* The occupations of parents of candidates for admission to West Point from 1842 to 1891 and of the parents of cadets admitted to the Academy from 1892 to 1899 inclusive were: farmers and planters, 1,149; merchants, 722; lawyers and judges, 625; physicians, 367; army officers, 632; mechanics, 341; no occupation, 191; manufacturers, 151; clergymen, 128. No other occupation contributed more than a hundred candidates. Charles W. Larned, “The Genius of West Point,” The Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, 1802–1902 (Washington, 1904), pp. 482–483. Richard C. Brown, “Social Attitudes of American Generals, 1898–1940” (Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. of Wisconsin, 1951), pp. 1–34 found the social profiles of the generals essentially the same as those of business and political leaders.
* Five of the six other major advanced schools established by the Army between 1865 and 1914 were first set up by departmental order without prior congressional authorization.
* The March 1884 issue of the Journal of the Military Service Institution, for example, contained an article by von der Goltz, correspondence with the Militärische Gesellschaft, and a discussion of von Moltke. This was not atypical.
* Luce subsequently wrote of his opponents: “While urging advanced courses in the higher mathematics, in the science of ordnance, nautical astronomy and the rest of it, they overlooked their own science — the science of war. In advocating the cultivation of the arts of gunnery and navigation, mechanical engineering, and the mechanic arts generally, they took no account of their own special art — the art of war.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, XXXVI (1910), 560.
* Prior to the Civil War the most significant military associations had been the West Point Military Philosophical Society, 1802–1812, and the United States Naval Lyceum in the 1830’s. Both groups, however, had scientific and technical as well as military interests. Except for the Naval Magazine, published by the Lyceum, the journals of the Military Enlightenment had been published by commercial houses rather than by the officers themselves, and all of them had brief existences.
* Official professional literature also grew in volume and quality, with the Office of Naval Intelligence, established in 1882, the Military Information Division of the War Department, the Naval War Records Office, and the war colleges, all playing significant roles.
* The analysis of the American military ethic which follows is based upon a comprehensive study of:
(1) the Journal of the Military Service Institution, 1879–1917;
(2) the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 1874–1917;
(3) the Infantry Journal, 1904–1917;
(4) United Service, 1879–1905;
(5) selected memoirs and textbooks by officers and articles in popular journals.
The professional journals are the best source for military thinking for a variety of reasons. Their articles were by officers on active duty and hence immersed in the military milieu. Few officers had the time or inclination to write books while still in the service, and when they wrote them after retirement, they at times looked back through rose-colored glasses. Most of the articles in the professional journals were by junior and middle-ranking officers whose views may be presumed to reflect the thinking of the bulk of the officer corps. Most of the books were written by generals whose views were more likely to reflect nonvocational influences. Articles in the professional journals were designed for military readers, and hence their authors were less likely to hide or modify their true opinions than if they were writing for the general public. The articles in the professional journals not only expressed military opinion but also shaped it. At the end of each section in the following analysis of the American military ethic, references will be given to some representative expressions of the military viewpoint on the topic of the section including those which have been quoted in the text.
10
The Failure of the Neo-Hamiltonian Compromise, 1890—1920
THE NATURE OF NEO-HAMILTONIANISM
From roughly 1890 (the publication of The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660—1783) to 1920 (the rejection of Leonard Wood by the Republican National Convention), a group of statesmen and publicists and a school of thought existed in America which might be labeled Neo-Hamiltonian. The outstanding individuals in this group were Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, Albert J. Beveridge, A. T. Mahan, Herbert Croly, Leonard Wood, Henry Adams, and Brooks Adams. The common bond among these diverse personalities was an outlook on politics which transcended the usual American categories. The Neo-Hamiltonians did not fall into the liberal tradition of Jefferson, Jackson, Spencer, and Wilson. Yet neither were they completely conservative, in the sense in which Calhoun was conservative. On economic issues, they bridged the gap from the reforming tendencies of Croly and the New Republic group to the staunch standpatism of Elihu Root. More significantly, the Neo-Hamiltonians also combined elements of military and civilian thinking. They were in fact the first important American social group whose political philosophy more or less consciously borrowed and incorporated elements of the professional military ethic.
