Against the background of these disagreements within the UN about the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, we prepared for the next stage of the confrontation at the heart of the scientific community. It would take place at the beginning of June in Kiev. The association Doctors for Chernobyl had succeeded in getting Dr Hiroshi Nakajima, who had failed in 1995, to be honorary president. Would there be a confrontation at Kiev? What might be the result?
Chapter II
THE KIEV CONFERENCE
The tragedy of Chernobyl is the result of an information process, in which the interpretation of the facts imposed by the authorities plays the main role […] As long as the media refuses to cross swords with these prestigious institutions, the WHO/IAEA power base will continue to maintain its order.
YVES LENOIR,
Tchernobyl, la tragedie optimisée, Bulle Bleue.
The 3rd International Conference, “Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident: Results of 15-Year Follow-Up Studies” took place between 4th and 8th June 2001 in Kiev, in Ukraine. The participants included researchers and scientists from Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as well as representatives from WHO, from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), from the IAEA, from the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), the UN Chernobyl programme in Ukraine and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).
Participants at the conference presented 88 reports and 316 summary presentations. The aim of the conference was to “provide a scientific basis for future decisions to be taken by national and international organisations about the medical consequences of the Chernobyl disaster”. Thus, every word of the final resolution of the conference would have a direct influence on the destiny of all those human lives affected by the disaster.
The idea of filming this conference came to us after Michel Fernex described in detail what had gone on at the Geneva Conference in 1995. “The programme put forward by Dr Hiroshi Nakajima had convinced the health authorities in the countries most affected and 700 doctors and scientists to take part. The IAEA, for its part, had mobilised staunch supporters of the nuclear industry. Contradictory opinions were expressed which produced a very lively exchange of views. The representatives of the nuclear lobby had tried to stifle debate and Professor S. Yarmonenko from the Centre of Oncology in Moscow (directed by Professor Ilyin) had insisted that in future, the organisers exclude from scientific conference programmes any speaker who introduced the subject of low dose radiation on living organisms161. Dr Hiroshi Nakajima’s attempt had ended in failure. Blocked by the IAEA, the proceedings of the conference, which were keenly awaited, were never published. The truth about the consequences of Chernobyl would have been disastrous for the promotion of the nuclear industry”.
161 Cf. Dr Michel Fernex, op. cit., L’Harmattan, 2001.
Having heard Fernex’s description, I could imagine what might happen at Kiev. He had described the fury of the representatives of the pro-nuclear UN agencies. Their power threatened by revelations about the health consequences of the disaster, they denied the seriousness of the radioactive contamination. It was a unique opportunity to observe and to film, at close quarters, the faces of those in power, imposing on the world the Holy Commandments of the nuclear industry, in conflict with the independent scientists. I explained this, both in a letter to Thierry Garrel, director of documentaries at the TV channel Arte, and then when I met him and put forward the idea of filming the whole event, in cinéma vérité style.
He told me in a meeting that he could not see the interest in filming the conference. My project did not interest him. On the other hand, our colleague Aldo Sofia, the producer of the programme “Falo” at TSI (Swiss TV in Italian language—translator’s note) gave us his help.
With Romano Cavazzoni as cameraman and Emanuela Andreoli as editor,—the same team who worked with me on the previous documentaries about Chernobyl—we made the film with our own limited means, and a small amount of money from the television company in Lugano. A short version of the film Nuclear Controversies was shown on three national television channels, (Swiss Italian, Swiss German and Canadian). It is an astonishingly revealing piece of theatre about human behaviour but it also provides incriminating evidence about the way officials from the nuclear lobby ended up duping a scientific conference in which new and crucial information was presented and ignored. This film created problems for WHO. Dr Brundtland set up a commission to find out why the proceedings from the 1995 conference had never been published. But some time after, she herself was replaced as the head of the organisation.
The director of documentaries at the television channel, Arte, was right. No-one films these conferences, so we were the only people filming over the five days. Swiss Television, whom I represented officially, was simply fulfilling its legitimate role of informing the public, when we filmed the conference at Kiev. But it was also a Trojan horse, given that the filming took place in one of the bastions of the nuclear establishment where, in the face of media indifference, one of the most dangerous scientific untruths of modern times is officially ratified: that chronic low levels of Caesium-137 incorporated into the body are harmless. As we had imagined, we were able to film the fury of UN officials and their Soviet accomplices on hearing the revelations of the independent researchers and doctors about the radiological causes of the health catastrophe in the Chernobyl territories. The data and the radioprotection measures recommended by the independent scientists to protect the contaminated populations were arrogantly and disdainfully dismissed. They refused even to discuss it.
