by Hall Gardner
Both the far right and the far left in France have highly criticized, if not opposed, French membership in the European Union and NATO. Out of nineteen French presidential candidates, only Emmanuel Macron was supportive of NATO and the European Union; the rest were critical of both international regimes. But even if Emmanuel Macron won the French presidential elections by 66.1 percent, an estimated 43 percent voted for him only in an effort to block Le Pen—with 8.6 percent of the voters voting blank or nul, and with high abstention at one-quarter (25.4 percent) of the voting population.47
After the May 2017 French presidential elections, all the political parties were shaken up by Macron's victory and are in the process of reconstituting themselves. Macron possesses a strong federalist vision of the European Union. He is calling for a banking union and an integrated EU budget that all EU states must follow, overseen by an EU finance minister. And yet, given the social and political divergence of the EU membership, only a limited degree of political and social integration has thus far taken place that would fit into this mold. It seems a more decentralized and interstate model of cooperation would be more appropriate, one that addresses the EU “democracy deficit” at both the local and national level. Whether Macron will try to push through a more centralized model or one that is more decentralized remains to be seen. He says he is open to discussion. And much depends on Merkel and Germany. (See chapters 9 and 10.)
RUSSIAN (AND AMERICAN) EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS
Just like it had been claimed that Moscow was supporting Trump against Clinton, it is believed that Moscow had been supporting the French Republican candidate François Fillon, whose political career as prime minister had brought him in close contact with Vladimir Putin, and who has been critical of NATO and US policy toward Russia. Moscow was also said to support the anti-EU, anti-NATO National Front candidate Marine Le Pen over any other candidates. Le Pen met with Putin in March 2017. In addition to being accused of interfering in the American elections, Moscow has also been accused of both overtly and covertly (through cyber-attacks) interfering in the elections and the domestic politics in Holland, Montenegro, Germany, and France in 2016–2017, in addition to in Estonia and in Georgia in the past.48
Marine Le Pen was able to borrow funds from a Czech-Russian bank after being unable to borrow from banks in the European Union, but she has had problems paying her debts after failing to win the presidential election.49 In addition to demanding a national referendum of France's membership in the European Union and NATO, the National Front has recognized Russia's annexation of Crimea and sent observers to the Crimean referendum, which was intended to legitimize the Russian annexation. But what was perhaps even more disturbing than Russian support for Le Pen was the fact that Marine Le Pen was seen at Trump Towers prior to the presidential inauguration in January 2017 in effort to gain political support and financing from some of Trump's associates.50 As Trump tacitly endorsed Le Pen just prior to the April–May 2017 French presidential elections, it was consequently feared that Trump associates (along with Putin) were still supporting a French exit (Frexit) from the European Union for nationalist-ideological reasons. In France, Le Pen was seen as an all-American “Trumpette.” But Le Pen then claimed that it is Trump who has been following French National Front policies of “economic patriotism.” Yet Trump's steps away from a positive relationship with Russia since February 2017 have greatly deceived Le Pen.
In France, Richard Ferrand, the secretary-general of Macron's En Marche! (Onwards!) stated that the Macron campaign had been hit by “hundreds, if not thousands” of attacks that were attempting to probe the campaign's computer systems from locations inside Russia.51 If true, this sounds much like what has been called a “cyber riot” involving angry individual hackers, as opposed to a direct Kremlin-sponsored “cyber-attack.” Moscow was said to strongly oppose the Liberal-Centrist Emmanuel Macron, who is pro-EU, even though he had opposed further NATO enlargement, but so might be “patriotically minded” Russian hackers, as Putin himself has claimed, in reference to attacks on the United States.52 (See chapter 2.)
Then, just two days before the French presidential elections, Macron's offices were hacked once again, purportedly by APT 28 (also known as Fancy Bear)—a cyber-espionage group tied to Russian military intelligence, the GRU, which may have also been involved with hacking during the US elections. The involvement of Russian military intelligence, of course, was vehemently denied by the Kremlin.53 After the French elections, Putin met with Macron at Versailles in late May 2017—but without making any major changes in French-Russian policy—in part as the G-7 opted to sustain sanctions on Moscow. There was, however, despite Macron's not-very-warm encounter with Putin at Versailles, a general recognition by Macron that many problems, including that of Syria and the battle against the Islamic State, could not be resolved unless Moscow was involved.
MOSCOW AND THE EU PARTNERSHIP WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES
In 2008–2009, Moscow had begun to oppose stronger EU efforts to expand its political-economic interests into former Soviet bloc states by means of the EU Eastern Partnership and neighborhood program. Before that time, even though the European Union began to implement a visa regime that blocked the entry of Russian citizens, Moscow generally did not consider the European Union a potential “threat.” Yet the European Union concurrently developed a common security and defense policy and mutual defense clause based on Article 42 (7) of the Treaty of the European Union, introduced in 2009. This treaty, in effect, links the defense of NATO members with the defense of EU members—and could potentially mean that both NATO and EU members could be drawn into support of both non-NATO members and partners of the European Union.
