Thereupon Marquis Wu had sitting mats set out in the ancestral temple hall, arrayed into three rows, and held a feast for the officers and chief officials. Those distinguished by their achievements sat in the front row and were feasted with the finest foods together with three meats served on the most valuable dishes. Those who ranked next in accomplishment sat in the middle row and were feasted with fine food served on less lavish vessels. Those who had not accomplished anything noteworthy sat in the last row and were feasted with fine food served on ordinary utensils. When the feast was over and they came out, he also honored the parents and families of the meritorious outside the temple gate, again according to their accomplishments. He annually sent emissaries to call on the families of those who had died in the service of the country, bestowing aid on their parents. By so doing he showed that they would not be forgotten.
After he had performed these actions for three years, Ch'in happened to mobilize its army and approach the West River commandery. When Wei's officers heard about it, those that buckled on their armor and enthusiastically attacked them without waiting for any orders from their superiors numbered in the tens of thousands.
Marquis Wu summoned Wu Ch'i and said: "Your previous instructions have all been effected."
Wu Ch'i replied: "I have heard that men have strengths and weaknesses, that their ch'i flourishes and ebbs. If your lordship is willing to test fifty thousand previously undistinguished men, I would like to lead them to engage the enemy. If Ch'in is not victorious, it will be laughed at by the feudal lords and lose the balance of authority [ch'uan] over the world.29
"Now if there is a murderous villain hidden in the woods, even though one thousand men pursue him they all look around like owls and glance about like wolves. Why? They are afraid that violence will erupt and harm them personally.30 Thus one man oblivious to life and death can frighten one thousand. Now if I can take a mass of fifty thousand and turn them into a single murderous villain, leading them to punish Ch'in, we will surely make it difficult for the enemy!"
Thereupon Marquis Wu assented to his plan, granting him another five hundred strong chariots and three thousand cavalry. They destroyed Ch'in's five-hundred-thousand-man army as a result of this policy to encourage the officers.
The day before the battle Wu Ch'i spoke to the Three Armies: "All the aides and officers must confront, follow, and capture the enemy's chariots, cavalry, and infantry. If the chariots do not make prisoners of the enemy's chariots, the cavalry does not make prisoners of the enemy's cavalry, and the infantry does not take the enemy's infantry, then even if we forge an overwhelming victory no one will be credited with any achievements." Thus on the day of the battle his orders were not onerous, but his awesomeness shook the world.
Translator's Introduction, 229
1. Heavenly Offices, 242
2. Military Discussions, 243
3. Discussion of Regulations, 244
4. Combat Awesomeness, 247
5. Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks, 250
6. Tactical Balance of Power in Defense, 252
7. Twelve Insults, 254
8. Martial Plans, 254
9. The General as a Law Official, 258
10. The Source of Offices, 259
11. Governing the Foundation, 260
12. Tactical Balance of Power in Warfare, 261
13. Orders for Severe Punishments, 263
14. Orders for the Squads of Five, 263
15. Orders for Segmenting and Blocking Off Terrain, 264
16. Orders for Binding the Squads of Five, 265
17. Orders for Regulating the Troops, 265
18. Orders for Restraining the Troops, 266
19. Orders for the General, 267
20. Orders for the Vanguard, 268
21. Military Instructions I, 269
22. Military Instructions II, 271
23. Army Orders I, 273
24. Army Orders II, 275
THE Wei Liao-tzu is purportedly named after a historical figure whose surname was Wei (although this is not the same Chinese character as the state of Wei) and personal name was Liao. The character "tzu," meaning master and indicating respect, was added by the compilers of his book. One notation suggests he had once been a student of Lord Shang, the famous Legalist theorist and fabled administrator who advocated the creation of a strong centralized government marked by strict control of the people and resources. In another tradition, Wei Liao is recorded as having been an important adviser to the first Ch'in emperor in his successful quest to wrest control over all of China, but scant historical evidence sustains either view.'
