The duties could become onerous. A 1939 report from a cell leader in Eisenach who was responsible for about 600 citizens outlined his activities for April and May. In addition to his many nonpropaganda functions, his propaganda-related duties included:
• Attending an educational evening for political leaders;
• Promoting membership in various Nazi affiliates;
• Attending a weekend county training course;
• Selling a book of Hitler’s speeches;
• Selling a book of Fritz Sauckel’s speeches (the Gauleiter for the region);
• Inviting each party member to the local group meeting; This content downloaded from 198.91.37.2 on Sun, 05 Jun 2016 03:34:40 UTC
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• Delivering written invitations to each household announcing block meetings, as well as posting notices, finding rooms, and arranging for speakers and music (he would have had about six blocks under him);
• Conducting block meetings.7
In 1939 party officials in Münster complained that, despite explicit party policies, block wardens were the propaganda errand boys of the movement. During the first four months of the year, they were instructed to sell three booklets of Hitler speeches, an edition of Mein Kampf, the special edition of the Illustrierter Beobachter (the party’s illustrated weekly) on Hitler’s fiftieth birthday, and five pamphlets on topics ranging from spies to world Bolshevism. They were handed stacks of tickets for party meetings, sometimes the day before the event, to sell to their neighbors. They were expected to visit everyone in their area regularly and maintain a card file on each.8 And they were given tasks guaranteed to make them unpopular.
Late in 1941, for example, Germans were instructed to hang a small sign from their radio’s tuning knob to remind them that listening to foreign stations was illegal. Block wardens were supposed to check to see that the signs were there, something that did not increase their popularity.9
This mass of lower-level functionaries was central to the party’s effectiveness. The party was to be an example to other citizens, a source of help, advice, and encouragement. These grass-roots officials made palpable the party’s claim to universal reach. Goebbels in Berlin could not personally take a citizen to task for grumbling, but a local block warden could (and was supposed to). In a curious way, this even increased the credibility of the national leaders. Citizens complained about the “little Hitlers,” the minor party functionaries who kept an eye on them, who benefited from the satisfactions of power. Although these functionaries were in fact doing exactly what the system expected them to do, they were also lightning rods that diverted criticism from their superiors. “If only the Führer knew,”
Germans often said. At the same time, participation in the system strengthened loyalty of these minions (or at least their public support). A block warden or local group functionary could not publicly express unapproved attitudes. Their behavior over time strengthened their own attitudes as well as influenced those of their neighbors.
Party speakers were another major group of propagandists.10 The elite were the national speakers ( Reichsredner), who were authorized to speak anywhere in the country. They included leading party officials, the Gauleiter, government ministers, provincial presidents, and about sixty others according to 1936 figures.11 By 1940 the number had risen to about This content downloaded from 198.91.37.2 on Sun, 05 Jun 2016 03:34:40 UTC
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500.12 The Stoßtruppredner (speakers in training) could be used during intensive campaigns on the national level. They were a step below the Reichsredner and could be promoted to the higher category if their performance justified it.13 The Gauredner were restricted to their region, the Kreisredner to their county. There also were expert speakers ( Fachredner) who spoke on particular themes (for example, agriculture or military matters). They were employed by party affiliates, such as the DAF or the Nazi agricultural organization. Altogether, about 9,800 speakers were certified at some level when the war began.14
The Nazis paid considerable attention to the ability of their speakers.
Well into the Third Reich, only those who had been active party members before 1933 could be certified as speakers. An article in the party monthly for propagandists explained why those who had become members after 1933 were not allowed to join the speaker corps: “Even though the National Socialist worldview has become the worldview of the German people, it is built on a foundation of struggle. Only those party members who themselves experienced and contributed to that struggle can speak with the proper spirit.”15 Their faith had proved its authenticity. Even the expert speakers of party affiliates were to be party members of long-standing and were expected always to draw a political consequence in their speeches.
They were expected to relate their speeches to the Nazi worldview.
The central purpose of the party organization after 1933 was propaganda. The system was capable of remarkable activity. During the first year of the war, the NSDAP claimed to have held 30,000 slide shows and about 200,000 public meetings, in addition to distributing enormous numbers of leaflets, brochures, and posters, despite the fact that many experienced propagandists were serving in the military.16 These figures include only efforts by the Nazi Party itself. The DAF, the party women’s auxiliary, and other groups carried on their own activities. Lower levels often concentrated their energies on intense propaganda campaigns over a brief time period. For example, sixty-two mass meetings were held in Breslau (the city’s population was about 630,000) on a single day in March 1939.17
Such bursts of rhetorical energy were common, rather like camp meetings during an American religious revival. As the war went on, the number of meetings diminished somewhat. According to party statistics, however, even during the period from 1 October 1943 to 30 April 1944, with 3,500
speakers serving in the military, nearly 80,000 meetings were held that attracted 19 percent of the population.18
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An elaborate and, as usual, overlapping system provided information to propagandists at lower levels. The most widely distributed organ was Unser Wille und Weg, published by the Reichspropagandaleitung. Its monthly circulation was about 120,000 by 1940. Unser Wille und Weg carried a wide range of articles. Although few were in any sense theoretical, some did view propaganda in a larger framework.19 The twelve issues for 1938 included 380 pages. Some articles provided background material on such topics as the history of the Nazi Party in Austria or reasons why Germans needed to eat more fish. Others provided advice on aspects of propaganda. For example, an article on organizing meetings noted that it was important to be sure that the room was neither over- nor underheated. There were brief book reviews of propaganda-related material.
