by Peter Hart
Captain H. C. Sparks, 1/14th Battalion (London Scottish), London Regiment, 168th Brigade, 56th Division
As the London Scottish began to fall back across No Man’s Land to the original British front line a domino effect was generated: after the Germans reoccupied their front lines on the right they began to bomb their way along the lines until the neighbouring positions were rendered utterly untenable.
By this time our numbers were very small, for reinforcements, bombs etc. could not be obtained owing to the heavy curtain of fire put up between the old front lines, and after a consultation I had with the Company Sergeant Major we decided it was a case for every man to do his best to get home, for there was not enough men to get to work with the bayonet in the open. Everybody hung on as long as possible, then small parties began to evacuate, but none got far before they were bowled over by machine-gun fire. It was when I tried to get home that I got one from the left through my thigh and, in getting up, one across my back from the right, just taking the skin off my spine and ripping a nice lump out of my left side in the small of the back. I was able to get up and rush into a shell hole where I remained until 11 p.m.33
Sergeant Gilbert Telfer, 1/9th Battalion (Queen Victoria’s Rifles), London Regiment, 169th Brigade, 56th Division
All along the 56th Division front, isolated NCOs and officers were left with no choice but to pull back towards the original German front line. The further forward they had got the more difficult it was to withdraw. Even to get back to the previous front fine was a real challenge. As the German counter-attack gained momentum, Lance Corporal Foaden and his small force were left increasingly isolated in their outpost in the Maze.
At 4 p.m. Sergeant Hember ordered us to withdraw also, but there being no communication trench, I told him we could not do so until dusk, as we had our Lewis gun and heavy packs of small arms ammunition. Enemy bombers appeared in Fibre and threw bombs at us. I opened fire with the Lewis gun, whereupon the enemy threw up his hands, I took this to be a ruse and fired again. This occurred on three occasions. I then retired towards the Maze taking the gun with me. I saw the enemy again there and once more fired. I was now covering a large shell hole in which were Sergeant Hember and fourteen men. Having but two grenades we decided to try and reach the rest of the battalion, so I stripped the gun, rendering it useless to the enemy. The premature explosion of one of our own grenades wounded Sergeant Hember and five others. I then decided to retire with the remainder and get reinforcements. After several fruitless attempts to find Fen we managed to work round the outer edge of the Maze and reached Exe. On reaching Female we encountered more enemy bombers, at whom we fired and threw our last grenade. We eventually crawled down Exe and reached the remainder of the battalion at the junction of Fen and Exe.34
Lance Corporal John Foaden, 1/5th Battalion (London Rifle Brigade), London Regiment, 169th Brigade, 56th Division
One desperate rearguard action was fought by Second Lieutenant Petley as he and his men were grudgingly forced back from their hard-won positions in the Eck Trench.
Sergeant Austin, Corporal Thorpe and myself brought up the rear. Our idea was to try and bring one at least of the wounded back; as soon, however, as the party started we were bombed rather heavily from Female, and, of course, I had to order all wounded to be left alone. We managed to account for two or three of the Huns in Female and kept them down until the rear of the party had passed the top of Exe. We worked our way round to about the junction of Maze and Fibre, Austin and I bringing up the rear. We had no less than four different bombing parties to keep off, and the whole of my party got to the German second trench with only two or three casualties. It was in the independent rushes across the open, of course, that the casualties occurred, but even then, most of us, I believe, got to the German front line, where apparently were the remnants of C and D Companies and a lot of Queen Victoria’s Rifles. Austin and I lay in a shell hole by the second line to cover as much as possible these final rushes. Our intention was to stay there until dark, but on a bomb bursting in our shell hole we cleared off before the smoke lifted. Austin muttered that he was hit, but we did not wait to argue. We ran in different directions and I have not seen him since. Although the bomb burst practically on us, I was unhurt except for a few tiny places in my legs. I worked my way to the German front trench and joined the others, Harvey, de Cologan, Smith, Cox of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, several other officers and about sixty or seventy men.35
Second Lieutenant R. E. Petley, 1/5th Battalion (London Rifle Brigade), London Regiment, 169th Brigade, 56th Division
Soon they had fallen right back to the German front line and had nowhere left to go but back across No Man’s Land. The London Rifle Brigade were the last to be forced out. As they hung on scattered remnants from the neighbouring battalions were forced back along the lines into their positions by the relentless bombing and sniping of the Germans. The survivors congregated in Ferret Trench just 200 yards from Gommecourt Park, but the situation was then beyond hope.
