The tendency of the business-manager Secretary to concentrate primarily on the civil side of his job to the exclusion of strategy was perhaps best exemplified in Wilson’s first year in Washington. Wilson summed up his concept of his role with: “Leave the military stuff up to the military, production up to us.” Secretary Lovett had defined his duty as “the establishment of policies under the guidance of the President.” Wilson, on the other hand, it was reported, thought his function was “to manage military policy rather than to make it.” As one Washington correspondent summed up Wilson after a few months: “He is no strategist, has no intention of trying to be. That is the military job. What he must do is supervise the organization of buying, manpower, construction and operation, in the field and in the Pentagon for efficiency and to eliminate waste and duplication.” This emphasis was not unnatural, since, as one of his subordinates in the Defense Department put it, his chief qualifications for the job were his “managerial genius, his ability to choose men, and his unique skill at production.”17
Both Johnson and Wilson in determining the size of the military budget and military force levels relied primarily upon the internal advice and assistance of the Comptroller and the external support and pressure of the Budget Bureau and Treasury. Military advice played a minor role in their decisions. Thus, in the early fall of 1949. on the recommendation of the Management Committee and without asking the services as to its implications for their programs, Johnson ordered a reduction of $929 million in service expenditures for Fiscal 1950.18 The formulation of Wilson’s first defense budget began with the Secretary’s pledge that his Department would reduce its share of the national budget deficit. The first decision was on the size of the cut in the earlier Truman-Lovett estimates. Then, after the budget had been fixed, the calculations were made as to the military forces that could be supported by the reduced estimates. It was not clear until the end of the budget-making process what the impact of the cuts would be on force levels and national strategy. The budget was primarily the work of Deputy Secretary Roger Kyes and Comptroller McNeil. While obviously the Joint Chiefs were aware that reductions were under way, it was apparently not until the last moment that they knew of the actual amounts to be allocated to each service. Although they protested these decisions, it was by then too late. In General Vandenberg’s words, “the Chiefs, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have not been participants in the makeup of this budget.” Ironically, the Secretary of the Air Force also declared that he had not participated in the decision on the cut because that “is not the province” of a civilian secretary: “I think that is a military decision and one that must be made by those who are competent to make that decision.”19 While Wilson like Talbott could avoid considering strategy, he could not avoid the effects that his actions, in identifying himself with McNeil, would have on strategy. Inevitably, the reduction in the goals of the Air Force build-up from 143 wings in 1955 to 120 wings in 1956 had significant implications for American military policy.
POLICY STRATEGIST. Two Secretaries of Defense, James Forrestal and Robert A. Lovett, conceived of themselves primarily as policy strategists. Both accepted the responsibility of balancing military requirements and economic demands. Both played an active and creative mediating role in the formulation of force levels and budget estimates. Both were hampered and frustrated by the lack of sufficient legal authority and, even more, by the lack of adequate staff assistance. Both urged the creation of staff organs which would enable the Secretary to discharge his functions in a responsible and effective manner. The contrast between their methods of operation and those of Marshall on the one hand, and Johnson and Wilson on the other, may be illustrated by their roles in the formulation of the 1950 and 1953 military budgets.
Forrestal and the 1950 Budget. From the start, Forrestal was faced with a presidential ceiling of $15 billion on the military budget. The President had established this on the advice of the Budget Bureau apparently without consulting either the JCS or the NSC. The uncoordinated original estimates of the three military services, on the other hand, totaled $30 billion.20 The task of the Secretary was to find the optimum balance of security and economy between these two extremes. When it appeared unlikely that the Joint Chiefs would be able to arrive at an allocation of the presidential figure among the services, Forrestal first considered appointing a special board of high-ranking officers to advise him directly on this problem. Subsequently, however, he instead directed the Chiefs to appoint a Budget Advisory Committee (the McNarney Board) to review service requests and attempt to bring them to some acceptable level. He also tried unsuccessfully to get guidance from the NSC as to the foreign-policy assumptions which should underlie the budget. Forrestal constantly emphasized the relation between strategy and money. The McNarney Board, for instance, reduced the service requests to $23.6 billion, which, it was said, would put the United States in a reasonable degree of readiness in the event of war. A budget of $15 billion, on the other hand, Forrestal eventually drew from the JCS, would only permit the United States to mount a strategic bombing offensive from Britain. Forrestal presented these alternatives to the President, but the latter appeared definite on the $15 billion ceiling. Nonetheless, Forrestal obtained tacit permission to go ahead along two lines: the $15 billion budget and another “intermediate” budget which would permit not only the air offensive from Britain, but which would also enable the United States to maintain control of the Mediterranean. The JCS estimated that this second strategy would require $16.9 billion. The alternatives in terms of dollars and policy were thus clear. When submitted to the President a few weeks before the budget was due to be presented to Congress, Truman again reaffirmed his decision in favor of the $15 billion, British air offensive choice. In one last effort, Forrestal then proposed that the President grant the military an additional $770 million so that they could add a half dozen more bomber groups. If the United States was to limit its capabilities to a strategic air offensive, he wanted to have sufficient air strength to insure success. The President still maintained a deaf ear, however, and in the end the Budget Bureau even reduced the budget somewhat below the $ 15 billion ceiling.
