“Why were the German ships there?”
“They had been bombarding Whitby, Scarborough and Hartlepool, everyone on Lion was furious about it actually. It was an outrage, they were making war on civilians. Nowadays that doesn’t seem so strange, but then it was shocking, absolutely shocking. Anyway, we were already at action stations so we opened fire and they started shooting back. All us lot in the first aid parties could do was sit tight and wait for the call and sure enough I was ordered to the bridge about ten minutes after we started firing. I remember running up the companionway and into the open, it was winter and the cold air just hit you right in the face as you came out of the ship. It was raining and I looked over and saw the German ships about six miles away, they were pitching pretty bad and their bows were digging right into the sea sending up showers of spray – wonderful sight really, I’ll never forget it…
“Anyway, there were three or four men injured from shell splinters, none of them badly but one of the lookouts had a gash in his forehead and blood was running into his eyes. He wouldn’t leave his post so I bandaged it right there and as I was finishing putting the dressing on him I looked up and I saw a hit on the third one in line, the third German ship. A great big sheet of flame seemed to come out of her. I thought she’d blown up. Everyone on the bridge was cheering, but when the smoke cleared she was still there and she was still firing at us. Same thing happened a few minutes later with one of the others.
“I suppose I should have gone back below but I was just a young lad and I’d never seen action before, I could see that we were getting hits, the wind was blowing a full gale and was behind us, which helped our guns and made it harder for theirs. Our shooting was getting better and better, theirs was getting worse.”
“Why was that?”
“Well our guns used a simpler fire control system than the Germans. You’ve got to remember that in a battle, everyone is under terrible stress and frightened out of their wits. Your mouth’s dry and your hands are shaking, you just want it to end – or I always did – so if you’re trying to do a complicated job it’s a lot harder than if you’ve got a simple one to do.”
“I should perhaps say here for our listeners that you were decorated several times.”
“That doesn’t mean I wasn’t scared though.”
“No I suppose not, can you tell us more?”
“Well, about fifteen minutes after the action started, we saw another squadron of ships off to the south, at first we thought it might have been more Germans but when they started shooting we knew it must be Vice Admiral Warrander with the Second Battle Squadron.
“Anyway, the Germans didn’t stop around long, they turned and sailed east as fast as they could, still letting fly at us with all they had. Of course night was coming down by now. In mid-December the sun sets before four at that latitude and what with the weather and the cloud cover it was coming on full dark even though it was only about half past three. Anyway, one of the PO’s chased me off the bridge…”
“Sorry, what’s a PO?”
“Oh, it means Petty Officer – a non-commissioned officer – he saw me hanging about and told me to hop it. Anyway we were all pretty disappointed I can tell you, when we stood down from Action Stations I went back to being a steward and I had to take some tea and sandwiches up to the bridge. Admiral Beatty was talking to Captain Chatfield, I remember he shook his head and he said he just couldn’t understand why we hadn’t sunk some of the German ships, he said: ‘Either the Germans have much thicker armour than we think, or our shooting isn’t as good as it looks, or there is something wrong with our shells.’ And that was it – that was exactly it. We didn’t know it but there was something wrong with our shells. Our shells weren’t working properly. That big flash I saw was one of them bursting on the German’s armour, but they weren’t supposed to burst on the armour, they were supposed to go right through you see.
“Anyway, about a month later, right after another battle – the Battle of Dogger Bank – there was a luncheon party in the wardroom.”
“Wardroom?”
“Yes, that’s the room where the officers eat their meals and suchlike. Anyway, this luncheon party was given in honour of Vice Admiral Sturdee who had just got back from the South Atlantic where he’d given the Germans a bit of a pasting at the Battle of the Falklands. When it got round to the main course, (which was a lovely bit of roast lamb as I remember) the Admiral started talking about the action at the Falkland Islands and the interrogation of some of the captured German officers afterwards. Well, he said that the Germans were saying that our shells were rubbish, that they usually broke up on impact and they couldn’t get through the German armour. Well, I looked at the Captain and he just about looked as if he’d been hit by a sledgehammer. Thunderstruck wasn’t the word. He and the Number One – the First Lieutenant – they started in asking the Vice Admiral all sorts of questions, I don’t really remember what was said but after the meal was over and the Vice Admiral left, the captain, the first lieutenant and the gunnery officer came back into the wardroom while I was clearing the table.
“They were pretty excited, the captain was absolutely furious, he was saying that their worst fears were confirmed and the Royal Navy couldn’t face the Germans with any confidence. He was effing and blinding and calling it a scandal and a disgrace. I’d never seen him so angry; never heard foul language pass his lips before, not even in battle and the other two were almost as bad. The poor old Lion was pretty banged up after Dogger Bank and we were in dock for repairs. The captain left the number one in charge and went to see Admiral Beatty and Beatty sent him straight down to London to the Admiralty.