Whatever his personal history, Wei Liao was a brilliant strategist and a perceptive observer who realized that only by integrating the civil and the martial could a state be assured of surviving in the tumultuous Warring States environment. He never illustrated his discussions with examples from personal military experience; he is not historically noted as a commander; and the book is almost devoid of actual tactics-therefore he appears to have been strictly a theoretician. However, his extensive military knowledge is evident from the frequent inclusion of passages that are found in the present Six Secret Teachings, the Art of War, and other military books2 and from his detailed description of army organization and discipline.3
One view holds that Wei Liao probably lived in the last half of the fourth century B.c., an era in which mendicant persuaders indiscriminately sought receptive ears among the feudal lords regardless of their moral qualifications or state identification. Although most of them propounded doctrines that emphatically required loyalty and good faith, they themselves apparently remained unencumbered by such virtues until being accorded respectful treatment and proper employment. Even then, as exemplified by the famous general Wu Ch'i, if times changed and favor was lost, they suffered few qualms about shifting their allegiance to another regime.
Wei was among the states confronted by the new, terrible reality of the Warring States period (as discussed in the introduction). One of the three feudal domains formed by the disintegration of Chin, Wei not only retained the strength to be numbered among the seven major powers but initially also grew in military prowess. With a western border along the future Great Wall, it encompassed the central region north of the Chou imperial domain. However, Wei's fortunes began to fade under King Hui (reigned 370-319 s.c.)4 when it suffered two significant defeats and was forced to move its capital to Ta-liang. The major defeat was at Ma-ling at the hands of Ch'i in 341 s.c., but the next twenty years also witnessed a series of losses to Ch'in-the emerging power that eventually unified the empire in 221 B.C.- and another to the large southern state of Ch'u. After shifting the capital the king renamed the state Liang and referred to himself as the "king of Liang."
The opening chapter of the Wei Liao-tzu makes it appear as though the book records Wei Liao's response to King Hui's obsessive search for the military and political knowledge that would not only strengthen Wei's sagging defenses but would also furnish the means by which to defeat his enemies and avenge his losses. When Mencius-the famous Confucian standardbearer-visited King Hui in about the same period, the king initiated their interview by saying:' "As for ourselves, in the east I was defeated by Ch'i, and my eldest son died there. In the west we suffered the loss of some several hundred li to Ch'in. In the south we have been insulted by Ch'u. I am ashamed of this."
King Hui brusquely initiated his interview with Wei Liao with the same theme: "Is it true that the Yellow Emperor, through punishments and Virtue, achieved a hundred victories [without a defeat]?" Wei Liao immediately redirected the focus with a reply that emphasized human effort:' "Punishment was employed to attack [the rebellious], Virtue was employed to preserve [the people]. This is not what is referred to as `Heavenly Offices, [auspicious] hours and days, yin and yang, facing toward and turning your back to.' The Yellow Emperor's [victories] were a matter of human effort, that is all." Wei Liao departed when he failed to secure employment in Wei, apparently becaus
e the king lacked confidence in policies that in addition to military measures would require the cultivation and pursuit of virtue.
The only other textual reference to a "Wei Liao" appears in the Shih chi annals depicting Ch'in's ascension to power roughly eighty years later. A man identified only as "Wei Liao, a man of Ta-liang" (the capital of Wei) offers advice to the youthful king of Ch'in, the eventual unifier of the empire known as Ch'in Shih Huang-ti. In 237 B.C. the king seized the reins of power from his ministers and immediately began to expel all foreign advisers and favored retainers:
The king had a sweeping search conducted in order to expel the foreign retainers. Li Ssu sent up a memorial [in opposition] and the king stayed the expulsion order. Li Ssu then persuaded the king of Ch'in to consider first taking Han in order to frighten the other states. Thereupon he had Li Ssu plan the fall of Han. The king of Han was worried and plotted with Han Fei-tzu how to weaken Ch'in.
