In 1266 Charles seemed to carry all before him. With Manfred’s death the Ghibelline cause collapsed in northern Italy, and with the Empire still irrelevant, Charles moved in. The Ghibellines also fled Florence, and Charles was elected Podesta of Florence and Lucca. He made a ceremonial entry into Florence in May 1267, then conducted a five-month siege of the fortress of Poggibonsi to break the power of Siena and Pisa. He was now King of Sicily with a kingdom extending up through southern Italy nearly to Rome. He had stepped down as Senator of Rome and appointed his supporter Henry of Castile in his place, but he was the elected ruler of Florence and Lucca and his seneschal administered Piedmont and Lombardy. Aside from a few isolated cities (notably Venice and Genoa), by the end of 1267 Charles ruled most of Italy.53
Italy was only the start, as Charles now set in motion the wide-ranging military and diplomatic activity that gives credibility to the argument that he was trying to create nothing less than a Mediterranean Empire that would include Greece, Constantinople and the Holy Land. He sent troops to seize Corfu and the mainland fortresses that had been the dowry of Manfred’s Queen Helena, who was the daughter of the Despot of Epirus, and established a foothold in Albania and Greece. When the disgraced Emperor Baldwin II returned to Italy – now that he had burnt his bridges with Louis IX – to meet the pope and beg for assistance to retrieve his throne, naturally he was referred to Charles. Clement was being slightly disingenuous, as he was also negotiating with Michael Paleologus in Constantinople for a reunion of the Latin and Greek churches without the restoration of the Latin Empire, but he seems to have had little hope of this proceeding and was happy to involve Charles in another potential invasion of the eastern Mediterranean.
Although Baldwin was reconciled with Charles, it was at a price: he formally confirmed Charles in possession of Helena’s dowry; he ceded his nominal authority over the Principality of Achaea to Charles along with sovereignty over most of the islands in the Aegean (aside from those ruled by Venice and a few Baldwin was allowed to keep); he granted Charles one-third of any territory in the former Latin Empire he reconquered; and, most importantly, Baldwin’s son and heir Philip was to marry Charles’s daughter Beatrice, with the proviso that if Philip died without heirs the claim to the Latin Empire would pass to Charles. Charles in turn agreed to provide an army of 2,000 knights to serve for one year in the reconquest of Constantinople for Baldwin. Although this kind of provision was standard, especially in anything to do with the Crusades, and Manfred had promised the same, it is striking that Charles was now committed to conquering Constantinople, and if he succeeded there was a distinct possibility that the Latin Empire might pass to him.54
Charles also sent envoys to the Mongols, hoping they might prevent the Byzantines from allying with the Turks to resist him. Sadly we have no idea what message his envoys brought and how the Mongols replied, though they seem to have been cordial. The Mongols were not averse to seeking an alliance in the West to gain assistance against the Mamluks of Egypt, and Charles would have further dealings with them.55
In this great burst of diplomacy Charles made one final overture, the most important of all. Despite Charles’s great victory over Manfred, one cloud above his success was the death of Beatrice of Provence in May 1267. If Beatrice had yearned to be a queen to match her three sisters, she had achieved her goal, but she held this status for only just over a year, and she never had the opportunity to join her sisters and enjoy their recognition of her new rank. Charles was besieging Poggibonsi when she died, but he found time to contact King Béla IV of Hungary and suggested marrying Béla’s daughter Margaret. This was rejected because she had vowed to become a nun, and she was also rumoured to have disfigured herself to avoid marriage. Although Charles looked elsewhere for a wife for himself, he suggested that his heir Charles of Salerno and his daughter Isabella should marry Marie and Laszlo, the children of Béla’s heir István. The double wedding was concluded, and although Charles could not have relied upon this outcome, the alliance would bring an Angevin dynasty to Hungary by the beginning of the 14th century.