By now I was just petrified. I knew that if I stayed in the trench I would have most certainly been killed. I hardly waited for the order, but it came, ‘Everyone for himself!’ I did not wait to argue—over the top I went like greased lightening—surviving a hail of bullets. I immediately fell flat. Then trying to imagine I was part of the earth, I wriggled along on my belly. Dead, dying and wounded, feigning death—who knows? The ground was covered with them. I sped from shell hole to shell hole. Never had I run faster. It was snipers, machine guns and shrapnel all the way. About halfway across, I rolled into a shell hole and fell on top of a badly wounded German in a pitiable state—probably an abandoned prisoner. All he said was, ‘Sclecht! Sclecht!’—which means, ‘Bad!’ I don’t know what made me do it but I gripped his hand and sped on. When I finally scrambled into our front-line trench I was greeted by our Adjutant Captain Wallis and Regimental Sergeant Major MacVeigh who both solemnly shook my hand. I was told that only twenty had returned so far.36
Private Arthur Schuman, 1/5th Battalion (London Rifle Brigade), London Regiment, 169th Brigade, 56th Division
There were other survivors of course, but most were still marooned out in the hostile wastes of No Man’s Land. Like a deadly game they had to choose their moment to try and sprint back. Get the timing wrong and the consequences were painful or fatal.
It was either a bolt back with a sporting chance of getting through, or else surrender. We turned tail and made a blind bolt back about 7.30 p.m. The moment we did so they turned a veritable hail of fire upon us from machine guns and rifles. I got caught in the wire and sprawled headlong, tore myself free and then caught again. Once more I disentangled myself and then plunged into a shell hole and stopped there. How I got as far as there I knew not, for men were falling like flies. None who kept on in this rush for our line got through. There were five of us in this shell hole—three wounded. I sat in a pool of blood and water until it started getting dark, and then we crept out and back to safety. We spent over two hours in that shell hole, but so exhausted were we that even during that time we dozed.37
Rifleman Frank Jacobs, 1/5th Battalion (London Rifle Brigade), London Regiment, 169th Brigade, 56th Division
At around 2130 the final party of ‘last ditchers’ were forced out of the German front line to take refuge in shell holes in No Man’s Land as an interim measure before making the last desperate dash across to the British front line.
There was no doubt that the VII Corps attack had been a failure for the Gommecourt Salient still remained intact, thrusting provocatively into the British lines. In retrospect it is clear that the number of British guns assigned to a counter-battery role proved totally inadequate to meet the massed artillery fire of the German divisions, not only to their immediate front, but also from around Adinfer Wood and to the south from around Puiseux on either side of Gommecourt. The result was that the 46th and 56th Divisions faced the heaviest concentration of artillery fire of any sector assaulted on 1
July. In addition the narrow width of the front assaulted meant that the Germans could also utilise their machine guns to deadly effect from both the flanks and from the uncaptured switch lines and Quadrilateral strong point ahead of them. However, one question remained. The Third Army diversion may have totally failed to achieve its local objectives, but had it achieved its wider tactical justification of diverting attention and resources from the main assault? Here, too, there was disappointment. Certainly it was true that the very visible offensive preparations over the past month had caused the Germans to strengthen their forces in the area, but the actual attack when it came had been successfully rebuffed by these local forces without in any way disrupting the German defence further south around Serre and Beaumont Hamel. In essence the attack had been useless and the men of the North Midlands and London battalions had suffered terrible casualties in vain. The 46th Division lost 2,455 casualties, while the 56th Division bore the brunt with 4,314. It was difficult for the men to accept such severe losses in making a peripheral attack that did not and probably could not have affected the overall outcome of the day’s fighting.
