"I believe that when soldiers abandon their units and return home, the other members of their squad in the same barracks and their officers take their rations for their own consumption while the person is eating at home. Thus a person is nominally with the army, but in reality double the ration is expended. The resources of the state are then empty and completely exhausted, and the harvest is outside. [Alternative reading: (The troops) are outside for years.] How can the number fleeing to the interior [be reduced]?
"If they can be stopped from returning home, it prevents the loss of an army and is the first military victory. If the squads of five and ten are caused to be mutually bonded to the point that in battle the troops and officers will aid each other, this is the second military victory. If the general is able to establish his awesomeness, the soldiers to master and follow their instructions, while the commands and orders are clear and trusted, and attacking and defending are both properly executed, this is the third military victory.
"In antiquity those who excelled in employing the army could [bear to] kill half of their officers and soldiers. The next could kill 30 percent and the lowest 10 percent. The awesomeness of one who could sacrifice half of his troops is established within the Seas. The strength of one who could sacrifice 30 percent could be applied to the feudal lords. The orders of one who could sacrifice 10 percent would be implemented among his officers and troops. I have heard that a mass of a hundred ten-thousands that does not fight is not as good as the corpses of ten thousand men. Ten thousand men who do not die are not as good as the ghosts of one hundred men.
"When rewards are as clear as the sun and moon and as credible as the four seasons; when orders are as strict as the fu and yueh axes and as sharp as [the famous sword] Kan-chian, it has never been heard of that there were officers and troops who would not die in the lists!"
Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung
Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Books
Notes to the Translator's Introduction
1. For an extensive discussion, refer to Hsu Pao-lin, HSK CS, pp. 26-33, and especially pp. 29-30 for the history of the text in Japan.
2. For a general discussion, see ibid., pp. 1-18.
3. From Shih chi 55, "The Hereditary House of Marquis Liu." The translation is based on Takigawa Kametaro, Shiki kaichu kosho, 1-volume reprint, 1-wen yin-shu- kuan, Taipei, 1972 (Tokyo, 1932-1934), original edition, pp. 784-785.
4. Cf. Hsu Pei-ken, T'ai-kung Liu-t'ao chin-chu chin-i, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1976, pp. 29-31.
5. Quoted in Ch'ni Wan-li, Hsien-Ch'in wen-shih tzu-liao k'ao-pien (hereafter Hsien-Ch'in, Lien-ching, Taipei, 1983, p. 481.
6. A Sung scholar, Chang Shang-ying-who is closely identified with the Su shu (for which he wrote an introduction and a commentary), claimed that the famous work given to Chang Liang was neither the Three Strategies nor the Six Secret Teachings but instead was the Su shu. He further asserted that Chang Liang had ordered the book entombed with him to prevent the unworthy from obtaining it and that it had resurfaced only when discovered by grave robbers in the Chin dynasty. Although it is generally accepted that Chang forged the Su shu himself, the concept of burying works to prevent their transmission is worth noting. For a brief discussion of the Su shu, see Ch'u Wan-li, Hsien-Ch'in, p. 481; and Chang Hsin-ch'eng, ed., Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao (hereafter Weishu), Vol. 2, Taiwan Shangwu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1970 (reprint) (original edition, 1939), pp. 808-809.
7. Cf. Hsu Pao-lin, HSK CS, pp. 6-18.
8. Slightly later in his biography the Grand Historian writes, "Chang Liang exercised his persuasion on the Duke of P'ei (Liu Pang) with the military strategies of the T'ai Kung" (Takigawa, Shiki, p. 785). Chang Lieh advances the same conclusion. See Cheng Liang-shu, ed., Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao (hereafter Hsu Wei-shu), Vol. 3, Hsueh-sheng shu-chu, Taipei, 1984, pp. 1594-1597.
