by Rex Warner
On this subject there was a debate in the Athenian Assembly which lasted for two days. The arguments which carried most weight had nothing to do with the legality or illegality of an Athenian alliance with Corcyra, though much was said by both sides on this point. In fact, here the issue was perfectly clear. No mention had been made of Corcyra in the terms of the peace treaty and both Athens and the Peloponnesian states had a perfectly good right to conclude alliances with any state not expressly included in these terms. The real problem was a quite different one. It was a choice between two risks, the danger of antagonizing Corinth and through her Sparta, and the danger of allowing Corinth, by subduing Corcyra, to unite the Corcyraean fleet with her own and thus become a considerable naval power, capable of challenging Athens in the western seas. There were, of course, other considerations, but this was the only one that mattered.
Pericles, as is well known, recommended that a strictly defensive alliance should be made with Corcyra, and the Assembly, as usual in all matters of importance, followed his advice. Since then I have often heard it said that by this action of his Pericles was deliberately precipitating war. Such a view is, I am convinced, mistaken and can easily be shown to be so. Had Pericles really wished to start a war he would have wished to start it with an initial advantage, and such an advantage could be gained with absolute certainty if the alliance made with Corcyra had been both offensive and defensive. A combination of the Athenian and Corcyraean fleets would unquestionably have destroyed Corinthian sea power for at least a generation. In fact Pericles, in his desire for peace and in his natural distaste for injustice (since an attack on Corinth would be a clear breach of the treaty), rejected this solution. On the other hand he was, as I have said, more conscious than anyone that war was a possibility, and he could not afford the risk of what might be in the end a combination of Corinth and Corcyra against Athens. It was impossible wholly to avoid both the dangers between which he had to choose. What he aimed at doing was to minimize them. By refraining from any aggressive action against Corinth, he would be keeping within the terms of the treaty; and by guaranteeing the independence of Corcyra, he would prevent the occupation of the island and the seizure of her fleet by a potential enemy.
In my view this policy was wise in itself and was immediately justified by results. In the first place only ten Athenian ships were sent to join the Corcyraean fleet and they were under the command of Kimon’s son who had been given by his father the name of “Lacedaimonios” or “Spartan” and who was inclined to share his father’s sympathies. Later it was felt that this token force might be too small to have any effect whatever, and twenty more ships were sent out. All had instructions to avoid battle with the Corinthians unless an occasion arose when the Corinthians actually threatened to land troops on Corcyra.
In fact when, in the autumn, the expected sea battle took place, only the ten Athenian ships were present. So far as numbers were concerned it was the greatest battle that had ever been fought at sea between Greek states. The Corinthians had a fleet of one hundred and fifty ships and the Corcyraeans one hundred and ten. The action was fought near the coast of Corcyra and the Athenians who were present say that though the fighting was hard, it was of an extraordinarily old-fashioned character. Neither side seemed to have any knowledge of modern naval tactics or much skill in seamanship. In the battle the Athenians obeyed their orders. They came up to the support of Corcyraean ships that were in danger, but forbore from ramming any enemy ship until, late in the day, it became evident that the Corinthians were victorious and were preparing to land on the island. By this time seventy of the Corcyraean ships had been sunk, many of their men were taken prisoner and many on both sides had been killed. Only at this stage did the Athenians take a fully active part in the fighting, and by the evening they, with the remainder of the Corcyraean fleet, were preparing to resist a landing by the enemy. The victorious Corinthians had already sung their battle hymn and were moving forward into action when suddenly they began to backwater, to turn around and break off all contact. The reason for this surprising behavior was that they had sighted on the horizon the twenty Athenian ships which had been sent out to reinforce Lacedaimonios. Thus the mere distant presence of an Athenian squadron was enough to change confidence into fear.
