67. The term translated as "constraints" is chieh, commonly used to indicate constraints or measures imposed on troops. The term lacks a satisfactory English rendering because it encompasses the concepts of "control," "timing," and "measure." The commentators generally agree it refers to the modulation of both time and space. Suntzu apparently intends "constraints" to encompass the deliberate structuring of actions to ensure that the timing is precise and that the impulse of strategic power is imparted at the proper moment to the objective at a critical position. When the target is moving, such as a bird or an enemy, controlling action to attain this objective becomes more difficult. The final stage should be kept short so as to minimize the enemy's ability to avoid the onslaught or effect countermeasures, as Sun-tzu states below. Liu Yin notes it also refers to the control or measurement of strength so that the objective will be reached and not missed. (SWTCC WCCS, I:37B. Also see ST SCC, pp. 71-72; ST CCCY, p. 124; and SS AS, pp. 119-120.)
68. The same term as for the "onrush" of the water, although "to attack" is clearly assumed.
69. Literally, "short." Whether in a temporal or spatial dimension, briefness is synonymous with precision and effectiveness.
70. The meaning of the circular formation has stimulated voluminous commentaries. Essentially, the army seems to be involuntarily compressed into a circular formation and is therefore vulnerable. However, such a formation presents no exposed points or positions yet offers the possibility of numerous fixed deployments and the employment of both orthodox and unorthodox tactics through unfolding. Conse quently, in some views it is chosen deliberately rather than forced on the army to allow flexibility while creating the similitude of difficulty and apparent defeat (cf. SWTCC WCCS, I:38A; ST SCC, pp. 72-75).
71. The translation follows Liu Yin's commentary, understanding the sentence as expressing some bases for practicing the art of deception (SWTCC WCCS, I:38A). However, there are other possible frames of reference for "Chaos is given birth from control," among them that one's own troops may become chaotic despite being well controlled. This might result from overcontrol, lack of flexibility, too fragile an organization, a shift in battlefield conditions, or laxity in maintaining discipline and organization (cf. ST SCC, pp. 74-76; STPF SY, p. 84; SS AS, pp. 122-123).
72. "Foundation," following the Sung/Ming text. However, many other texts-including the BS and the SCC-have "troops," which most modern commentators feel is correct. "Foundation" presumably refers to the general's well-disciplined, well-organized army, so indirectly it means "forces." (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, 1:39A; ST SCC, p. 78; STPF SY, p. 75. Wu Jung-sung retains pen, "foundation," and translates it as "heavy forces." STPF CS, p. 67.)
73. Liu Yin comments: "Thus one who excels at warfare seeks (victory) through the certain victory of the army's strategic power, not through reliance on untalented men. Thus he is able to select the talented among men and entrust them with strategic power" (SWTCC WCCS, I:39B). Although many others follow Liu Yin's thoughts, a second line of commentary observes that by relying on strategic power, men can be employed according to their talents in the quest for victory. Within the context of surpassing power, even the timid will become assertive and perform their roles-something rewards, punishments, and the laws may not be able to accomplish. Furthermore, men will not be forced to attempt actions they are unable to perform (cf. ST SCC, pp. 7980; SS AS, p. 127; STPF SY, pp. 86-87).
74. The chapter is so named because key paragraphs advance the concept of striking and exploiting any voids or weaknesses in the enemy's deployment. The substantial should always be avoided rather than confronted. (In the BS, the title characters are reversed: "Substance and Vacuity.")
75. Controlling others, rather than being controlled by others, is one of Sun-tzu's fundamental principles, and many of his tactical measures are devoted to appropriately manipulating the enemy.
76. The Seven Military Classics edition reads "Go forth to places he will not race to," whereas the ST SCC edition emends the "not" to "must" (cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:2B-3A; ST SCC, p. 87). D. C. Lau also supplies a perceptive note on the error of this emendation ("Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," p. 321), but the recovered bamboo text indicates the original reading is "must," and collateral evidence appears in the "T'aip'ing yu-lan" (hereafter TPYL) quotation. (However, Chu Chun prefers the traditional text. See STPF SY, pp. 90-91, 96.) This coheres well with the preceding sentence, and the traditional text has been altered accordingly. Also note that some commentators and translators would understand the traditional sentence as "Go by way of places he will not race to."