1. DR HIROSHI NAKAJIMA’S ADMISSION OF POWERLESSNESS
It was Dr Hiroshi Nakajima who presided over the conference at Kiev. We could not miss the opportunity to interview this important figure. We approached him during a coffee break, while he was talking to Michel Fernex.
Fernex.—… the one in 1995 was the best. That was an excellent conference…
Nakajima.—Unfortunately, even the Japanese did not take up the recommendations of that conference.
—Why were the conference proceedings that were ordered not published?
—Because the conference was organised jointly with the IAEA. That was the problem.
—And here, at this conference, does WHO have more freedom than in Geneva? Here in Kiev?
—But I am not the Director General any more—I’m a private individual.
Would the former Director General dodge the issue that really interested us? I questioned him myself.
Q.—Don’t you think that the link between the WHO and the IAEA is contradictory? If WHO is to act completely freely? ... What do you think?
Nakajima (without any embarrassment, he replies clearly and honestly)—I drew attention to this at the time when I was Director-General, and therefore responsible, but it was my legal department above all, my legal advisor that raised the issue… You need to understand that the IAEA reports to the United Nations Security Council. And the rest of us, all the specialised agencies, report to the Economic and Social Council. It’s not a question of hierarchy, we are all equal, but in nuclear matters, in the military and peaceful use of the atom, or in civil nuclear power, it is the organisation that reports to the Security Council that has authority.
Q.—They give the orders.
Dr Nakajima looks at me in silence: silence means consent.
No-one in such a position of authority had ever admitted that the defenders of our health were subordinate to the promoters of the atom. The whole power structure, as it is exercised both in practice and legally by the military over the civilian wing of the nuclear industry, was delivered to us in a few words by someone whose competence in the matter could not be doubted. Nakajima’s allusion to the “legal department” at WHO, confirmed that what was at stake was a real conflict of interest, enshrined in the legal framework from the very beginning. The un
natural agreement of 1959, that imposed mutual prior consent in any initiative in the nuclear domain, tied the hands of the organisation responsible for health from the first day of a disaster. It had prevented it from helping the victims of Chernobyl. Eleven years after our visit to the town of Poliske, Hiroshi Nakajima had answered Alla Tipiakova’s desperate plea with this admission of powerlessness, this prohibition to offer help to the children she saw suffering162. Today, twenty-nine years later, just as in the first days following the disaster, this scandal morally disqualifies the United Nations and the states that make up its Security Council. Perhaps before Chernobyl, their attitude could have been explained by a lack of foresight and a disproportionate confidence in technology, but since the accident, this pact of silence is a crime committed by the very people in whom we place our trust. Fortunately, there was a righteous man who had shed tears of powerlessness when faced with the deaf ears of the powerful.163
162 See p. 6–9. Part One. Alla Tipiakova’s complaint “But it’s as if the policies, that might actually resolve our problems, are being blocked somewhere and at the political level no-one’s interested in us”.
163 . See p. 94–95, Nesterenko “talking to the wall” with his academic colleagues.
As we had expected, these contradictions and tensions between the same official protagonists from the 1995 conference, resurfaced at Kiev. They divided the representatives of agencies. They were openly expressed by the independent doctors and scientists, who made forceful presentations but to no avail: the representatives of the IAEA and UNSCEAR took the podium. They played a decisive role on the last evening, when the wording of the final resolution was determined behind closed doors, and distributed after the conference had closed.
It is impossible to recount all the presentations and debates. I will relate only those exchanges and passages that illustrate the gulf that separates the two versions of the medical consequences of Chernobyl. A dialogue of the deaf. The testimonies that follow are authentically reproduced from film and recordings.
2. OFFICIALS AT THE CONFERENCE
The representative from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Dusan Zupka, agrees with Kofi Annan’s estimate that there will be about 9 million victims from Chernobyl and that the tragedy has only just begun.
Zupka. The consequences of Chernobyl do not fade away, but actually grow increasingly, uncertain and in many ways more intense. The United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan put it very clearly when he said that “the legacy of Chernobyl will be with us, and with our descendants, for generations to come”. Given the magnitude of the disaster, its long term consequences, its international implications, the international community has a humanitarian obligation to assist 9 million people affected by the Chernobyl accident. However, while millions of US dollars have been pledged for the construction of a new and safer sarcophagus, comparatively little has been done by the international community to provide direct assistance to the populations affected by the consequences of the accident. We, the international community, can and should do much more to provide tangible assistance to the populations of the three countries. In the current highly competitive atmosphere when natural disasters and other crisis situations around the world are competing for donor attention, Chernobyl remains the only catastrophe with an unpredictable future. We do not know exactly what new health manifestation from the radioactive contamination the next years will bring. The United Nations programme aims at strengthening international cooperation, the mobilisation of resources and the coordination of efforts to study, mitigate and minimize the consequences of an unprecedented disaster. In ignorance, we had hoped that the situation could be returned to normal in a matter of years. Now, in retrospect it is clear that it will take generations just to bandage the wounds.