The Athenians sailed into Corcyra unopposed and next day, with every ship that could be manned, sailed out toward the Corinthian station. The Corinthians sent a messenger to lodge an official protest, demanding that the Athenians withdraw and claiming that they were breaking the treaty. The Athenians replied that the Corinthians were free to sail anywhere they liked except against the territory of an Athenian ally. The Corinthians then sailed home.
The results of this action were that both Corinth and Corcyra had seriously weakened themselves, that the attempt to occupy Corcyra had failed, that Athens had gained greatly in prestige without suffering a single casualty, and that in no legal sense could she be said to have broken the terms of the peace treaty. To my mind these results are sufficient to justify the policy of Pericles, and it was for different reasons that they were insufficient to prevent the war.
16
War Declared
Indeed, the events in Corcyra had clarified rather than altered the existing situation. It is true that Athens had gained in strength, but she had been gaining in strength for years. Corcyra, therefore, is chiefly significant because it so emphasized this fact that Sparta and the Peloponnesians began to see it more clearly and to become more afraid of it.
It was natural that the Corinthians, after the ignominious failure of their great naval expedition, should attempt to do what they could in retaliation, but they were aware that they could do nothing considerable without the help of Sparta, and in Sparta there were for some time divided opinions. There was a strong party in favor of making war immediately, but many of the elder men, who could remember how in past campaigns Athens had suffered no irreparable damage and had indeed emerged from each of them as strong or stronger than before, were on the side of caution. The leader of this party was the old King Archidamos, a personal acquaintance of Pericles and one for whom he had some regard. Archidamos was prepared to admit that at some stage the interests of Sparta might demand war, but he understood the value of Athenian sea power and urged that before making any irrevocable decision, Sparta should equip herself with a navy strong enough to make some show of guarding her coasts and capable of intervening in aid of any Athenian ally which could be induced to revolt.
It seemed impossible to say which of these two parties in Sparta would prevail, but it was now generally recognized in Athens that there was indeed a danger of war, and the position of Pericles, who had long foreseen the possibility and long guarded against it, became, if possible, even stronger than before. Not that he was faced with no opposition at all. There were some (and these were the opponents whom he regarded as dangerous) who were for taking the initiative at once. Of these some talked of invading the Peloponnese before the Spartans could mobilize; others were for extending the empire into the west and bringing into the Athenian alliance the naval strength and manpower of the Italian and Sicilian cities. To such ventures Pericles was utterly opposed. His strategy had long been decided upon. In his view existing Athenian resources were sufficient to guarantee victory. She could be defeated only if she dissipated her strength in areas which were not vitally important or risked her manpower in a pitched battle against equal or superior numbers. He was aware, however, of the importance of the west and about this time renewed the alliances between Athens and some of the Sicilian cities. This in itself, he considered, would be enough to deter any of the other cities with pro-Spartan sympathies from sending ships or men to fight against Athens.
It was, as I have said, the rashness of those who were for doing too much too quickly which Pericles chiefly feared, and he was no doubt aware that in the Assembly he and he alone had the authority and influence to restrain them. There were people like Kleon who in order to make themselve
s prominent would exaggerate every policy; and there were many young men, such as Alcibiades, who with little experience of war were eager for distinction and ready, in pursuit of it, to take any risk. When, as in the case of young Alcibiades, such people were not only inordinately ambitious but also extremely able and intelligent, they were likely to be, if uncontrolled, all the more dangerous because of their evident ability.