Why was Charles interested in Hungary? There were two reasons. Hungary in this period was a vast kingdom that included Transylvania, Slovenia, Croatia and Dalmatia, and thus was Charles’s neighbour across the Adriatic. Further, the Arpad dynasty of Hungary was the holiest in Europe with numerous saints in its ancestry, including three holy kings. Charles was already beginning to promote the sanctity of his family, the beata stirps, or ‘holy lineage’ that would come to characterize the – completely intertwined – dynasties in France, Hungary and Naples. Louis IX was known in his own lifetime to be a saint, and Charles consciously sought to link the prominent religiosity of the Capetians with the saintly pedigree of the Arpads. Again, this would succeed beyond his wildest dreams since the Angevin ruling families of Naples and Hungary would themselves produce saints within the next century.56
After being rejected by the King of Hungary’s daughter, Charles was more successful in Burgundy, and he married Margaret of Burgundy in 1268. Charles seems to have been a good husband to both Beatrice and Margaret, and there are no reports of any royal mistresses or bastards. Margaret outlived Charles and would return home to find much greater fame for establishing a hospital in Tonnerre, where the splendid 13th-century building still stands, than for being Charles’s wife.
Charles was now completely in the ascendant in Italy and was expanding his domains unchecked in every direction. Or so it seemed, but the Hohenstaufen were not finished. Conradin was the heir to Sicily, and he was now fifteen. If Manfred is eulogized as the perfect handsome prince, Conradin the brilliant teenager is even more lauded. He had been raised by his mother, Elizabeth of Bavaria, and she had powerful relatives. Although they lived fairly quietly in Bavaria, no one had forgotten Conradin and what he represented.
‘The Empire Strikes Back’
Despite the seemingly easy acceptance of Charles’s rule in Italy, by the end of 1266 many of Manfred’s former supporters had crossed the Alps and joined Conradin, who was ready, even at this young age, to take the opportunity offered him. He held a diet at Augsburg in October 1266 and announced that he would launch an invasion of Italy the following summer. Even as Charles was mopping up resistance in Tuscany and carrying out the long siege of Poggibonsi, Conradin was raising an army and preparing to cross the Alps. Two years after Charles’s great victory at Benevento, as Martin Aurell wryly puts it, the time had come for the Empire to strike back.57
Although Charles himself seemed oblivious or indifferent to the Hohenstaufen threat, the pope was aware of the danger. By the end of 1266 he had threatened to excommunicate anyone who worked to make Conradin emperor or even received his agents. This was the background to papal acceptance of Charles’s domination of Italy, since Charles had explicitly renounced plans to hold other offices in Italy and yet now he held numerous titles and was systematically reducing the cities of Tuscany. Although the pope warned Charles that he was spending too long in Tuscany and there were potential problems in Sicily and the south, Charles stubbornly remained before Poggibonsi throughout the summer of 1267.