The casualties have been very heavy indeed. The trying thing is that many of them are left, wounded or killed, in the German trenches, and whether they are alive or dead we do not know. We are filled with pride for all that has been done, bitterness for the little there is to show for it, and sorrow for those we shall never see again. We are told we have, in fact, helped in the general scheme, and done our job, but the battalion is sadly mauled about. I feel that our job is done as regards actual fighting for many months and for, perhaps, the rest of the war.38
Major Samuel Sampson, 1/9th Battalion (Queen Victoria’s Rifles), London Regiment, 169th Brigade, 56th Division
But his men would be back on the Somme long before the battle was done.
VIII Corps: Serre to Beaumont Hamel—disaster on the left of the attack
The northern flank of the main assault was the responsibility of the VIII Corps of the Fourth Army. The VIII Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General Aylmer Hunter-Weston who had acquired a very mixed reputation. Born in 1864, he joined the Royal Engineers in 1884 and had seen service in the North West Frontier, Egypt and South Africa before he was appointed as Assistant Director of Military Training in 1911. On the outbreak of war he commanded a brigade in action in 1914 but on promotion was whisked away with the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to take part in the campaign with which his name will forever be linked—Gallipoli. As the fighting degenerated into a welter of bloody frontal assaults on the Turkish trenches Hunter-Weston soon got a reputation as an unimaginative general who was not overly concerned by casualties. In July 1915 he was evacuated due to the after-effects of severe sunstroke with some evidence of considerable nervous debilitation in the face of the unremitting mental and physical pressures that faced anyone serving on the Peninsula. On his recovery he returned to command the VIII Corps. The Somme would be his first command in a major Western Front battle.
Three of Hunter-Weston’s divisions were assigned to the attack; from north to south they were the 31st, 4th and 29th Divisions. His men faced a mighty task ahead of them for they were staring directly across to the fortress villages of Serre and Beaumont Hamel lying on a series of ridges and valleys that formed an almost ideal landscape for defence. The preliminary artillery bombardment had been partially successful: the barbed wire had been cut or at least disrupted in most sectors of the VIII Corps, while the German front lines had been severely battered. Yet the deep dugouts survived almost unscathed. Perhaps even more ominous was the fact that the latent threat of the German artillery had not been dealt with. Here again the counter-battery arrangements had flattered only to deceive the men that relied on them for their lives. Several German batteries had not been put out of action and the location of many others was still unknown.
The plan for the VIII Corps infantry was fairly simple. The 31st Division would advance towards Serre, pivoting on John Copse and occupying the conveniently named German Flank Trench positions to form a strong defensive line facing north. A shallow tunnel had been dug across No Man’s Land and would be blown open to leave a trench, thus providing a continuous flank line between the British front line and the expected gain of Flank Trench. The right of the division would ensure that they remained in contact with the neighbouring 4th Division.
The task of the two regular divisions, the 4th and 29th Divisions was daunting in the extreme. They were to advance straight into a natural amphitheatre across the valley in which Beaumont Hamel lay and then climb up onto the Beaucourt Spur to tackle the German second line. A key component of the plans was the mine prepared by the 252nd Tunnelling Company, Royal Engineers underneath the German strong point known as Hawthorn Redoubt, in front of Beaumont Hamel on the 29th Division front. The mine was primed and ready to ‘blow’ with some 40,000 lbs of ammonal high explosive, yet there was considerable controversy over the best timing of the explosion. Hunter-Weston wanted to set off the mine at 0330, with the intention thereby of seizing and consolidating the Hawthorn Redoubt well before the main assault. This was an optimistic plan and presumed that the British would be successful in getting to the crater first. The Inspector of Mines was very sceptical, and advised the General Headquarters, BEF that previous experience of crater warfare on the Western Front had revealed a definite German superiority in the tactical acumen and speed required to seize control of a crater. He therefore recommended that the mine be detonated only at 0730 as the troops went over the top. After much consultation with the headquarters of the Fourth Army it was finally decided to fire the mine at 0720—a compromise solution in circumstances where compromise was neither rational nor possible.
