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Henry Sidgwick- Eye of the Universe

Page 138

by Bart Schultz


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  Notes to Pages –

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  is of course controversial, though I think highly plausible, particularly if utilitarianism is understood in a broader way, with less of a fixation on “maximizing” as

  opposed to “satisficing.” See, especially, T. D. Campbell’s excellent work Adam

  Smith’s Science of Morals (London: Allen and Unwin, ); Ian Simpson Ross’s The Life of Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ) gives a clear and concise statement of the view, and some helpful points of comparison with Hume – see,

  e.g., p. .

  . Mill, Utilitarianism, p. .

  . J.B.Scheewind,“SidgwickandtheCambridgeMoralists,”inSchultz,ed., Essays,

  p. .

  . Interestingly, Skorupski has also noted how, from certain angles, Mill and

  Sidgwick seem closer than has been supposed: “the difference between Mill and

  Sidgwick is not great. Both think that fundamental principles of reasoning are

  located by reflective scrutiny, which identifies what our most fundamental com-

  mitments are. In both cases there is also an appeal to the systematic coherence a

  principle can provide, and to the general agreement it can secure. Nor does Mill

  deny that a fundamental principle, either of theoretical or of practical reasons, is

  a requirement of reason. . . . his standpoint on reason is naturalistic, not sceptical.

  And on the other hand Sidgwick does not put his self-evident rational intuitions

  into an explicitly anti-naturalistic Kantian or Platonic setting.” See his English-Language Philosophy, – (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), p. .

  Hurka, in “Moore in the Middle,” takes sharp issue with any such account of

  the differences between Sidgwick and Moore, questioning “whether there is

  a significant difference between non-naturalisms that do and do not posit non-

  natural properties” (p. ). But he leaves it open how to draw the larger

  moral: “that Moore’s metaethics were no more metaphysically suspect than

  Sidgwick’s, or that Sidgwick’s were as hopelessly extravagant as Moore’s.”

  Gibbard’s “Normative and Recognitional Concepts” is suggestive of how to push

  the former line, though Gibbard’s own expressivist position is rather similar to

  Russell’s noncognitivist appropriation of Sidgwick’s intuitionism in Human So-

  ciety in Ethics and Politics. Sidgwick and Moore remained cognitivists, taking ethical claims as having truth value.

  . Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics, p. .

  . Sidgwick, it must be admitted, did much to contribute to the unfortunate ten-

  dency to seize on some of the less perspicuous passages of Mill’s Utilitarianism in order to demonstrate his supposed failings as a logician. See Crisp’s critical discussion of Mill in his edition of Utilitarinism and his Mill on Utilitarianism.That Mill did not suffer from many of the confusions critics have attributed to him

  is plain. To assess the worth of Sidgwick’s argument, however, it is necessary

  to ask why he was so persuaded that only intuitionism could afford a rational

  justification of first principles.

  . An especially helpful discussion, produced while work was proceeding on the

  Methods, is to be found in Sidgwick’s “Verification of Beliefs,” Contemporary Review  (July ), pp. –. The earlier and in some ways more revealing

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  version of this, delivered to the Metaphysical Society, is reproduced for the first

  time in CWC.

  . See the excellent discussion in Shaver, Rational Egoism, pp. –.

  . Sidgwick, “Utilitarianism,” p. .

  . See, e.g., PSR.

  . Thus, William Frankena, in “Henry Sidgwick,” in The Encyclopedia of Morals, ed. V. Ferm (New York: Philosophical Library, ), finds eight; Schneewind,

  in Sidgwick’s Ethics, ultimately settles on four. The latter seems the more helpful account.

  . It is this gap, between what the axioms actually accomplish by way of crediting

  the powers of pure practical reason, and the greater claims of utilitarianism on

  the matter of the nature of the good and its maximization, that suggests how close

  Skorupski’s “generic” or “philosophical” utilitarianism actually is to Sidgwick’s

  position–see his Ethical Explorations for an extended account. The parallels are even more striking if one holds, as Shaver does, that Sidgwick’s account of the

  justification of egoism is not on the same level or as compelling as his defense of

  universal concern or impartiality; see the discussion in the following sections of

  this chapter.

  . Sidgwick in fact wrote extensively about the Kantian system as a whole, and

  at the time of his death was contemplating a book on “Kant and Kantism in

  England.” The drift of his larger interpretation, which is more cogent than the

  Methods conveys, is given in the posthumous LPK. The best discussion of the

  complex Kantian elements in Sidgwick’s ethics remains Schneewind, Sidgwick’s

  Ethics, which is treated at greater length in the final section of this chapter. It is curious that the interest in Kantianism was another matter on which Moore

  was apparently more indebted to Sidgwick than he allowed; the lecture course on

  The Elements of Ethics that Moore gave in  was to be followed by a series on Kant’s moral philosophy, and the original title of the first series was A Course of

  Ten Lectures on The Elements of Ethics, with a View to the Appreciation of Kant’s Moral Philosophy. See Moore, The Elements of Ethics.

