Until the middle of the nineteenth century, no real distinction existed between political and military competence. Any man of affairs was capable of command, and the exercise by the President of his military functions created no difficulties. There was a single, clear political-military hierarchy running from the President through the Secretaries of War and the Navy to the uniformed commanders. Political and military responsibilities and abilities were mixed all along the line. The President frequently had previous military experience; the Secretary of War almost always had. The top generals, on the other hand, were usually involved in politics. The organization of the service departments, consequently, was little different from that of any other department.
This unified hierarchy began to break up as the military function became professionalized. The President was no longer qualified to exercise military command, and even if he were qualified by previous training, he could not devote time to this function without abandoning his political responsibilities. The political functions of the Presidency became incompatible with the military functions of the Commander in Chief. Nor were the civilian politicians appointed Secretaries of War and the Navy competent to exercise military command. On the other hand, the emergence of the military profession produced officers whose experience had been exclusively military, who were quite different types from the politician secretaries, and who were technically qualified to command. The constitutional presumption that the President exercised command still remained, however, and complicated the relations among President, secretary, and military chief. Under the Constitution the military chief was military, the secretary political, and the President political and military. Normally, one would assume) that the secretary, with his duty to represent the interests of his department, would be more military in outlook, if not in capability, than the President with his broader interests and responsibilities. The Constitution, however, reversed this relationship, and obscured the clearness of the hierarchy. Did the chain of command go up through the secretary, a civilian politician, to the President? Or were there two lines of authority emanating from the Presidency: a political-administrative line to the secretary and a military command line directly to the highest professional officer? These issues have befogged American military organization down to the present day.
THE BALANCED, COORDINATE, AND VERTICAL TYPES OF EXECUTIVE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. It is possible to conceive of three different types of executive civil-military relations among the President, secretary, and military chief.* The balanced pattern assigns to the President a purely political function: the decision of the highest policy issues and the general supervision of the military establishment. Beneath him is the secretary, also a purely political figure, reponsible for the entire military organization. Below the secretary, the hierarchy divides into military and administrative components. The highest professional officer is the leading military adviser to the secretary and normally has command of the military forces. The military chief is subordinate to the secretary who is subordinate to the President, but neither of the two civilian officials exercise military command. Military command stops at the level of the military chief. Also subordinate to the secretary are administrative officials (civilian or military) who direct the nonmilitary supply, logistical, and financial activities of the department.
This balanced pattern of organization tends to maximize military professionalism and civilian control.21 Civilian and military responsibilities are clearly distinguished, and the latter are subordinated to the former. The President and the secretary handle political matters; the military chief military matters; and the staff or bureau chiefs administrative matters. The scope of the authority of the professional military chief is limited to the military realm by the administrative bureaus, and the level of his authority, subordinate to the secretary, does not involve him in political decisions. Administrative and military interests are balanced by the secretary under the authority of the President. English civil-military relations have been organized along comparable lines since the last half of the nineteenth century. Between 1794 and 1870 the War Office administered the civilian affairs of the army, and the Commander in Chief, directly under the sovereign, was responsible for military command and discipline. In 1870, however, the Cabinet insisted that the military chief be subordinated to the Secretary of State for War. A fully balanced scheme was achieved with the abolition of the post of Commander in Chief in 1895 and the subsequent creation of the office of Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The same system also existed at the Admiralty. This organization was possible only because the sovereign consented, however reluctantly, to have his role as first general and admiral become, in Bagehot’s phrase, a “dignified” part of the constitution. The “efficient” hierarchy of control ran from Parliament to Cabinet to Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and then to the military chief and the administrative bureaus of the War Office. In the United States, however, no President has permitted his constitutional functions as Commander in Chief to atrophy. These remain efficient and not dignified. Consequently, the balanced pattern of organization has been difficult to achieve and even more difficult to maintain. American civil-military relations almost inevitably gravitate in the direction of other arrangements which tend to weaken military professionalism and civilian control.
