6. This is an example of inauspiciously facing toward, being turned toward.
7. Probably an error for the Ch'ing River because the former does not flow through the Mu-yeh battlefield region, whereas the latter does (see WLT CC, note 11, p. 3).
8. There appears to be some logical inconsistency in this sentence, and the commentators offer several different understandings. Clearly, Kung is expressing the thought that the comet is irrelevant and that despite its baleful omen, they will be victorious. However, another interpretation is "If we were to employ the comet to fight, we would have to turn the tail over before we could be victorious" (WLT CS, p. 47).
9. The Sung edition has "seasons of Heaven" instead of "Heavenly Offices." The thought expressed in this chapter reflects the theme of the entire work and is also picked up by Li Ching in Book III of Questions and Replies.
10. These sentences echo a passage in Chapter 4 of the Art of War. This chapter is particularly complex, not because of the ideas expressed or any shortage of textual materials but because of the extensive reconstructions possible with the recovered tomb materials (YCS CP) supplemented by the Ch'un-shu chih-yao. In this instance, the RT reads: "Measure the fertility and barrenness of the earth, and then establish towns and construct city walls. In accord with the city walls, determine the appropriate terrain" (WLT CS, p. 53).
11. The RT: "In accord with the terrain, determine the appropriate number of men" (WLT CS, p. 53).
12. The RT: "These three having been mutually determined, when one withdraws he can thereby be solid in defense, and [when he advances can thereby] be victorious in battle" (WLT CS, p. 53).
13. The bamboo slips read "fu" (blessings, good fortune, prosperity) rather than "pei" (preparations). In full, the RT: "Being victorious in battle externally, prosperity being produced internally, victory and prosperity respond to each other..." (see WLT CC, notes, p. 6; WLT CS, p. 53).
14. The Sung edition has "respond," as translated in note 13.
15. An image from Chapter 4 of the Art of War.
16. Hsu Pei-ken believes "open" is an error for "closed" because military affairs should be secretive and obscure (cf. WLT CCCY, p. 15).
17. RT: "Closing it, it is small but not.... Thus, for one who is king, the people turn to him as flowing water, look up to him as the sun and moon, return to him like their father and mother. Thus it is said..." (serial periods indicate a damaged or lost portion in the text).
18. Understood as opening the path to life, nourishing the people (cf. WLTCC WCCS, I:5).
19. Liu Yin understands "stopping up" as referring to stopping the excessively harsh correction of minor transgressions (ibid.). Others see the efforts directed toward stopping extravagance and profligate customs (cf. WLT CY, p. 5; WLT CS, p. 56). The RT adds: "His taking of All under Heaven will be like a transformation. One whose state is impoverished he will be able to make rich" (cf. WLT CS, p. 53).
20. The RT adds: "Those who do not respond to the [constraints of] the four seasons, he will be able to bring it about that they respond to them" (WLT CS, p. 53).
21. Both phrases in the RT use a double negative for emphasis: "cannot but be wealthy," "cannot but be governed" (ibid.).
22. The RT: "As for a state that is well governed and moreover wealthy, even though they do not remove the blocks from the chariots, nor is the armor taken out from the bags, their awesomeness causes All under Heaven to submit" (ibid.).
23. In accord with Sun-tzu's approach to warfare. However, the RT adds a series of phrases indicating that victory comes in the fields, marketplaces, and so forth (ibid.).
24. As the sentence stands, the implication is that once the army is in the field, any victory is attributable to the general. However, the RT adds phrases that change the meaning somewhat: "If one engages in battle and then is victorious, it is the high officers' victory. If one is victorious a second time, it is equivalent to a defeat. `If an army of a hundred thousand goes forth, the daily expenses will be a thousand pieces of gold.' `Therefore, attaining a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence"' (ibid.). These phrases reflect Sun-tzu's admonition against protracted fighting and Wu-tzu's emphasis on winning decisively and avoiding numerous battles.
