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Henry Sidgwick- Eye of the Universe

Page 116

by Bart Schultz


  persons; and even, perhaps, with approval, if the government of the conquerors

  was shown by experience to be not designedly oppressive or unjust; since the

  benefits of completer internal peace and order, improved industry, enlarged op-

  portunities of learning a better religion and a truer science, would be taken – and,

  on the whole, I think, rightly taken – to compensate for the probable sacrifice of

  the interests of the conquered to those of the conquerors, whenever the two came

  into collision. (EP )

  Indeed, it is in this context that Sidgwick warmly recounts some of the

  genuinely “remunerative” factors involved in colonization:

  [T]here are sentimental satisfactions, derived from justifiable conquests, which

  must be taken into account, though they are very difficult to weigh against the

  material sacrifices and risks. Such are the justifiable pride which the cultivated

  members of a civilised community feel in the beneficent exercise of dominion, and

  in the performance by their nation of the noble task of spreading the highest kind of civilisation; and a more intense though less elevated satisfaction – inseparable from patriotic sentiment – in the spread of the special type of civilisation distinctive of their nation, communicated through its language and literature, and through the

  tendency to imitate its manners and customs which its prolonged rule, especially

  if on the whole beneficent, is likely to cause in a continually increasing degree.

  (EP )

  This is “spiritual expansion,” such as occurred, he suggests, with the

  French in Algeria. The contrast is supposedly with the “physical expan-

  sion which takes place when the conquered region is so thinly populated

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  as to afford room for a considerable immigration of the conquerors.”

  Unfortunately, Sidgwick rather glosses over the ways in which this might

  be associated with unjustifiable as well as justifiable conquests, and in-

  stead turns his attention back to the more common denotation of the

  term “colonisation,” given earlier, observing that the “rational motives

  to colonisation, in this narrower sense, are partly the same as those that

  prompt to the conquest of semi-civilised countries.” (EP ).

  In a revealing note, he admits that it is often difficult “to estimate the

  force of the desire for national expansion, – including the desire of culti-

  vated minds to spread the special type of civilisation which they enjoy –

  as distinguished from the more primitive impulse to the amelioration of

  the emigrants’ condition.” He goes on to discuss the peculiar relation-

  ship between Great Britain and the United States, observing that despite

  their economic and political rivalry, “if we derive any satisfaction from the

  expansion of the English race, and of the English type of civilisation as

  communicated through its language, literature, and law, the prosperous

  growth of the community inhabiting the United States must be regarded

  as the most important means to this end – and perhaps more important

  than if the colony had remained in political connexion with England.” In

  one of his better forecasts, he explains that “if any existing language should

  ever become the one common language of civilised man it will probably be

  English: and the chief cause of this result, if it should be brought about,

  will probably be the growth and commercial pre-eminence of the United

  States.” (EP )

  Thus, spiritual expansion may actually be at odds with the expansion

  or maintenance of the colonial empire and at any rate needs to be distin-

  guished from more narrowly self-interested aims. And it is at this juncture

  that Sidgwick finally addresses in a more direct fashion some of the ex-

  plosive racial questions arising out of colonial expansion:

  It remains to speak of the management of the relations between civilised settlers

  and the uncivilised tribes inhabiting the district into which immigration takes

  place – commonly called the ‘aborigines.’ It is not without hesitation that I venture to touch this question, as I can only treat it in a very brief and general way; while any student of the history of European colonisation must be profoundly impressed

  with its difficulty. What a well-informed writer [Merivale], by no means unduly

  sentimental, called the ‘wretched details of the ferocity and treachery which have

  marked the conduct of civilised men in their relations with savages,’ forms one of

  the most painful chapters in modern history; all the more painful from the frequent

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  evidence it gives of benevolent intentions, and even beneficent efforts, on the part

  of the rulers of the superior race. At present in England there is a general agreement that the wellbeing of the uncivilised first-comers, found in regions colonised by

  civilised men, should be earnestly and systematically kept in view by the governors

  of these latter; and that the ‘aborigines’ should be adequately compensated for any

  loss that they may suffer from the absorption of their territory – and ultimately

  of themselves – by the expanding civilised societies. It is therefore permissible to

  hope that in the future some closer approach may be made to the realisation of

  this ideal than has been made in the past. (EP –)