There were also, of course, a few, but not many, who out of hatred for the democracy or for Pericles himself would have welcomed at any price peace and the secure enjoyment of their possessions. It was, as a rule, members of this small minority who had in the past attempted to injure Pericles by prosecuting his friends. One other such attack was made upon him at this time. It was of a peculiarly cowardly nature and, though it did him no harm whatever, caused him great anxiety and great distress. Indeed, this attack seems to have been purely spiteful. No political purpose could be involved in accusing Aspasia of impiety and in raking up all the old stories, which no one believed, of Pericles’s affairs with married women. The prosecutor in this case was the comic poet Hermippos. He had enjoyed a certain success on the stage and perhaps in this prosecution was as eager to advertise himself as to injure those whom he was attacking. The charge of impiety was based on an allegation that Aspasia had organized a party in which the girls present were dressed up as and called by the names of the nine Muses. In the course of the prosecution it was possible to make play with the usual stories about Aspasia’s immortality and Pericles’s amatory propensities. Hermippos employed his opportunity with his customary vulgarity. But more disgraceful still was the conduct of Pericles’s son Xanthippus, who had recently quarreled with his father, as he was always doing, about money. This time he was offended because Pericles had refused to acquiesce in having his name used as a means of raising a loan for Xanthippus under false pretenses. Xanthippus now came forward and accused Pericles of having seduced his wife. By this action he hoped to revenge himself both on his father and on his wife, who not unnaturally disliked him intensely.
Aspasia being a woman and also an alien, did not, of course, appear in court. Pericles spoke in her defense, and I am told that this was the only occasion on which in public he allowed his emotion to get the better of him. Whether it was grief or anger that caused him to shed tears I do not know, but there is no doubt of their effect and that of his speech upon the jury. Aspasia was acquitted and from that time Hermippos ceased to attack her on the public stage. The reputation of Pericles was increased rather than diminished by the whole affair. As for his son, he never alluded to his evidence and never spoke to him again.
I mention this story not because it is important in itself but as an indication of how feeble at this time was any opposition that could be organized against Pericles. A few years later, when I myself was the object of attack, the situation had changed, but in the period immediately before the outbreak of war, his policies were accepted generally and his only fear was that there might be a demand for their exaggeration. There was little of what might be called a war fever, but there was no disposition to yield a single concession. Thus the great majority of Athenians had come, at least for the time being, to take exactly the view which Pericles had commended to them.
Though there had been little thought of war until the time of the debate on Corcyra, it now became evident to everyone that the likelihood of war was increasing every day. As was natural, people viewed the prospect with different feelings, but I observed no signs of fear or of anxiety. At this time there is no doubt that most of the young were looking forward to it. Alcibiades, for instance, now about eighteen or nineteen years of age, was displaying himself everywhere in new and particularly brilliant armor. He was as wild and extravagant in his ways as ever, but now, for the first time in his life, he saw the opportunity of distinguishing himself by courage and ability in battle rather than by his beauty, his drunkenness and his unexpected or outrageous behavior. His friend Socrates was delighted with the change in him. He was one of the few who had always maintained that Alcibiades was capable of exceptional virtue and nobility, and it is certainly true that in the presence of Socrates the young man did invariably behave well. One may say that Socrates is the only man whom Alcibiades genuinely respects; indeed he both loves him and fears him.
The attitude of Socrates himself toward the war was characteristic of the man. He was wholly indifferent to military glory, but it would never have occurred to him as possible that he should shrink from sacrificing his life if required by the city to do so. Both he and Alcibiades served in the campaign of Potidaea and indeed shared the same tent. In the first battle both distinguished themselves, and when Alcibiades, who had recklessly exposed himself in the fighting, lay wounded on the ground, Socrates stood over him, looking, they say, like a bear guarding her cub, and beat off all attacks until he could be carried to safety. Later, when the question arose of who should receive the prize of valor, Socrates proposed that the prize should be given to Alcibiades, and Alcibiades would have rejected it in favor of Socrates. The generals, bearing in mind the popularity of Alcibiades among the young and his noble connections in Athens, were glad to have the support of Socrates in awarding him the prize, and Socrates was delighted that his friend’s passion for honor and real merit should be so soon rewarded, being himself wholly indifferent to all honors. This story I heard later, from both Pericles and others. I have not seen either Socrates or Alcibiades since they set out on this campaign.