Moscow soon began to interpret the 2008–2009 EU Eastern Partnership as being aimed at bringing its six Eastern European, yet former Soviet bloc, neighbors away from Russian spheres of influence and security. The EU partnership thus limits Russian political-economic influence over its six post-Soviet Eastern European neighbours—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine. In such a way, the European Union was seen as redirecting the political-economic orientation of Ukraine and other former Soviet republics toward Europe and away from Moscow—as the latter's political-economic and energy interests were not taken into account.
This leads to questions as to how, and if, the European Union will balance its relations with Russia and with the new EU “Eastern Partners.” Although EU supporters do not like to admit it, it had been EU efforts since 2008 to 2014 to bring Ukraine—along with other post-Soviet states into EU Associate Agreements—that represented one of the major factors that provoked the Russian annexation of Crimea in early 2014. It is possible that the Russian response would have been very different if there had been greater political-economic coordination between the European Union, Ukraine, and Russia.
Kiev did, however, sign the EU Association Agreement after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 despite the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region—only to see that association accord rejected by a referendum in a European state, Holland, in April 2016.54 Georgia and Moldova already possess association agreements with the European Union. Moldovans, Georgians, and Ukrainians obtained visa-free access to the European Union in the spring of 2017, while Armenia and Azerbaijan should complete negotiations on somewhat-similar partnership deals.
Even Belarus could soon participate in Eastern Partnership summits—as the European Union hopes to distance the country from Moscow, despite its authoritarian leadership under President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. In February 2016, the European Union had lifted sanctions against Lukashenka and other Belarus defense-sector officials for human rights abuses. This was true even though UN observers have seen no substantial improvement in the treatment of journalists and others who have criticized the government.55 The fact that Belarus has been attempting to facilitate the Minsk accords between Moscow, Kiev, Paris, and Berlin has represented a sign that Belarus wants to move closer to Eu
rope, in part due to fear of Russian irredentist claims to Belarus. At the same time, Minsk needs to closely balance its relations with Moscow and Brussels, as Moscow opposes the defection of Belarus from the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union.
A BREAKUP OF THE CSTO?
One of Moscow's key concerns is the fear that Belarus could break away from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Union and shift toward the European Union. Part of Russia's militarization has been intended to prevent the breakup of its system of alliances as the bitter conflict in Ukraine also indirectly impacts Russian ally and trading partner, Belarus, given Russian irredentist claims to Belarus and Ukrainian territory. Belarus could well be the next former Soviet state to enter into a political succession crisis similar to that which took place in Ukraine.
A political succession crisis in Belarus appears highly likely given strong social opposition to President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, his difficulties in finding ways to balance political-economic relations between the German-backed EU association promises and Polish influence, and the Russian difficulties in subsidizing the Belarusian economy. The drop in world energy prices, and the imposition of US and European sanctions since 2014, has led Moscow to fear the breakup of its CSTO—which represents a mini-version of the Warsaw Pact.56
Moscow is also in competition with the European Union in Serbia, which is both a candidate for the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and a candidate for membership in the Russian Eurasian Union. Interestingly, this presents the same dilemma for Serbia as that which faced Ukraine in the choice between the EU Associate Partnership and the Russian-led Eurasian Union. In theory, Belgrade could join both. In practice, however, it might not work because once it joins the EU Associated Partnership, Serbia would have to implement the exact same tariffs on trade with the Russian-led EEU, which the European Union, as a single trade bloc, does.57 Perhaps much like EU efforts to bring Ukraine into a closer partnership in 2013–2014, steps to bring Serbia into a closer partnership with the EU also forewarns of potential political-economic instability in Serbia as the latter splits between those who want closer ties to Russia and those who want closer ties with Europe, which dominates Serbian imports and exports—that is, if the European Union and Russia cannot begin to forge some form of compromise deal. (See chapter 9.)
The general problem is that it is not certain the European Union can offer by means of these Association Accords anything that is truly better than what Russia or China or other countries can offer.58 In addition, Russia could react by force once again with respect to Belarus, for example, if it sees its interests threatened by an expanding European Union, like it did in Ukraine in 2014. Will the European Union renew economic sanctions against Russia, which are set to run out by the end of January 2018, thus risking the further alienation of Moscow? Will all EU countries continue to abide by the sanctions regime? Will the United States and the European Union be able to continue to align their policies toward Moscow? Or will US and EU policies diverge? Could the European Union then look to closer security and defense relations with China? Or will it seek an accommodation with Moscow without US input?
RISKS OF EU COLLAPSE
In sum, the Trump administration's encouragement of economic nationalism could facilitate the breakup of the European Union (after Brexit)—if not the disintegration of NATO as well—particularly if Italy enters into a financial crisis and/or if France veers to the left-wing or right-wing and opts to break out of the European Union in the next in five to ten years.59 A collapsed European Union would then be preyed upon by US, German, Russian, and Chinese political, economic, and military pressures. Both Russia and China have been attempting to draw a number of states closer to the Eurasian orbit—hoping to further splinter Europe and weaken its global influence.