  At least Sidgwick fretted over this subject a good deal. In a letter to

  Bryce, complaining about his slow progress, he explained that “there is

  a horrid new chapter on ‘Principles of External Policy’ which has been

  giving me trouble for weeks: I am trying to find something judicious to

  say on the treatment of ‘aborigines’ but have not yet succeeded.” Bryce

  responded: “The greatest difficulty about the aborigines question seems

  to be the question of their lands – as to which there are many American

  [duties?] but none that clear up the practical perplexities of reconciling

  justice with the ‘progress of civilization.’” (CWC)

  As Sidgwick sees it, one central issue concerns the difference between

  colonies “where the manual labour can be and will be supplied by the

  civilised race” and those where “it can only supply capital and superior

  kinds of labour.”

  In the first case the main difficulties of the problem are likely to be transient;

  the incoming tide of civilised immigration will gradually modify or submerge the

  barbarism of the aborigines; so that ultimately the question, how to deal with such

  of them as may survive without becoming really fit for civilised work, will sink

  into a part of the general question of dealing with the incapable and recalcitrant

  elements found in all civilised communities. But in its early stages the collision

  of races is likely to be more intense in colonies of this cl
ass; since the process of settlement inevitably involves more disturbance of the economic conditions of the

  life of the aborigines.

  On the other hand, in colonies where the superior race does not supply the

  manual labour, the difficulties of governing a community composed of elements

  very diverse in intellectual and moral characteristics must be expected to last

  indefinitely longer; but there is no stage at which the conflict of interests need be quite so acute as in the former. (EP )

  Sidgwick believes that the former case has been more important his-

  torically, but that “its importance is rapidly diminishing, and in most of

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  the territories open to the future expansion of civilised European States,

  manual labour is likely to be mainly performed by non-European races.”

  But he also tries to downplay the significance of his remarks, explaining

  that he will not discuss either case in detail, but only “indicate briefly

  the nature of the problems that arise and the principles prima facie ap-

  plicable to them, in accordance with the general view of politics taken

  in the present treatise.” Astonishingly, he actually goes on to say that he

  will “not attempt to distinguish between the international duty and the

  interest of the civilised nation aiming at expansion,” because “here, as

  elsewhere, duty and interest are mostly coincident.” Still, he would have

  it understood that he has in view “as ultimate end, the aggregate happiness

  of all the human beings concerned, civilised and uncivilised – native or

  imported.” If it “does not seem possible – even if it were desirable – to

  check the expansion of civilised Europe,” then “the problem of regulat-

  ing and governing composite social aggregates, with a civilised minority

  superimposed on a semi-civilised majority, must be regarded as one of

  the most important proposed for European statesmanship in the proxi-

  mate future.” (EP –) With this statement, the growth of federation

  starts to look more worrisome, as a way of regulating the behavior of the

  “civilised minority superimposed.”

  And now, having thus done his best to cast a soft light on the hard realities

  of European expansion, stress the importance of the issue, and confess the

  inadequacies of his treatment of it, Sidgwick finally brings himself to

  some broader statements of principle. On the topic of the “civilised” State

  claiming supreme control over the territory in question:

  It would be going too far to say that no exercise of power over these latter is

  justifiable, unless the general consent of the persons subjected to it may be pre-

  sumed from agreements formally made by their chiefs or on some other adequate

  ground. But we may say that no serious interference of the civilised government

  with the aborigines should take place without such evidence of consent, except

  under circumstances which afford a special justification for it; – as (e.g.) when the civilised State has been victorious in a war provoked by the aggression of the inferior race, or when the interference is necessary for the security of its own subjects in the exercise of rights that they may fairly claim, or to protect the natives from

  the evils of intercourse with the most lawless and degraded elements of civilised

  society. Further, the claim of sovereignty should not be understood to carry with

  it any obligation to interfere with the laws and customs of the aborigines, even

  when opposed to civilised morality. Such interference should be regulated by an

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  unprejudiced regard of the social wellbeing of the tribes subjected to it; which

  might be seriously impaired by the sudden abolition even of pernicious customs.