9. Cf. Hsu Pao-lin, HSK CS, pp. 6-9.
10. The former Han officially ended with Wang Mang usurping the throne and declaring himself the first emperor of the Hsin dynasty in A.D. 9. He was a member of the imperially related Wang family who exploited the family's power and influence, became regent for two youthful emperors, and finally reigned under his own authority. Accordingly, Hsu Pao-lin believes the Three Strategies describes the conditions leading to this usurpation, itemizing the dangers of powerful imperial relatives monopolizing power and of skilled politicians controlling affairs. However, rulers at every level of the old feudal hierarchy were equally confronted with such problems throughout ancient Chinese history, and many other strategists and intellectuals-including Han Fei- tzu-decried the situation. Hsu's argument that the passage about reducing the power of commanding generals after a campaign refers to the period following the establishment of the Han also lacks the singularity of uniqueness. Clearly, the Ch'in had also been confronted with demobilizing a tremendous force-a mass no longer bound to the land (cf. Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, Beacon Press, Boston, 1960, pp. 441-443)-as had other states after massive efforts and significant strategic victories during the Warring States period.
11. Hsu Pao-lin perceives a new realization of the value of strategic strongpoints in the Three Strategies, one that results from experiences gained in the increasingly vast scope of conflict leading to the establishment of the Han dynasty. This may, however, be a case of projecting historical events into strategic thought. The Six Secret Teachings had already advanced tactical methods for systematically exploiting configurations of terrain (as Hsu acknowledges), and the passage on which his view is based consists of only three four-character phrases. Cf. Hsu, HSK CS, pp. 22, 74-75.
12. See Wei Ju-lin's running comments throughout the HSK CCCY; and Hsu Paolin, HSK CS, especially pp. 10-13, as well as his running commentary and analysis. Hsu has perhaps artificially isolated Legalist elements that are an integral part of prior strategic thought. Wei's commentary tends to emphasize the book's continuity with previous military writings, especially the Six Secret Teachings.
13. Hsu, HSK CS, pp. 87-88, does not accept the possibility that it might bean interpolation.
14. Hsu believes the Three Strategies expresses a new, significantly advanced attitude toward the people because they are seen as being as essential as the general to attaining victory. Moreover, the general should have his intentions penetrate to the masses rather than simply commanding them while keeping them ignorant, as Sun-tzu advocated (see Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapter 11). Effective government presumably responds to the people's problems and needs, so a new relationship is thereby created (see Hsu, HSK CS, pp. 20-21, 57-58). However, Wei Ju-lin takes the opposite view (HSK CCCY, p. 39).
15. HSK CS, pp. 52, 108-111.
16. This spirit clearly pervades the entire Tao Te Ching. Readers unfamiliar with this Taoist classic can consult the readily available translations by D. C. Lau (see note 17), Wing-tsit Chan, or Arthur Waley.
17. This famous phrase is from Verse 31 and may also be translated "Weapons are inauspicious implements." It is followed by a second phrase, "There are things that abhor them" rather than "The Tao of Heaven abhors them." In his translation (Tao Te Ching, Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1982, p. 49) D. C. Lau notes that this verse lacks Wang Pi's commentary, leading to the suspicion that it may be a commentator's interpolation. At the same time the concept appears elsewhere, as in Kou Chien's biography in the Shih chi, 41 (Takigawa, Shiki, p. 654), and Chapter 12 of the Six Secret Teachings (cf. HSK CCCY, p. 123).
18. See Hsu, HSK CS, pp. 64, 96-97. It seems doubtful that the Three Strategies represents the most advanced conceptualization of character usage up until that time, as Hsu asserts.
19. Note how the concept of shame-which is vital to Confucian thought, the Wutzu, and other military writings-has been superseded.
20. The pivotal expression is found in the Tao Te Ching, Verse 78, "Under Heaven nothing is softer or weaker than water, but for attacking the firm and strong nothing is able to surpass it." Also note Verse 76.
21. The Thr
ee Strategies does not really expand on the referents of the hard and soft, the weak and strong, but merely mentions them in two passages. Once the duality is established, prolific speculation is possible.
22. Liu Yin, HSKCC WCCS, "Superior Strategy," 3B-4A.
Notes to the Text
1. Although this sentence is usually taken as referring to the "commander in chief" rather than the ruler, the subsequent content of the passage suggests it might be translated as "The ruler's method for command focuses on winning the minds of the valiant."