European Council President Donald Tusk, the former premier of Poland, has warned that acts of Russian imperialism, an assertive China, anarchy in the Middle East and Africa, plus the threat posed by radical Islamist groups—combined with the economic nationalism of Donald Trump—all represent threats to European unity. For his part, despite very strong policy differences toward global warming, for example, and how to handle the Iranian and North Korean disputes, President Macron has thus far sought a close working relationship with Trump, while seeking to convince Trump that alternative multilateral strategies, as outlined in Macron's address to the UN General Assembly, are plausible if France, the European Union, and the United States can work together. For Macron, it is urgent to “rebuild multilateralism” with regard to the conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, Iran, and North Korea, and to sustain the COP 21 process to reduce global warming.60
Both Macron and Tusk mentioned above realize that a breakup of the European Union and NATO could lead individual states, including Germany, potentially under the pressure of the far right, to “re-nationalize” their defenses while renewing old territorial and nationalist/ethnic rivalries within Europe. Already, after Brexit, the United Kingdom appears willing to rebuild its special relationship with the United States, if the United States is willing to do so as well. Yet the complex process of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union could potentially leave Brussels relatively impotent and unable to work toward greater unity. The United States, Germany (after breaking out of the European Union), Russia, and China would then begin to compete to obtain political, economic, and financial, if not military, influence over a divided Europe in turmoil.
If this latter scenario is to be avoided, the United States, NATO, and a more effective European Union (with close French-German cooperation) need to begin to find ways to work with, and not against, Russia. The United States/NATO, Europeans, and Russians also need to begin to defuse political-military tensions and reinitiate efforts to reduce the ongoing buildup of nuclear and conventional arms in Europe, while trying to find as many political-economic and ecological areas as possible where they can work in common both in Europe and abroad. (See chapters 9 and 10.)
In August 2016, presidential candidate Donald Trump had warned that US efforts to regain Crimea on behalf of Ukraine against Russia in the aftermath of Moscow's annexation of the Ukrainian-controlled Crimea in early 2014 could result in World War III.1
But in February 2017, the Trump administration appeared to have completely reversed position. The new US ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, condemned Moscow's military support for the autonomists in eastern Ukraine: “We do want to better our relations with Russia, however the dire situation in eastern Ukraine is one that demands clear and strong condemnation of Russian actions. The United States—calls for an immediate end to the Russian occupation of Crimea. Crimea is a part of Ukraine. Our Crimea-related sanctions will remain in place until Russia returns control over the peninsula to Ukraine.”2
Ambassador Haley's statement caused resentment in Moscow since the fighting had only begun to escalate once again after Kiev's forces engaged in a “creeping offensive” since mid-December 2016 into the buffer zone closer to the positions of the eastern Ukrainian autonomists in the Donbas region. (See further discussion on eastern Ukraine, this chapter.) These forward actions, in which Russia was then blamed for the outbreak of the fighting, took place at a time when Kiev feared that Trump would make a separate deal with Moscow over US sanctions on Russia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine, but without Kiev's participation.
Haley's statement thus appeared to have reversed Trump's previous position, that, in order to improve US-Russian relations, and prevent a possible major power war, the United States would seek out a new “deal” with Moscow. In the aftermath of the US ambassador's address to the United Nations, Trump did, however, promise to “work with Ukraine, Russia, and all other parties involved to help them restore peace along the [Russian-Ukrainian] border.”3 But it was not clear how this would be achieved. Nor was it clear what how the Trump administration would approach the issue of Moscow's annexation of Crimea.
At this point, Trump h
ad been proposing the possibility that the United States would lift the fairly tough economic and political sanctions that had been placed on Russia in the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea—if Moscow would, in turn, begin the process of reducing the size of its strategic nuclear forces. The issue was that some of the major sanctions against Russia were due to expire in December 2017—if Congress did not renew them.4 The problem with this approach, from the perspective of Trump's critics, was that it appeared to delink the sanctions issue away from Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and its political-military interference in eastern Ukraine. Moreover, Trump's proposal to remove sanctions on Russia appeared to be tied to the “Russia-gate” controversy in which Trump and his associates have been accused of collusion with Moscow. (See chapter 3.)
SANCTIONS AND ENERGY QUESTIONS
Yet a deeper factor that underlies the debate as to whether or not to sustain or lift sanctions on Russia is another debate raised by Trump's America First nationalist ideology. Is it better to sustain US-based multinational corporate energy investments in Russia for the long term? Or would it be better to invest in the development of US shale energy industry? (The real debate, however, should be on how to fully develop alternative sources of energy that produce jobs and that are more ecologically sustainable, but this does not appear to be on the Trump-Pence administration agenda. See chapter 10.)
