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Henry Sidgwick- Eye of the Universe

Page 107

by Bart Schultz


  liquor-laws.” (EP –)

  Sidgwick is of course well aware of how the demand for voter confidence

  might undercut the point of democracy, since a legislature representing

  only certain class interests could be even harsher toward those excluded

  than a despot with fewer prejudices. But for all that, he is quite liberal in

  excluding people from the franchise:

  On the whole it would seem that the permanent exclusion of any class of sane

  self-supporting adults, on account of poverty alone, from the share of the control

  over legislation which the representative system aims at giving to the citizens

  at large, is not easily defensible in face of a strong and steady demand for their

  admission. It is less difficult to maintain such an exclusion in the case of avoidable ignorance of an extreme kind: i.e. to refuse the suffrage to persons who have not

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  attained a certain educational standard, provided that facilities for education are

  within the reach of all classes. Various other exclusions are permanently defensible

  on different grounds. Thus it seems reasonable to withhold the suffrage – partly

  as a deterrent, partly as a security against its perversion – from persons who have

  committed grave offences of any kind; also from all who have been convicted of

  buying or selling votes, or intimidating electors. In some cases, disgraceful con-

  duct not amounting to crime seems a sufficient ground for exclusion – e.g. the

  keeping of a brothel, where this is tolerated. It also seems reasonable to disfran-

  chise temporarily persons who without crime have so far failed to maintain their

  economic independence as to receive support as paupers from public funds; on

  the ground that their use of the vote as a protection of their political interests is specially unlikely to be advantageous to the public. Other temporary exclusions

  appear to be desirable for reasons that involve no sort of discredit. Thus, as we

  have seen, the ordinary objections to electoral restrictions do not apply in the case of exclusion on the ground of youth and inexperience; and it seems reasonable to

  impose, as a condition of the suffrage, an inferior limit of age somewhat higher

  than that of ordinary legal maturity; so that a man may not have a share in the

  control of public affairs until after some years of the experience gained by the

  independent management of his own affairs. Again, when we examine the possi-

  bilities of bringing the motive of private interest into illicit operation in political elections, we are led to distinguish a special class of persons in whose case this

  operation cannot effectually be excluded, except by a partial withdrawal of the

  right of voting. I mean persons employed by candidates or their friends for the

  work of an election. A similar danger exists in some measure in the case of perma-

  nent employment, private or governmental: but not such as to justify a sweeping

  disfranchisement of employees, provided that the independence of the latter is

  tolerably secured by the protection of the ballot or otherwise. There is, however,

  a special ground for excluding from the exercise of the suffrage such employees

  of government as are charged with the function of physical coercion – policemen

  or soldiers on service – on the score of the peculiar importance of keeping them

  impartial in political conflicts. (EP –)

  As one might expect, there is a fairly nuanced discussion of the en-

  franchisement of women, though Sidgwick admits that, sad to say, “if we

  seek for a definition of democracy applicable to modern facts, it seems

  necessary to limit the ‘governed’ whose consent is required to ‘sane law-

  abiding adult men’ ” (EP ). But he can see “no adequate reason for

  refusing the franchise to any sane self-supporting adult otherwise eligible,

  on the score of her sex alone.” Indeed, “there is a danger of material in-

  justice resulting from such refusal, so long as the State leaves unmarried

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  women and widows to struggle for a livelihood in the general industrial

  competition, without any special privileges or protection.” (EP )

  Sidgwick makes short, rather sarcastic work of the claims that the fran-

  chise belongs to those who can defend the country when attacked, or who

  represent a preponderance of physical force: the “manifest superiority

  of trained soldiers in physical conflict” would, on this argument, require

  that they receive “electoral power out of proportion to their numbers”

  (EP ).

  The matter of race as a possible ground for exclusion from the franchise

  is one that Sidgwick treats in a much more gingerly fashion. He appears

  to have maintained a certain agnosticism on the subject that allowed him

  to remain at least somewhat loyal to Mill’s emphasis on racial equality.