[At this time] Wei Liao, a native of Ta-Jiang, advised the king of Ch'in, saying: "With respect to [the vastness of] Ch'in's borders, the feudal lords may be compared to the rulers of provinces and districts. My only fear is that the feudal lords will form an alliance, uniting to do something unexpected. This is how Chili Po, Fu Ch'ai, and King Min perished. I request your Majesty not begrudge the expense of his wealth to bribe the great ministers and thereby cause confusion in their plans. Without expending more than thirty thousand chin the feudal lords can be eliminated." The king of Ch'in followed his plan, never stood on ceremony in his interviews with Wei Liao, and wore the same clothes and ate the same food.
Liao said [to others]: "As for the king of Ch'in's character, he has a nose like a wasp, elongated eyes, shoulders like a vulture, and sounds like a wolf. He has little kindness and generosity for others but has the heart of a tiger or a wolf. When in straightened circumstances he easily humbles himself to others, but when he attains his ambition he will just as easily consume people. I am a common man, but when he sees me he is always very deferential. If I truly enable the king of Ch'in to gain his objective of ruling All under Heaven, then All under Heaven will become prisoners. I cannot consort with him for long." Then he departed. The king of Ch'in realized it, stopped him, and appointed him as a Commander, using his plans and strategies. Li Ssu was in charge of governmental af- fairs.7
No further mention of Wei Liao's activities or his role in Ch'in survives, although the policy he suggested was apparently implemented with considerable success.
The historical picture is complicated further by the former existence of two distinct works entitled Wei Liao-tzu, based on their inclusion in two different Han shu bibliographic categories. One, which is identified with the Wei Liao who is noted as a disciple of Lord Shang, appears in the "miscellaneous" category, whereas the other is found under "military" books. The text incorporated in the present Seven Military Classics, although essentially consistent, also appears to combine two distinct works. (The first twelve chapters are more philosophical and general in scope and frequently deal with grand strategy, whereas the last twelve focus on the nature and problems of organization, discipline, command, and structure.) This dichotomy has prompted various theories about the possible authors and their relationship with these texts, which are discussed in the last part of this introduction.
Scholarly interest in the Wei Liao-tzu has recently increased because several chapters, still fairly well preserved on bamboo slips, were discovered in 1972 in the Han dynasty tomb at Lin-i. Although there are numerous minor differences in wording-especially in the choice of particles-and the bamboo slip edition is characterized by a somewhat more philosophical orientation than the current Wei Liao-tzu, only a few of the differences significantly affect the traditional understanding of the historically received passages.
The style and historical content of the book suggest a composition date around the end of the fourth century B.C., and based on the bamboo slip edition,' the book clearly assumed its present form before the inauguration of the Han in 206 B.c.-contrary to skeptical claims that denigrate it as a much later fabrication. Therefore, it might tentatively be concluded that the Wei Liao-tzu may actually be based on Wei Liao's court conversations with King Hui in the fourth century B.C., perhaps with additional, detailed material about military organization appended by someone from his family or school within the century after his death.
Basic Measures and Policies
Wei Liao must have been painfully aware of the military developments and famous engagements of the fourth century B.C. as well as of the escalating magnitude and brutality of battle. When he began his audiences with King Hui, he should have been thoroughly familiar with Wei's defeats at Kui-ling and Ma-ling, and he had probably studied and reflected on the strategies employed within the context of evolving military theory. Analyzing the state's situation, he apparently concluded that only radical, thoroughly implemented policies could provide any hope for preserving the state and perhaps achieving the king's virtually unobtainable objectives. Thus his conversations-as portrayed in the Wei Liao-tzu-propose drastic measures requiring strict enforcement and advocate a thorough revision of the state's values, policies, and basic approach to political and military issues.
The Basis: Agriculture and the People
Because the state of Wei had suffered devastating territorial, military, and economic losses in the preceding wars, increasing the population became an immediate priority. From Wei Liao's viewpoint, a state's prosperity de pended mainly on fully developing and exploiting its agricultural resources. In order to increase productivity, new lands must be cultivated and energetic farmers nurtured. Government policies that emphasize agriculture and offer incentives to attract disaffected, displaced, or vanquished migrant peoples simultaneously accomplish both objectives.9 Greater harvests rapidly provide the populace with adequate nourishment while creating economic wealth. When they are well fed, clothed, and sheltered, the people will be healthy, strong, and content and will naturally give their allegiance to the benevolent ruler who nurtured them. They will thus become loyal citizens capable of being inculcated with values, instructed in the virtues and demands of the state.
