by Rex Warner
With regard to the allies the problem was different and more difficult. It could be reasonably maintained that as there was now nothing to fear from Persia, there was nothing to be gained by an organization of independent states designed originally for no other purpose than to defend and liberate Greeks from Persian aggression. The allies had suffered in casualties almost as much as Athens, and those who did not provide ships and men contributed money to the alliance. It was only natural that many, particularly among the richer classes in the allied states, should think that this money could be more profitably used if diverted to their own hands. And in Athens those who opposed Pericles, either because they feared the expansive quality of the democracy, or because they had Spartan sympathies, or for both reasons at once, now appeared to have a good moral reason for withdrawal from the dangers and the hardships of continued enterprise.
These views were, as I have already explained, not tolerable to Pericles. He defended the continuance of the alliance on two grounds: first that it was necessary, and second that it was desirable in the best interests of both Athens and her allies. And, for a variety of reasons (some enlightened, some merely selfish) he received overwhelming support from all classes, and particularly from that great majority of those who had only recently become aware of the power in their possession and of the scope before them.
It was to encourage these supporters, to disarm criticism, and at the same time to give some intimation of his ultimate aims that Pericles carried through his proposal that envoys should be sent to every state in Greece to convene a Pan-Hellenic conference in Athens. This conference was to mark the end of the war with Persia, and the subjects to be discussed were the rebuilding of temples burned by the Persians, the payment of the sacrifices which in the course of the fighting had been promised to the gods, and the question of the use and freedom of the seas. It must have been clear to everyone that whatever the advantages or disadvantages in such a conference might be, Greece was being invited to confirm by agreement the exceptional position of Athens. The only considerable temples burned in the war had been those of Athens; in the war itself and in the liberation of the Greek cities far the greater part had been taken by Athens; the control of the seas was already in the hands of Athens; and as though Athens were to be acknowledged as the center and the leader of Greece, it was in Athens that the conference should meet. The proposal was, in fact, an open challenge to the established position of Sparta. In making it Pericles could claim that he was doing no more than stating the facts of the present situation. He was making clear his willingness for peace, a peace secured and guaranteed by Athenian fleets and Athenian organization. And if (as no doubt he expected) the proposal were rejected by Sparta and her allies, he would have secured at least some advantage in the fact that the rejection of such a general plan for peace and security would, in the eyes of both friends and enemies, entitle Athens to take her own steps to secure her own safety. And as it was Athens, and Athens alone, which guaranteed the safety of the allies, it was reasonable to expect the allies to continue to play their part.
So indeed it happened. The Spartans refused to have anything to do with the proposed conference and persuaded their allies in the Peloponnese to follow their example. The Athenians, on the motion of Kleinias, a member of a noble family and connected by marriage with Pericles, confirmed and strengthened their alliance, making new arrangements for the collection of the tribute. It was at this time that the cities were first required to send to Athens every four years offerings and beasts for sacrifice at the great festival of the Panathenaea, which was soon to eclipse in splendor all festivals that had ever been held in Greece.
On the whole the allies accepted the new arrangements willingly enough, though it was certainly true that in most states there were, as there are today, anti-democratic parties opposed both to their own governments and to that of Athens. These parties looked naturally to Sparta, but have never so far received any practical assistance from that quarter. The Spartans indeed spoke, as they do today, of the tyranny of Athens, but, with so large a subject population of their own, found it difficult to speak with great conviction. There have been, of course, revolts in the Athenian alliance, some of them serious, but what seems to me significant is that these revolts have nearly always occurred in isolation from each other; there has been no concerted attempt to escape from the obligations imposed by Athens. As it was, Athens a few years later had great difficulty in suppressing Samos alone, and if Samos had been joined by other states, the difficulties would have been great indeed, since Sparta would certainly have intervened. The present war would have begun much earlier and at a time when Athens was less strong than she is now. There was a strong party in Sparta which favored war, and it is certain, I think, that had there been any possibility of a general revolt in the Athenian alliance, this party would have found some pretext to break the truce and to act. That none of this happened seems to me evidence that among the allies a large majority continued to associate their own happiness and prosperity with that of Athens.