The RPL also published the Aufklärungs- und Redner-Informationsmaterial (Educational and Speaker Information Material) in conjunction with the DAF, which was included with copies of Unser Wille und Weg. This came in loose-leaf format that could be organized in a binder by topic. The 1936 issues included 560 pages of material on themes such as housing, labor policy, agriculture, Bolshevism, and the Treaty of Versailles.20 The material was not confidential, although only speakers were likely to subscribe.
The material provided detailed information that speakers could incorporate in speeches. For example, three pages in the July 1936 edition discussed compulsory military service around the world. Hitler had declared compulsory service in March 1935. The point of the information was to demonstrate that Germany was only following the example of the rest of the world. According to the article, the French were the first to introduce conscription in 1793. Austria had reintroduced it in March 1936, Italy in 193
4. Russia introduced the draft in 1874: “The Soviet Union has continued the policy, and intends to use compulsory military service to develop a mass army on the largest scale.” Most other leading nations had done the same, a policy clearly justified by the experience of World War I. England and the United States have “not yet” done so. The article ends with these remarks: “Nearly all nations have introduced universal military service, though with differing lengths of active service and reserve duty. The freedom of a people depends on the strength and the extent of its military capacity.” Since Hitler had just begun an enormous public campaign to rebuild German military power, the material fit smoothly into the broader propaganda campaign. The speaker information provided common material for speakers to draw on, which was particularly useful during the frequent Nazi campaigns that ranged from a 1934 campaign against This content downloaded from 198.91.37.2 on Sun, 05 Jun 2016 03:34:40 UTC
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grumblers and complainers to the four national plebiscites Hitler called between 1933 and 1938.
As Reich organization director, Robert Ley published two propaganda-related magazines. Der Schulungsbrief was intended for all citizens and contained articles on various aspects of Nazi ideology. As the result of an energetic subscription campaign involving lower-level propagandists, its monthly circulation rose from 1.5 million at the beginning of 1937 to 4.5
million in 1939. In 1937 issues included themes such as the role of women in the Middle Ages, the Austrian army before 1914, and antiliberalism in the nineteenth century. Its goal was to provide a Nazi interpretation of German history and culture in a form understandable to a reasonably liter-ate citizen.
Der Hoheitsträger appeared between 1937 and 1943 and was intended for party officials at the local group leader level or above. Its circulation in 1941 was 38,000.21 Each issue was numbered, and every page was marked
“confidential.” Readers were ordered to keep it from the sight of unauthorized citizens. Nothing in it, however, was confidential; indeed party leaders were urged to share its contents with their subordinates, although not by citing it directly. Typical articles included advice on how to encourage families to have more children, methods of establishing contact between local groups and German emigrants, and ways to encourage block leaders to function more effectively. There were also obituaries of party leaders, criticism of improper behavior (for example, carrying a suitcase with commercial advertising on its sides while wearing a party uniform), and book reviews. Occasionally an article appeared both in Der Hoheitsträger and Unser Wille und Weg.
Besides these periodicals, propagandists received a wide range of other material. Ley’s office published a mass of training material.22 Gau propaganda offices published monthly newsletters.23 Goebbels introduced a publication for party leaders called Die Lage in 1943. Its goal was “to provide leaders in politics, the army and the economy with the information they need to evaluate the situation and carry out their leadership responsibilities.”24 Party affiliates published their own material for propagandists. For example, the DAF established Unsere Parole, a periodical for its propagandists, in 1939. Regular propaganda conferences were held.25 In short, propagandists received a variety of material to support their efforts, which in typical Nazi fashion came from sources that were not always on the best of terms with each other.
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A final way of organizing and supporting local propagandists was through the Reich Circle for National Socialist Propaganda and People’s Enlightenment, discussed in the preceding chapter. It had some effectiveness in organizing several dozen disparate entities with varying agendas.26
The Gau Circles published monthly newsletters, generally marked “confidential,” though there was nothing particularly revealing in them.
Party members were to be models to their fellow citizens. Ley’s 1938 Organizational Handbook of the NSDAP laid out the responsibilities of party members, perhaps the twelve commandments of Nazism, stated in typical imperative form:
• The Führer is always right.