77. Because this sentence does not appear in the bamboo text, some modern commentators view it as a later, inappropriate accretion (see STPF CS, p. 78). However, these coupled sentences are frequently quoted in other military works and have an inherent parallelism that tends to suggest their correctness (cf. SS AS, p. 134).
78. STPF CS, based on the BS, emends "will not attack" to "must attack" (STPF CS, p. 73). There is also collateral evidence for this reading in the TPYL. However, "will not attack" accords with the chapter's trend of thought, particularly in light of such sentences below as "When someone excels at defense the enemy does not know where to attack" and "If I do not want to engage in combat, even though I merely draw a line on the ground and defend it, they will not be able to engage me in battle because we thwart his movements." If the defense is impregnable, the enemy will be deterred from foolishly attacking and uselessly expending his forces. (Cf. STPF SY, p. 91; SS AS, pp. 137-138; and ST SCC, pp. 88-89.) Wu Ju-sung notes that tacticians of Sun-tzu's generation valued defense over offense, although his text accepts the BS version "must attack" (see STPF CS, pp.77-78).
79. Formless, "not hsing," having no form or discernible configuration.
80. The BS have "an advance which is unresponded to" rather than "unhampered" (or "not repulsed").
81. There are two differences in the BS: "stopped" for "pursued" and "distance" for "speed." Thus it would read "To effect a retreat that cannot be stopped, employ unreachable distance." These are variously accepted or rejected by modern commentators. (Cf. STPF CS, p. 73; STPF HC, pp. 91-92; and the traditional commentaries, ST SCC, pp. 90-91.)
82. This sentence has occasioned rather divergent views. Although the translation reflects the chapter's progression, another possibility is understanding the "hsing chib" at the beginning of the sentence in a causative sense, as causing them to betray their form (STPF SY, p. 99). A radically different view-expressed by Liu Yin, among others-suggests that through the employment of unorthodox and orthodox tactics, one creates and displays a deceptive form or disposition to the enemy while actually being formless (SWTCC WCCS, II:5B). Others simply interpret it as displaying a form to the enemy (see STPF CS, p. 75; ST SCC, p. 93; and SS AS, p. 144).
In the BS the sentence begins with "Thus those who excel at command ... "
83. Note that D. C. Lau also understands the sentence in this way, as do several commentators. Cf. "Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," pp. 329-330.
84. The BS invert the sequence of "field of battle" and "day of battle" and also lack the character for "Assemble."
85. The sequence of left/right and front/rear is reversed in the BS.
86. Presumably a comment directed to the king of Wu by Sun-tzu. However, Chang Yu comments that "I" is an error for Wu, the State's name (which seems unlikely). SWTCC WCCS, 11:8A; ST SCC, p. 97.
87. The BS have "solely" or "monopolized" for "achieved." Accordingly, "Thus I say victory can be monopolized."
88. Predictability means having form; therefore, repeating previously successful tactical methods would completely contradict Sun-tzu's principle of being formless. Through flexibility and variation the configuration of response attains to the inexhaustible.
89. The BS have "move/moving" rather than "configuration." Because "configuration" is used consistently throughout the chapter, it seems preferable.
90. The BS have "victory" rather than "configuration."
91. Again the
BS have "move" rather than "flow." (Chu Chun, among others, prefers the traditional text. See STPF SY, p. 93.)
92. The BS have "complete," so the phrase would be translated as "completed (fixed) configuration of power."
93. The BS lack "water," so the last part of the sentence would also describe the army.
94. The BS only have "transform" rather than "change and transform" and also lack "wrest victory."
95. The BS have two characters at the end, sben yao-perhaps an additional comment by an unknown hand with the meaning "Spiritual Essentials."
96. The title does not refer to actual combat but to achieving the conditions that make contention possible. The main themes are therefore the considerations of rapid versus measured advance; exploitation and avoidance of terrain and obstacles; and the critical element of ch'i, the army's spirit.
97. "Tactics" or "plans," but also the same character as "estimations" and therefore suggestive of comparatively valuing the effects of various routes.