  . See Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics, pp. –.

  . Schneewind’s early essay “First Principles and Common Sense Morality in

  Sidgwick’s Ethics,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , no.  (),

  pp. –, might be seen as setting the stage for a Rawlsian interpretation,

  as it was by Peter Singer in “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,” Monist 

  (), pp. –, who defends Sidgwick as closer to Hare in the rejection of

  received opinion. A good summary is in Steven Sverdlik, “Sidgwick’s Method-

  ology,” Journal of the History of Philosophy  (), pp. –, and as will be shown, the debate has been revisited more recently by Brink, “Common Sense and

  First Principles in Sidgwick’s Methods,” and Shaver, Rational Egoism, especially pp. –.

  . Again, on this see Shaver, “Sidgwick’s Minimal Metaethics,” and Darwall,

  “Learning from Frankena.” It is noteworthy that intuitionism is also under-

  going something of a revival. Robert Audi, though he scarcely recognizes the

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  significance of Sidgwick as his intellectual godfather, has importantly w
orked out

  a form of fallibilistic intuitionism that “is free of some often alleged defects of

  intuitionism: arbitrariness, dogmatism, and an implausible philosophy of mind.”

  See his Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (New York: Oxford University

  Press, ), p. . Also important in this connection is Roger Crisp’s “Sidgwick

  and the Boundaries of Intuitionism,” in Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations, ed.

  Philip Stratton-Lake (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ), pp. –. Crisp suggests

  that Sidgwick took a “step backwards” when he disparaged “aesthetic intuition-

  ism,” or judgment in particular cases, and that this was left to Ross to develop.

  Even so, “[F]reed of the mistaken emphasis on practical precision . . . Sidgwick’s

  intutionism provides a powerful method for the resolution of debates in nor-

  mative ethics, though much remains to be done in working out the details and

  implications of his conditions for self-evidence” (p. ). For a sharply contrary

  view about the “step backwards,” see the works by Donagan cited in note .

  . Sidgwick’s Ethics, pp. –.

  . Crisp, “Sidgwick and the Boundaries of Intuitionism,” p. .

  . Crisp, “Sidgwick and the Boundaries of Intuitionism,” p. , p. . Crisp, like

  Skorupski, takes a profoundly Sidgwickian approach to ethics and metaethics,

  one far less anachronistic or opportunistic in its appropriation of the Methods than most such efforts. As remarked earlier, it remains an open question just how far

  Sidgwick can be cast in “naturalistic” terms. There is something mildly peculiar

  in the idea that he was deeply averse to postulating ghostly entities in metaethics,

  when he was, after all, so receptive to the existence of ghosts generally.

  . Brink, “Common Sense and First Principles,” pp. –. As Brink notes, the

  dialectical method is common to Aristotle and Mill.

  . Ibid., p. , p. .

  . Ibid., p. .

  . Schneewind’s Sidgwick’s Ethics demonstrates how progressivism was a distinctive feature of mid-nineteenth-century intuitionism; see also Alan Donagan,

  “Sidgwick and Whewellian Intuitionism,” in Schultz, ed., Essays; “Whewell’s

  Elements of Morality,” Journal of Philosophy  (), pp. –; and “Justice and Variable Social Institutions,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. ,

  Social and Political Philosophy, ed. P. French et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, ). Donagan was a distinguished defender of the Whewellian

  project who argued, like Schneewind, that Sidgwick had treated it unfairly by

  failing to appreciate how alternative, deontological fundamental principles could

  succeed in systematizing commonsense morality. However, he did credit Sidgwick

  for having resisted the move to an Aristotelian defense of “prima facie” reasons,

  the course that Ross would later take.

  . Sidgwick, “Utilitarianism,” p. .

  . Shaver, Rational Egoism, pp. –. Shaver’s work provides an excellent defense of Sidgwick’s epistemology, avoiding many of the crudities of earlier interpretations,

  though it does admittedly develop points made by Schneewind and Schultz in

  defense of Sidgwick’s consistency.

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  . See Rawls’s discussion in Political Liberalism, pp. –, though his (brief) characterization of Sidgwick as sharing the rational intuitionism of Clarke and Price

  conceals more than it reveals. Again, see McMahan, “Moral Intuition”; Shaver,

  Rational Egoism; and Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.

