist glorifies as the supreme values of existence. The military man sees struggle inherent in human relations; the fascist glorifies struggle as the highest activity of man. The military ethic accepts the nation state as an independent unit; fascism hails the state or the party as the embodiment of moral virtue, the ultimate source of morality. While military thinking accepts war, fascist thinking romanticizes war and violence. The military man recognizes the necessity and uses of power; the fascist worships power as an end in itself. The military ethic recognizes the necessity of leadership and discipline in human society; fascism emphasizes the supreme power and ability of the leader, and the absolute duty of subordination to his will.
The fascist and the military views on human nature and history differ widely. In opposition to military emphasis upon the universality of human traits, the fascist believes in the natural superiority of a chosen people or race and in the inherent genius and supreme virtue of the leader. Military thinking, on the other hand, is skeptical of everybody. While the military man learns from history and the liberal relies on reason, the fascist stresses intuition. He has little use or need for ordered knowledge and practical, empirical realism. He celebrates the triumph of the Will over external obstacles. In this respect, fascism is more individualistic than liberalism and more removed from the military ethic with its emphasis upon the limitations of human nature.
Unlike liberalism, fascism willingly supports the maintenance of strong military forces. While the liberal will fight for ideals and the military man for the security of the state, the fascist fights in order to fight. War is the end not the instrument of politics. In contrast to the cautious, unbelligerent foreign policy of the military man, the fascist advocates a dynamic, aggressive, revolutionary policy with the avowed aims of conflict and the expansion of the power of the state to its ultimate limit. The fascist believes in the internal subordination of all other social institutions to state or party. The military profession itself must have the proper ideological coloring. While fascism does not go as far as liberalism in imposing extraneous forms on military institutions, it is even more hostile to the existence of any potential sources of power apart from the state. Like liberalism, fascism believes in total war, mass armies, and that it is the duty of every citizen to be a soldier.
Marxism. The Marxist view of man is fundamentally opposed to the military view of man. For the Marxist, man is basically good and rational; he is corrupted by evil institutions. He is naturally at peace with his fellow men. This was his condition before the beginning of history. This will be his condition when the dialectical processes grind to a halt. While Marxist thought denies the existence of fundamental distinctions among men, at the present stage in history it views the proletarian as more progressive than other classes. Like the military man, the Marxist is a careful student of history. While there is a cyclical element in the constant repetition of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the basic course of history is linear and progressive. Like the military man, the Marxist sees struggle throughout, but unlike him he sees only class struggle. While the military man recognizes the role of chance and human freedom in history, the Marxist holds that all significant events are determined by economic forces. The Marxist view of history is monistic, while the military view is pluralistic. The Marxist also differs from the military man in his faith that history will come to an end with the realization of a more or less utopian society.
Both Marxism and the military ethic recognize the importance of power and groups in human affairs. The Marxist, however, stresses the importance of economic power, whereas the military man holds with Machiavelli to the superiority of the sword. For the Marxist the basic group is the class — mankind is cut horizontally; for the military man, the basic group is the nation state — mankind is cut vertically. Indeed, Marxism denies the reality of the state as a reflection of group unity, holding that it is merely an instrument of class warfare. While the military ethic recognizes that states will go to war for many reasons, it stresses the concerns of power and security. To the Marxist economic imperialism is the basis of interstate wars. The only wars which he can sanction are class wars, and the only military forces which he can approve are class instruments. He does not recognize universal military values and forms; the character of every military force is determined by the class interests for which it is fighting. He is favorably disposed towards a military force organized upon “proletarian” lines and opposing capitalist interests. Like liberalism, therefore, Marxism insists upon the patterning of military institutions upon nonmilitary ideas.
Conservatism. Unlike liberalism, Marxism, and fascism, conservatism is basically similar to the military ethic.* Indeed, it was found appropriate to designate the military ethic as one of conservative realism. In its theories of man, society, and history, its recognition of the role of power in human relations, its acceptance of existing institutions, its limited goals, and its distrust of grand designs, conservatism is at one with the military ethic. Most importantly, conservatism, unlike the other three ideologies, is not monistic and universalistic. It does not attempt to apply the same ideas to all problems and all human institutions. It permits
a variety of goals and values. Consequently, conservatism alone of the four ideologies is not driven by its own logic to an inevitable conflict with the military values which stem from the demands of the military function. It alone has no political-ideological pattern to impose on military institutions. While inherent contrast and conflict exist between the military ethic and liberalism, fascism, and Marxism, inherent similarity and compatibility exist between the military ethic and conservatism.