2. "All living beings" is actually expressed as "the category of [beings] containing ch'i." The conceptualization of men in terms of ch'i underlies the military psychology of courage, discipline, and ch'i manipulation, as can be seen in the other military classics as well.
3. "Pronouncements" appears to be the best English rendering for the term ch'en (Matthews #181, where the pronunciation is given as "ch'an"; Morohashi, #36144; and Ta Chung-wen ts'u-tien, #36986), which basically means prophecy or verification. However, these "pronouncements" generally seem to be based on military experience and common sense rather than on prognostications about the future. They predict the results that will be obtained from following particular courses of action in certain situations and also provide abstracted wisdom. The original source for these quotations, if one existed, has been lost. As discussed in the translator's introduction, Hsu Pao-lin cites the use of this term as evidence that the text was composed in the Han period, based on his assertion that the character ch'en does not appear before the Ch'in dynasty (HSK CS, p. 15). Also note HSK CCCY, p. 40.
4. This sentence is cited as evidence of the Taoist influence in the text. The Three Strategies obviously differs from a purely passive posture in advocating the appropriate use of both the hard and soft, even though in a relativistic sense, the soft can overcome the hard. Accordingly, Hsu Pao-lin asserts that the work is a product of HuangLao Taoism and therefore could not have been written until Huang-Lao thought developed and flourished in the Former Han era (HSK CS, pp. 10-13).
5. "Brigand" appears to be the best translation for the term tsei, which originally carried the strong meaning of harming or killing people and committing crimes against the established order (such as an officer killing his superior or ruler). It also had a class or social status basis because presumably the mean or common people could only commit tao, which primarily meant robbery but also included the murder of officials. Cf. Tu Cheng-sheng, "Ch'uan-t'ung fa-tien shih-yuan-ch'ien lun Li Li Fa-ching to went'i," in Hsu Cho-yun, Chung-kuo li-shih lun-wen-chi, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1986, pp. 433-438. Tsei may also be translated as "bandit" and "murderer."
6. Wei Ju-lin believes there must be an error in the text because basic military thought dictates seizing the active role rather than responding. See HSK CCCY, p. 42. (However, permitting affairs to begin to unfold may also allow taking control and therefore still being the manipulator.)
7. This four-character phrase is somewhat problematic. According to the Ming commentator Liu Yin (HSKCC WCCS, 1:8), the enemies who harm and insult the ruler are to be overturned. (However, the character may be a loan for "investigated" rather than overturned.) Those whose offenses are not serious are to be tolerated to see whether they reform. Hsu Pao-lin glosses it as "to warn" (HSK CS, pp. 35 and 42). Alternatively, this may be a fragment that means "restore the decimated."
8. Some commentators, including Hsu Pao-lin (HSK CS, p. 35), interpret this causatively-make the enemy depart so as to tire him. Others read it more simply, as to depart yourself. The latter seems preferable, even though it is a general principle of the military works that one should exhaust an enemy by moving him about. Note Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Chapters 5 and 6.
9. Liu Yin elaborates this as "Accord with the desires of the people to initiate appropriate measures" rather than simply responding in an active fashion to his plans and movements. See HSKCC WCCS, I:9B.
10. Another interpretation would be "Spread accusations and point out his errors," which would be a basic propaganda measure in psychological warfare.
11. Liu Yin believes this sentence should be understood as "Set out a net of principles to catch the Worthy" (HSKCC WCCS, I:9B). Hsii's modern translation has "Establish ambushes on all four sides to encircle and destroy them" (HSK CS, p. 43).
12. Wu Ch'i both advocated and embodied this principle.
13. This incident (circa 375 B.c.) involved Kou Chien, king of Yiieh, prior to the war that annihilated the state of Wu. Consequently, it is argued that the Three Strategies must have been written after 375 B.C. (assuming the incident is not a later interpolation).
14. This is virtually a quotation from Wu Ch'i's biography in the Shih chi, which has been translated in the translator's introduction to the Wu-tzu. A similar passage is also found at the end of Chapter 4 in the Wei Liao-tzu.