  (EP )

  Government may also have to control the sale and purchase of lands,

  in order to prevent the aborigines from being taken advantage of. Even

  when the aborigines may not have conceptualized their “property rights,”

  compensation should be made “for the loss of the utilities in the way of

  hunting, fishing, etc., which they have been accustomed to derive from

  such lands.”

  As for further restrictions on the free interaction between settlers and

  aborigines, these need to be worked out on a case-by-case basis. The famil-

  iar examples of the “prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors, and the

  prohibition of the sale of firearms” being in principle defensible, Sidgwick

  goes further, suggesting that “in some cases a more complete separation

  of races, and a more thorough tutelage of the inferior race, would seem to

  be temporarily desirable.” But he hastens to add that it is “hardly likely

  that this kind of artificial isolation can ever be more than partially success-

  ful,” and that “such measures should generally be regarded as essentially

  transitional, and only adopted – if at all – in order better to prepare the

  aborigines for complete social amalgamation with the colonising race.” It

  is in this connection that he allows, in the footnote quoted earlier, that

  there has been no proof adequate to support the conclusion that “the so-

  cial amalgamation of two races would be debasing to the superior race,”

  though if this were clearly demonstrable, permanent forms of separation

  would be justifiable. (EP )

  Furthermore, the government must ensure that the punishment of

  crimes against the settlers proceed “within the limits of strict justice,”

  though the crucial object is less to achieve “pedantic adhesion to the forms

  of civilised judicial procedure” and more to “impress the intellect of the

  aborigines with the relation between offence and punishment.” On the

  matter of education, however, Sidgwick is insistent that the aborigines are

  owed much more than mere “industrial education.” The educational task

  should include all kinds of instruction required to fit the inferior race to share the life of civilised mankind. In particular, though the religion of the settlers should

  not be compulsorily imposed on the natives, every encouragement should be given

  to the effort of missionaries to teach it. Experience seems to show that the potency

  of such teaching as an instrument of civilisation varies very much in different

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  Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe

  cases, but few will doubt the desirability of allowing full scope to its application.

  (EP )

  Finally:

  One of the most indisputable services that – as we may hope – the expansion of

  civilised States is d
estined to confer on uncivilised humanity is the abolition of

  the evils of enslavement, and of the wars and raids that have enslavement for their

  object; and, ultimately, of the condition of slavery. But it may often be expedient

  that this latter result should be only gradually attained: while, on the other hand,

  even where the status of slavery is formally excluded by law, special restrictions

  on freedom of contract between natives and settlers are likely to be required in

  the case of contracts of service; since, if such contracts are left unrestricted, there is some risk that the inferior race may be brought too completely into the power

  of private employers. This point is of course peculiarly important in the case of

  colonies in which the superior race cannot or will not undertake the main part

  of the manual work required: in this case the demand of the capitalist employer

  for a steady supply of reliable labour led modern civilisation in its earlier stage

  back to the institution of slavery in an extreme form: and prompts even now to

  longing aspirations after some system of compulsory labour, which shall have

  the economic advantages of slavery without its evils. But I know no ground for

  thinking that such a system can be devised: and should accordingly deprecate any

  attempt to approximate to it. I do not therefore infer – as some have inferred – that contracts of long duration ought to be prohibited altogether; but only that they

  ought to be carefully supervised and closely watched. The need for this vigilance

  arises equally – it may be even greater – when the labourers in question are not

  natives, but aliens belonging to a lower grade of civilisation; at the same time there are strong economic reasons for introducing labour from abroad in colonies of

  this class, where the natives are either not sufficiently numerous or wanting in

  industrial capacity. (EP –)

  Indeed, Sidgwick insists that in

  regulating the relations between aborigines and settlers, the care of Government

  will be specially needed to prevent the interests of the former from being dam-

  aged through the occupation of land by the latter. We may lay down that the

  aborigines should never be deprived of any definite rights of property without full

  compensation; and that, so far as possible, such rights should be only ceded volun-

  tarily. I cannot, indeed, hold that compulsory transfer is in principle inadmissable; since I cannot regard savages as having an absolute right to keep their hunting-grounds from agricultural use, any more than an agricultural occupant in a civilised

 

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