Two days later, however, with the Christian army having failed to follow up its advantage with a serious attempt to storm the city, the situation began to improve for the inhabitants. Light cavalry reinforcements had arrived and the Muslim forces could now mount raids to harass the crusaders. At the same time, the Damascenes embarked on a frenzied burst of diplomatic activity.
Th
ey appealed to Nur ad-Dīn, the ruler of Mosul, but they also seem to have off ered lands and territory to Christian leaders, including the Templars, if they would halt the attack. Th
is, at least, was the view of William of Tyre, the future
chancellor of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, and it is supported also by a Muslim source, Abu Shama, albeit writing a century later.
It did not help the Christian princes directing the siege that they had already begun to squabble over who should be ruler of the captured city. Th e barons of
the kingdom of Jerusalem and the Queen agreed that its lord should be Guy Brisebarre, lord of Beirut and that it should be a fi ef of the kingdom. Th ierry,
count of Flanders, however, put himself forward, with the support of Conrad and Louis, proposing to govern Damascus as a semi-independent principality.
On 27 July 1148 the whole army was persuaded to move to the plains east of the city in order to assault what they had been told were the weaker walls. Th e
move was a major mistake, as it cut the army off from water supply and the walls of the city were in fact sturdier at this section. Disheartened and concerned by rumours of the imminent arrival of Nur ad–Dīn, the Christian army broke off the siege and returned to Jerusalem, humiliated. Conrad departed soon aft er for Constantinople, writing to Germany the following bitter letter: Let us now speak of our troops. When following the advice of the common council we had gone to Damascus and aft er a great deal of trouble had pitched our camps before the gates of the city, it was certainly near being taken. But certain ones, whom we least suspected, treasonably asserted that the city was impregnable on that side and hastily led us to another position where no water could be supplied for the troops and where access was impossible to anyone. And thus all, equally indignant and
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grieved, returned, leaving the undertaking uncompleted. Nevertheless, they all promised unanimously that they would make an expedition against Ascalon, and they set the place and time. Having arrived there according to the agreement, we found scarcely any one. In vain we waited eight days for the troops. Deceived a second time, we turned to our own aff airs.10
Th
e enormous eff ort at rousing Europe to crusade in response to the fall of Edessa had come to nothing.
One of the most important consequences of the failure of the Second Crusade to take Damascus was that the population of the city changed their attitude towards the strongest Muslim prince of the region. Nur al-Dīn was the second son of Zankī the Turkish atabeg of Aleppo and Mosul, who had conquered Edessa in 1144. Aft er the assassination of his father, Nur al-Dīn and his older brother Saif al-Dīn Ghazi divided the kingdom amongst themselves, with Nur al-Dīn governing Aleppo and Saif al-Dīn establishing himself in Mosul.
Nur al-Dīn had sought to make alliances with his Muslim neighbours in northern Iraq and Syria in order to strengthen the Muslim front against their Christian enemies. In 1147 he had signed a bilateral treaty with Mu’in al-Dīn Unur, governor of Damascus; as part of this agreement, he also married Mu’in al-Dīn’s daughter. His aspiration to become ruler of Damascus was no secret and while the military elite of the city remained determined to preserve their autonomy from the ruler of Aleppo, the broader population, suff ering from several years of famine and the shock of nearly having been victims of a Christian sack, considered having Nur al-Dīn as overlord a price worth paying for prosperity and security.
On 18 April 1154 Nur al-Dīn brought his full army to Damascus. He advanced upon the city from the east and a sizeable force from Damascus opposed them, with some fi ghting, but no committed battle. Th
e next day the
troops of Nur al-Dīn pressed harder and were close enough that a woman from the Jewish section of the town could lower a rope for a foot soldier to climb in.