25. This echoes Sun-tzu's admonition in the Art of War, Chapter 12.
26. Unfortunately, this relatively simple sentence is subject to several interpretations by the commentators. Literally, "do not mobilize one day's army" can be understood as translated; as meaning do not mobilize for only a day (because this would be negligent and haphazard and would doom the forces to defeat); and as meaning do not mobilize in just a day because again this would be too hasty. (The translation follows Liu Yin's emphasis on acting quickly and decisively so as not to lose an opportunity. See WLTCC WCCS, 1:6, and compare WLT CS, p. 56; WLT CY, p. 6; and WLT CCCY, pp. 18-19.) The RT adds a long, supplementary passage.
27. The RTadds a lengthy, broken passage on the general and the senses.
28. The RTadds, "Deployed in an elongated formation it will be victorious" (WLT CS, p. 54).
29. Another, broken passage follows in the RT that appears to have inappropriate sentences as well.
30. A paraphrase from the Art of War, Chapter 11. The RT adds, "Those whose heads are bowed cannot raise them; those whose heads are raised cannot bow them" (WLT CS, p. 54).
31. Another paraphrase from the Art of War, Chapter 6. (Note that this describes the plight of a general who lacks intelligence and knowledge of the battlefield.) The RT adds, "Wise officers cannot offer plans, courageous officers cannot (take action?)" (ibid.).
32. Liu Yin understands the image as "like a whirlwind" (WLTCC WCCS, I:8A).
33. Drums were used to sound the advance, pennants to direct the troops.
34. The Sung edition has "harms" instead of "diminishes."
35. Following Liu Yin (WLTCC WCCS, 1:9) and WLT CCCY (p. 29), ship chiang is understood as "generals through the ages." However, other interpretations are "hereditary generals"-those whose families have served as generals for generations (with the implication that they are unqualified)-and "contemporary generals" of their age. The latter seems least likely. (Cf. WLT CS, p. 62; WLT CY, p. 10; WLT CC, p. 13.)
36. Some editions have t'o, "to drag", rather than pao, "to embrace."
37. The concept of ch'i ("unorthodox") forces is discussed in the translator's introduction and notes to the Art of War.
38. Following the consensus of the commentators that "commander" should be understood in parallel with the succeeding phrases referring to the ssu-ma and the general.
39. See note 5 to Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung.
40. Duke Huan, who ruled Ch'i from 685 to 634 B. c., was the first of the five hegemons, or strongmen who exercised de facto power over the entire realm in the name of supporting the now-weakened hereditary house of Chou.
41. Analogies from Sun-tzu's "Strategic Military Power" (Art of War, Chapter 5).
42. The Sung edition has "Heaven" for "man," changing the sentence to "Do not be the first under Heaven to engage in battle."
43. Reading "disposition," "shape," "form" in accord with the Sung edition, rather than the Ming edition's "punishment."
44. The modern commentators generally understand this sentence as translated. However, it may also refer to receiving the Mandate of Heaven to go forth and punish the evil. (Cf. WLT CCCY, p. 51; WLT CS, p. 72; WLT CY, p. 16; WLT CC, p. 19.)
45. For other possible interpretations, such as "speed," see WLT CS, p. 72; WLT CC, p. 19; and WLT CY, p. 16.
46. "Unify" is implied and is also found in several of the variant editions.
47. The RT adds considerable material from the Ch'un-shu chih-yao, with the important sentences then reading as follows: "Military affairs rely on the strength of the masses. If you are not extremely careful about actions taken, you will have to change them several times. When you change them sev
eral times, then even though affairs are initiated, the masses will be perturbed" (WLT CS, p. 71). The fostering of certainty in the general's orders and avoiding doubt in both their minds and in the mind of the commander are important themes in most of the Seven Military Classics.
48. The translation follows the Ming text (note WLT CCCY, pp. 53-54; and WLT CY, p. 17). However, the RT provided by the WLT CS is somewhat more consistent: "In antiquity, among those who led the people it never happened that they were unable to gain their minds and yet able to gain their strength" (WLT CS, p. 71).
49. The RT variant merits note: "Only after the people will die for their ruler just as for their families should you constrain them with regulations. Thus in antiquity those who engaged in warfare would invariably take ch'i as their foundation in order to stimulate the will, and stimulate the will in order to employ the four limbs, and the four limbs in order to employ the five weapons. Thus when the will is not stimulated, the soldiers will not die for honor. When the soldiers will not die for honor, even though they constitute a multitude, they will not be martial" (WLT CS, p. 71).