The 1950 military budget was thus a case where a firm presidential ceiling was set and maintained. This did not, however, prevent Forrestal from functioning as a creative policy strategist. Both sides of the coin were constantly before him. An increase in the budget had to be justified in terms of its “functional” strategic gains. A decrease in the budget had to be weighed in terms of its effect on American capabilities in the event of war. Every dollar had a strategic implication and justification.
Lovett and the 1953 Budget. The formulation of the 1953 military budget was in many respects quite different from that of 1950, yet Secretary Lovett played essentially the same role then that Secretary Forrestal had played previously. The starting point for 1953 was not a Budget Bureau ceiling, but rather the force-level estimate of the Joint Chiefs, in which the key element was the recommendation that the Air Force goal be increased from 95 wings to 143 wings in 1954. These force levels were approved by the NSC in October 1951. The initial uncoordinated requests of the military services based on these forces totaled $71 billion in new obligational authority. Faced with this imposing figure, Secretary Lovett and the NSC directed the military services to prepare an alternative “point of departure” budget based on new appropriations of $45 billion. As in 1951, preparation of both budgets went on simultaneously. In the end, Lovett recommended a budget of $55 billion to the President based upon the achievement of the recommended force levels in 1953 and 1954. Over the protests of Lovett and the Joint Chiefs, the President reduced this to $52 billion, which delayed the date of achieving the 143-wing Air Force from 1954 to 1955. Here, too, the Secretary played a creative, mediating role balancing extra expenditures against calculated risks. On the one hand, in Lovett’s words, the budget did “not give us, within the time that the military leaders feel desirable, the strengths which they feel necessary.” On the
other hand, neither did the Comptroller-Budget Bureau viewpoint completely prevail.21
Both Forrestal and Lovett were frustrated by the lack of an adequate staff equipped to develop over-all policies. Both recognized this deficiency and attempted to remedy it. Forrestal appointed his first statutory special assistant, John Ohly, as head of an office of the Secretariat. Ohly advised the Secretary on the coordination of plans and programs, served as executive secretary of the War Council and other policy committees, and collected and analyzed the facts and opinions relevant to important decisions. He also was the Defense Department liaison with the State Department and the NSC. In title and substance this office was inspired by the English Cabinet Secretariat and was to provide the same sort of services for Forrestal which that office does for the Prime Minister.22 In addition to this civilian policy staff, Forrestal attempted to develop an independent source of military advice, relying primarily on Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff. Forrestal viewed Gruenther as his “principal military adviser” and utilized him as his intermediary in dealing with the Joint Chiefs. Gruenther was in constant attendance at all important meetings, accompanied the Secretary on his travels, and placed at his disposal “real ability” in “achieving resolution of differences.”23 At various times, Forrestal also attempted to develop other sources of military judgment which would furnish him with an independent check on the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs.* He was, indeed, engaged in an almost constant search for unbiased military advice. But, in the end, he usually fell back on Gruenther.
Lovett’s experience led him to conclude that the Secretary of Defense should be furnished with a “combined military-civilian staff” responsible to him alone. This staff would aid him in resolving disputes among the services, distributing shortages among them, and helping him formulate policies on the budget, procurement, logistics, manpower, personnel, and intelligence. In the absence of such a staff, the Secretary was forced to turn many administrative and policy matters unrelated to their principal functions over to the Joint Chiefs, and to rely upon them exclusively for military facts and “experienced military judgment.” Only if the Secretary had a civil-military policy staff would it be possible to confine the Chiefs to their proper concern with war plans.24
THE NEEDS OF THE OFFICE
A balanced system of civil-military relations in the Department of Defense requires that the Secretary function as a policy strategist. The principal obstacles to the achievement of a balanced system are political forces outside the realm of structure and organization. Nonetheless, administrative means exist which would enhance the ability of the Secretary to act as a policy strategist even within the prevailing political framework. The three prerequisites are: (1) adequate legal authority for the Secretary; (2) adequate staff assistance in the Secretary’s office; and (3) the appointment as Secretary of individuals equipped to perform a policy-making role.
LEGAL AUTHORITY. The National Security Act of 1947 gave the Secretary of Defense inadequate control over the National Military Establishment. The 1949 amendments to the Act extended his authority in four ways. The military services were reduced from the status of executive departments to that of military departments within a single Department of Defense presided over by the Secretary. The limiting word “general” was removed from the 1947 provisions granting the Secretary “general direction, authority, and control” over the military establishment. The Secretary was designated as the “principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense.” The “Tenth Amendment” clause in the 1947 act giving the services all authority not specifically granted to the Secretary of Defense was eliminated.