No sooner was one of Nur al-Dīn’s banners above a section of the walls of the city than it surrendered and the new ruler of the city was careful to ensure peace, while abolishing unpopular taxes on foodstuff s. By the Friday prayers, the farmers, women and artisans of the city were openly calling out Nur al-Dīn’s name, wishing him long life and victories. As far as the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem went, this was a disaster, so wrote William of Tyre, lamenting that a formidable adversary arose, where previously had been a weak ruler willing to pay regular tribute to Jerusalem.11
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Severe illness, however, brought Nur al-Dīn’s campaigning to an end and for several years the pressure of Muslim forces on Christian territories eased, until the emergence of the man who was to successfully unite all the major Muslim cities and restore Jerusalem to Muslim rule: Saladin. Salāh al-Dīn Yūsu ibn Ayyūb had come to prominence in the company of his uncle Shirkuh, one of Nur al-Dīn’s generals. Shirkuh had been given the important mission of answering the request of the Fatimids for aid against the Christians, who at the urging of the Grand Master of the Hospital had broken a peace treaty and in October 1168 had attempted to besiege Cairo under the leadership of king Amalric of Jerusalem.
Shirkuh had managed to interpose the Sunni army between the Christians and the Shia capital and once Amalric had been beaten back, entered Cairo himself. Th
ere it was only a matter of time before Shawar the Fatimid vizier was overthrown in favour of Nur al-Dīn’s offi
cers. On 18 January 1169 Shawar
was ambushed, decapitated and, to defl ect any possible rioting against the new rulers, his palace was given over to the public for pillage.
Th
e attack on Cairo by the Christians had proven to be a profoundly mistaken initiative, perhaps an even more disastrous one than the attempt to take Damascus. William of Tyre, writing at a time when the consequences of Shirkuh’s victory had become clear stated:
O blind cupidity of men, worse than all other crimes! O wicked madness of an insatiable and greedy heart! From a quiet state of peace into what a turbulent and anxious condition has an immoderate desire for possessions plunged us! All the resources of Egypt and its immense wealth served our needs; the frontiers of our realm were safe on that side; there was no enemy to be feared in the south. Th
e sea aff orded a safe and peace-
ful passage to those wishing to come to us. Our people could enter the territories of Egypt without fear and carry on commerce and trade under advantageous conditions. On their part, the Egyptians brought to the realm foreign riches and strange commodities hitherto unknown to us and, as long as they visited us, were at once and advantage and an honour to us. Moreover, the large sums spent by them every year among us enriched the fi scal treasury and increased the private wealth of individuals. But now, on the contrary all things have been changed for the worse.
Th
e sea refuses to give us a peaceful passage, all the regions round about are subject to the enemy, and the neighbouring kingdoms are making preparations to destroy us.12
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Shirkuh took the title of vizier and king, but did not live long to enjoy it, dying of overeating on 23 March 1169. His successor was Saladin. Not all of the other Sunni generals present agreed with the appointment and some of them returned to their overlord Nur al-Dīn. Th
ose who remained, however, proved
suffi
cient to crush a revolt by the Egyptian army and drive it in to Upper Egypt.
Nur al-Dīn’s main instruction to Saladin was that the new ruler proclaim the Sunni religion. Th
is was obeyed without great distu
rbance and upon the
death of the Shi’ite Caliphe, al-Adid in 1171, the remaining members of the Fatimid elite were placed in honourable captivity so that the dynasty died out over time.
From Nur al-Dīn’s perspective, the new Sunni control of Egypt meant vast resources that could be used to assist the main confl icts, which for him were in Syria. Saladin had a diff erent political outlook, believing that rather than drain the new realm of resources it should be strengthened as a base of operations.
Th
roughout his subsequent career Saladin showed a constant concern for the defence of Egypt. Saladin also encouraged Italian cities to trade directly with Cairo, which they increasingly did.
Th
is independent policy led to fears among Saladin’s supporters that Nur al-Dīn might seek to depose him as ruler of Egypt. A potential military confrontation between the two leading Sunni princes was avoided by the death of Nur al-Dīn, on 15 May 1174. Saladin promptly came north with an army to Damascus, which he occupied on 28 October 1174. He reinforced his legitimacy there, and indicated his ambition to reunite the Muslim world, by marrying Nur al-Dīn’s widow. It is testimony to Nur al-Dīn’s political skill in building a base of support at Damascus that Saladin was not faced with a renewed attempt by the city to become free from external control; he was faced with very little resistance to his own takeover. Leaving his brother Tughtagĩn as governor, Saladin then pressed on to Aleppo.