Pericles was always alive to every danger from Sparta. Here, as in other respects, his policy was consistent. He would tolerate no intervention from Sparta in anything which concerned Athens, but he preferred peace to war, being confident that peace would bring to Athens, more safely and more certainly than war, the supremacy which he had already begun to claim. And at this time he acted with more than usual caution. He was aware that the Athenian position, though secure in essentials (in the fortifications, the fleet and the alliance), was far from secure in central and northern Greece. The Thessalians had already shown themselves unreliable, and in both Megara and Boeotia, which had never been attached to Athens by any sentiment of kinship or any obvious self-interest, there were strong parties bitterly opposed to the ideas of democracy and to the infiltration of what seemed to them a foreign and dangerous way of life. Pericles believed that in time these feelings would change, but he knew that time was necessary. So he let it be known in Sparta that he was willing at any time to negotiate a lasting peace settlement to take the place of the five-year truce. But the Spartans already felt humiliated by the terms of this truce; they had lost in Kimon the only Athenian whom they trusted; and they were affronted by the claims of Athens to represent Greece. A few of them (notably one of the kings, Archidamus, who was acquainted with Pericles and respected him) were in favor of a relaxation of tension. Sparta, they argued was a world to herself; she could always defend herself and would always be respected; foreign adventure and entanglement were contrary to Spartan tradition and dangerous to Spartan character. Such a view as this is, of course, characteristic of Spartan arrogance. And the same arrogance was expressed in the view of the majority, who demanded simply that Athens should be humbled if only as a gesture of Spartan superiority. I can see no evidence to show that anyone in Sparta had a grasp of the complexity of the whole Hellenic situation which was at all comparable with that not only of Pericles but of many other Athenians.
Before long Sparta did make the kind of gesture that seemed to be demanded. It was again characteristic that the action was taken on a religious pretext that of restoring the administration of the sanctuary of Delphi to the citizens of Delphi. The real aim was to demonstrate Spartan authority in central Greece by proclaiming Delphi independent of the Phocians. Delphi was in the country of Phocis, but Phocis was allied with Athens. An army, rather too big for its purpose, was transported across the Gulf of Corinth, and Athens, keeping the truce, made no attempt to interfere with it. The Spartans marched to Delphi, installed their own friends in charge of the temple and sanctuary, and, on the forehead of the bronze wolf that stands in front of the temple, engraved an inscription recording their pious action and the decree passed by the men of Delphi granting precedence in the consultation of the oracle to Spartan embassies. They then marched back to the Peloponnese and dispersed.
As soon as they had gone Pericles took out a force from Athens to Delphi, replaced the Spartan-appointed
guardians of the temple with the Phocians who had held the post before, and, without disturbing the Spartan inscription, had another one engraved on the side of the same wolf to record a second decree giving all rights of precedence to Athens. Spartan prestige suffered rather more than it gained as the result of this incident.
Next year, however, Athens suffered a serious setback, though not at the hands of Sparta. To the north of Attica the anti-democratic party in Boeotia had for some time been active. What was even more alarming was that they were receiving help and supplies from discontented elements in the island of Euboea, a fact which seemed to indicate that Euboea herself might be on the verge of revolt. This island, as I know well, was to Pericles a point of absolutely vital interest. The general principle of his strategy was, as I have already explained, that Athens was secure so long as she kept her fortifications, her ships and her empire overseas. The rest was, comparatively, of minor importance. With her sea power, Athens could draw on the resources of every land. So, though alliances with Boeotia, Phocis and other mainland states were useful, they were not essential. And in the whole empire few places were of such importance as Euboea, which not only provided Athens with much of her agricultural supplies but controlled the sea route to the north.