“Anyway, to cut a long story short it got right the way up to Jackie Fisher – who was First Sea Lord – and Winston Churchill – who was First Lord of the Admiralty. They were the commanders of the Navy, the top men, top jobs in the Navy and Jackie Fisher, he wasn’t one for mucking about, nor Churchill neither. They ordered all sorts of tests and firing trials, an inquiry, everything. Still it took more than a year for us to get new shells, more than a year – well there was a war on I suppose, they had all kinds of problems manufacturing shells in 1915, they didn’t have enough of them for the army you see, but Churchill and Fisher they got the ball rolling and what with the invasion scare that was on, the navy got top priority.
“Of course both of them were out of a job pretty soon after because of Gallipoli, but they set the wheels in motion and Fisher, he wouldn’t even let it go after he’d resigned. I don’t know what would have happened at Jutland if our shells hadn’t been working properly by then. It’s hard to say, we might have lost, it might have been a German victory, I might not be sitting here talking to you…
CHAPTER 3: THE BATTLE OF FLAMBOROUGH HEAD
From ‘The Rule of the Waves’ by Michael Fanshaw, Twelvemonth 1963
The Raid by the High Seas Fleet on the Yorkshire coast of 15th – 16th December 1914 caused the first civilian casualties on British soil since the French attack on Fishguard in 1797. Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, the commander of the German High Seas Fleet, wanted to pursue an aggressive strategy, and on 3rd November 1914 had led a raid on Great Yarmouth. He selected the Yorkshire coast line as his target in part because it lay between two British fleet bases, on the Tyne and the Humber. In the early months of the war minefields had been laid off both rivers, leaving a gap opposite Scarborough. The region was also a comparatively short distance from the German naval bases. Compared to Yarmouth however, it was much nearer the British Grand Fleet’s Scottish anchorages and there was a possibility that the British might trap the German raiding force which consisted primarily of light forces and Admiral Franz von Hipper’s battle cruisers. Consequently Ingenohl decided to take the van of his fleet out, to protect the battle cruisers if the British should attempt to intercept them.
In Britain there was a fear that the Germans might attempt a landing somewhere on the easter
n coast. The Army estimated two divisions could safeguard the coast against raiders, but all of its regular troops were fighting in France. The Royal Navy was compelled to spread out along the East Coast, with battle squadrons at Rosyth, on the Tyne, the Humber, in the Wash and at Sheerness. It was believed that such small forces would be able to delay the High Seas Fleet if it attacked, permitting the Grand Fleet to deliver the coup de grace.
Unbeknown to Ingenohl, the British had advance warning of the raid. Room 40 of Naval Intelligence had just broken the German naval codes and the British fleet was already well out to sea by the time the Germans left their bases. However, they were unaware that the battleships of the HSF were involved in the raid also.
At noon on 15th December, the British 2nd Battle Squadron and the Battle Cruiser Squadron rendezvoused off the Scottish coast, and began to steam south. Later that afternoon the HSF made its first general rendezvous and began its journey west with the German battle cruisers in the lead. Hipper’s force, the First Scouting Squadron consisted of the battle cruisers Seydlitz, Moltke, Von der Tann and Derfflinger and the armoured cruiser Blücher. The 2nd Scouting Squadron, consisting of light cruisers came next, followed by the van under Ingenohl, some distance behind.
The British 2nd Battle Squadron was commanded by Vice Admiral George Warrender, his force consisted of the battleships King George V, Ajax, Centurion, Orion, Monarch and Conqueror and the cruiser Boadicea. The Battle cruisers were commanded by Admiral David Beatty, from his flagship HMS Lion. At 15:00 on 15th December they were joined by the Third Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth. The British fleet was screened by seven destroyers, steaming on the port side of the main body.
The first exchange occurred at 05:20 on the following morning between two groups of destroyers. This could easily have led to a major German naval victory, six British battleships and four battle cruisers were within a short distance of the main body of the German Fleet. But Ingenohl had no way of knowing that he wasn’t entering a trap and at 05:45 he ordered his ships back to port. He received sharp criticism for this, but if he were to safeguard Germany’s ‘fleet in being’ he had little choice. Both Ingenohl and Warrender assumed that the destroyers were screening larger forces. Even if the two forces had come into contact, the British squadrons were faster than the Germans and could have tried to escape. It was still dark (sunrise was not till 08:13) and it seems unlikely that anything other than a confused and scrappy action could have taken place.
Hipper’s bombardment force had passed through the gap in the minefield but the weather was deteriorating and his light cruisers were obliged to turn back. At 08:00 the German battle cruisers were off Hartlepool and Scarborough and began a brief barrage. The force that attacked Scarborough then steamed north to bombard Whitby, before all five ships turned for home reaching the western entrance to the gap in the minefield by 11:00.