THE EQUILIBRIUM OF OBJECTIVE CIVILIAN CONTROL
The distribution of power between civilian and military groups which maximizes military professionalism and objective civilian control varies with the compatibility between the ideology prevailing in society and the professional military ethic. If the ideology is inherently antimilitary (such as liberalism, fascism, or Marxism), the military acquire substantial political power only by sacrificing their professionalism and adhering to the values and attitudes dominant within the community. In such an antimilitary society, military professionalism and civilian control are maximized by the military’s renouncing authority and influence and leading a weak, isolated existence, divorced from the general life of society. In a society dominated by an ideology favorable to the military viewpoint, on the other hand, military power may be increased to a much greater extent without becoming incompatible with a high level of professionalism. The realization of objective civilian control thus depends upon the achievement of an appropriate equilibrium between the power of the military and the ideology of society.
The concessions which the military make in order to acquire power in an unsympathetic society are just one example of the general phenomenon of the ameliorating and diluting effects of power. It is a truism that power melts principle and that those who hold to definite, dogmatic, and rigid value systems are excluded from power in a pluralistic society. Only he who is flexible, willing to adjust, and ready to compromise can win widespread support: power is always to be purchased for a price. The price which the military have to pay for power depends upon the extent of the gap between the military ethic and the prevailing ideologies of the society. The effect which the acquisition of power in a nonconservative society has upon military men is similar to the sobering effects that the acquisition of power has upon radicals. Michels remarks at one point in his Political Parties that “Socialists may triumph but never socialism.” The same is true with the military in an unsympathetic society. The generals and admirals may triumph but not the professional military ethic. The taming effect of political power makes them good liberals, good fascists, or good communists, but poor professionals. The satisfactions of professional performance and adherence to the professional code are replaced by the satisfactions of power, office, wealth, popularity, and the approbation of nonmilitary groups.
In most societies the relation among power, professionalism, and ideology is a dynamic one, reflecting shifts in the relative power of groups, changing currents of opinion and thought, and varying threats to national security. The maintenance of that equilibrium between power and ideology which constitutes objective civilian control is obviously difficult at best. Any profession experiences a tension between its inherent professional aspirations and the extraneous politics in which it may become involved. The military profession, because of its crucial significance to society as well as the vast power which it must wield when the state is threatened, manifests this tension to a higher degree than most other professional bodies. An element of tragic necessity exists in this relationship. Professional success breeds its own downfall by stimulating political involvement. Nonetheless, the professional man who pursues the values of professional competence and obedience and the political man who pursues power as an end in itself are two distinct types. Yet elements of both exist in most human beings and in every group. The tension between the two, consequently, can never be removed; it can only be ordered so as to make it more or less endurable.
Antimilitary ideologies have flourished in western societies, and the demands of military security, or simply the desire for power, have forced many military individuals and groups to play dominant roles in their governments. They have only been able to do this, however, by surrendering their professional outlook. Yet because these military individuals and groups have been the most prominent and politically involved military men, their attitudes have frequently been assumed by nonmilitary groups to be typical of military thinking. Thus, deviant, nonmilitary military men such as De Gaulle, Ludendorff, and MacArthur are often considered to be representative examples of the “military mind.” Actually, such men in their political roles express values stemming from nonmilitary sources.
THE PATTERNS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
The general relations among power, professionalism, and ideology make possible five different ideal types of civil-military relations.* These are, of course, ideals and extremes; in actual practice the civil-military relations of any society combines elements of two or more. Three of the five types permit a high degree of professionalism and objective civilian control; two presuppose low professionalism and subjective civilian control.
