by Unknown
Moreover, whoever has command of the air is in a position to inflict such damage on his opponent's supply columns that serious shortages will soon make themselves felt. By maintaining a continuous watch over the roads leading to the front he can stop completely all supply traffic in daylight and restrict it to the hours of darkness, thus occasioning an irretrievable loss of time.
For us, therefore, it was fundamentally necessary to dispose of such stronger air forces as would give us, if not equality in the air, at least something approaching equality.... Any one who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy with complete air superiority, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same operational and tactical handicaps and with the same chances of success.
We had now to try to put our defence against the expected British attack [the El Alamein offensive] into such a form that the British air superiority would have the least possible effect. For the first and most serious danger was that which threatened us from the air. As the result, we could no longer put the main burden of the defensive battle on to the motorised formations since these, as has been shown, were too vulnerable to attack from the air. Instead, we had to try to resist the enemy in fixed positions, constructed for defence against the most modern weapons of war. We had to accept the fact that in future the enemy would be able to delay our operations at will by strong air attacks by day and similar attacks at night with the aid of parachute flares. Experience had taught us that no man could be expected to stay in his vehicle and drive on when attacked by enemy bombers and that it was useless to try to work to a time-table. Our positions had to be constructed so strongly that they could be held by their local garrisons independently and over a long period, without support of operational reserves, until, in spite of the delays caused by the R.A.F., reinforcements could arrive.
British air superiority threw to the winds all our operational and tactical rules, which hitherto had been followed with such success, simply because they could no longer be applied. Without strong air forces of our own, there was no answer to the problem of dealing with the enemy air superiority. The strength of the Anglo-American Air Force was, in all the battles to come, the deciding factor.
THE BATTLES OF 1942
Rommel's account of the battles of the spring and summer of 1942 runs to such length that it is impossible to give it here, in the limited space available, as a connected narrative. I have, therefore, selected passages which throw light on his military thinking, on his relation with the German High Command, on his judgment of his opponents and on his plans, vetoed by Hitler, for escaping complete disaster in North Africa. Such passages have not been summarised but are given in his own words with occasional interpolations in square brackets. It will be seen that the views attributed to Rommel in the book itself are confirmed by his own writings. The words “operational” and “operations,” which occur frequently in the text, have a special significance in German military phraseology, not easy to express exactly in English. The field of “operations” lies between strategy and tactics. Rommel himself, until the final stages, was an “operational” commander in North Africa, as was General Montgomery, whereas Generals Wavell, Auchinleck and Alexander had responsibilities in the sphere of strategy. “Operational reserves” are the reserves available to the commander in the field. “Operation” is used by Rommel to describe a dynamic movement of the bulk of his motorised forces
After the end of our counter-offensive, which had led, at the beginning of 1942, to the reconquest of Cyrenaica, serious difficulties arose over supplies.
The reason, apart from the scant attention given to the African theatre of war by the German High Command, who failed to recognise its immense importance, was the half-hearted conduct of the war at sea by the Italians, whereas the British Navy was very active and the R.A.F. caused us tremendous trouble. The German High Command, to which I was subordinate, continued to ignore the importance of the African theatre. They did not realise that in the Near East we were able, with relatively small means, to achieve successes which, in their strategic and economic value, would have far surpassed the conquest of the Don Bend. Ahead of us were territories containing an enormous wealth of raw materials, Africa, for example, and the Middle East, which could have freed us from all our anxieties about oil. The reinforcement of my army by a few German motorised divisions would have been sufficient to bring about the complete defeat of the entire British forces in the Near East.
It was not to be. Our demands for reinforcement by additional formations were not granted. The decision was explained by the statement that the Eastern Front required such vast quantities of transport that the creation of further motorised units for Africa was quite out of the question in view of Germany's limited productive capacity. Quite clearly some people in the High Command believed all along that Africa was in any case a “lost cause,” as had been unequivocally stated as far back as 1941. It was apparently their opinion that the investment of large quantities of material in Africa would pay no dividends. A regrettably short-sighted and misguided view!
For the supply difficulties which they were anxious to describe as “insuperable” were far from being so. All that was wanted was a man with real personlity to deal with these questions in Rome, someone with the authority and drive to tackle the problems involved. This would undoubtedly have led to friction in certain Italian circles but this could have been overcome by a mission which was not encumbered with political functions. Our Government's weak policy towards the Italian State seriously damaged the German-Italian cause in North Africa.
The heavy burden placed upon German material resources by the Eastern Front was certainly not to be underestimated, particularly after we had lost the greater part of our equipment there in the winter of 1941-42. But in spite of all this I am firmly convinced that, considering the tremendous possibilities offered by the North African theatre, there were undoubtedly less important sectors of the front which could have spared some mechanised divisions. It can truthfully be said that there was a lack of understanding of the situation and hence of goodwill.
