that proves to be an index of a mutation that has to do with the very ontological
categories through which reality is conceived. Contrary to Diezinger, who seeks
very carefully to keep Wirkung and Wirklichkeit distinct, the compilers of the entry in fact warn that it is impossible to separate with certainty the meaning of
effectiveness ( actus efficiendi) from that of effect of the act ( actus fructus): et est saepe in arbitrio interpretantis singulos locos, utram significationem potius accipiat.
The initial two meanings registered in the Thesaurus may seem banal at first
glance. The first is Cicero’s affirmation according to which effectus eloquentiae
audientium approbatio ( Tusculan Disputations 2.3). This does not mean “the effect of eloquence is the approval of the listeners,” which would be a truism,
but as results unequivocally from the context, “the reality, the effectiveness of
eloquence lies in the approval of the listeners” (that is, in the effect that it gives
rise to). That is to say, Cicero has in mind something, a mode of being, in which
reality and effect are indiscernible.
The second occurrence is in Varro ( On the Latin Language 9.39). Varro here
observes that, in comparing words, one must not be concerned only with what
they have in common in form ( quid habeat in figura simile), but also in eo quem habeat effectum, which does not mean “the effect that they have” so much as
rather (as implied in the example that follows) “the effectiveness of their use.”
That effectus does not designate simply the effect, but a special modality of
something’s being, is evident in the syntagma esse in effectu, which one comes
across frequently starting with Cicero. Particularly significant from this perspec-
tive is a passage ( De finibus 3.32) in which unjust actions ( peccata) are distinguished according to their being in effectu (as in mistreating one’s parents or
profaning temples) or their being sine effectu as in being sad or experiencing
an erotic desire, in libidine esse). Here also the translation “to have or not have effects” would be manifestly insufficient: what is in question is the ontological
status of the act, whether the effectiveness that belongs to it is full or somehow
lacking, depending on whether one is dealing with an action or a state.
The properly ontological meaning of the term effectus becomes clear later in a
series of passages in which it expresses a particular declension of the Aristotelian
energeia in its relation to dynamis. In this sense the term appears in Calcidius’s commentary on the Timaeus, in relation to the definition of material. Material
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( silva, as Calcidius calls it) is by its nature deprived of qualities and formal determinations ( sine qualitate ac sine figura et sine specie) and is moreover never given if not accompanied by these latter. And just as we can remove from it in thought
those qualities without which it does not exist, so also can we attribute to it the
possession of them non effectu sed possibilitate (Calcidius 337). Effectus is here opposed to possibility but not exactly as energeia is opposed to dynamis in Aristotle.
Calcidius takes care to specify that possibility or potential must be understood
here not in the sense in which one says that the seed contains in itself the po-
tential of the plant but in which one says bronze has a potential insofar as it can
become a statue through the operation of an external ( extrinsecus) agent. That is
to say, effectus names not simply being-at-work ( energeia) but the operation that actualizes a potential from the outside and in this sense renders it effective.
One can thus understand why Quintilian, in a text that was to exercise no
small influence on Christian authors, can distinguish between arts in actu (or
in agendo), like dance, which has its end in itself and does not leave behind
any work once the act is ended ( nihilque post actum operis relinquit), and arts in effectu, like painting, which reaches its end in a work ( operis . . . consummatione finem accipit [ Instituto Oratoria 2:18.1–2]). More than the Aristotelian distinction between praxis, which has its telos in itself, and poiēsis, which has an external end (a distinction that would here be out of place, because for Aristotle a technē-ars
can in no case be defined as a praxis: anankē tēn technēn poiēseōs all’ou praxeōs
einai [ Nicomachean Ethics 1140a17]), what is in question here is the different ontological status, the different mode of presence that belongs to due species
of arts. While the energeia in dance is of the order of actus ( in actu posita), that of painting is of the order of effectus, in the operation of which it is rendered
effective, is given reality and consistency in an opus—considered, however, not
in itself, but first of all as effectus of an operatio.
For this reason Ambrose, taking up the passage of Quintilian in the Hex-
ameron (I, 5.17) in connection with the divine creation of the world (probably
through the mediation of Basil), develops it, in his already fully liturgical vocab-
ulary, by distinguishing between artes actuosae, which “relate to the movement
of the body or to the sound of the voice” and in which nothing remains after the
operation, and those arts, like architecture and weaving, which cessante quoque
operationis officio, operis munus adpareat . . . ut operatori operis sui testimonium suf-fragetur (even when the craftsman’s office has ceased, still exhibit his skill, so that testimony is presented of the craftsman’s own work). Only in appearance does
Ambrose here seem to be aiming at a primacy of the work. The syntagma operis
munus—not the work, but the function of the work—put in correspondence
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with the operationis officium, the action conceived as an “office,” and the reference to the craftsman show that in truth he is moving in an ontological dimension
that has nothing to do with that of Aristotle. What is in question is not the mode
of being and the permanence of a form and a substance (that is, of a being that,
in Aristotelian terms, “is what it was”) but a dislocation of being into the sphere
of praxis, in which being is what it does, is its operativity itself.