These were the considerations that most weighed upon Pericles when, late in the autumn, it was reported that a large band of anti-democrats from Boeotia together with exiles from Euboea and a number of ordinary adventurers from neighboring states had seized the two cities of Orchomenos and Chaeroneia in the far north of Boeotia and were planning to move southward in order to overthrow the democracy at Thebes.
At Athens the news was received in amazement and there was demand for immediate action, and the Tolmides proposed to lead out at once a volunteer force to deal with the rebels. What Myronides had done at Megara he, with better material to draw on, could, he was convinced, do easily in Boeotia. But Pericles, to the general surprise, opposed Tolmides and argued for time. The surprise was irrational, for while Pericles, as he had often enough shown, was ready enough to take risks when some vital point was at stake, he always saw further than the particular situation. His view was that an expedition such as that proposed by Tolmides should not be undertaken at all unless it was certain to be successful. Success would, admittedly, be valuable, but by failure more would be lost than could be gained by success. And while Pericles was willing to agree that success was probable, he could not affirm that it was certain. At this time of the year a large force could not be mobilized at a moment’s notice; the rebel strength was unknown; and even the best tactical plans could be disrupted by elements, such as early snow or floods, which were beyond control. So he was urgent for delay and, finding for once that the people were unwilling to listen to him, said, “You may not approve of the advice of Pericles, but time is a better counselor than anyone and you would be unwise not to recognize the fact.” But the people would be guided neither by Pericles nor by Tolmides received overwhelming support for his policy and within a few days set out with a force of only one thousand Athenians together with some allied contingents. The Athenians were all volunteers and many of them were young men from the leading families, though some (Kleinias, for example) were distinguished veterans.
This was one of the very few occasions when the Assembly voted against Pericles, and it appeared at first that their decision had been correct. Tolmides advanced rapidly through Boeotia, picking up more troops on his way. He took the town of Chaeroneia and dealt with the inhabitants in the severest possible way. Not only Euripides, I remember, but many others were shocked to hear that all prisoners were to be sold as slaves. In fact this immoderate action seems to have stiffened resistance rather than undermined it. With no prospect of mercy if they surrendered, the rebels determined to fight on. Tolmides failed to take the fortress of Orchomenos and, finding difficulties in supplying his men, decided to march home. It seems that he acted with too little precaution in his march through mountainous and difficult country. His force was ambushed and surrounded near the town of Koroneia; his allies fled; half of the Athenians were killed in the fighting and the rest forced to surrender. Among the dead were Tolmides himself and also Kleinias, who left to Pericles, as his nearest kinsman, the guardianship of his two sons, one of whom, Alcibiades, was a boy of quite unusual brilliance.
In one action the Boeotian rebels had gained everything. At Athens the one desire was to recover the prisoners, and it was agreed that in exchange for them all claims to exercise control over Boeotia should be abandoned. The exiled parties came back to power in the cities. They remained distrustful of Athens and, though too weak to become open enemies, would certainly avoid any kind of understanding which might help to revive the democratic governments which they had suppressed. In the event of war, the best that Athens could hope for would be that Boeotia should neutral.
It was a severe blow to Athenian pride, but what chiefly alarmed Pericles was still the danger of revolt in Euboea. This danger had naturally increased because of the defeat at Koroneia. Moreover, the five-year truce with Sparta had nearly expired and so far the Spartans had been unwilling to renew it. They would now be even less likely to do so.
All the worst apprehensions were soon justified. First, the expected revolt broke out in Euboea. Pericles himself with a large force crossed over to the island. He would have taken a still larger force if it had not been necessary to leave behind a considerable army to guard the defensive positions in the Megarid in case of a Spartan invasion, for which, of course, the rebels in Euboea were hoping. Pericles’s plan was, by acting with the utmost speed, to subdue Euboea before the Spartans, who are notoriously slow to move, could mobilize and bring up their forces. However, on this occasion the Spartans were unusually quick in seizing their opportunity. Pericles had scarcely begun operations in Euboea when news reached him that Megara had revolted. The Athenian garrison had been massacred and the large army under the general Andokides was cut off from Athens. The Spartans with their Peloponnesian allies had crossed the isthmus and had already reached the Athenian frontier.
