The T'ai-tsung nodded his head.
The T'ai-tsung said: "Are the orthodox and unorthodox distinguished beforehand, or are they determined at the time of battle?"
Li Ching said: "According to Duke Ts'ao's Hsin shu [New Book],18 `If you outnumber the enemy two to one, then divide your troops into two, with one section being orthodox, and one section being unorthodox. If you outnumber the enemy five to one, then three sections should be orthodox and two sections unorthodox.i19 This states the main point. As Sun-tzu said: `In warfare the strategic configurations of power do not exceed the unorthodox and orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox cannot be completely exhausted! The unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle. Who can exhaust them?'2° This captures it. So how can a distinction be made beforehand?
"If the officers and troops are not yet trained in my methods, if the assistant generals are not yet familiar with my orders, then we must break [the training] into two sections. When teaching battle tactics, in each case the sol diets must recognize the flags and drums, dividing and combining in turn. Thus [Sun-tzu] said: `Dividing and combining are changes.'21
"These are the techniques for teaching warfare. When the instructions and the evaluation [of their implementation] have been completed and the masses know my methods, only then can they be raced about like a flock of sheep, following wherever the general points.22 Who then makes a distinction of unorthodox and orthodox? What Sun-tzu refers to as `giving shape to others but being formless ourselves'23 is the pinnacle in employing the unorthodox and orthodox. Therefore, such a distinction beforehand is [merely for the purpose] of instruction. Determining the changes at the moment of battle, [the changes] are inexhaustible."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Profound indeed! Duke Ts'ao must have known it. But what the Hsin shu teaches is only what he [conveyed] to his generals, not the fundamental method of the unorthodox and the orthodox."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Duke Ts'ao states, `Unorthodox troops attack from the flank.' My lord, what do you have to say about this?"
Li Ching replied: "I recall that, in commenting on Sun-tzu, Duke Ts'ao said: `Going out first to engage in battle is orthodox; going out afterward is unorthodox.' This is different from his discussions about flank attacks. I humbly refer to the engagement of great masses as orthodox, and those which the general himself sends forth as unorthodox. Where is the restriction of first, or later, or flank attack?"
The T'ai-tsung said: "If I cause the enemy to perceive my orthodox as unorthodox, and cause him to perceive my unorthodox as orthodox, is this what is meant by `displaying a form to others?' Is employing the unorthodox as orthodox, the orthodox as unorthodox, unfathomable changes and transformation, what is meant by `being formless?"'
Li Ching bowed twice and said: "Your Majesty is a spiritual Sage. You go back to the ancients, beyond what I can attain."
The T'ai-tsung said: "If `dividing and combining are changes,' wherein lie the unorthodox and orthodox?"
Li Ching said: "For those who excel at employing troops there are none that are not orthodox, none that are not unorthodox, so they cause the en emy never to be able to fathom them. Thus with the orthodox they are victorious, with the unorthodox they are also victorious. The officers of the Three Armies only know the victory; none know how it is attained.24 Without being able to fully comprehend the changes, how could [the outstanding generals] attain this? As for where the dividing and combining come from, only Sun-tzu was capable [of comprehending it]. From Wu Ch'i on, no one has been able to attain it."
The T'ai-tsung said: "What was Wu Ch'i's strategy like?"
Li Ching said: "Permit me to speak about the general points. Marquis Wu of Wei asked Wu Ch'i about [the strategy to be employed] when two armies confront each other. Wu Ch'i said: `Have some of your low-ranking, courageous soldiers go forward and attack. When the fronts first clash, have them flee. When they flee, do not punish them, but observe whether the enemy advances to take [the bait]. If they sit as one and arise as one, and do not pursue your fleeing troops, the enemy has good strategists. If all their troops pursue the fleeing forces, some advancing, some halting, in disordered fashion, the enemy is not talented. Attack them without hesitation.'25 I think that Wu Ch'i's strategy is generally of this sort, not what Sun-tzu would refer to as `an orthodox engagement.'
The T'ai-tsung said: "My lord, your uncle Han Ch'in-hu once said you could discuss Sun-tzu and Wu-tzu with him.26 Was he also referring to the unorthodox and orthodox?"
