For Cesare, waiting anxiously at Nepi, the news of Pius’ election was not the worst that could have been expected, but neither was it the best. It was clear to everyone that the new Pope’s reign could hardly be long. He was a cultivated and able man, who had led a blameless life, but was prematurely old and decrepit, tormented by gout as his uncle had been, and on the morning of his election he was too ill to kneel in St Peter’s and had to be carried to the high altar to give thanks. The reign of Pius III was likely to be little more than a breathing space preluding the advent of a new and possibly more powerful pope. For Cesare it was some consolation to know that the new Pope was obligated to him, and to d’Amboise, who continued to show strong support for him, and had indeed moved into his former apartments in the Vatican, as a mark of special favour from Pius. But everything depended on how far Pius would be prepared to go to give substance to his election obligations. He was surrounded by powerful enemies of Cesare’s, Giuliano, Riario, the Venetian envoy and agents of Guidobaldo of Urbino, who acted in concert and never ceased to bombard the Pope with requests for permission to attack il Valentino.
Cesare had recovered some of his health and strength at Nepi, and he had lost none of the almost desperate courage expressed in the mottoes on a ring engraved for him at the time: ‘Do what you must, come what may’ and ‘One heart, one way’, but his illness had left its mark on him in the form of anxiety and depression. A Pisan envoy who visited him at Nepi at the end of September reported him as well, but very anxious about his affairs, and obsessed with two things, his confirmation as Gonfalonier and the salvation of his Romagna states. Indeed, in Cesare’s mind, the two things were synonymous; as Gonfalonier, with the authority of the Church behind him, no one, he thought, would dare to attack him. Pius’ first actions on his election seemed to indicate that he was prepared to implement some at least of his promises to Cesare. On the very next day he told a dismayed Giustinian that he was displeased that the Signoria had tried to foment revolt in the Romagna, and when the envoy tried to recommend to him the lords ‘wretchedly’ dispossessed by Cesare, he replied that ‘God willed that they should be castigated with a wretched instrument’. He refused Giuliano a brief for his nephew’s return to Sinigallia, and would not listen to Cardinal Riario’s arguments in favour of his nephews of Imola and Forlì. Three days after his election he sent a brief to Cesare confirming him in his vicariates and condoling with him on the league formed against him by his enemies at Perugia on 16 September. At the same time he dispatched strongly worded briefs to the Doge, condemning the Venetian raids on Cesare’s territories and demanding the withdrawal of their troops, to Perugia complaining of the Baglionis’ activities against the Duke of Romagna, and to the Romagnol cities recommending their continued obedience to their lord. These briefs had their effect in that Pandolfo Malatesta was once more expelled from Rimini, Venice refused open support to the League of Perugia, and Florence redoubled her offers of help to Cesare. But this, it seemed, was as far as Pius was prepared to go. As Giustinian reported, messengers of Duke Valentino passed every day from Rome to Nepi and from Nepi to Rome, ‘but up till now he has not decided to give him any more favour than briefs’.
Indeed, on 26 September, the day after he had issued these briefs on Cesare’s behalf, Pius told Giustinian:
In consequence of the pressure put on me by the Spanish cardinals I have been compelled to issue some briefs in favour of Cesare Borgia, but I will not give him any further help. I do not intend to be a warlike, but a peace-loving Pope … I wish no harm to the Duke, for it is the duty of a Pope to have compassion for all, but I foresee that by God’s judgement, he must come to a bad end …
Pius’ reservations about Cesare were understandable; he had no wish to see the Papacy borne helplessly along on the tide of il Valentino’s ambition. It was Pius who, only three months before, had described Alexander to Giustinian as ‘the wolf’, and from certain remarks he let fall to the Venetian at this time it seems that he secretly desired the destruction of the wolf’s cub. To the agents of the Duke of Urbino who came to ask permission to take Fano from Cesare in the name of the Church, he is reported to have said that he could do nothing openly against him but that it was pleasing to him that Guidobaldo should do what he could. As Giustinian commented: ‘This clearly shows the mind of the Pope to be that they should do to this Duke Valentino the worst they can, as long as it is not seen to come from him.’ Cesare, with his excellent sources of information at the Roman court, was not deceived by Pius’ outward demonstrations of goodwill. Giustinian noted: ‘He has good words from the Pope, but does not trust him.’
It was by now obvious to Cesare that to remain any longer at Nepi was not only useless but even dangerous. The forces he had with him had dwindled to a point where he could no longer feel himself secure against any concerted attack; on learning of Cesare’s agreement with France, Gonsalvo de Cordoba had riposted by sending letters ordering all Spaniards in his service to leave for the Kingdom, and he had thus lost much of his heavy cavalry and infantry and some of his best captains, including Ugo de Moncada, who had ridden off to join Gonsalvo in Naples. Moreover, under his treaty obligations to Louis he had perforce to dispatch most of his remaining forces to join the French, who were once again on the march for the Kingdom. He now learned that the most redoubtable of his many enemies, Bartolomeo d’Alviano, was planning to attack him in Nepi in concert with troops from Urbino, Camerino and Città di Castello. On 2 October, Giustinian reported that d’Alviano ‘counts it certain to have him in his hands, and appears to intend the greatest vendetta against him’. Faced with this situation, Cesare had two alternatives for action: to go to the Romagna to stiffen the morale of his loyal followers and to block any further deterioration in his position there, or to return to Rome.