98. The translation follows the Military Classics edition (SWTCC WCCS, II:14B). However, other editions (such as the ST SCC, p. 106; STPF CS, p. 81; STPF SY, p. 109) and the BS all have the character for "army" (chin) rather than "masses" (chung), so both parts read in parallel: "Thus combat between armies can be advantageous; combat between armies can be dangerous." Both readings are congruent with the chapter's content because fighting with an undisciplined mass is dangerous, whereas it is the nature of warfare to entail both gain and loss.
99. Following STPF WC, p. 215, and SS AS, p. 169. They literally "roll up their armor" and presumably leave it behind with the baggage train so as to allow greater foot speed. (Heavy equipment is implied from the sentences below, which all couple the baggage and heavy equipment.)
100. In the Art of War and the Ssu-ma Fa, the concept of plundering and then dividing the spoils among the troops remains evident. In contrast, the later Military Classics strongly advocate a policy of neither harming the general populace nor seizing their possessions.
101. Night battles did not commence until late in the Spring and Autumn period and were not common because the confusion wrought by the darkness made the results uncertain. The exact reason for multiplying the numbers of flags and fires is a subject of debate among the commentators: It was done either to ensure that their effect as tools for communication and signaling literally overwhelmed the soldiers or (and possibly as well as) to confuse the enemy by confronting it with a myriad stimuli (cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:19B-20; ST SCC, pp. 117-118).
In the BS, this passage immediately follows the quotation from the Military Administration (STPF CS, p. 81).
102. Following D. C. Lau's gloss on kuei ("Some Notes on the Sun-tzu," p. 320).
103. Or "majestic formations."
104. The BS have ni-"go against," "go contrary to"-rather than ying-"to meet," "to confront." This reading is also preferred by Chu Chun (STPF SY, p. 112).
105. The BS have "leave an outlet"; the Ming text has "must/outlet," the "leave" being understood. (Cf. STPF SY, p. 112, for Chu's rejection of the Ming edition.)
106. Liu Yin notes that this last paragraph is apparently repeated from the next chapter. However, only the Ming edition has the passage in the next chapter as well, where it is apparently an accidental accretion.
The BS have "masses/large numbers" for "military."
107. Chapter titles in the extant editions of the ancient classics have frequently been appended by later hands-whether compilers, subsequent authors adding material, or commentators. Many were simply drawn from the first few words of the chapter, others from a salient sentence within it; therefore, they may be largely unrelated to the chapter's overall subject matter. "Nine Changes" forces the commentators to somehow justify "changes" because the chapter's admonitions against certain courses of action on particular terrains do not constitute changes. For example, Chang Yu asserts that the chapter refers to employing the expedient-the "unusual" rather than the "normal"-in these situations, but his view lacks justification. Although the concept of flexible response is critical to Sun-tzu's tactics, it hardly seems to be the topic of this chapter. Others-including Liu Yin-suggest the chapter is badly mangled, and because the BS preserve only about forty words, they offer little help. In addition, the BS fragments lack a title. Finally, "nine" may simply be used here as a cognomem for "many" or "numerous," such as "Nine Heavens" (STPF SY, pp. 128-129). A minority view holds that "nine" might also be an error for "five" because five terrains are discussed (see SWTCC WCCS, 11:24-25; ST SCC, p. 131; SS AS, pp. 194-195; and STPF CS, pp. 89-91).
108. This repeats the formula used previously to introduce the topic. Five classifications of terrain follow, all of which also appear in subsequent chapters in similar descriptive lists-frequently with definitions. Although some notes are provided below, also refer to Chapters 10 and 11 for further explication. (For additional discussion of the terms together with comments on previous translations and a full translation of the relevant lost material on terrain classification from the Art of War that is preserved in other texts, see Ralph D. Sawyer, "The Missing Chapter of Sun-tzu," IKF 6 [1987], pp. 77-98.)
109. "Entrapping terrain" is traditionally understood as low-lying ground, perhaps surrounded by hills or mountains and characterized by bodies of water such as marshes or swamps. It is thought to be land that can be inundated, possibly by heavy rains or by breaking restraining banks (as was done in China in World War II) and consequently involves heavy slogging for the chariots and men. However, there is considerable disagreement as to its defining characteristics (See STPF SY, pp. 125-126; ST CCCY, p. 165; ST SCC, p. 131). The Six Secret Teachings, among other works, discusses the dangers posed by similar terrain in Chapter 58. The BS have fan-"over- flow" or "inundate"-rather than p'i, which means "subvert(ed)" or "defeated." Chu Chun prefers the original because the scope is wider and is capable of encompassing any terrain through which passage is difficult (STPF SY, pp. 125-126). There is another, nearly identical character i, which means "bridge" or "embankment"; its existence raises further, although unexplored, possibilities.