The fundamental cause of Neo-Hamiltonianism in an age otherwise characterized by business pacifism was the shock of American involvement in world politics at the end of the nineteenth century. Neo-Hamiltonianism was essentially a positive reaction to the end of isolation and a favorable response to the opportunity to play power politics. It briefly captured the attention and support of the American people by its emphasis on power and the primacy of the national interest. Woodrow Wilson, however, dealt it a death blow by developing an alternative philosophy of international involvement which transcended national interest and which was more deeply rooted in the American liberal tradition. Neo-Hamiltonianism had a semi-conservative explanation of the role which America should play in world politics. Wilsonianism offered a completely liberal explanation. Given the overwhelming devotion of the American people to the values of liberalism, it was inevitable that the latter should displace the former. And when the Wilson program failed, the American people reacted in the 1920’s, not by going back to Neo-Hamiltonian interventionism, but by abandoning intervention altogether and returning to liberal isolationism. Neo-Hamiltonianism never had a secure base in the continuing interests and outlook of any specific social or economic group. The political vehicle of the Neo-Hamiltonians was the Republican Party, and, when they finally lost control of that party to business elements, they were irremediably excluded from further political influence. The main current of American liberalism flowed majestically onward between 1890 and 1920. Neo-Hamiltonianism was a side eddy of a different hue, which at times diverted a substantial portion of the political water, but which was ultimately reabsorbed by the main channel.*
The civilian expressions of the Neo-Hamiltonian ethic — the writings and speeches of Theodore Roosevelt, the philosophizing of the Adamses, the policies of Elihu Root, the editorials of the prewar New Republic — reveal a peculiar amalgam of liberal-conservative values. Neo-Hamiltonianism differed from liberalism and resembled the professional military viewpoint in its appreciation of the role of power in human affairs. Like the military and unlike the liberals, the Neo-Hamiltonians saw international politics as basically a struggle among independent nations with interests which not infrequently brought them into conflict with each other. Contrary to the optimistic doctrines of business pacifism, they held to the military view that war was far from obsolete. Also, like the military and unlike the liberals, the Neo-Hamiltonians argued that national policy must primarily reflect not abstract ideals but a realistic understanding of the national interest. This was the first responsibility of the statesmen. So long as nations exist, force is the ultimate arbiter. Consequently, nations must maintain adequate armaments to back up their national policies, the nature of national policy determining the size and nature of the forces required. The Neo-Hamiltonians shared with the military an essentially Clausewitzian view of the relations of policy and force. They supported the military in thei
r efforts to build up the nation’s defenses. They were more willing than most Americans to accept the military profession. Herbert Croly’s New Republic in 1915 could pour a withering scorn at the liberal illusions of Bryan and Carnegie that a citizen army, springing to arms overnight, was sufficient for the nation’s defense. Along with the military, the Neo-Hamiltonians rejected plutocracy and were bitter in their contempt for the prevailing commercialism, materialism, and the values inherent in an economically oriented way of life. They shared with the military a stress on loyalty, duty, responsibility, and subordination of the self to the requirements of the nation. Brooks Adams even went so far as to suggest openly that America would do well to substitute the values of West Point for the values of Wall Street.
Despite this wide agreement with the military ethic, there were, nonetheless, significant differences. Neo-Hamiltonianism was not completely divorced from the popular ideologies of the times. Many of its advocates, particularly Theodore Roosevelt, made an effort to rationalize the national interest in terms of universal moral values of justice and righteousness. The Neo-Hamiltonian interest in politics was much broader than the strictly military approach. Croly’s international realism, manifested in The Promise of American Life, was part of a broad political philosophy which offered answers to the issues of domestic as well as foreign politics. More fundamental, perhaps, was the value which the Neo-Hamiltonians put on violence and force. In many respects the underlying moral values of the Neo-Hamiltonians were closer to those of aristocratic romanticism than they were to those of military professionalism. Peace was enervating and degrading. Man was born to struggle and triumph. Virility, adventure, the strenuous life, strife and combat — these were good in themselves. The militant version of Social Darwinism had a much greater influence on Neo-Hamiltonian ideas than it did on military thinking. Unlike the military, the Neo-Hamiltonians supported national expansion. The world was divided into vigorous nations asserting themselves, expanding their power and prestige, and weak, timid nations on the decline. The dividing line between these two groups was frequently given a racial basis, the virile Anglo-Saxon nations with the capacity for self-government opposed to the inferior peoples of the world. “The American nation,” as Croly put it, “needs the tonic of a serious moral adventure.” And he went on to complain that America had been too comfortable and too safe. No military man could ever agree with this analysis. And here was the root of the difference. For the military, the fundamental aim was national security. For the Neo-Hamiltonians, it was national assertion and national adventure.1
MAHAN AND WOOD: THE TRAGEDY OF THE MILITARY PUBLICIST
The participation of Alfred Mahan and Leonard Wood in the articulation of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas was the first and only time in American history that professional military leaders contributed so directly to the outlook and activities of a political movement. Other military officers, before and since, have been prominent in political life. But they have usually been popular heroes identifying themselves with a civilian interest or movement. Their role has been passive and instrumental. The contribution of Mahan and Wood, on the other hand, was active, positive, and intellectual. They brought many elements of the military ethic to Neo-Hamiltonianism. Yet the influence was not simply in one direction. In espousing Neo-Hamiltonianism, Mahan and Wood had to make concessions to American opinion and become something less than military. Despite their popularity and influence, this was their tragedy: to be caught between two worlds. With one foot on the bedrock of military professionalism, and the other in the shifting sands of politics and opinion, they were unable to maintain a standing on either.
Both Mahan and Wood attempted to bridge the gap between the military and American society by riding the tide of temporary popular interest in military might and war. Mahan was the military officer become prophet of expansion in the first phase of Neo-Hamiltonianism in the 1890’s; Wood was the military officer become prophet of preparedness in a second phase between 1908 and 1917. Mahan attempted to build a link between the Navy and the public, Wood between the Army and the public. Mahan justified expansion on nonmilitary moral, economic, and political grounds; Wood justified preparedness on nonmilitary moral, economic, and political grounds. Mahan’s philosophy was a semimilitary explanation of the relation of the United States to the rest of the world, Wood’s theory a semi-military explanation of the relation of the armed services to the rest of the country. Each contributed to the development of professionalism in his own service, but was never at home there, and went on to become a political figure. The difference between Luce and Mahan and between Pershing and Wood were the measures of their distances from the professional ideal.