Pericles made his decision at once. Abandoning Euboea, He brought his whole force back to Athens. Meanwhile Andokides, by hard marching on difficult routes, had succeeded in extricating his army and was able to join up with Pericles. The combined forces, however, were still inferior in numbers to the great army of Sparta and her allies. Athens herself could be defended and, in course of time, the Spartans would withdraw. But it was just time that Pericles needed. In a few more weeks the whole of Euboea would be in arms.
In Athens itself there was bewilderment, but no panic. It was now recognized that Pericles had been right in opposing the ill-planned adventure of Tolmides, and people were willing to trust him absolutely in the present, far more difficult situation. They were prepared to defend their walls or to march out and fight. They would do what he asked. Meanwhile the Peloponnesian army continued to advance. It reached Eleusis, one day’s march from Athens, and began to move down the Sacred Way towards the last ridge of hills before the city — the place from which Xerxes, on his golden throne, had watched the battle of Salamis. It is, of course, a Spartan custom that the army should be under the command of one of the two kings, and on this occasion the king who held the post was Pleistoanax, a very young man, in fact guided entirely by a senior and distinguished Spartan officer, Kleandridas, who had already shown on this campaign exceptional skill and energy. Pericles knew something of the man himself and much of the Spartan character in general. He had perfectly clear ideas of what were the essential interests of Athens and was prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice much in order to secure them. Now, above all, he needed time in order to reduce Euboea. He knew too that Spartans, in spite of, or possibly because of, the extreme rigidity of their moral code, are peculiarly vulnerable to bribery. He therefore made secret contact with Kleandridas and explained to him that Athens was now prepared to make large concessions for the sake of peace, but that if it was to be war she wa
s perfectly ready for it and had the power to land men at any spot she chose on the Peloponnesian coast. And, to make matters easier, he offered a large sum of money to be paid to Kleandridas in person as soon as he had withdrawn his army beyond the isthmus. No one except Pericles himself and a few others knew of these negotiations. There was therefore as much surprise as relief when scouts rode in to that the great enemy force had broken camp and was retiring by the way it had come.
In Sparta itself there was not only surprise but anger. The young king was put on trial and exiled. Kleandridas preferred not to await trial. He fled abroad and was condemned to death in absence. He had a distinguished career later as a general in Italy, and seems to have been one of the few Spartans who has not been wholly corrupted by having money to spend.
In Athens people were mystified by what had happened, until Pericles, in putting forward his accounts to the appropriate committee at the end of the year, included an expenditure of ten talents, paid, he said, for “necessary reasons.” As Pericles’s scrupulous care in accounting was well known, nobody had much doubt about how this sum had been spent and everyone was amused by his method of revealing the fact.
As soon as the Spartans had withdrawn Pericles set out again for Euboea with fifty ships and five thousand men. It was a short and brilliant campaign. In a matter of months the whole island was reduced. One town, the inhabitants of which had captured an Athenian ship and massacred the whole crew, was treated with severity, the whole population being expelled from their territory. Otherwise there were no reprisals, though the precaution was taken of settling another large Athenian colony in the north of the island. In the winter Pericles, with Kallias and Andokides, went to Sparta to negotiate peace. Pericles was prepared to make great concessions as he had promised, but not to concede anything that seemed to him vital; after his victories in Euboea he was in a good position to resist such inevitable Spartan demands as the withdrawal of Athens from Aegina and from the Gulf of Corinth. His eyes had always been on the sea and to him the essential positions were Aegina and the town of Naupactus on the Gulf, garrisoned by those Messenians whose loyalty could be absolutely depended upon. He agreed, however, to withdraw from the Peloponnese and from Megara with its two harbors. On this basis was signed the treaty for a thirty-year peace, a peace which did, in fact, last for fifteen years. It was the first time since Salamis that Athens had not been engaged in either one or two major wars.