110. "Focal" terrain (following Griffith's apt term) is defined in Chapter 11 as "land of the feudal lords surrounded on three sides such that whoever arrives first will gain the masses of All under Heaven." The characters literally mean "terrain where highways intersect"; therefore, narrowly defined it would be land that is accessible from several directions over prepared roads.
111. Several sentences follow in the Ming edition of the Seven Military Classics that have been duplicated erroneously from other sections. Neither the Sung dynasty edi tion of the Seven Military Classics nor other editions-such as the SCC-contains them, and they are therefore omitted here.
112. Emending "can" to "not," following the Sung edition. Cf. ST SCC, pp. 132133.
113. With this sentence there are already nine principles.
114. Wu Ju-sung notes that in the so-called "lost" fragments from the bamboo slips, the following sentences appear: "There are orders from the ruler which are not implemented. If the ruler orders anything contrary to these four, then do not implement it." "Four" refers to the last four in the series (see STPF CS, pp. 89-91). The "Nine Changes" would therefore be encompassed by the series listed prior to the strong statement about not accepting certain orders from the ruler, which is consonant with the view of commentators such as Wang Hsi, rather than being an arbitrary number (cf. STPF CS, pp. 89-91; ST SCC, p. 131; STPF WC, p. 254).
115. "Five advantages" is found in almost all editions, including the Sung and Ming, and is generally understood as referring to the advantages of the first terrains characterized at the start of this chapter. However, there may be errors in the characters because the "five" are not advantageous but rather are disadvantageous terrains, and much circumlocution is required to convert them to "advantage." One suggestion is that this should read "advantages of terrain"-the advantages and terrains, however, remaining unspecified. (See ST CCCY, p. 164; and SS AS, pp. 20
1-203. Compare ST SCC, pp. 136-137.)
116. Literally, "espy life"-generally understood as "look for tenable ground," terrain that can be fought on or defended. Some commentators identify it with the yang side, the side looking toward the sun (facing south or east). (Cf. SWTCC WCCS, II:35A; ST SCC, pp. 144-145; STPF WC, pp. 273-274.)
117. Sun-tzu rarely discusses the military problems posed by water-streams, rivers, lakes-no doubt reflecting an early heritage of plains warfare. As the scope of conflict expanded, the problems entailed in fording rivers, crossing wetlands, and negotiating lakes grew enormously, stimulating the development of naval forces in the southeast. Accordingly, the later military classics address these concerns somewhat extensively. (The character translated as "rivers"-shui rather than ch'uan-originally a graph of running water, can refer to rivers or to bodies of water in general. Because Sun-tzu speaks about the current's direction, rivers appear to be intended here.)
118. This is under stood as meaning that armies should not assume positions downstream from an enemy because of such potential dangers as being inundated by suddenly released flood waters or felled by drinking water drawn from a poisoned river (see SWTCC WCCS, II:36A; ST SCC, p. 147).
119. Presumably, terrain easy for chariots to negotiate and for supply wagons to cross.
120. Fragments recovered from the Han tomb (as well as materials in the Shih chi) briefly summarize the Yellow Emperor's conquest over the other four (evil) emperors, striking each in turn in his associated quarter (that is, the Black Emperor in the north, the White Emperor in the west, and so on). This conflict, which is denied vigorously by the Confucians, was popularly understood as marking the (mythological) inception of military conflict and strategy in China. See "Lin-i Yin-ch'ueh-shan Han-mu ch'u-t'u Sun-tzu ping-fa ts'an-chien shih-wen," WW 1974, No. 12, p. 12.
121. Life-supporting terrain is obviously ground that has sunlight, grass for the animals, brush and trees for firewood, and especially potable water. Liu Yin and others equate the "substantial" with high ground (SWTCC WCCS, 11:38A. Cf. ST SCC, p. 150, and STPF SY, pp. 142-143).
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 58