Conradin’s army set off for Italy in September 1267. He had lived at the castle of Hohenschwangau with his Bavarian relatives, the (rebuilt) castle where Mad King Ludwig would grow up in the 19th century steeped in medieval fantasies, and go to an equally tragic end. Conradin first issued a strident manifesto condemning Manfred as a usurper and the pope for his meddling, and he had other agents promoting his cause. Also in September 1267, they raised a revolt in Sicily, and much more importantly, and foreshadowing the conflict that would define Angevin rule in Naples for decades, a force from Tunis led by Frederick of Castile invaded the island. The two brothers of King Alfonso of Castile, Frederick and Henry, were as active as those other royal brothers Richard of Cornwall and Charles of Anjou himself. Henry of Castile had become Senator of Rome with Charles’s backing, and Frederick had fought for Manfred at the battle of Benevento and was curren
tly in the service of the Muslim emir of Tunis. As Frederick attacked Sicily with a Tunisian force, Henry betrayed Charles and declared his support for Conradin, receiving his envoys in Rome in a formal procession with the Hohenstaufen banners flying.58
Even as Charles triumphantly imposed his will on Tuscany, Conradin arrived in Italy and the revolt was spreading from Sicily throughout southern Italy. Modern historians have criticized Charles for lingering in Tuscany for nearly a year while the revolt spread, but there was a strategic reason for his actions. Tuscany was the richest area in Italy and the basis for Charles’s finances, as well as traditionally being the strongest political unit that supported the papacy. If Tuscany were destabilized, Charles’s finances and the position of the papacy could unravel very quickly. We should also keep in mind geographical considerations: Charles must have felt that controlling the centre of the peninsula by dominating Tuscany would do him more good than removing himself to the south and abandoning the north to Conradin. He had the example of what had happened only two years before. Manfred had remained in the south while Charles established himself in Rome and brought his army into Italy unopposed, and this had proved disastrous. Charles’s strategy clearly emerges, which was to impose his authority in the middle of Italy and support the Guelfs of Tuscany, which would block Conradin’s passage south and potentially threaten Conradin in the north by inciting Guelf resistance in traditionally Ghibelline cities. The danger was that Charles sat in the middle between a growing revolt in Sicily and the south and a hostile army in the north, and he risked being crushed between the two.
Conradin and his army were in Verona by October 1267, probably hoping that Charles would go south to deal with the revolts and allow them to move towards Rome, but they waited there for three months, vindicating Charles’s strategy. Charles was aware of Conradin’s presence, and we might ask why Charles didn’t go north to meet Conradin at once. Charles is known to have considered this option, but it would have involved a winter crossing of the Apennines into hostile territory, where his army might easily be harried by enemies without ever getting near Conradin.
This jockeying for position carried into 1268, and finally in March Charles returned to the south, first receiving formal recognition as imperial vicar of Tuscany from the pope. Conradin had left Verona in January, though the Duke of Bavaria and many of the other Germans in his army declined to accompany him further and returned home. Charles’s efforts in Tuscany seemed to have succeeded in blocking the way south as Conradin now went west to Liguria, but he found a ship to carry him to Pisa, and this traditional Angevin enemy welcomed him warmly. Over the next month Ghibelline forces poured in to support him, showing that his activity in key cities such as Verona and Pavia had paid off.
Worse, Conradin’s arrival in Tuscany showed how superficial Charles’s victory had been. Poggibonsi immediately expelled its Angevin garrison and went over to the Hohenstaufen. Siena, mortal enemy of the Angevin ally Florence, also welcomed Conradin and was promised rewards for its support. All of Tuscany was crawling with Ghibellines, and although an attempt on Lucca was blocked by the Angevin force Charles had left behind, the Angevins were later surprised and routed. Conradin now had a credible army and marched south from Siena to Rome. On the way, Conradin marched past Viterbo where the pope resided, and legend says that the pope sat at the window of a high tower watching him pass and praying that the lamb was being led to the slaughter.59
Conradin arrived in Rome at the end of July, and he received a rapturous welcome. The Senator Henry of Castile presided over the ecstatic celebrations and the historian Saba Malaspina described the people of Rome decked in flowers and dancing in the streets as if a Golden Age had come. Everywhere Conradin went, Angevin support seemed to melt away as if Charles no longer existed. Yet there still had to be a final confrontation with Charles, so on 14 August Conradin and his ever increasing army set off south to complete the conquest.
Charles had besieged the Muslim city of Lucera in an attempt to cut off support for Conradin, but when he heard that the Hohenstaufen army was on the move he broke off the siege. The road to Naples was well defended by Angevin forces, so Conradin was heading southeast towards Apulia where Hohenstaufen support was stronger. Charles waited on the road to Apulia to block this advance and camped not far from the town of Tagliacozzo.