Michael Repacholi (WHO, director of the Radiation Department)—We all have our ideas of exactly what happened with the accident and there is no doubt that it was a tragic event. One of the aspects that has been highlighted in particular is the stress and trauma caused by the psychological problems linked to being evacuated from the contaminated zones, and having to abandon one’s home. I would like to talk to you briefly about the efforts that were undertaken by WHO. The information available was very limited. I would like to add that it was three and a half years after the accident that the Soviet Government asked the IAEA for assistance with the catastrophe. Now most member countries have signed the first agreement on notification. This agreement specifies that in the case of an accident, the signatories inform the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that this agency, which has great expertise in determining contamination levels, and the possible contamination of different zones, is in a position to mobilise its teams of experts who, arriving in the field, can evaluate the situation and assess the significance of the impact. As I said, it was only in 1990 that WHO was officially requested to intervene and become involved with the health effects of the accident. The lesson we draw from all this, is that in the case of an accident of this scale, national governments need to be able to transmit information as quickly as possible so that the risk of losing information is reduced to a minimum. It was only in May 1991, so five years after the accident, that WHO was able to put a programme of health assistance in place for the Chernobyl accident. WHO was able to provide a great quantity of medical equipment, among the most up to date, that was able to detect thyroid cancer in children or other thyroid diseases and this allowed an enormous number to be identified. The three countries received modern medical equipment worth 16 million dollars that allowed them to bring their health system up to date. In 1996 OCHA participated in the development of brochures that were distributed to the population to help them understand the risks to health from exposure to ionising radiation. Additionally, the population were informed that they had nothing to fear from exposure in the long term to low level radiation.
I would like simply to say something about the lesson we have drawn from the Chernobyl accident: we absolutely must be ready for the next accident that could occur. A response is necessary and we must face the fact that this kind of disaster, like all major ecological disasters, earthquakes, flooding, has a traumatising effect on the population and there are psychosomatic effects that need to be confronted: psychological stress, social and economic upheaval in people’s lives that need to be addressed in as humane a way as possible. We need to make sure that all personnel intervening to mitigate the effects of an accident in a nuclear reactor receive effective training so that they know exactly how to deal with the situation and to reduce to a minimum the risk of exposure of the population. Now that the Chernobyl reactor is quiet and not producing harmful radiation to anyone, we can reflect on what happened with this accident and what we need to do in the future to protect ourselves in the most rapid and appropriate way.
The IAEA representative supports the view that the Chernobyl disaster caused 31 deaths, a few hundred cases of acute radiation, and 2000 thyroid cancers in children. This UN agency only recognizes validated reports, in other words, reports confirmed by the laboratories at Los Alamos and at the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) in France, manufacturers of the atomic bomb.
Gonzales (IAEA).—Our agency as you probably know is the only agency in the United Nations family with the specific charter obligations in radiation safety164, radiation protection. We were already here with our Director-General in front of us a few days after the accident and since then, we have been fully committed to the Chernobyl tragedy. We were with the local people, the people who really suffered the consequences of this accident. And we shared not only their suffering; we shared also the tremendous change that happened since the accident until today in this area of the world. Capitalism brought good things, but capitalism brought a lot of problems as well. A lot of problems to people that were not prepared for the changes. Our challenge is to distinguish the health effects attributable to the radiation exposure, to the health situati
on created by the Chernobyl situation and by the political changes in the region.
164 He uses the words “safety” and “the only…agency…with specific obligations…” when he himself is not a doctor, but a physicist promoting nuclear industry.
What do we know today? Really not too much that is new.
Let me remind you that the significant radionuclides were two and only two: caesium and iodine, which cause tumours in the thyroid in children and which, unfortunately, were not blocked, and could have been blocked without any tablets, without any emergency intervention, simply by banning the drinking of milk165. We launched a large scale program to verify seriously how many people had been exposed to radiation. We made 16,000 measurements in the different villages. This data was monitored by the Los Alamos Laboratory and also by the French CEA, and were published by our agency. The conclusion that we drew was that the levels of contamination revealed by our measurements were very much inferior to those predicted from theoretical models166.
165 In France, unlike in the neighbouring countries, the government did not make this recommendation to its citizens.
The Crime of Chernobyl- The Nuclear Gulag Page 56