The consequences were serious. For a year and a half, up to the moment when our strength failed in front of El Alamein, we had, with only three German divisions, whose fighting strength was often ridiculously small, kept the British in Africa busy and inflicted on them many a heavy defeat. After the loss of Africa an increasingly large number of German divisions had to face the British and Americans, until finally some 70 divisions had to be thrown into the battle in Italy and France. Given six or seven German motorised divisions we could, in the summer of 1942, have so thoroughly mauled the British that the threat from the south would have been eliminated for a long time. With a certain amount of goodwill, supplies for these formations could have been organised in sufficient quantities. Later on, in Tunis, when it was, of course, already too late, it proved perfectly possible suddenly to double the amount of our supplies. But at that time it had at last come to be realised that we were up to our necks in trouble in the Mediterranean theatre.
Earlier, after a period during which, out of total supply requirements of 60,000 tons only 18,000 tons reached the German army on African soil, the situation temporarily changed, thanks to the initiative of Field-Marshal Kesselring, whose air forces were able, during the spring of 1942, to gain superiority in the Central Mediterranean. In particular, the heavy Axis air raids against Malta contributed greatly to the fact that, for some time, the threat to the sea routes was as good as eliminated. It was only because of this that it was possible to increase the flow of material to Tripoli, Benghazi and Derna.
Nevertheless it was obvious that the British Eighth Army would be reinforced more rapidly than ourselves. The greatest efforts had been made by the British Government to provide the Eighth Army with all the material they could lay their hands on. Large convoys arrived one after the other in the Egyptian ports, bringing war material from England or America round the Cape. Naturally this 12,000 mile v
oyage, which the British transports could make at the most only a couple of times a year, involved tremendous problems for the enemy staff, already struggling with the serious problem created by the activity of our U-boats. But in spite of all this, the British Navy and Merchant Marine were able to maintain over this huge distance supplies to the British forces in the Near East on a scale far superior to our own. Petrol, moreover, could be obtained in abundance from the refineries of the Near East. Only rarely did the British supply ports become the target of serious German bombing attacks. From these ports the British could bring up their supplies to the front by three routes:
1. A well-constructed railway ran from the Suez area to the outer perimeter of Tobruk.
2. The British Navy had organised coastal shipping in an admirable manner and in Tobruk had one of the best ports in North Africa.
3. A well-built road sufficiently wide for supply columns to pass was available.
Above all, there were people on the British side with great influence who were doing everything they could to organise the supply service in the most efficient manner possible. Our enemy benefited by the fact that North Africa was the principal theatre of war for the British Empire and was therefore regarded as the most important by the British Government as well as from the fact that Britain had a first-class, powerful navy of her own while we had to deal with unreliable Italian naval staffs.
It was obvious to us that the British would try, with all the means at their disposal, to destroy my army as soon as they felt themselves strong enough to attempt it. Our southern flank lay wide open. Ritchie would have a great number of operational choices. Our supply lines would be constantly threatened. If we were compelled to withdraw owing to the danger of being out-flanked we would be in very serious difficulties, for most of my Italian divisions were not motorised. But Ritchie was not to have the chance to exploit his many opportunities, for I had decided to anticipate his attack.
BRITISH POSITIONS IN THE MARMARICA
The basic British plan for the defence of the Marmarica was characterised by their efforts to impose upon the attacker a form of warfare which was better suited to the British Command than manoeuvring in the open desert. Technically the execution of this plan was excellent, but the British approached the solution of the problem from false premises. In North Africa, a rigid system of defence in any position with an open southern flank was bound to lead to disaster. In these circumstances a defensive battle could only be successful if it were conducted as an operation. Naturally fortified positions might also be of great value-if they deprived the enemy of the chance of any particular operational action. But it was essential that they should not be occupied by the force destined for the operational defence.
The plan which my staff and I worked out gave the possibility of a decision in the most favourable circumstances. But the fate of my army did not by any means depend on the success of this conception alone. Following my usual practice, I calculated from the beginning on the basis that things might not go according to plan. As far as could humanly be foreseen the situation at the start of the battle would be far from unfavourable. With full confidence in our troops, their excellent tactical training and experience in improvisation, we approached the battle full of optimism.
PLAN OF ATTACK
The opening move of the offensive was to be made by a frontal attack of the Italian infantry divisions occupying the Gazala positions against the 50th British Division and the South Africans. A powerful force of artillery was earmarked to support this attack. The impression was to be created both by day and by night that tank assembly positions existed behind the front. For this purpose tanks and lorries were to be driven round in circles in this area. The British Command was to be made to expect our main attack in the northern and central part of the Gazala position. What we wanted to achieve was for the British tank formations to deploy behind the infantry on this sectpr of the front. To the British Command, the idea of a German frontal attack against the Gazala position could not have appeared too far-fetched as it was by no means impossible that we should prefer such an attack to the risky right hook round Bir Hacheim. If our attempt to mislead the British into concentrating their entire tank forces there should fail, then we hoped that they would send at least part of their tank brigades into that sector, and thereby split their striking force. During daylight hours all movement of my motorised forces was to be directed towards the point of attack of the Italian infantry. But after nightfall the motorised group was to drive into its assembly area. This group consisted of the German Afrika Korps with the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, the 20th Italian Motorised Corps and the 90th Light Division with the three reconnaissance units. The beginning of the advance, which was to take the form of an enveloping attack on Bir Hacheim, was fixed for 2200 hours. From there the German Afrika Korps and 20th Italian Corps with the Ariete Tank Division and Trieste Motorised Division were to push on to the coast via Acroma, in order to cut the supply line and smash the British divisions in the Gazala position, together with the tank forces which were there assembled.