The coordinate scheme involves the separation of military and administrative functions immediately below the President. The secretary is limited to nonmilitary administrative duties, and the military chief discharges his military functions directly under the President. The chain of administration goes from President to Secretary to bureau chiefs; the chain of command from President to military chief to the military forces. This accords with constitutional theory and keeps civilians, except the President, out of the military hierarchy. It tends, however, to undermine civilian control. The scope of the authority of the military chief is limited to military matters, but the level of his authority with direct access to the President involves him in political issues. The President is normally too busy with other affairs to devote sufficient attention to the interrelation of political and military policies, and the military chief consequently has to make political decisions. His direct access to the President also encourages the latter to try his hand at military affairs and to intervene in professional military planning and command where he has no special competence.
The vertical pattern solves the problem of the Commander in Chief clause in a different manner, but one which is equally inconsistent with civilian control. In this scheme the secretary and the military chief have identical responsibilities. The administrative bureau heads are subordinated to the professional military chief, and the professional military chief is subordinated to the secretary who is in turn responsible to the President. Since the President is still Commander in Chief, and some connection must exist between him and the rest of the military hierarchy, the secretary is given a place in the military chain of command and is described as the President’s deputy commander in chief or in some similar terms. The military chief, however, is given control over all the activities of the department under the secretary, the specifically military command and planning functions being delegated down the hierarchy to a subordinate of the military chiefs on the same level as the administrative chiefs of bureaus. This prevents the military chief from achieving direct access to the President because his responsibilities are identical with those of the secretary. Consequently, he can claim no peculiar relation to the President and must be subordinate to the secretary. On the other hand, he supervises all the activities of the department below the secretary and, consequently, may be able to reduce the secretary to a figurehead. By combining in his own person political and administrative responsibilities, as well as functions of military command, the military chief transgresses his competence. He sacrifices higher level for broader scope, which is equally damaging to his professional status. Also, the extension of the constitutional myth so that not only the President but also the secre
tary is assumed to exercise military command violates the facts of reality.
The American constitutional system thus does not facilitate the stable existence of a balanced pattern of executive civil-military relations. The President’s power as Commander in Chief inevitably tends to push the executive structure in the direction of either the coordinate or the vertical pattern. The interests of the military chief lead him to seek both direct access to the President and over-all supervision of both the military and administrative aspects of his department. The secretary, on the other hand, attempts both to maintain exclusive access to the President and to have a multiplicity of subordinates reporting to him. Neither secretary nor military chief ever completely achieve their two objectives. The level and scope of military authority tend to be inversely related. Inevitably, the secretary tends to get cut off from his department by a military head who oversees both military and administrative aspects, or he tends to surrender the military aspect to the professional chief who maintains a direct command relationship with the President.
CIVILIAN CONTROL AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
Objective civilian control has existed in the United States but it has been the product of geographical isolation and the international balance of power, which permitted the virtual elimination of standing military forces and the exclusion of the military from political power. Civilian control in this sense has been so effective that Americans have called it a fundamental principle of their system of government. But they have been deluding themselves. They have ascribed to the Constitution a virtue of geography. Objective civilian control has been extraconstitutional, a part of our political tradition but not of our constitutional tradition. Civilian control has, in a sense, been like the party system. The Framers did not foresee the rise of popular democracy; consequently, they did not provide for political parties. They did not foresee the rise of the military profession; consequently, they did not provide for civilian control. Neither is contemplated in the Constitution, yet both have been called into existence by nonconstitutional forces. The Constitution has contributed its share to obstructing the growth of a strong party system such as exists in Great Britain. It has also contributed its share to obstructing effective civilian control such as exists in Great Britain. The restraints of a written constitution have proved effective against some of the most powerful functional imperatives.
The question thus arises: to what extent is it possible, short of amending the Constitution, to provide for civilian control in the existing framework? The difficulties are constant but they are not all of equal strength. The extent to which the Commander in Chief clause operates to damage civilian control depends largely upon the individuals who occupy that office. It adds nothing and detracts much from military professionalism and civilian control. The British Prime Minister who is not commander in chief and has no military functions has more effective control over his military forces than does the American President. The principal positive use of the clause has been to expand presidential power against Congress in nonmilitary areas. If the clause can come to be viewed primarily in this nonmilitary sense, and if the presidents can exercise constitutional self-restraint so as to make their military command of the armed forces as honorific as that of the king of England, this obstacle to civilian control would be removed, and a balanced pattern of executive organization be made workable.