It is significant that the divine creation itself can in this way be presented
through the vocabulary of officium and munus. The work, which was in Aristotle the paradigm of being, is here only the proof and the effect of a working ( est
enim hic mundus divinae specimen operationis, quia dum opus videtur, praefertur
operator [this world is an example of the workings of God, because, while we ob-
serve the work, the Worker is brought before us]). The ontological status of the
liturgical act, of the opus Dei, in which being and praxis, effectiveness and effect, operation and work, opus operatum and opus operans are inseparably intertwined, here has its obscure precursor.
א In reality, the paradigm of action that is in question here is much closer than it
seems to that of the artes actuosae, like dance and theater. In a passage from the De finibus (3.7.24), which contains perhaps the most precise definition of effectiveness, Cicero,
comparing the officium of wisdom to the gestures and movements of the actor and the dancer, writes that in these latter, “its end, being the actual exercise of the art, is contained within the art itself, and is not something extraneous to it [ in ipsa insit, non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio].” The end here is not an external work (as in poiēsis), but nor does it coincide, as it might seem at first glance, with the a
ction itself (as in praxis).
In fact, it only coincides with the act to the extent to which it is the execution ( effectio) of an art. What is decisive here is that it is a specifically artistic operation (theatrical or choral) that furnishes a new ontological-practical paradigm, that is to say, that what is in question is not an ethical paradigm, but a particular technical paradigm. While Aristotle
in fact considered the work ( ergon) as the telos of the artisan or artist’s poiēsis, here, by means of the paradigm of performative arts like dance and theater, which are by definition without a work, the telos is no longer the work, but the artis effectio (execution of the art).
9. It is from this semantic constellation that an ontological paradigm is
progressively elaborated among the Christian authors in which the decisive
characteristics of being are no longer energeia and entelecheia but effectiveness and effect. It is from this perspective that one must consider the appearance
in the Fathers, around the middle of the third century, of the terms efficacia
and efficientia, closely linked to effectus and used in a technical sense to translate (and betray) ( tradurre [e tradire] ) the Greek energeia. Thus Rufinus can write: aliud est possibilitatem esse in aliquo, aliud efficaciam vel efficientiam, quos
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Graeci dynamin et energeian vocant (it is one thing for there to be possibility in something, another for there to be efficacia or efficientia, which the Greeks call dynamin and energeian [in his translation of Origen’s Commentary on Romans 8.2]). That Rufinus means by this term simply effectiveness is proved
beyond any doubt by subsequent passages, in which efficacia and efficientia
are glossed hoc est re ipsa atque effectu and an example is given in the work of
the blacksmith or of the one who effectu operis agit, renders his work effective
(literally, “acts with the effectiveness of the work, with its ‘operativity’”). The
thing and the work, considered inseparably in their effectiveness and in their
function: this is the new ontological dimension that is substituted for the Aris-
totelian energeia. And it is interesting to note that before finding its canonical translation as potentia-actualitas, the couple dynamis-energeia had been rendered by the Latin Fathers as possibilitas-efficacia ( effectus).
A gloss on the adjective efficax clearly expresses the semantic sphere that is in
question here: efficax dicitur quasi effectum capiens ( Gramm., suppl. 74, 23).What is effective is not so much what produces an effect as what “takes effect,” is given
effectiveness—that is, exists in the mode of effectus. It is in this sense that in the Vulgate of Hebrews 4:12 Jerome renders the text’s energēs with efficax: vivus est enim sermo Dei et efficacx et penetrabilior omni gladio (the Word of God is living and active, able to penetrate more than any sword). And that this effectiveness
implies, as effectus already did in Calcidius, a divine or human operation, and
not simply an immanent natural process, is obvious in those passages in which
the term efficientia is opposed to natura: sit . . . in eo efficientia potius quam natura sapientiae (in him there is effectiveness rather than a wise nature; Hilary of Poitiers, In Evangelium Matthaei Commentarius 11.2).
It is in Augustine ( De gratia Christi et peccato originalis 1.4.5) that we find confirmed with perfect awareness the pertinence of effectus to the sphere of ontology: posse in natura, velle in arbitrio, esse in effectu (the “ability” we place in our nature, the “volition” in our will, and the “actuality” in the effect). Let us linger over this
triple affirmation, which seems to have almost the form of a theory but, restored
to its context, permits us to understand and, so to speak, to follow at close range
the transformation of ontology that was to be carried out in the Christian sphere.