Li Ching said: "How could Ch'in-hu know about the pinnacle of the unorthodox and orthodox? He only took the unorthodox as unorthodox, and the orthodox as orthodox! He never knew about the `mutual changes of the unorthodox and orthodox into each other, the inexhaustible cycle."'27
The T'ai-tsung said: "When the ancients approached enemy formations and then sent forth unorthodox troops to attack where unexpected, were they also using the method of `mutual changes?"'
Li Ching said: "In earlier ages most battles were a question of minimal tactics conquering those without any tactics, of some minor degree of excellence conquering those without any capabilities. How can they merit being discussed as the art of war? An example is Hsieh Hsuan's destruction of Fu Chien. It was not [because of] Hsieh Hsuan's excellence but probably Fu Chien's incompetence."28
The T'ai-tsung ordered the attending officers to find Hsieh HsUan's biography in the histories and report on it. After hearing the report he said: "Fu Chien's management of this affair was really not good."
Li Ching said: "I observe that Fu Chien's biography records that `Ch'in's armies had all been broken and defeated, with only Mu-Jung Ch'ui's single force still intact. Fu Chien [the Ch'in king], leading more than a thousand cavalry, raced over to join him. Ch'ui's son Pao advised Ch'ui to kill Fu Chien but without result.' From this one sees that when the Ch'in armies were in turbulence, only Mu-Jung Ch'ui's force remained intact, so it is obvious that Fu Chien was probably betrayed by Ch'ui's [treachery]. Now to be betrayed by others yet still hope to conquer the enemy, is it not difficult? Thus I say that men such as Fu Chien lacked tactics."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Sun-tzu said that `one who plans extensively will conquer one who does less planning,'29 so thus we know some planning will conquer no planning. All affairs are thus."
The T'ai-tsung said: "The Yellow Emperor's Art of War30 has been transmitted by previous generations as The Classic of Grasping the Unorthodox and as The Classic of Grasping Subtle Change. What do you have to say about this?"
Li Ching said: "The pronunciation of the character 'unorthodox'31 is the same as that for `subtle change.'32 Thus some have transmitted [the title] as the latter, but the meaning is the same. If we investigate the actual writing it says: `Four are orthodox, four are unorthodox. The remaining forces33 are for "grasping subtle change."' Here [the character] `unorthodox' is `excess.' Because of this it is pronounced `chi.' My foolish opinion is that there is nothing which is not subtle, so why stress `grasping' in speaking about it? It ought to be the remainder, then it would be correct.
"Now orthodox troops receive their [mission] from the ruler, while unorthodox troops are ordered forth by the general. Sun-tzu said: `If orders are consistently implemented so as to instruct the people, then the people will submit.'34 These are what are received from the ruler. Moreover, he says: `The [employment of] the troops cannot be spoken of beforehand"' and `there are commands from the ruler which are not accepted.'36 These are what the general himself issues.
"As for generals: If they employ orthodox tactics without any unorthodox ones, they are defensive generals. If they employ unorthodox tactics without any orthodox ones, they are aggressive generals. If they employ both, they are generals to preserve the state. Thus `grasping subtle change' and 'grasp ing the unorthodox' are not fundamentally two methods. Students [of military strategy] thoroughly understand them both!"
The T'ai-tsung said: "[The Classic of Grasping Subtle Change states:] `The numbe
r of formations is nine, with the center having the excess which the commanding general controls.37 The "four sides" and "eight directions" are all regulated therein. Within the [main] formation, formations are contained; within the platoons,38 platoons are contained. They [can] take the front to be the rear, the rear to be the front.39 When advancing, they do not run quickly; when withdrawing, they do not race off. There are four heads, eight tails.40 Wherever they are struck is made the head. If the enemy attacks the middle, the [adjoining] two heads will both come to the rescue. The numbers begin with five and end with eight.'41 What does all this mean?"
Li Ching said: "Chu-ko Liang set stones out horizontally and vertically to make eight rows. The method for the square formation then is this plan. When I instructed the army, we invariably began with this formation. What generations have passed down as The Classic of Grasping Subtle Change probably includes its rough outline."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Heaven, Earth, wind, clouds, dragons, tigers, birds, and snakes-what is the meaning of these eight formations?"