The artillery arrangements of the VIII Corps were brought in line with this new deadline. The plan included a simple creeping barrage, but the orders requiring lifts of 50 yards a minute were ignored by the three divisional commanders who preferred to have lifts of 100 yards per minute, and starting from the German front line rather than in No Man’s Land. As the mine exploded most of the heavy guns would lift their fire from the German front line to concentrate on their second and third lines. In effect the Germans would be first warned by the explosion of the mine and then left in relative peace to emerge from their dugouts in the ten minutes before the British troops began their advance. Coupled with the fact that a threatening proportion of the German artillery had not been knocked out, it was a recipe for disaster.
The story of the vain assault by 31st Division on the fortress village and ridge of Serre has often been told and has become an essential part of the tragic mythology of the Battle of the Somme. For the most part the division was composed of ‘Pals’ battalions recruited across the length and breadth of northern England. These were brave men, confident in their own abilities, but they were under-trained and lacked the experience of war to have any realistic chance against a defensive system that could have thrown back even the most battle-hardened troops. As the British climbed out of their trenches the defenders of Serre were ready and waiting for them. Brigadier Rees watched his men of the 94th Brigade going over the top with mingled hope and trepidation. He did not have long to wait before his hopes were dashed.
Ten minutes before Zero our guns opened an intense fire. I stood on top to watch. It was magnificent. The trenches in front of Serre changed shape and dissolved minute by minute under the terrific hail of steel. Watching, I began to believe in the possibility of a great success, but I reckoned without the Hun artillery. As our infantry advanced, down came a perfect wall of explosive along the front trenches of my brigade and the 93rd. It was the most frightful artillery display that I had seen up to that time, and in some ways, I think it was the heaviest barrage I have seen put down by the defence on any occasion.39
Brigadier General Hubert Rees, Headquarters, 94th Brigade, 31st Division
The German garrison and their machine guns had rushed out of their deep dugouts and were in position, ready and w
aiting. The scything blast of their machine-gun fire hit the Pals with dreadful effect.
Every man climbed out of the trenches at the whistle of the officers and not a man hesitated. But I was lucky. I was in a part of the trench where the parapet had been battered down as Jerry sought for a trench mortar. When I ran up the rise out of the trench I was under the hail of bullets which were whizzing over my head. Most of our fellows were killed kneeling on the parapet. There was nobody coming forward, only one man, the reserves had been shelled in our lines and blown to smithereens. The Sergeant decided that as the attack was finished we’d go back and try and get into our own line. We wriggled out of this shell hole and then made a dash. Well my rifle got caught on the wire, it stopped there! I hadn’t time to take it off and we got back in the line. I noticed higher up the trench one of our chaps laid there with a baulk of timber across his leg, one leg had been cut off—severed. This baulk of timber had cut across his leg and acted as a tourniquet and stopped the bleeding. Well, I ran down the trench looking for stretcher bearers and I bumped into a Bradford officer with about half a dozen men and he stopped me and wanted to know where I was going. I said, ‘I’m going for help, there’s Jim there with his leg off!’ ‘Oh!’ he says, ‘Never mind him, fall in with my men! So I picked a rifle up, wiped it and fell in with his men. But when I got the first chance I lost him! Well Jim was found, was carried out and sent to ‘Blighty’ and he’s alive to this day!40
Private Arthur Pearson, 15th Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment, 93rd Brigade, 31st Division
The German barbed wire had been partially cut by the British bombardment but in some sectors it remained a severe problem, especially protected as it was by concentrated machine-gun fire and the blast of the German artillery fire sweeping across No Man’s Land.