Cesare resolved to return to Rome, a decision for which he has been faulted by historians, who assert that he should have gone to the Romagna to consolidate his position there, leaving his supporters in the city to manage his affairs. Rome was full of his enemies, and in going there he could be riding into a trap. But it was for this very reason that Cesare chose to return to Rome. He had always believed that the best way to outwit his enemies was to confront them rather than to turn his back on them. He did not trust Pius to withstand the attacks of men like Giuliano, who openly berated the Pope for his support of Cesare and devoted all his time to intriguing with the Venetian envoy and his other enemies against him. His supporters at the Vatican needed him as much, perhaps even more, than his commanders in the Romagna. Rome had always been his power-base, and he needed to feel himself secure there before riding northward, which, he assured his Romagnol followers, he intended to do immediately after the Pope’s coronation. Above all he needed to gain confirmation as Gonfalonier and Captain General, the concrete symbol that he still enjoyed the support of the Holy See, which would discourage his enemies and encourage his friends. He still had enough confidence in himself to believe that his personal presence in the city would counteract the influence of his enemies and intimidate the Pope into fulfilling his election promises. And so his cardinal supporters pressed the Pope to allow him to return to Rome, representing him as gravely ill, threatened on all sides by his enemies, and only wishing to come back to the city to die in peace. The kindly Pius was moved by their descriptions of Cesare’s pitiful condition. He told the Ferrarese envoy Costabili: ‘I never thought that I should feel any pity for the Duke, and yet I do most deeply pity him. The Spanish cardinals have interceded for him. They tell me he is very ill and wishes to come and die in Rome, and I have given permission.’
On 3 October, Cesare returned to Rome with his family, guarded by 150 men-at-arms, 500 infantry and a squadron of light horse, to be met by Cardinals d’Amboise, Ascanio, Sanseverino and his brother-in-law d’Albret, who escorted him to his palace of San Clemente in the Borgo. He was widely believed to be on the point of death, and it came as an unpleasant shock to his enemies to discover that not only was il Vale
ntino not dying but that he was as confident, arrogant and active as ever. Giustinian wrote sourly on 6 October: ‘Duke Valentino is not so ill as was believed; he speaks with arrogance and says that he will soon regain possession of all his states.’ Cardinals della Rovere and Riario raged at the Pope for having allowed him to return; Giuliano had never made the mistake of underestimating il Valentino and he was afraid that in person, with his troops at his back, with the Palace guard which was composed of the same men who had served his father, and the castellan of Sant’Angelo well known to be his ‘creature’, Cesare would intimidate the helpless Pope into acceding to his wishes – which was exactly what Cesare intended. The wretched Pius, menaced by Giuliano’s towering figure and fierce temper, could only excuse himself feebly on the grounds of having been deceived. ‘I am neither a saint nor an angel, but only a man and liable to err,’ he told Giustinian on the 7th. But Cesare, confident and optimistic again, happy to be back at the centre of things, had no need of armed men to intimidate the Pope; his persuasive personality and his money were enough to get him what he wanted. Giustinian reported that he loaned Pius money to pay for his coronation, as well he might, since the unfortunate Pope on his accession had found the Apostolic treasury full of nothing but debts and the Palace stripped of all its furnishings. However that may have been, Cesare achieved the object for which he had come to Rome; on 8 October, the day of his coronation, Pius confirmed him as Gonfalonier and Captain General of the Church.
Cesare was content. He had once again outmanoeuvred his enemies and proved to the world that he still held the Vatican in his hand. He was still Duke of Romagna, and was now once again Gonfalonier and Captain General of the Church. These titles meant more to him than their prestige value, which was considerable. They implied the continuance of his policy of control of the forces of the Church, interrupted by the sudden death of Alexander before it could be permanently established by his nomination as hereditary Gonfalonier. It meant that he would once again be able to maintain the standing army which had made him a major power in Italy, to preserve the states he already had, and possibly, with luck and by a skilful playing of his cards between France and Spain, to resume the plans for the dominion of Tuscany which he had been about to put into execution that summer. For the moment the question of the security of the Romagna was of the first importance. There the news of his return to Rome with the apparent favour of the King of France and of the Pope had had the propaganda effect which Cesare had hoped for; in the first week of October attempts by the Ordelaffis and Manfredis to enter Forlì and Faenza had been repulsed by the citizens, confident that their Duke had re-established his position. But only his personal presence there could definitely quash the signs of possible treachery among some of the leading families, such as the Moratinis of Forlì, which had appeared for the first time since the death of Alexander. Immediately after the coronation, therefore, Cesare made preparations to leave for the Romagna. Pius wrote to the Florentines requesting safe passage for the Duke and his troops on their way, while d’Amboise charged Giangiordano Orsini to see him safely through the family territories north of Rome.