The militia clauses only directly hamper the development of military professionalism in one segment of the armed forces. Conceivably, of course, Congress could abolish dual control over the militia. But in the face of the political strength of the National Guard this hardly seems possible. And, given the existing situation, it probably would not even be desirable. The more appropriate course is to make the best of the situation of military federalism. The existence of the Guard will necessarily prevent the development of a strong and ready national reserve organization. The Constitution has made the Guard into a powerful political force, and it is not inconceivable that this political strength may make the Guard into an effective military organization. At the end of 1954, the Army and Air National Guard had almost 400,000 men on drill pay status — twice the number of the Army and Air Force Reserves. At the beginning of 1956 Guard ground forces consisted of 21 infantry divisions, 6 armored divisions, 9 regimental combat teams, 9 armored cavalry regiments, 123 antiaircraft battalions, 74 field artillery battalions, and miscellaneous other units. The Air National Guard was organized into 27 combat wings. The readiness of the Guard was at a higher level than ever before in its history. Many of the antiaircraft units and interceptor squadrons were participating in the air defense of the nation on a semiactive alert status.22 By its very nature the National Guard can never be brought fully within objective civilian control. But it may still be possible to create a respectable reserve force within the existing constitutional and political framework.
The real constitutional stumbling block to objective civilian control is the separation of powers. This is the essence of the American system of government, and its impact is felt throughout the armed forces. Short of fundamental constitutional change, the separation of powers cannot be altered. Indeed, it is highly questionable whether, even if such change were possible, it would be worth the price. There are values other than civilian control and military professionalism, and these were the values the Framers had in mind when they wrote the Constitution. Foreign countries may have more effective systems of civilian control but no country has as effective a system of restraints upon arbitrary political power or such a unique balance of executive unity and legislative diversity. Inevitably, both military officers attempting to adhere to professional standards and civilian secretaries attempting to exercise civilian control look with envy to the cabinet system. Such a system, however, is not for the United States. Within the framework of the separation of powers, institutional adjustments can be made which will reduce its deleterious effects upon civilian control. But it will never be possible to eliminate these effects completely. A lesser measure of civilian control and lower standards of military professionalism are the continuing prices the American people will have to pay for the other benefits of their constitutional system.
* The problems raised by the militia clauses have not changed fundamentally in more recent years, and this discussion of the militia will include events after 1940. In contrast, the discussion of the separation of powers and the Commander in Chief clause in this chapter will be limited to the period previous to 1940; the special problems arising after 1940 will be treated separately in Part III.
* There are, of course, other possible structures of executive civil-military relations, such as one making a military officer departmental secretary. This analysis, however, will be confined to the three ideal types relevant to American experience. Although professional military men have occasionally been appointed Secretary of War, this is unusual and contrary to accepted practice. The only plan seriously advanced to put military men in the place of the secretary was the unsuccessful 1815 proposal to substitute a board of three naval officers for the Secretary of the Navy.
8
The Roots of the American Military Tradition before the Civil War
THE THREE STRANDS OF AMERICAN MILITARISM
Technicism, popularism, and professionalism are the three strands of the American military tradition. All originated prior to the Civil War. The technical element emphasized the mechanical crafts and specialized sciences which contributed to the trade of the soldier; the good military officer was expert in a technical skill such as civil engineering, ship design, cartography, or hydrography. The roots of military technicism were widespread in American culture in the first part of the nineteenth century, but primarily they were found in the Jeffersonian contributions to American militarism. The technical influence was heaviest in military education and in staff organization, particularly in the Navy. The popular strand of the American military tradition stressed the general capability of all Americans, irrespective of knowledge o
r training, to excel in the military art; the military officer was the citizen-soldier inspired by the ideals of democracy and liberty. The popular element was derived principally from Jacksonian Democracy. Its institutional manifestations were most notable in the systems of entry and advancement in the officer corps and in the Army organization which crystallized during the Jacksonian period. Finally, the idea of a science of war and of a military profession expert in that science — the Southern contribution to the military tradition — also existed by the middle of the century. Unlike the technical and popular strands, however, which were outgrowths of the dominant strains of American liberalism, military professionalism was identified with a conservative sectional minority which during the course of the century became increasingly isolated from the mainstream of American development. The Southern support which permitted military professionalism to be expressed as an idea, also condemned it to defeat in practice. Unlike technicism and popularism, it lacked institutional manifestations. Prior to the Civil War no significant professional military institutions existed in the United States.
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