Humanistic Values and Authoritarian Government
The government must embrace the full range of humanistic values associated with Confucianism, although the Wei Liao-tzu never refers to Confucius nor attributes them to his school. The ruler must be the foremost exemplar of the Tao, personally cultivating and embodying Virtue. He should severely limit his desires and follow the path of moderation and restraint.10 His actions must always be righteous, his motives benevolent. His policies must be directed toward aiding and sustaining the people rather than toward self-aggrandizement and the glorious exercise of power. The forms of propriety, good faith, filial behavior, the family, friendship, and shame must all be fostered among the populace. When the agricultural seasons are respected and the government imposes few taxes and minimizes corvee duties, the people can be virtuous. As their faith in the government develops, they can be instructed in and rewarded for appropriate performance. When the laws, standards of propriety, and righteousness are taught, a sense of shame will develop and the government can then properly punish deviant behavior.11 As long as the government does not exhaust the people, moral behavior and social conformance can be expected.
Although Wei Liao believed in the fundamental Confucian, humanistic virtues, he also advocated draconian measures to ensure that only those values sanctioned by the state as productive and acceptable would be honored. Therefore, he proposed strictly prohibiting heterodoxy and vigorously suppressing any tendencies inimical to agriculture and warfare, the twin foundations of the state. The government must establish the proper tone by not permitting desires nor extravagance, by eliminating decoration and frivolity. Talented administrators must be employed to supervise all the activities of both the state and the people, with the people's welfare being paramount. Commercial enterprises and the pursuit of profit, although essential to the state's eco
nomic strength and welfare,12 must be appropriately di rected and constrained to prevent them from harming the people and the entire value system. Harmony, cooperation, and unity must be fostered and ensured in all activities.
Conquest and the Path to Victory
If the government can truly establish Virtue and foster the people's welfare, the state should be able to develop the internal strength to vanquish its enemies without resorting to force of arms. Although there are many prerequisites to military success, proper preparation and thorough planning coupled with careful evaluation of the enemy and the battlefield situation are paramount. Accordingly:
In general, [in employing] the military there are those who gain victory through the Tao; those that gain victory through awesomeness; and those that gain victory through strength. Holding careful military discussions and evaluating the enemy, causing the enemy's ch'i to be lost and his forces to scatter so that even if his disposition is complete he will not be able to employ it, this is victory through the Tao.
Being precise about laws and regulations, making rewards and punishments clear, improving weapons and equipment, causing the people to have minds totally committed to fighting, this is victory through awesomeness.
Destroying armies and slaying generals, mounting barbicans and firing crossbows, overwhelming the populace and seizing territory, returning only after being successful, this is victory through strength.
(Chapter 4: Combat Awesomeness)
Wei Liao extended the mandatory observance of humanitarian measures to campaign armies, reflecting the time-honored Confucian idea that punitive military actions should be directed against evil monarchs and their cohorts and not against the populace, except as armed adults might actively attack them. Implemented as military policy, this idea includes preserving the fields and orchards; not plundering the towns nor disturbing the populace; never destroying the people's means of livelihood; and generally securing the welfare of the people.13 In proposing such benevolent constraints, Wei Liao was probably reacting to the almost unimaginable scale of the carnage witnessed in his era-when several hundred thousand died in battles-and the brutal policies of states such as Ch'in, which awarded rank based on the number of heads taken in combat. Therefore, rather than foraging and plundering, as Sun-tzu advocated, Wei Liao felt the army should follow practices that minimize enemy opposition and encourage the enemy to surrender to the humane ruler who will return them to their lands. Although the Wei Liao-tzu is not alone among the Seven Military Classics in advocating such measures, its author differed consciously from the practices of his time, no doubt because of the policy's strategic advantages rather than from any naive commitment to virtue.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 28