Li Ching said: "There was an error made by those who transmitted them. The ancients secretly concealed these methods, so they craftily created these eight names. The eight formations were originally one, being then divided into eight. For example, `Heaven' and `Earth' originated in flag designations; `wind' and `clouds' originated in pennant names. `Dragons,' `tigers,' `birds,' and `snakes' originated in the distinctions of the platoons and squads. Later generations erroneously transmitted them. If they were cleverly creating formations in the image of animals, why would they just stop at eight?"
The T'ai-tsung said: "The numbers begin with five and end with eight, so if they were not set up as images, then they are really ancient formations. Would you please explain them for me?"
Li Ching said: "I observe that the Yellow Emperor governed the army according to the methods by which he first established the `village and well' system.42 Thus the `well' was divided by four roads, and eight families occupied it. Its shape was that for the Chinese character for `well' [see Figure 1], so nine squares were opened therein. Five were used for formations, four were empty.43 This is what is meant by `the numbers beginning with five.'
"The middle was left vacant to be occupied by the commanding general, while around the four sides the various companies were interconnected, so this is what is meant by `ending with eight.'
"As for the changes and transformations to control the enemy: Intermixed and turbulent, their fighting [appeared] chaotic, but their method was not disordered. Nebulous and varying, their deployment was circular, but their strategic power [shih] was not dispersed.44 This is what is meant by `they disperse and become eight, reunite and again become one."'
The T'ai-tsung said: "The Yellow Emperor's governance of the army was profound indeed! Even if later generations have men with the wisdom of Heaven and spirit-like planning ability, none will be able to exceed his scope! After this who came near to him?"
Li Ching said: "When the Chou dynasty first flourished, the T'ai Kung substantially copied his methods. He began at the Ch'i state capital by establishing the well-acreage45 system, [constructing] three hundred chariots, and [training] three hundred Tiger Guards46 in order to establish a military organization. [They practiced advancing] `six paces, seven paces,' [making] `six attacks, seven attacks, 41 so as to teach them battle tactics. When he deployed the army at Mu-yeh, with [only] a hundred officers the T'ai Kung controlled the army48 and established his military achievements. With fortyfive thousand men he conquered King Chou's mass of seven hundred thousand.
"In the Chou dynasty the Ssu-ma Fa was based upon the T'ai Kung. When the T'ai Kung died the people of Ch'i obtained his bequeathed strategies. When Duke Huan became hegemon over All under Heaven, he relied on Kuan Chung49 who again cultivated the T'ai Kung's methods. Their army was referred to as a `restrained and governed force,' and all the feudal lords submitted."
The T'ai-tsung said: "The Confucians mostly say that Kuan Chung was merely the minister of a hegemon [rather than a true king], so they truly do not know that his military methods were founded upon a king's regulations. Chu-ko Liang had the talent of a king's supporter, and he compared himself with Kuan Chung and Yueh I. From this we know that Kuan Chung was also the true sustainer of a king. But when the Chou declined the king could not use him, so he borrowed the state of Ch'i and mobilized an army there."
Figure 1 Chinese character for "well"
Li Ching bowed twice and said: "Your Majesty is a spiritual Sage! Since you understand men this well, even if your old minister should die, he would not be ashamed before any of the great Worthies of antiquity.
"I would like to speak about Kuan Chung's methods for organizing the state of Ch'i. He divided Ch'i to compose three armies. Five families comprised the fundamental unit, so five men made up a squad of five. Ten fundamental family units composed a hamlet, so fifty men composed a platoon. Four hamlets constituted a village, so two hundred men composed a company. Ten villages constituted a town, so two thousand men formed a battalion. Five towns made up an army, so ten thousand men composed one army. It all proceeded from the Ssu-ma Fa's meaning that one army consists of five battalions, while one battalion consists of five companies.50 In actuality, these are all the bequeathed methods of the T'ai Kung."
The T'ai-tsung said: "People say the Ssu-ma Fa was composed by Jangchu. Is this true or not?"