Here the mood of the population, and especially of the ruling elite, was more hostile. Saladin’s ambitions seemed nothing more than those of an aggressive proponent of his own dynasty, attempting to usurp that of Zankī. Nur al-Dīn’s young son, Malik as-Salih appealed to the population of Aleppo to protect him from Saladin, and, interestingly, the Zankīd faction urged the Christian ruler, Raymond III of Tripoli to assist them. Th
ey also hired assassins and appealed to
Mosul for assistance. Saladin survived the assassination attempts and retreated to Hims to ward off the attack from Raymond. Th
e arrival of troops from Mosul
led to the Zankīds going on the off ensive, but they were decisively beaten in battle at the Horns of Hamah (1175), partly because Saladin had obtained reinforcements from Egypt but also because some of the Mosul offi
cers were
sympathetic to him as someone with the potential to unite the Muslim world.
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At the end of April 1175, envoys came from the Sunni caliph, formally invest-ing Saladin with the government of Syria and Egypt. He now had hegemony, if not direct power, over the entirety of the Muslim Near East.
It is hard, and perhaps unnecessary, to separate Saladin’s personal piety from his political strategy. Certainly there are no shortage of anecdotes about him to build up a picture of a person who was very diligent in prayer and attentive to the imams and the views of renowned theologians. But the fact that Saladin abolished all taxes determined to be contrary to Islamic law, as was his fi rst act at Damascus, helped consolidate his support, particularly among merchants and intellectuals whose loyalty lay outside of any one particular city. He was breaking down local restrictions and helping create a more unifi ed Muslim state, while emphasizing that this was being done out of zeal for the love of God.
In his personal conduct Saladin set an example for his administrators, in particular by having no interest in accumulating riches. Ibn Shaddād described how his staff would have to conceal the amount of cash they had at their disposal because if Saladin believed he had reserves, they would be distributed to petitioners. On his death Saladin was found to own almost no personal wealth. 13
Saladin’s careful attention to his responsibilities as leader of Islam refl ected his concern to establish legitimacy, particularly with regard to Aleppo and Mosul. Being a Kurd, his dynasty represented a break from the Seljuk Turks, whose cadres formed the core of the ruling elites north of Baghdad. Th e Seljuks
were sceptical, if not openly hostile, and exemplary conduct by Saladin was essential to reconcile them to his rule. Even at the end of his career, aft er his successes in defeating the Christians, it was considered remarkable that he could count on support from the Seljuk elite. On one occasion, in 1191, when Saladin was departing Mosul, a descendent of the atabeg Zankī, whose position at the top of Syrian society had been overthrown by Saladin, helped him get into his saddle and arranged his garments. A companion of this Seljuk lord was surprised at the sight and commented that Saladin need not worry for his life while he had a Seljuk prince help him mount.14
Having establishing a stable peace in Syria and appointing his relatives to many of the key castles and cities, Saladin returned to Egypt, where he reorganized the fl eet and rebuilt the walls of Cairo. At the same time he promoted colleges for the fostering of a layer of Sunni intellectuals and administrators, indicating, as Nur al-Dīn had done, an appreciation of the importance of such a social layer for the long-term cohesion of a large realm.
While the major Muslim cities of the region were being drawn together under Saladin, the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem and the adjacent Christian
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principalities were fragmenting disastrously. With Baldwin IV suff ering from leprosy, to the point where no one could look at him without feeling sick, the key question was that of fi nding a husband for his elder sister Sybil, someone who would be able to lead the realm in the event of Baldwin’s incapacity or death.