  Thus,

  Exclusion on the ground of race alone may be expedient if the general intellectual

  or moral inferiority of the race excluded is sufficiently clear. But a political society in which such exclusion is an important question, will be necessarily different

  from that which has been generally contemplated in the discussions of the present

  treatise, and will be likely to require different laws in other matters besides the

  franchise. (EP )

  The “present treatise” had of course considered such countries as the

  United States and Australia. Furthermore, in a note to his discussion on

  colonization, he remarks,

  Of course if it should become clear that the social amalgamation of two races

  would be debasing to the superior race, or otherwise demonstrably opposed to

  the interests of humanity at large, every effort ought to be made to carry into

  effect some drastic and permanent measures of separation. But I do not think

  that any proof has yet been brought adequate to support such a conclusion.

  (EP )

  This is Sidgwick’s characteristic way of commenting on the issue.

  In correspondence, he repeatedly states that there is no evidence wor-

  thy of the designation “scientific” for inherent racial differences when

  it comes to such things as intelligence and moral capacity. But his

  views on race and prejudice are perhaps not so innocent, and will be

  treated more fully later, when discussing the issues of colonialism and

  imperialism.

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  In addressing Sidgwick’s conception of democracy, with its severe lim-

  itations on the franchise, it is vital to bear in mind that his main worry was


  how to ensure justice in legislation: “I did not mean to imply that good

  legislation is a kind of bargain struck between conflicting class-interests; it

  is the interest of the whole, which includes justice to all the parts, at which

  the statesman should aim: and justice, as Mill says, consists in giving a

  man not the half of what he asks, but the whole of what he ought to have”

  (EP –). Restriction of the suffrage admittedly runs the risk that the

  interests of the unenfranchised class will be unfairly sacrificed, but on

  the other side, “a widely extended suffrage involves a danger . . . that the ultimate interests of the whole community may be sacrificed to the real or

  apparent class-interests of the numerical majority of the electors, either

  through ignorance or through selfishness and limitation of sympathy”

  (EP ). Sidgwick thinks that the latter danger “may be more or less

  effectively met by giving the wealthier and more educated classes a repre-

  sentation in the legislature out of proportion to their numbers,” which is

  in effect the aim of most bicameral legislative structures.

  But the general means and principles by which this might be done are

  very problematic. Given Mill’s views on the matter, Sidgwick is naturally

  appreciative of the importance of weighted or plural voting schemes, ac-

  cording to which either certain classes or certain individuals are given

  proportionately more voting power. He allows that there are some argu-

  ments for so weighting the votes of the rich, since “man for man, the rich

  have more important interests to defend than the poor.” But he is more

  impressed by the idea that “superior political knowledge and insight”

  come

  to be possessed on the average by the classes with larger incomes; partly from their

  more advanced education, and the habits of reading and thought thus acquired,

  partly from the exercise of intellect involved in the management of property, in

  the direction of industrial and commercial undertakings, and in the work of the

  ‘learned’ professions and other higher forms of skilled labour.

  Still, superiority of this form “does not universally, or at all uniformly,

  accompany wealth,” and any system of weighted voting would have to

  allow the poor to demonstrate that they had the requisite intellectual

  superiority. (EP –)

  In fact, on balance, Sidgwick finds these schemes to be faced by

  very grave difficulties. Any plan for implementing the recognition of the

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  superiority of wealth or intelligence would have to be “to a great extent

  arbitrary: we have no means of determining, with any pretence to exact-

  ness, how much additional electoral power is due to wealth on account

  of the implication of social with private interests, or how much properly

  corresponds to any available evidence of probable superiority in politi-

  cal judgment.” Any scheme would have to be left open to change, and

  would more or less perpetually encourage political agitation in some di-

  rection. Furthermore, as for any balance of interests, “it is impossible

  to divide society into classes which remain identical and equally distinct

  for all legislative purposes: as we pass from one proposed law to another,

  we find that the important lines of division are continually changing.”