Conradin knew Charles’s position, so he manoeuvred his army to meet Charles on the plain of Scurcola, where his heavy cavalry might have an advantage. On 22 August, Charles drew his force up to meet Conradin, and the two armies settled on either side of the river Salto to prepare for a battle the next day. Conradin’s army was probably slightly larger, numbering about 6,000 compared to the 5,000 troops led by Charles, but it was also much more recently raised and disparate, whereas the troops Charles led had been together continuously for nearly two years.
Each army was divided into three groups as at Benevento, but each side also used a variety of stratagems. Villani links this to Charles’s disadvantage in numbers, and gives credit for directing Charles’s army to the Chamberlain of France, Erard of Saint-Valery, who was returning from the Holy Land and had joined Charles. The Angevin troops were led by Henry of Cousances, who wore Charles’s insignia to act as a decoy, and guarded the bridge over the Salto with a division of Provençal and Italian knights, supported by a second division of French knights. The third detachment, led by Charles and Erard, hid behind a hill to wait in ambush.60 They were joined by William of Villehardouin, who led a detachment of 400 knights from Morea, a rare example of Angevin hegemony over Greece proving beneficial, although by the 14th century the main Angevin attitude towards their lands in Greece was boredom.
Conradin also had three detachments, the first of Spanish cavalry and Ghibellines from Rome led by Henry of Castile; the second of Ghibellines from Lombardy and Tuscany; and the third of German troops led by Conradin himself. Henry of Castile led the assault, and attacked the bridge over the Salto. However, he had also sent half his force south to a ford, so that they might cross the river unnoticed and attack the Angevin army from the flank.61
In the event, both tricks were completely successful. While Henry of Castile engaged the Angevin army at the bridge, the Ghibellines who had crossed at the ford took the second Angevin detachment by surprise and launched a devastating attack. In the chaos, the first Angevin corps fell back from the bridge and Henry of Castile’s force crossed the river. The Angevin army was routed. Henry of Cousances, dressed in the king’s surcoat, was mistaken for Charles and killed, and the royal banner was captured. The Angevin army disintegrated and fled, pursued by Henry of Castile and a large part of his army, while the rest began to plunder the Angevin camp. Conradin crossed the bridge to savour his victory, and his detachment also broke up to take a share of the plunder.
All of this was witnessed by Charles of Anjou and his hidden reserve force. Charles at first considered intervening to try and turn the tide, but Erard of Saint-Valery counselled patience. As appalling as the slaughter was, Erard predicted that if they waited, Conradin’s army would lay down their arms to plunder the Angevin camp, and that would be the moment to attack. This is precisely what happened. Conradin’s forces began to disperse to collect the spoils of war, and when they saw that Conradin was almost alone, the Angevins struck. It took a moment for Conradin to realise that a new Angevin force was attacking, and by then it was too late. The Angevins easily defeated the few remaining German and Ghibelline troops, and Conradin and his bodyguard fled up the road to Rome.
Henry of Castile and his substantial force now realized what was happening and turned back to meet Charles. They outnumbered the Angevins and included a large number of German knights in plate armour. Yet they had been fighting all day and their horses were tired from pursuing the stragglers from the initial Angevin defeat. They also had to cross a considerable part of the plain in full view of Charles and his troops, who had plenty of time to prepare. As they charged towards the Angevins, Charles, with admirable sang
froid, drew his army up to meet them but instructed the men to remove their helmets so they could cool off and rest before the battle started.
Erard of Saint-Valery, who had already saved the day once, intervened again. Erard led half the army away in a feigned retreat, as if they were afraid of the superior Hohenstaufen force, and for the third time in the battle a stratagem worked. Despite Henry of Castile’s warning that it might be a trick, the Hohenstaufen army divided to attack the Angevins separately, and when Erard of Saint-Valery suddenly turned back to rejoin the fight, the Angevins gained the advantage. In the August heat the cavalry, especially the Germans in their plate armour, were exhausted from their previous exertions, and they either fled or were killed.
Angevin Dynasties of Europe 900-1500 Page 30