15. This echoes, if not copies, Sun-tzu's analysis in the Art of War, Chapter 5, "Strategic Configuration of Power."
16. There are two interpretations of this passage. One is expressed by the translation; the other would run "Thus officers can be treated with deference, but they cannot be treated arrogantly."
17. Wealth may refer here to the general's possessions, goods brought in by merchants, excessive materials for the army, or perhaps the gifts and bribes of other states. In all cases temptation arises, and evil follows.
18. This is essentially a summation of the allegory used by the T'ai Kung in his initial interview with King Wen of the Chou dynasty, as preserved in the first chapter of the Six Secret Teachings.
19. The Three August Ones are variously identified; however, they represent the ultimate embodiment of government through radiant Virtue and profound nonaction. The five legendary emperors, again variously identified, followed them and were much more active-creating culture and the essential artifacts of civilization. In the Taoist view, as civilization declined from Virtue into artifice, rulers became more active-increasingly interfering in people's lives and creating laws, taxes, and bureaucratic burdens. The Confucians held a similar "decline from Virtue" view, attributing the world's problems to a lack of such Sages and the failure of moral values to be practiced-not because of the activity of the great rulers but in spite of it.
20. The Army's Strategic Power is presumably another lost text. Whether this was an actual book or merely a convenient title created by the authors to attribute sayings-actual or conveniently concocted-that justified their thoughts is unknown.
21. This hierarchy of armies allocated on the basis of feudal rank perhaps represented the conditions at the start of the Chou dynasty, but by the middle of the Spring and Autumn period, the stronger states had five or more such armies-assuming an army to be 12,500 men.
22. This sentence is cited as evidence that the work was composed after the Han dynasty had restored peace and tranquility. Hsu Pao-lin further asserts that it comes from a dialogue recorded in a Shih chi biography, proving a post-Shih chi date of composition (HSK CS, p. 15).
23. The character for "pleasure"and "music" is the same but with different pronunciations. Because the Confucians believed that the forms of propriety and music were essential elements of the foundation of personal development and education, the character is translated as music. However, "pleasure" would work equally well, reading: "Their physical submission is attained through the forms of propriety; their mental submission is attained through pleasure. What I refer to as pleasure is not the sound of musical instruments." The senses are never mutually exclusive. Mencius has a famous discussion with King Hui of Liang on music, pleasure, and the responsibilities of rulership (Book I), which this passage clearly draws on. In addition, numerous passages in the Hsun-tzu and the Li chi couple the forms of propriety-the li-with music. Although proper, volitional practice of the li results in self-cultivation and emotional alchemy, music is recognized as being truly influential in harmonizing and developing the emotions. Hsu Pao-lin's comments agree with the present translation (ibid., p. 100). Most c
ommentators simply avoid the question by merely repeating the character for music/pleasure in their notes without further elaboration.
24. Literally, "lost." Some commentators, such as Hsu Pao-lin, take this as referring to the ruler's errors in framing commands. Others understand it as failures in execution at the highest level, which then work down to affect even the lowest officials. See ibid., pp. 105 and 123.
25. The "discontented" might also refer to the source of discontent, the laws that are causing the problem (cf. Hsu, ibid., p. 105, who understands it in this way).
26. The four classes of people are the shih (officers, old nobility, members of the bureaucracy, literati), farmers, artisans, and merchants.
Questions and Replies Between T'ang Tai-tsung and Li Wei-kung
Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Books
Notes to the Translator's Introduction
1. In addition to the Sui and T'ang dynastic histories, the general introduction is based primarily on the following works: Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, general eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3: Sui and Tang China, 589-906, Part I, Cambridge University Press, London, 1979; Arthur F. Wright, The Sui Dynasty, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1978; Arthur E. Wright and Denis Twitchett, eds., Perspectives on the Tang, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1973; Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1970; Fu Yueh-ch'eng, Chung-kuo t'ung-shih, 2 vols., Ta-Chung-kuo t'ushu kung-ssu, Taipei, 1985 (reprint) (original ed., 1960); Hsu Cho-yun, ed., Chungkuo li-shih lun-wen-chi, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1986; and Hsu Pei-ken et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng-shih, Li-ming, Taipei, 1976 (rev. ed.), Vol. 7 and Vol. 8.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 65