But even as Cesare was making his preparations to leave, his enemies were gathering to destroy him. Before Pius’ coronation one of Giovanni Bentivoglio’s sons, Annibale, had come to Rome to intrigue with Cardinals Riario and Giuliano della Rovere ‘so that he may, by secret means, obtain the Pope’s permission to damage the Duke’ by attacking the Romagna. On the 10th, Bartolomeo d’Alviano and Gian Paolo Baglioni, thwarted in their plan to catch Cesare at Nepi, arrived in Rome bent on the pursuit of their vendetta. That night they went secretly to Giustinian’s house, where they found him in bed, and told him they had come ‘to lay hands on the Duke … whom at all costs they desired to pursue to the death’. The next day Giuliano Orsini and Bartolomeo’s brother, the abbot, rode past Cesare’s palace shouting: ‘Let us kill the Jewish dog, and plunder him before the others do.’ Cesare’s men-at-arms stood on guard outside his palace, but the situation was becoming menacing in the extreme, and the city seethed with Orsini partisans. While d’Alviano backed by Cardinals della Rovere and Riario attempted to persuade the Pope to order Cesare to lay down his arms, the Colonnas signed a pact with his Orsini enemies. The Orsinis’ hatred of Cesare was such that they agreed to abandon their traditional allegiance to France, Cesare’s protector, and signed a condotta to serve on the side of Spain in the Kingdom! The agreement was signed in the house of the Spanish envoy de Rojas, whose hostility to Cesare was well known. In the midst of all this turmoil the maverick Giangiordano, to the fury of the rest of his family, arrived in Rome to obey d’Amboise’s orders to escort Cesare to the Romagna. But it was too late; on the same day Pius, who had suffered a severe operation on his leg on 27 September and had been too ill to kneel at his coronation, was seized with a fit of vomiting and fever, and it was soon clear that he was dying. Cesare was now defenceless in the midst of his enemies. The French army was too far away to help him, his nearest reinforcements under the faithful Michelotto were at Rocca Soriana north of Rome, and now his one protector in the city, the Pope, was on his deathbed.
He saw that he must break out of the trap before it closed upon him. On the morning of the 15th he put his troops in order and was preparing to march when two companies of his Italian infantry mutinied, demanding higher pay. Cesare’s loyal German foot-soldiers turned on the rebellious Italians and chased them into St Peter’s, but the Orsinis, having had wind of his plans, broke through the gate of the Borgo. According to the chronicler Bernardi, Cesare, hearing this, cried that he would rather die in the saddle than in bed, mounted his horse and ‘rode like a mad dog’ to attack the Orsinis, accompanied by Jofre, his loyal Romagnol commander Giovanni Sassatelli, the men-at-arms, and the Germans. A ferocious fight ensued in which several men were killed, but the Borgia troops were outnumbered and Cesare was forced to retreat to the Vatican for safety. If the Italian infantry had not abandoned him he would have beaten the Orsinis, the Mantuan Cattaneo reported, but now he was in peril of his life, and deserted by the majority of his men-at-arms, only seventy of whom followed him back to the Palace where the German infantry stood guard. Only the intervention of d’Amboise and the Spanish cardinals and the friendship of the castellan of Sant’Angelo saved him from destruction; while the Orsinis stormed through the Borgo, Cesare with his family fled through the covered way from the Vatican to Castel Sant’Angelo. According to Burchard, he had with him the two little Borgia Dukes, Rodrigo and Giovanni, and his two illegitimate children, of whom nothing before had been known. He was now deserted by most of his men, and his palace pillaged by Baglioni and d’Alviano who, says Giustinian, ‘raged like a mad dog’ against him, and set guards at every gate to prevent his escape. Two days later, on the night of 17 October, Pius died, after a reign of only twenty-six days, leaving Cesare isolated, at bay in Castel. Sant’Angelo, apparently at the mercy of his enemies.
In fact Pius’ death was timely for Cesare, and changed his position overnight from one of desperation to one of hope. As soon as Pius was dead, no one in Rome thought of anything else than the election of his successor. Cesare with his clutch of cardinals at his disposal could once more play the role of pope-maker. Giustinian reported on the 19th that the cardinals were totally occupied in negotiations with each other, and that the tone of their business was openly that of the market-place. ‘Now,’ he wrote disgustedly, ‘there is no difference between the pontificate and the sultanate, because to those who offer the most, it is given.’ Cesare’s Spanish cardinals, he reported, were the masters of the place for their numbers and their unity, and every man who had ambitions towards the Papacy would do anything to please them. The Orsinis were soon made aware that their prey had slipped from their grasp; their request that the cardinals should hold Cesare under arrest in Castel Sant’Angelo until the election of a new pope met with a blunt refusal, and they knew that in sede vacante they would soon be obliged to withdraw their troops from Rome. They t
hen changed their tactics, and attempted to lure their victim out of the castle and the city with promises of safe conduct. Cesare turned the trick against them by replying agreeably that he was anxious to leave for France, and would do so within eight or ten days provided the Orsinis left immediately. This was quite simply a ruse to get rid of the Orsinis, and to keep them in check while he carried on negotiations for the forthcoming election.
Cesare Borgia Page 31