The 90th Light Division was ordered to push into the El Adem-El Hamed area together with the three reconnaissance units in order to prevent the withdrawal of the Tobruk garrison and the bringing up of reinforcements into the Acroma area. In addition the British were to be cut off from the extensive supply depots which they had established in the area east of Tobruk. In order to simulate the existence of massed tank forces in that area the 90th Light Division had been equipped with lorries on which were mounted aero-engines fitted with propellers, which were intended, by stirring up large quantities of dust, to suggest the approach of strong tank forces. We wanted to keep the British forces in that area from intervening in the Acroma battle, so long as our tank units were trying to achieve a decision there.
Following upon the destruction of the British forces in the Marmarica we had planned for a rapid conquest of the fortress of Tobruk. My freedom of operation had been limited by the Duce to the area bounded by the Egyptian frontier.
It had actually been intended that Malta should be taken by Italian and German parachute and landing forces before the offensive started but for some unaccountable reason our High Command abandoned this scheme. Unfortunately, my request to have this attractive little job entrusted to my own army had been turned down back in the spring. Consequently, in view of the steady increase in British war potential, we fixed the date of the attack for May 26th, 1942.
BATTLES FOR GAZALA POSITION
This covers the period from May 26th to June 15th. During these three weeks the battle of attrition was waged in the Western Desert in its most ruthless form. The battle opened very badly for us but in the fluctuating fighting which ensued, we succeeded, partly by means of attacks with limited objectives, partly by means of our defence, in defeating the superior British formations, in spite of the courage which their troops displayed.
In view of the superior strength of the British forces this victory of my German-Italian troops came as a complete surprise to world opinion. The dispositions of my adversary, Lieutenant-General Ritchie, were severely criticised. Was their defeat in fact caused by the mistakes of the British commander? After the battle I came across an article by the British military critic, Liddell Hart, which ascribed the shortcomings of the British Command during the African campaign to the fact that the British generals stuck too closely to infantry warfare. I had the same impression. The British Command had not drawn the inferences which it should have drawn from the defeat of 1941-42. Prejudice against innovations is a typical characteristic of an Officer Corps which has grown up in a well-tried and proved system. That was the reason why the Prussian Army was defeated by Napoleon. The same phenomenon demonstrated itself during the war amongst both British and German officers, who, in their preoccupation with complicated theories, had lost the ability to adapt themselves to the realities of the situation. A military doctrine had been worked out down to the last detail, and it was now regarded
as the sum of military wisdom. In their opinion, only that military thinking which followed their standardised rules was acceptable. Everything outside these rules they regarded as a gamble and, if it succeeded, the result of luck and accident. This attitude of mind created prejudice, the consequences of which were quite incalculable.
For even military rules are affected by technical development. What was valid in 1914 is valid to-day only where the greater part of the formations engaged on both sides, or at least on the side which is attacked, consists of non-motorised infantry units. In this situation the armoured troops still play the part of the cavalry whose task it is to outrun and cut off the infantry. Quite different rules apply in a battle which is being fought by fully motorised adversaries on both sides, as I have already explained. However valuable it may be to base one's actions upon tradition in the field of soldierly ethics, this attitude must be condemned in the field of military science. For in these days it is not left to the military leaders alone to think up new methods, thereby rendering others valueless; to-day the possibilities of warfare are constantly being changed by technical progress. Hence, the modern army commander must be free of all excessive attachment to routine methods and must have an extensive understanding of technical matters. He must be ready to adapt his ideas to the situation at any given moment and to turn the whole structure of his thinking inside out, if conditions should make this necessary. I think that my adversary, General Ritchie, like many generals of the older school, had not completely realised the consequences which followed from the fully motorised conduct of operations and from the open terrain of the desert. In spite of the excellent and detailed way in which his plans had been worked out, they were bound to fail, for they were in effect a compromise.
In spite of the dangerous situation which existed on the evening of May 27th, which set us serious problems, I was full of hope about the further course of the battle. For Ritchie had thrown his armoured formations into the battle separately and at different times, thereby giving us the chance of engaging them each time with just about enough of our own tanks. This splitting up of the British armoured brigades was incomprehensible. In my opinion the sacrifice of the 7th British Armoured Division south and southeast of Bir-el-Harmat served no operational purpose whatever for it made no difference whether my Panzer divisions were engaged there or at the Trigh-el-Abd, where the remainder of the British armoured forces did eventually enter the battle. The principal aim of the British should have been to bring all their avail- able armoured formations into action at one and the same time.