The phrase is not Augustine’s but is contained in a citation from Pelagius, whose
opinion Augustine refers to in order to refute it. “We distinguish,” writes Pelagius
in his impassioned defense of the human possibility not to sin, “three things,
arranging them in a certain graduated order. We put in the first place ‘ability’
[ posse]; in the second, ‘volition’ [ velle]; and in the third, ‘actuality’ [ esse]. The ‘ability’ we place in our nature, the ‘volition’ in our will, and the ‘actuality’ in the effect
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[ esse in effectu].” It is obvious that in Pelagius the three elements still articulate an ontological gradation in the Aristotelian sense, which corresponds to the passage from the mode of being of potentiality ( posse, which according to Pelagius
belongs exclusively to God), through the will ( velle), to the act ( esse, which here significantly has its place in effectiveness, in effectu). But when Augustine summarizes his adversary’s theses, the ontological conceptuality gives way to a practical
conceptuality, within which esse is already synonymous with “acting”: Nam cum
[Pelagius] tria distinguat . . . possibilitatem, voluntatem, actionem ([Pelagius] posits and distinguishes three faculties . . . capacity, volition, and action; 1.3.4).
Here the transformation of the ontological paradigm that is already a fait
accompli clearly shows its strength: being coincides without remainder with ef-
fectiveness, in the sense that it does not simply exist but must be effectuated and
actualized. What is decisive is no longer the work as a stable dwelling in presence but operativity, understood as a threshold in which being and acting, potential
and act, working and work, efficacy and effect, Wirkung and Wirklichkeit enter into a reciprocal tension and tend to become undecidable. This tension and this
undecidability define the liturgical mystery that the Church recognizes as its
most proper and highest task.
א Nothing better illustrates the new meaning that energeō and energeia are acquiring and will acquire with ever greater clarity in Christian literature than the Pauline use of the terms. While energeia and dynamis in Aristotle designate a diverse and correlated mode of existing and being present (“Energeia is”; Metaphysics 1048a32), in Paul (and in his Latin translators) energeia indicates not a mode of being but rather the effectuation of a potency, the operation through which it receives reality and produces determinate effects. From
this perspective God is defined twice as the principle that renders everything effective
and real ( ho theos ho energōn ta panta en pasin; 1 Corinthians 12:4) and that has rendered effective the “potency of his great power” ( kata tēn energeian tou kratous tēs ischyos, hēn enērgēsen en tōi Christōi; Ephesians 1:19–20). Particularly significant in this sense is the frequent use of the syntagma kata tēn energeian tēs dynameōs, “according to the working of his potency” (Ephesians 1:20, 3:7, 4:16; Philippians 3:21). It is not surprising that in all these cases, Jerome made use of the terms operare ( qui operatur omnia in omnibus) and operatio ( secundum operationem potentiae) in his translation.
10. The place where the ontology of effectiveness finds its complete expres-
sion is the theory of the sacrament as sign, elaborated by the scholastics from
Berengar of Tours and Hugh of St. Victor up to Aquinas. According to this
theory, what defines the sacraments is their being at once a sign and the cause
of that of which they are a sign. It is not surprising that in order to characterize
this special performativity of the sacrament, the theologians have recourse to
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the vocabulary of effectiveness. “The sacrament,” one reads in an anonymous
thirteenth-century Summa sententiarum, “is not only a sign of something sacred,
but is al
so efficacy.” Or in the formula that Aquinas cites as canonical, the sacra-
ments efficiunt quod figurant, effectuate what they signify.
The paradigm of this effectiveness of the sacrament is the performativity of
Christ’s words that is at the center of the eucharistic liturgy. In this sense two
passages from Ambrose are fundamental. In them the word of Christ is defined
by means of its effective or operative character (for this purpose, Ambrose coins
the adjective operatorius, which is not found before him; cf. Pépin, 333), and this effectiveness of the word defines in its turn the performativity of the sacrament.
In the first passage ( De fide 4.7), citing Hebrews 4:12, Ambrose translates with
the adjective operatorius the word energēs, with which the author of the letter defined the word of God: Sed non sermo noster operatur, solum est verbum Dei,
quod nec prolativum est, nec quod endiatheton dicunt: sed quod operatur et vivit et sanat. Vis scire quale verbum? Audi dicentem: “vivum est enim verbum Dei et
validum atque operatorium et acutum.” (But the words we speak have no direct
efficacy in themselves; it is the Word of God alone, which is neither an utter-
ance, nor an endiatheton, as they call it, but works efficaciously, is living, and has healing power. Would you know what is the nature of the Word—hear the
Scriptures. “For the Word of God is living and mighty.”) In the second passage
( On the Sacraments 4.15) the “operatorious” character of Christ’s word is evo-
cated to explain the efficacy of the formula of eucharistic consecration: Quis est
sermo Christi? Nempe is, quo facta sunt omnia. Iussit dominus, factum est caelum;
iussit dominus, facta est terra; iussit dominus, facta sunt maria; iussit dominus,
omnis creatura generata est. Vides ergo quam operatorius sermo sit Christi. Si ergo
tanta vis est in sermone domini Iesu, ut inciperent esse quae non erant, tanto magis
operatorius est, ut sint, quae erant et in aliud commutentur. (What is the word of Christ? That, to be sure, whereby all things are made. The Lord commanded,
and the earth was made; the Lord commanded, and the seas were made; the
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