50. As Liu Yin discusses, the ruler should accord with the people's desires and social affairs to further structure and direct their activities (WLTCC WCCS, 1:20).
51. Following the Ming text and the understanding of WLT CCCY, p. 59, and WLT CY, p. 16, which assume the terms are correct as they stand-meaning a "company" and a "po," the officer for the company. However, note that WLT CS emends the text to the terms for the paths crisscrossing (and defining) the ancient agricultural fields and therefore, by implication, referring to the organizational cohesiveness of the agricultural community (cf. WLT CS, pp. 71-72. However, this seems contextually inappropriate). The WLT CC (p. 22) understands po as a larger unit, perhaps something like a double company or regiment, but the appearance of the term in Chapter 15 of the Wei Liao-tzu clearly shows it to be one hundred men, a company.
52. The RT prefaces the passage with "the Former Kings" (WLT CS, p. 71). In this case the remaining sentences would continue the description of the ancient practices by discussing their results rather than stating a general conclusion, as translated; the latter would be appropriate for a contemporary listener such as King Hui.
53. An "old" army is a prominent concept in the "Superior Strategy" of Huang Shih-kung. The proper behavior for a general exercising personal leadership is discussed in many military writings, including Chapter 23 of the Six Secret Teachings ("Encouraging the Army") and the "Superior Strategy" of Huang Shih-kung. They both contain descriptions similar to the ones found in this chapter.
54. The BS read "The military is solid through being quiet and victorious through being united." (WLT CS, p. 80; WLT CY, p. 22; WLT CC, p. 27.)
55. This clearly continues the observations and principles of the last chapter.
56. In Sun-tzu's conception, one of the commander's aims is to create a tactical balance of power (ch'uan) that dramatically favors him, resulting in an easy, overwhelming victory. Failing to effect this imbalance, the victory can only be viewed as fortuitous. (Cf. Sun-tzu's Art of War, Chapter 1, "Initial Estimations." Also refer to the notes to the translator's introduction and translation for a brief discussion of ch'uan, which is translated as "tactical balance of power" or sometimes "imbalance" of power to emphasize the desired orientation.)
57. The BS have "die for the Tao/Way" rather than "able to implement the Tao/ Way" (WLT CC, p. 28). Note the discussion of the general's awesomeness and the problem of doubt in the "Superior Strategy" of Huang Shih-kung, where the analogy of the mind and limbs is also used.
58. There are several interpretations of this seemingly simple sentence. Rulers frequently, and generals sometimes, are spoken of as "loving their people" or "loving their men." However, the phrase "loving and cherishing the minds of their men" is unusual and in the context of the passage that follows, seems to require understanding in a causative sense: "causing the minds of their men to love and cherish them," just as "causing their minds to fear and respect them." (Liu Yin's comment accords with the simple "loving the minds of the men"; our translation agrees with WLT CY, p. 23; and WLT CCCY, p. 78.) Another possibility is "Those who are not able with love and solicitude to cause their officers and troops to cherish them and submit cannot be employed by me; those who are unable with awesomeness and severity to cause the officers and troops to respect and fear them cannot direct the army for me" (see WLT CS, p. 82).
59. Possibly reflecting Sun-tzu's concepts in Art of War, Chapters 3 and 4, insofar as the wise general will not undertake an assault unless he can be victorious.
60. The term translated as "occupies ravines" is also the title of Chapter 50 in the Six Secret Teachings, "Divided Valleys." Throughout the Six Secret Teachings the authors advocate seizing and occupying such strategic points when outnumbered or otherwise at a disadvantage. The BS read somewhat differently: "Those imprisoned in a ravine have no mind to fight." (WLT CC, p. 28. See Chung's note 19 for a discussion of relevant ideas from Sun-tzu. However, he does not consider whether this situation is desperate enough to force the men's spirits to ultimate commitment.)