  . Sidgwick, “The Establishment of Ethical First Principles,” pp. –.

  . Sidgwick, “Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies,” p. .

  . Sidgwick, “Utilitarianism,” pp. –.

  . Stephen, “Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics,” p. .

  . “Henry Sidgwick,” The Independent Review (June ), p. .

  . See the letter from Sidgwick in Alexander Bain, Autobiography, ed. W. L.

  Davidson (London: Longman, ).

  . Seth Pringle–Pattison, “Critical Notice: Henry Sidgwick and Thomas Hill

  Green,” Mind, new series,  (), p. .

  . Broad, Five Types, p. .

  . See C. A. J. Coady’s helpful piece, “Henry Sidgwick,” in the Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol. VII, The Nineteenth Century, ed. C. L. Ten (London: Routledge,

  ), p. . William Frankena had long urged the plausibility of this form of

  response to Broad; see his “Sidgwick and the Dualism of Practical Reason,” and

  other essays reprinted in Perspectives on Morality, ed. K. E. Goodpaster (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, ); and “Sidgwick and the History

  of Ethical Dualism,” in Schultz, Essays.

  . Shaver, Rational Egoism, p. .

  . See, e.g., David Brink, “Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason,” pp. –,

  and “Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism,” in Schultz, ed., Essays, pp. –.

  . Shaver, Rational Egoism, pp. –.

  . Ibid., p. .

  . See Reasons and Persons, especially pp. –, where Parfit discusses the distinction passage.

  . Parfit suggests that Sidgwick’s hedonism may have misled him here, making

  him confuse the present-aim view with the (absurd) “hedonistic egoism of the

  present” view that one should maximize one’s happiness now. See Reasons and

  Persons, pp. –.

  . In the first edition, p. , there is a similar suggestion: “If the unity of the Ego is really illusory, if the permanent identical ‘I’ is not a fact but a fiction . . .”

  . Shaver, like most other philosophical commentators on Sidgwick, ignores it

  entirely.

  . See C. D. Broad, “Self and Others,” in Broad’s Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. D. Cheney (London: George Allen and Unwin, ), pp. –. It should

  be noted that Broad concludes this essay with a sketch of an argument for the

  Sidgwickian “neutralist”: “Even if Neutralism be true, and even if it be self-

  evident to a philosopher who contemplates it in a cool hour in his study, there are

  powerful historical causes which would tend to make certain forms of restricted

  Altruism or qualified Egoism seem to be true to most unreflective persons at

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  all times and even to many reflective ones at most times. Therefore the fact

  that common-sense rejects Neutralism, and tends to accept this other type of


  doctrine, is not a conclusive objection to the truth, or even to the necessary truth, of Neutralism” (p. ). See also Allan Gibbard’s “Inchoately Utilitarian Common

  Sense: The Bearing of a Thesis of Sidgwick’s on Moral Theory,” in The Limits

  of Utilitarianism, ed. H. B. Miller and W. H. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, ), pp. –; and Crisp, “Sidgwick and Self Interest.”

  . Shaver, Rational Egoism, pp. –.

  . Ibid., pp. –.

  . Ibid., p. .

  . Ibid., pp. –.

  . The passages are from “Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies,” p. .

  . The passages are quoted by Shaver, Rational Egoism, p. .

  . Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’ – (New York: Cambridge University Press, ), p. , note .

  . Stephen Darwall, “Reason, Norm, and Value,” in Reason, Ethics, and Society:

  Themes from Kurt Baier, with His Responses, ed. J. B. Sehneewind (Chicago: Open Court, ), pp. –.

  . William Frankena, “Sidgwick and the History of Ethical Dualism,” in Schultz,

  ed., Essays, p. . Frankena’s work on Sidgwick rightly stressed the importance of comparing ME to OHE, which grew out of Sidgwick’s entry on “Ethics”

  for the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. There are some interesting student notes on Sidgwick’s lectures on the history of ethics in the archives at

  King’s College, Cambridge, mostly taken by John Neville Keynes.

  . Ibid., pp. –.

  . Ibid., p. .

  . Of course, Shaver does address these matters to a degree. But he is fairly impatient with the religious orientation that Sidgwick took so seriously, regarding it more

  as a source of potential error that should have led Sidgwick to discount the

  importance of consensus among the theologically inclined (see Rational Egoism, p. ). Sidgwick was at least slightly more receptive to the idea of enlightened,

  Apostolic theological inquiry.

  . Henry Sidgwick, “Review: J. Grote’s Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy,”

  Cambridge University Reporter (February , ), pp. –.

  . Popularinrecentneo-Hobbesian theory–onthis, see, e.g.,David Brink,“Rational

 

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