ALFRED THAYER MAHAN. Mahan was, of course, born into the main stream of the American military tradition. His father’s military ideals, his early childhood at West Point, his contact with such figures as Lee and McClellan, even his name honoring the father of the Military Academy, all indicated a military career. At an early age he decided upon the Navy, graduating from Annapolis in 1859. During the Civil War and for twenty years afterward, he had a normal naval career, steadily moving up the ladder of rank and responsibility. As he himself subsequently stated, he was at this time merely the average officer “drifting on the lines of simple respectability” and very much the prisoner of his professional environment. Politically, he was a staunch anti-imperialist. In 1885, however, the turning point came when he was invited by Luce to join the Naval War College staff. During the following seven years at Newport, he embarked upon a career of thinking and writing which changed him from naval professional to naval philosopher.
This metamorphosis was largely the result of historical study and the impact upon his thinking of the events and currents of opinion of his day. Nonetheless, elements which propelled him in this direction were already present in his character and thought. He had never been completely satisfied with the professional military life. His interests, his thinking, and his morality went too deep to be completely absorbed within narrow professional confines. His father had warned him that he was more suited for a civilian than for a military career, and, subsequently, Mahan was to acknowledge the wisdom of this paternal insight. “I think myself now that he was right; for, though I have no cause to complain of unsuccess, I believe I should have done better elsewhere.”2 During his early cruises, he developed a deep interest in politics and read widely in international relations. This interest continued and grew right down to his going to the Naval War College. He was much discouraged with the inactivity and routine of the naval profession, and with the indifference it suffered from the American public. He was also extremely religious, his entire outlook colored by his orthodox Episcopalianism. Paternal influence, attendance at an Episcopalian school, and the influence of an uncle who was a minister, all contributed in this direction. At the Academy, and on his early cruises, he devoted much thought, reading, and worry to theological questions. Discontent with the naval profession, political interests, and religious concerns thus all forced Mahan to search for a wider frame of reference and endeavor. These he found in history and in public opinion. Just as his father represented the military technician who became a professional, Alfred Mahan represented the professional officer who became a political figure. In terms of the evolution of social types, the elder Mahan is separated from the younger by the professional generation of Luce, Sherman, and Upton.
The views Mahan expressed in his historical and popular writings from the publication of The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 in 1890 to his death in 1914 were a typical Neo-Hamiltonian combination of military and nonmilitary elements. 'Mahan had a basically conservative outlook. The fundamental causes of war were to be found in the nature of man as a creature of passion and reason. Each nation pursued its interest, destiny, and ideals, and clashes between nations could not be avoided. Mahan was highly skeptical of the value of arbitration as a means of settling international disputes. He believed that an equilibrium of power was the be
st means of preserving peace, and that effective armed preparedness was a national necessity. Following the preachings of Luce, he urged naval officers to concentrate upon the true heart of their profession, the science of naval warfare, and to appreciate the importance of naval history to its mastery. He was a consistent advocate of a balanced system of organization for the Navy Department which he believed would effectively delimit civilian and military responsibilities. He also urged the establishment of a national defense council modeled after the British Defense Committee so as to secure adequate coordination of foreign and military policies. In all these respects, Mahan was enunciating standard military ideas common to both Navy and Army officers of the period.
In four important particulars, however, Mahan’s thinking went beyond the purely professional outlook. His theory of the significance of sea power in the rise and fall of nations transcended the limits of military analysis. By sea power, he meant all the elements contributing to national strength on the ocean, not just the military ones. His theory rested primarily upon the examples of Athens. Rome, and, above all, England. Mahan’s scope was far broader than that of Clausewitz, Jomini, or other military writers. His theory was a philosophy of history not a philosophy of warfare. As such, it had political, ideological, and even racial overtones. Secondly, in his study of international relations, Mahan went beyond a mere realistic analysis of the conflicts of national interests and the situations in which they led to war. Instead, he formulated a philosophy of national power which glorified national expansion as an end in itself, a national duty and responsibility. At times, he became intoxicated with the mystique of power. The political goal of national expansion prevailed over the military goal of national security. He supported the acquisition of the Philippines by the United States, for example, on grounds of morality and duty without really considering what effects this might have on national security. Thirdly, Mahan went beyond warning of the inevitability of war to justifying it on moral and religious grounds. War was the instrument of the progressive improvement of mankind. “Power, force, is a faculty of national life; one of the talents committed to nations by God.” Finally, Mahan deviated from the orthodox military view in his attitude toward the blending of strategy and politics. “Aim to be yourselves statesmen as well as seamen,” he advised naval officers, stressing the desirability of political knowledge and political action. Writing in 1911, he acknowledged the change in his own viewpoint on this subject from an earlier, more professional outlook:
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