• Always maintain discipline!
• Do not waste your time in idle chatter or criticism, rather get to work and do something!
• Be proud, but not arrogant!
• The program is your dogma; it requires your absolute devotion to the movement!
• You are the representative of the party. Bear yourself and behave accordingly!
• Loyalty and selflessness are the highest duty!
• Show that you are a true socialist by being a good comrade!
• Treat your fellow citizens as you would like to be treated!
• In a battle be tough and silent!
• Courage is not shown through rudeness!
• Whatever helps the movement helps Germany, which means it helps your people!27
Party members received steady injunctions to work harder. A 1943
newsletter to propagandists noted: “The party member who came to us voluntarily must prove himself by selfless service to the people, just as he did during the period of struggle.”28 Party members were urged to set the example, to refuse to tolerate any criticism of the party or government.
Above all, they were to believe absolutely in the Nazi message. As Hadamovsky wrote in 1938: “We propagandists are used to believing firmly in what will be tomorrow as if it were already so. Only thus are we able to teach faith.”29
Despite the legions of local evangelists and the plethora of evangelistic literature, things did not work out as well as the party wished. Citizens failed to grant the party the respect it might have earned if its officials had actually obeyed Ley’s injunctions. Der Hoheitsträger and Unser Wille und Weg This content downloaded from 198.91.37.2 on Sun, 05 Jun 2016 03:34:40 UTC
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carried articles lamenting the shabby treatment propagandists sometimes received from other Germans.30 Citizens quickly grew tired of attending meetings. They accepted minor shows of loyalty (for example, buying the Schulungsbrief) while avoiding time-consuming activities. Party propagandists were often a nuisance and sometimes a threat to their fellow citizens.
Propaganda in the Colors of the GDR
The Nazis began their rule with a large corps of experienced propagandists.
The entire party had made propaganda, which Hitler deemed to be the first task of an organization. On 30 January 1933 Nazi propaganda changed from opposition to domination, but it was a flexible system that adjusted readily to the new conditions. The Nazis had the advantage of an existing system of mass media and communication, much of which was at least in general sympathy with Nazi goals.
The GDR’s opening situation was different. Twelve years of National Socialism left few experienced socialist propagandists. There was no broad party organization. There was no propaganda literature. The mass media system was in ruins.
The first step was to build the party’s organization. As under the Nazis, it included a tight network of party units that reached into every part of the country. The SED, too, was organized hierarchically. It came to have about 60,000 local groups, which could be either workplace or neighborhood based.31 These reported to Kreis offices (264 in 1989), which were subordinate to fifteen district ( Bezirk) offices. There were people responsible for propaganda and agitation at every level. Finding and training them were the first challenges.
The party leadership’s 1950 publication titled “On Improving Party Propaganda” noted weaknesses in the party education system:
• The still inadequate Marxist-Leninist training of party members and candidates;
• The inadequate training of propagandistic and theoretical leadership;
/> • The often formal training at party schools, divorced from the everyday experiences of party work;
• The superficial, random selection of students.32
The system that developed after 1950 included party schools at the national, district, and county levels and similar institutions conducted by other organizations. By the end of the GDR, half of the propagandists This content downloaded from 198.91.37.2 on Sun, 05 Jun 2016 03:34:40 UTC
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conducting the Parteilehrjahr (the annual training course for party members) had completed one-year courses at party schools, and 80 percent had postsecondary degrees. Most of the rest had attended a party school for shorter periods.33 In the 1980s all the professional staff members of the Propaganda Department had university degrees.34 Such formal education became a primary means of equipping members with the right doctrine and techniques.
Securing qualified agitators was a challenging task. The SED needed more agitators than the Nazis, since it tried to place one in each workplace unit, neighborhood, or apartment building. Because the position was time-consuming and unpaid and often failed to secure the prestige from workmates that Marxist-Leninist theory held it ought to receive, many were not eager to take on the task. Finding diligent neighborhood agitators was a particular problem. In 1955 an article in Neuer Weg reported that 13 percent of the 350,000 neighborhood groups had held the expected monthly agitation meeting in March.35 Only 45 percent of the apartment buildings in the Prenzlauer Berg district of Berlin had appointed agitators in 1963.36
Finding agitators in workplaces was easier. In 1986 the Prenzlauer Berg district reported that it had agitators in place for all of its 1,700 work collectives, which seems to have been generally true throughout the country.37 The goal was to find agitators who had credibility with their workmates. An agitation leader at a 1976 district conference reported on the importance of recruiting good agitators: “Our goal is to choose comrades [as agitators] who have the political and professional qualifications, who have the respect of their collective, and who in general have the best abilities. . . . Once it is clear to the comrade that because of his position and knowledge he is already the collective’s agitator, the one to whom colleagues come with questions or when they need advice, then we have won the agitator we need to solve our problems.”38
The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic Page 11