(1) Antimilitary ideology, high military political power, and low military professionalism. This type of civil-military relations generally is found in more primitive countries where military professionalism has been retarded or in more advanced countries when security threats are suddenly intensified and the military rapidly increase their political power. The export of the institutions and ethics of military professionalism from western Europe to other countries has been as difficult as the export of the institutions of constitutional democracy. Consequently in the Near East, Asia, and Latin America this type of civil-military relations has tended to prevail. Only with great difficulty have nations such as Turkey removed their officers from politics and cultivated professional behavior and outlook. Japan is the only major power to maintain this pattern of civil-military relations over a long period of time. It was, however, also characteristic of Germany during World War I and of the United States in World War II.
(2) Antimilitary ideology, low military political power, and low military professionalism. This combination of elements only appears where the ideology of society is so intensely pursued that it is impossible for the military to escape its influence no matter how far they reduce their political power. Civil-military relations in modern totalitarian states may tend toward this type, a close approximation to it being achieved in Germany during World War II.
(3) Antimilitary ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism. A society which suffers few threats to its security is likely to have this type of civil-military relations. Historically, this pattern prevailed in the United States from the rise of military professionalism after the Civil War until the beginning of World War II.
(4) Promilitary ideology, high military political power, and high military professionalism. A society with continuing security threats and an ideology sympathetic to military values may permit a high level of military political power and yet still maintain military professionalism and objective civilian control. Probably the outstanding achievement of this variety of civil-military relations was by Prussia and Germany during the Bismarckian-Moltkean epoch (1860–1890).
(5) Promilitary ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism. This type might be expected in a society relatively safe from security threats and dominated by a conservative or other ideology sympathetic to the military viewpoint. Civil-military relations in twentieth-century Britain have, to some extent, tended to be of this type.
* Conservatism, as used here and hereafter in this volume, refers to the philosophy of Burke, and not to the meaning given this term in popular political parlance in the United States to refer to the laissez-faire, property-rights form of liberalism as exemplified, for instance, by Herbert Hoover.
* There are eight conceivable combinations of these three factors, but one (antimilitary ideology, high military power, high military profes
sionalism) is impossible given the theoretical premises stated above, and two others (promilitary ideology, low military power, low military professionalism; promilitary ideology, high military power, low professionalism) are unlikely to occur except in the most unusual circumstances.
5
Germany and Japan: Civil-Military Relations in Practice
THE GERMAN AND JAPANESE PATTERNS
Modern Japan dates from 1868 and modern Germany from 1870. The history of German and Japanese civil-military relations during the following seventy-five years, down to their defeat in World War II, offers excellent material for the application of the theory developed in the previous chapter. Americans have tended to classify both Germany and Japan as fundamentally “militaristic” nations. Yet their patterns of civil-military relations could hardly be more dissimilar. Probably no country has had a wider variety of experiences in civil-military relations than modern Germany. No other officer corps achieved such high standards of professionalism, and the officer corps of no other major power was in the end so completely prostituted. Each chapter of the German story has its lesson and its warning. The imperial experience shows the benefits of civilian control. The republican period demonstrates the difficulty of achieving that control amidst political chaos. World War I illustrates the disastrous results when military men assume political roles. Nazi rule illustrates the equally catastrophic results when military warnings are unheeded and political leaders ride roughshod over the soldiers. The variety of German civil-military relations makes its history a terrifying but highly instructive study. In contrast, Japanese civil-military relations remained in a single relatively stable pattern from 1868 to 1945. From the start, the Japanese military played a persistently active role in the politics of their country. While the high level of German professionalism produced acute tension between the military and popular ethics, the popular thinking of the Japanese officer corps reflected general harmony between military and people. The key to German civil-military relations was sporadic disintegration; the key to Japanese civil-military relations was sustained disorder. Yet the ultimate causes and effects of the breakup of the German equilibrium and the failure of Japan ever to develop an equilibrium were the same. In both countries the disruption of the civil-military balance reflected more basic constitutional disorders. In both countries, too, that disruption helped undermine the nation’s security: distorting the perspective and judgment of soldiers and statesmen, confusing their responsibilities and duties, fostering fanaticism and arrogance, and leading to a bellicosity in peace and a weakness in war which contributed to their ultimate downfall.
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