61. Following the Ming edition and Liu Yin, WLTCC WCCS, I:27B. Armies marching forth under the banner of righteousness, such as the effort led by King Wu of the Chou dynasty against the Shang, presumably have fervent public support and should therefore initiate action. Those contending over lesser, "nationalistic" state issues should respond rather than initiate action, probably to generate public support. The BS are completely contradictory: "One who awaits the enemy values being first" (WLT CC, p. 29, followed by WLT CS, p. 80).
62. BS have "During the conflict you must be timely" (WLT CC, p. 29).
63. This directive emphasizes speed in reaching the marshaling point for the offensive, apparently to take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; this is similar to the concept found in Art of War, Chapter 2, "Military Discussions." However, note that Sun-tzu clearly advised against this sort of exhaustive employment of military forces because it would make them susceptible to being defeated by any well-rested forces that might await them (see Art of War, Chapter 7, "Military Combat"). Although minor advances in transport technology may have occurred between the writing of the Art of War and the first chapters of the Wei Liao-tzu, even if more than two or three centuries had passed, without the advent of the cavalry, chariots and infantry would still only be able to cover roughly thirty Ii a day on an extended march.
64. Following WLT CCCY, p. 88; WLTCC WCCS, I:30A (Liu Yin's commentary); and WLT CS, p. 84. Two editions understand "fa," translated as "to construct," as "broken" or "destroyed," which seems unlikely (WLT CY, p. 22; WLT CC, p. 30). Constructing fording points (or possibly "ferries") and bridges would facilitate the general movement of defense forces; however, destroying them could thwart an enemy's advance, particularly in a concrete situation in which the invader's objective might be clear.
65. Literally, "guests," which should probably be understood as forces invading another state's territory-thus generally called a "guest" in military terms-or perhaps stationed inside foreign territory, just beyond the border, to prevent incursions.
66. Although these sentences certainly reflect Sun-tzu's thinking, they are not found in the Art of War.
67. Following WLT CCCY, p. 92. The commentators generally understand the term yii as "borders" or "border defense works."
68. The context clearly describes policies designed to deny all material aid and shelter to the invaders, forcing them to transport provisions extreme distances and thus expend great energy to maintain their siege. (Compare the ideas in the "Superior Strategy" of Huang Shih-kung.) Therefore, although a certain amount of preparatory destruction and loss is entailed, in general the defenders expend only a fraction of the enemy's energy to collect their foodstuffs, bring in their knocked-down shelters (rather than destroyed, as the commentators would have it), and prepare for the siege. The translation follows Liu Yin's commentary, WLTCC WCCS, I:31A, with whi
ch both the CCCY and CYeditions agree. However, Hsu Yung's CS edition, apparently misunderstanding it completely, views it as a discussion of ch'i (understood as spirit rather than effort or energy). Thus he translates it into modern Chinese as "In this fashion it causes the aggressor's spirit (ch'i) to grow and expand and the defenders' spirits to drop" (WLT CS, p. 89). Apparently in the belief that the passage continues the initial condemnation of inept actions, based on the YCS BS, he then translates the next sentence as "Once they encounter the enemy's advance and attack, the defending army will then sustain great losses" (WLT CS, p. 89).
69. From the earliest period down into the Warring States era, walls were generally made from tamped earth, sometimes packed within a permanent retaining form built of stones that then made up the exterior faces. Consequently, great effort was required to move the dirt necessary for a wall of any functional dimensions, and such walls-if never put to defensive use-would appear to be a wanton waste of energy.
70. Emending "wall" to "defend," according to the Sung edition.
71. The YCS CP have "the soldiers, people, and masses selected" (WLT CS, p. 88; WLT CC, p. 32).
72. Here the YCS CP text resolves a murky passage quite well, adding to the number of besieging forces the critical words "to balance," "to be suitable." Thus the sen tence would read "The attackers must not be less than a mass of more than one hundred thousand to be suitable [to the task]" (cf. WLT CS, pp. 88-89).
73. Liu Chung-p'ing interprets this as shielding and protecting the somewhat fragile earthen walls against damage from the natural elements, such as wind and rain (WLT CCCY, p. 97).
74. Strength broadly construed rather than simple numerical superiority, as some commentators suggest.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 62