  Thus, sometimes the conflicts are between agricultural interests and man-

  ufacturing ones, sometimes between manual laborers and artisans, and so

  on, so that any weighting of the vote in favor of wealth might aggra-

  vate “the natural inequalities of a modern industrial society by adding

  artificial political inequalities to correspond” and “cause a real injus-

  tice corresponding to the appearance.” (EP –) Finally, weighting

  in terms of superior political knowledge and judgment is also bound to be

  arbitrary:

  For, in the present state of the political art, such superiority is largely derived

  from personal experience, and reflection on such experience: and in any case

  requires a steady direction of thought to political questions, of which, in most

  cases, a satisfactory guarantee is not afforded either by prolonged education, or

  certificates of scholastic attainments, or the exercise of professinal functions. A

  thoughtful artisan who has only had an elementary education may easily have

  more political insight – and even knowledge – than e.g. a schoolmaster, physi-

  cian, or engineer whose intellectual energies are absorbed in his special pursuit.

  (EP )

  As Sidgwick goes on pointedly to observe, even without formal ad-

  vantages in voting power, the rich “are likely always to count practically

  for more than one vote each.” Bribery cannot be altogether prevented,

  nor intimidation, and more importantly, “gratitude for services, private

  or public – and hopes of similar services in the future – will always be

  motives operating on the side of wealthy candidates, or candidates with

  wealthy backers.” Something of the same applies to superior intelligence,

  since when directed to “political exposition and persuasion” it will also

  wield great indirect electoral power.

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  Such considerations as these “somewhat reduce the danger that a widely

  extended suffrage prima facie involves, of legislation in which the interests of the rich minority are sacrificed to those of the poor majority in a manner

  disadvantageous to the community as a whole.” They do not, however,

  demonstrate that such dangers are “immaterial,” and Sidgwick allows

  that they are “likely to become more formidable in the future history of

  Western Europe and America.” After all, “we have not yet seen the working

  of a thoroughly organised democracy, with a strong urban element, in a

  crowded country with very marked contrasts of wealth and poverty.” Still,

  Sidgwick thinks it preferable, if at all possible, “to meet this danger by

  developing the natural and legitimate influence of wealth, when used as

  a means of performing social services, and of intelligence, when directed

  to political instruction and persuasion.” Should these prove inadequate,

  then artificial weighting measures might be called for, and the plural vote

  would be more workable than unequally represented classes. In any event,

  if the weighted-vote scheme is to work, “the standard either of wealth or

  intellectual attainment should be low, so that the increased electoral power

  allotted to them may be widely shared, and the invidiousness of heaping

  votes on a privileged few may be avoided.” (EP –)

  In the course of these discussions, Sidgwick makes some singularly<
br />
  illuminating remarks, delicately tucked away in notes. Thus, he wants

  to make it clear, however discreetly, that the unequal share of wealth of

  any given rich individual does not call for special protection on utilitar-

  ian grounds, given that inequality is prima facie not in accord with the

  general happiness. But with an eye toward Mill, he goes on to explain

  that we “cannot indeed say that every man’s happiness is of equal im-

  portance as an element of the general happiness; because development

  of intellect and refinement of taste generally imply a capacity for supe-

  rior pleasures. But it is just because this higher kind of happiness is at

  present enjoyed by few that a distribution of wealth much less unequal

  than the present would be undoubtedly desirable if it could be effected

  without any material diminution in the total amount to be distributed.”

  (EP ) Moreover, he has high hopes for the future progress of eco-

  nomic and political science. He doubts that “the value of political insight

  is underrated by thoughtful persons generally in any class.” If the less ed-

  ucated “have now a difficulty in determining where it lies, and are liable to

  take a charlatan for a statesman, it is largely because educated opinion is so

  divided; – because the ‘royal art’ of government, as judged by the criterion

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  of ‘consensus of experts,’ is still in so rudimentary a condition.” In the

  future, as knowledge progresses, “disinterested students of politics should

  come to greater agreement,” and consequently it is “reasonable to hope

  that the less educated will in preponderant numbers follow their lead.”

  (EP –) Clearly, the advancement of the educating society is a matter

  of some urgency.

  Interestingly, when Sidgwick comes to the matter of legislative districts

  and the issue of proportional representation, he strongly dissents from

  the plan of Thomas Hare, which had been so enthusiastically endorsed

  by Mill in Considerations. The idea of obtaining a truer representation

  by “the formation of constituencies by free combination, independent of

 

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