Two factions emerged. Baldwin of Ibelin was a prominent local noble who had the support of the lords of the northern Christian principalities, Raymond III of Tripoli and Bohemond III of Antioch. Against them were the senior offi
ce holders of Jerusalem, including Joscelin III of Courtenay, the seneschal of Jerusalem and Raynald of Châtillon, lord of the lands east of the Jordan. It was this faction who in 1180 managed to have Sybil married to their candidate, Guy of Lusignan. Th
e Lusignans were a noble family from
Poitou and vassals of Henry II of England. Four generations of family members had participated in crusades. Th
e northern faction struck back against Sybil
and her new husband by placing their hopes in Sybil’s son by her fi rst marriage, the infant Baldwin, whom they had crowned as Baldwin V, co-king of the realm in 1183, even though he was just fi ve years old and had to be carried on the shoulders of Prince Raymond for the ceremony.
Despite his illness, Baldwin IV was able to defeat Saladin’s invasion of 1182.
He also proved to be extremely capable in lift ing a siege in August that year and again obliging Saladin to withdraw. But with his death in the spring of 1185 and young Baldwin V’s death in the summer of 1186, the kingdom was once more thrown into crisis. Understanding the dangers they faced, the High Council of the kingdom proposed a compromise between the rival factions, Sybil would be recognized as queen by all, providing she repudiated Guy of Lusignan. All parties agreed to this decision, including Sybil, who added the important pro-viso that she should be free to choose her next husband. Th
e point of this quali-
fi cation was shown immediately aft er Sybil was recognized as queen, when she outwitted the High Council by choosing Guy as her husband once more. Th is
was a skilful tactical move for her supporters, but strategically disastrous for the kingdom. Th
e rivalry between Guy and those who refused him homage,
such as Baldwin of Ibelin and Raymond III of Tripoli, was so deep that in face of the prospect of civil war Raymond even sought and obtained troops from Saladin in defence of his lands at Tiberias.
In 1187 Saladin once more invaded the Christian kingdom, this time with an army drawn from all over his realm: some 20,000 troops. Bohemond III was busy dealing with a Turkmen invasion of his Antiochene principality.
Raymond III was willing to make peace with Guy, but was mistrusted. Th e
Frankish forc
es, created by denuding all the cities and castles of their garrison,
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numbered some 60–70 per cent of Saladin’s. Raymond III advised the king not to fi ght a pitched battle but to shadow Saladin until the Muslim ruler was obliged by lack of resources to dismantle his army, Gerard of Ridefort, master of the Templars, took exactly the opposite view, insisting on battle as soon as possible. With Guy needing a victory to secure his position as king, he welcomed Gerard’s viewpoint. Th
e new ruler of Jerusalem therefore gambled
nearly all the military resources of the kingdom on an all-out assault against the larger Muslim army; leading his forces to a crushing defeat at Hattin on 4 July 1187. Th
ere, in a matter of hours, the core fi ghting force of the Kingdom of Jerusalem was destroyed.
On 2 October 1187 Jerusalem surrendered to Saladin, whose soldiers entered the city under a very tight discipline. A faction of the Muslim army urged Saladin to take revenge for 1099, 15 but the sultan overruled them. Two fully armoured warriors and ten foot soldiers from Saladin’s army were placed as guards in each street of the city and not one incident of revenge against the Christian population was reported.16 Th
ere was neither violence nor plunder,
instead, as had been agreed between Balian of Ibelin the last commander of Christian forces in Jerusalem and the sultan, the Christian population were given the chance to ransom themselves to avoid captivity. Th e wealthy
Christian property owners were not dispossessed; in fact they were able to sell their houses and furnishings before leaving the city. Th
e poor gathered at the
gates of the city, begging for the coins that would allow them to leave and avoid a life of slavery.
Heraclius, the patriarch of Jerusalem, rode out of the city at the head of a train with all the wealth of the Holy Sepulchre and other churches. It was put to Saladin that this gold and silver should be seized, but the sultan refused to act treacherously and only took ten dinars from Heraclius, the patriarch’s personal ransom.17 Similarly, once the Hospitallers and Templars realized that they would be allowed to leave with their goods, their enthusiasm for ransom-ing the 40,000 Christians too poor to save themselves from slavery waned.
The Siege of Jerusalem: Crusade and Conquest in 1099 Page 27