Events after 1949 demonstrated that a further clarification of the Secretary’s authority was desirable, particularly with respect to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some “legal beavers,” Secretary Lovett complained, argued that the provision which placed the Joint Chiefs under the “authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense” meant that the JCS was not “directly under” the Secretary. Lovett suggested that the complete authority of the Secretary over the Chiefs and the military departments be spelled out in additional legislation. In 1953, the Rockefeller Committee on Defense Organization agreed with Lovett as to the proper scope of the Secretary’s control, but declared that existing law gave him this power, and that challenges to it were based on an erroneous interpretation of the National Security Act. A legal opinion by the Committee’s counsel defined the scope of the Secretary’s authority in sweeping and forceful terms. It held that the clause making the Secretary the “principal assistant” to the President in Defense Department affairs made him Deputy Commander in Chief and “the highest military officer of the Department.” No grounds existed for claiming that the Joint Chiefs were outside his authority, and the statutory provision making them the principal military advisers to the President should be interpreted in this light.25 So long as the legal opinion of the Rockefeller Committee was accepted as the authoritative definition of the powers of the Secretary, he possessed all the power needed to perform his proper role. The issue would only finally be settled, however, if Congress confirmed by statute the interpretation of the powers of the Secretary advanced by the Committee.
STAFF ASSISTANCE. The greatest single deficiency in the organization of the Department of Defense was the absence of the proper staff assistance for the Secretary. Legal authority was meaningless without the organizational means to exercise it. “The creation of the staff facilities,” Forrestal said in 1949, “is paramount even to the increase of power.”26 The Secretary was surrounded by antagonists. In front were the State Department and the NSC, presumably pointing out the path of national policy; behind him, the Treasury and the Budget Bureau, always acting as a drag; on either side, the Joint Chiefs and the Comptroller, pushing him off the road in one direction or another. The Secretary, however, was institutionally naked and defenseless. It was not surprising that his functions were encroached upon by other agencies or that he himself found it necessary to identify his interests and role with that of some other agency. He had no support with which to maintain an independent stand.
One argument raised against the need for more staff assistance for the Secretary was the already great size of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The OSD was intended, it was said, to be a small policy-oriented unit but it had expanded to gigantic proportions with a staff of over two thousand. What use could the Secretary possibly have for any more staff assistance? He was surfeited with staff. The reply to this, of course, was that the important issue was not how much staff the Secretary had, but rather what kind of staff he had, and to what extent the staff was actually his. A staff is only a real aid to an executive when its outlook is his outlook and its interest is his interest. No one of the Secretary’s principal staff organs had a scope or an interest as broad as that of the Secretary. The Joint Chiefs gave him military advice; the Comptroller gave him budgetary advice and represented the needs of economy; his other eight assistant secretaries all had limited functional responsibilities and interests; the service secretaries defended their own service needs. The Secretary’s office as formally defined was not really his office. It contained agencies and officials representing forces independent of him and whom it was his job to balance and control. The Secretary had assistance to help him in accomplishing everything except the discharge of the one responsibility which was his and his alone: the formulation and enforcement of over-all defense policy. What was needed was the institutionalization of the secretarial viewpoint: a small, competent, corporate body to aid the Secretary in developing the interests and advice surrounding him into a comprehensive military program.
This absence of staff agencies with a secretarial perspective made the Secretary unable to play an independent role and to formulate his own viewpoint. Instead of rising above the subordinate interests within his department, the Secretary was forced to lower himself and identify his interest with t
hat of one of his subordinate agencies. The lack of an effective secretarial office was the institutional reflection of the feast or famine approach to American military policy. In the quiet years of peace, the economy viewpoint held sway, and the Secretary became its instrument. In the years of war, military demands were unquestioned, and the Secretary became a military advocate. If the nation was to have a continuing and consistent military policy along the Aristotelian path between these extremes, however, it needed an organ to represent and embody that interest at the level of the Secretary of Defense. This organ would be an institutional gyroscope designed to keep military policy on an even keel. When political pressures were directed toward a slash in military spending, it would remind political leaders of the needs of security. When the reverse was true, and the military were riding high, it would serve as a counterbalance in the other direction. So long as the nation remained in a state of half-peace and half-war, such an agency was essential. The National Security Act met some of the institutional needs of the Cold War in establishing the NSC and legalizing the Joint Chiefs. But it left a yawning gap at the level of the Secretary of Defense. As the Hoover Commission Task Force pointed out in 1948, the Secretary of Defense “lacked the clarity of authority, the staff assistance, the organizational instrumentalities, and the sheer time” necessary to remain on top of his job. Four years later the same defects still persisted.27 The need for over-all policy assistance for the Secretary was recognized by virtually all those who had given thoughtful attention to the problem. The weakness of the staff serving the American Secretary was also highlighted by the comparison with that which served his counterpart in Great Britain. There the Minister of Defense was aided by about fifty military officers and high level civil servants headed by a Chief Staff Officer and a Permanent Secretary.* Almost every other executive department in the American government had an over-all policy staff to assist its secretary. The Hoover Commission Task Force on Departmental Management recognized this in 1948 and recommended that all departments heads “should have the necessary machinery for the systematic review of department-wide policies and programs.”28 The need for this was obviously much greater in the Department of Defense with its tripartite structure and its far-flung operations than it was in many of the smaller domestic departments.
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