Li Ching said: "According to the `Biography of Jang-chU' in the Shih chi, he excelled in commanding the army at the time of Duke Ching of Ch'i, defeating the forces of Yen and Chin. Duke Ching honored him with the post of Commander of the Horse [Ssu-ma], and from then on he was called Ssuma Jang-chu. His sons and grandsons were then surnamed Ssu-ma. In the time of King Wei of Ch'i they sought out and talked about the methods of the ancient Commanders of the Horse [ssu-ma] and also narrated what Jangchu had studied. This subsequently became a book in ten chapters called Ssuma Jang-chu. Moreover, what has been transmitted from the military strategists and remains today is divided into four categories: `balance of power and plans,' `disposition and strategic power,' `yin and yang,' and `techniques and crafts.' They all come out of the Ssu-ma Fa. ,51
The T'ai-tsung said: "During the Han, Chang Liang and Han Hsin ordered [the books on] military arts. Altogether there were one hundred and eighty-two thinkers, but after they collated and edited them to select the important ones, they settled on thirty-five. Now we have lost what they transmitted. What about this?"
Li Ching said: "What Chang Liang studied was The Six Secret Teachings and The Three Strategies of the T'ai Kung. What Han Hsin studied was the Ssu-ma Jang-chu and the Sun-tzu. But the main principles do not go beyond the Three Gates and Four Types, that is all!"
The T'ai-tsung said: "What is meant by the Three Gates?"
Li Ching said: "I find that in the eighty-one chapters of the Plans of the T'ai Kung, what is termed `secret strategy' cannot be exhausted in words; the seventy-one chapters of the Sayings of the T'ai Kung cannot be exhausted in warfare; and the eighty-five chapters of the Warfare of the T'ai Kung cannot be exhausted in resources. These are the Three Gates."52
The T'ai-tsung said: "What is meant by the Four Types?"
Li Ching said: "These are what Jeri Hung discussed during the Han. As for the classes of military strategists, `balance of power and plans' comprises one type, `disposition and strategic power' is one type, and `yin and yang' and `techniques and crafts' are two types. These are the Four Types."
The T'ai-tsung said: "The Ssu-ma Fa begins with the spring and winter ceremonial hunts.53 Why?"
Li Ching said: "To accord with the seasons, secure the connections with the spirits, and stress their substance. They were the most important government affairs according to the Chou li [Rites of Chou]. King Ch'eng held the spring hunt on the southern side of Mount Ch'i. King K'ang held the assem bly at Feng Palace. King Mu held the assembly at Mount T'u. These are the affairs of the Son of Heaven.
"When Chou rule declined, Du
ke Huan of Ch'i assembled the armies [of the feudal states] at Chao-ling, while Duke Wen of Chin made his alliance [with the feudal lords] at Ch'ien-t'u. In these cases feudal lords respectfully performed the affairs of the Son of Heaven.54 In actuality they used the Law for Nine Attacks" to overawe the irreverent. They employed the pretext of the hunt to hold court assemblies, accordingly conducting tours and hunts among the feudal lords, instructing them in armor and weapons.56 The [Ssuma Fa also] states that unless there is a national emergency, the army should not be wantonly mobilized, but that during the times between the agricultural seasons they should certainly not forget military preparations.57 Thus is it not profound that it placed the hunts of spring and winter at the beginning?"
The T'ai-tsung said: "During the Spring and Autumn period, the 'Methods for the Double Battalion of King Chuang of Ch'u'58 stated that `the hundred officers should act in accord with the symbolization of things, military administration should be prepared without official instructions.i59 Did this accord with Chou regulations?"
Li Ching said: "According to the Tso chuan, `King Chuang's chariot battalions [kuang] consisted of thirty chariots per battalion. [Each chariot] in the battalion had a company [tsu] of infantrymen plus a platoon [Bang] for the flanks.'60 `When the army was advancing [the ones] on the right deployed by the shafts.i61 They took the shafts as their defining measure. Thus they stayed close to the shafts to fight.62 These were all Chou regulations.
"[In the case of Ch'u] I refer to one hundred men as a company [tsu], while fifty men are called a platoon [hang]. Thus each chariot is accompanied by one hundred and fifty men, many more than in the Chou organization. Under the Chou each chariot was accompanied by seventy-two infantrymen and three armored officers. Twenty-five men, including an officer, formed one platoon [liang], so three Chou platoons were seventy-five men altogether. Ch'i is a country of mountains and marshes; chariots were few, men numerous. If they were to be divided into three platoons [tui],63 then they would be [functionally] the same as the Chou."
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 40