The fighting at Potidaea broke out, of course, before the open declaration of war. It did not in itself make war inevitable, but, like every event of the time, tended in that direction. Here again Athens was acting strictly within her rights, for Potidaea, though a colony of Corinth, is an ally of Athens in the tribute-paying class. The place is, as you know, of great strategic importance in the Thracian area and it was inevitable that Athens should be determined to keep control of it. So, when it became clear that the Corinthians in the town were intriguing with the King of Macedonia and with other cities and tribes in the neighborhood with a view to organizing a general revolt, it was only to be expected that the Athenians should demand that the Corinthian magistrates be expelled and part of the fortifications dismantled. The Corinthians, however, had raised a force of so-called “volunteers” and had introduced them into the city in good time. Thus the revolt of an Athenian ally was organized by Corinth, a city which was supposed to be at peace with Athens. Again there was fighting, this time of a much more serious nature than at Corcyra, between Athenians and Corinthians. In the battle the Corinthians were defeated, but they still held the town and Athens was committed to a long, difficult and expensive siege operation. It is only very recently that Potidaea has capitulated. Even before this battle, however, the Corinthians had appealed to Sparta for help, and it seems certain that some at least of the Spartan authorities had undertaken that Attica would be invaded unless the Athenians withdrew from Potidaea.
The Corinthians received support from other states. Megara sent a deputation to Sparta. So, in an unofficial way, did Aegina. The Megarians complained of the recent Athenian action in prohibiting them from selling their goods either in Athens or in any market of the Athenian alliance. The purpose of this “Megarian decree,” which had been proposed by Pericles, was to show that it was dangerous for small states to take unprovoked action against Athens. The Megarians had supplied a contingent to the Corinthian fleet at Corcyra. They had given asylum to escaped slaves from Athens and they had joined the Corinthians in assisting the anti-Athenian party in Aegina. No doubt the Athenians also remembered the time when the Megarians had treacherously massacred so many of their men who had been garrisoned in towns held by Athens in Megarian territory.
All these complaints were used to the full by the party in Sparta which was determined upon war. Soon after the investment of Potidaea a congress was held to which all Sparta’s allies were invited. Pericles realized at once that this congress would prove decisive for peace or war
and he arranged to have in Sparta at the time some Athenian envoys, ostensibly on other business but instructed by him personally what to say if they could secure a hearing from the Spartan assembly. At this congress the speeches made by the Spartan allies were as might have been expected. The Corinthians, who without aid would certainly lose their army in Potidaea, made the bitterest and most energetic attacks on Athens. Most of the maritime states of the Peloponnese supported them and a few of those who lived inland and felt themselves in no way threatened advocated caution. Finally the Athenians asked leave to speak and were invited to do so. They had been instructed by Pericles to make the Athenian position so clear that there could be no possibility of misunderstanding it. In his view the danger of war would be increased rather than diminished if the Spartans were led to imagine that they could gain their objectives either by the threat of force or by any limited use of force. They were, he considered, most likely to be restrained by the thought that if they took any action at all against Athens, they would inevitably be involved in a war much greater than anything which they had experienced.
The Athenians spoke as instructed. Briefly they defended the acquisition and maintenance of the Athenian empire in words that Pericles might have used himself. It had been acquired by superior patriotism at a time when Sparta had declined her responsibilities; it was maintained for security; it was, in structure and policy, more liberal than any other empire that had ever existed, contrasting favorably in this respect with the domination exercised by Sparta over her Greek subjects. In no case could Athens acknowledge that a congress of Sparta and her allies had any right to control or even to criticize her policies. Athens was, like Sparta, an independent state. If there were disputes between them, these disputes should be settled by arbitration as was laid down in the terms of the existing treaty. Athens was perfectly prepared to submit to arbitration. If Sparta was not, then the responsibility for war would plainly be hers. If Sparta chose war, Athens would fight to the limit of her resources. It would be well for the Spartans to reflect on how great those resources were.