Hipper assumed that when he emerged from the safe passage at the south west corner of the Dogger Bank he would have a choice of going either south or north but unbeknown to him, Warrender was heading to block the southern route and Beatty the northern.
At 11.25 Beatty’s cruisers, (which were to the north of his main body of battle cruisers) found the German light cruisers, steaming east. They opened fire on the German force, but Beatty attempted to signal that two of the four British cruisers should disengage and return to their scouting duties. Unfortunately, the signal was misdirected and all the British cruisers broke off the engagement upon which the Germans turned south.
At noon Hipper had reached the middle of the safe channel when disaster struck. Because of the danger to his ships from mines that might have drifted into the cleared passage, lookouts and marksmen had been posted on their forecastles with rifles to fire on any mines they saw floating in the water. Several drifting mines were observed (probably freed from their moorings by the bad weather) and fired on, but because the sea was choppy and the visibility poor these were not seen until they were very near the ships and the pitching of the bows threw the marksmen’s aim off. Consequently the German squadron was forced to slow down to a crawl and they did not emerge from the cleared passage until 14:15. [13] Warrender and Beatty were now in an ideal position to intercept them. At 14:17, almost at exactly the same time as Hipper’s force was through the channel and free to manoeuvre, Warrender sighted the German light cruisers through the mist and assuming the German battle cruisers must be nearby, turned north east to intercept them. In response, Hipper turned south east, in an attempt to draw the British away from the vulnerable cruisers.
When Beatty received a signal from Warrender informing him of these developments he turned west – this was the crucial moment in the hunt for Hipper. [14] At 14:30, Warrender lost the Germans in the mist, and turned east in the hope of re-acquiring them. Hipper, believing that a gap had now opened to the north, turned to a north easterly course at 14:37 and ran straight into Beatty’s battle cruisers.
Hipper turned to a south easterly course with Beatty in pursuit and both sides began to exchange fire at 14:42. The British had a slight advantage in that the wind was behind them and they scored seven hits in all before Warrender’s force came in to view at 14:51. Hipper was now steering east-south-east with Beatty on his port quarter and Warrender closing from his starboard bow at an angle of about 30º variance from his own course, but the weather was becoming even worse and the light failing rapidly. Sunset was due at 15:37, but heavy cloud cover, squalls and patches of mist made visibility very poor and Hipper now turned due east and lost the British in a bank of mist making good his escape.
Despite the success of the raid, Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kaiserlich Marine, felt that Ingenohl had lost a chance to inflict a catastrophic blow against the Royal Navy. He conveniently forgot that Ingenohl was under orders not to engage with a superior force and on the morning of 16th December had no way of knowing if he was about to run into the entire Grand Fleet. Ill-founded though the criticism was, it actually strengthened Ingenohl’s desire to conduct more offensive operations and led directly to the battle of Dogger Bank five weeks later on 24th January 1915.
British public opinion was outraged by the German breach of the rules of war in bombarding an undefended port. Some of this anger was also directed at the Royal Navy who had allowed the raiders to get away with it. The apparent ease with which the Germans had got through to the east coast did little to dispel disquiet about an invasion and it is fortunate that the public were unaware that the fleet was in possession of advanced warning of the German sortie or confidence might have been even further damaged.
From ‘The Ordnance Crisis of 1915’ by Peter Hamilton writing in The Journal of British Metallurgy volume 26 part 3, 1962
It was not only the British Army that found that it had malfunctioning shells. Although deficiencies in the performance of British heavy naval shells were known prior to the onset of hostilities, a mixture of complacency, incompetence and vested commercial interests prevented any decisive action being taken with regards to their effectiveness.
The naval actions that occurred in the opening six months of the conflict however, caused the British Admiralty a great deal of disquiet. At the Battle of the Falkland Islands, Sturdee’s battle cruisers were compelled to expend most of their ammunition in subduing a German force whose thin armour should have yielded very quickly to the heavy calibre guns carried by the British squadron. HMS Inflexible’s gunnery officer, Commander Verner wrote that ‘Although our shots were obviously falling all over the Sharnhorst we could not stop her firing and I remember asking my rate operator: “What the devil can we do?” German prisoners taken at the action even stated under interrogation that the British shells had not worked properly. [15] Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty and Jackie Fisher, the First Sea Lord, were both made aware of the situation and expressed their concerns. However, there was a general feeling that the results obtained at the Falklands might not have bee
n typical. The ‘experts’ and the manufacturers resisted all criticism and refused to entertain the idea that something was wrong.
However, the Battle of Flamborough Head on 16th December again called the performance of British shells into question. The conclusion drawn in Naval Operations by Sir Julian Corbett and Sir Henry Newbolt is poignant.
“In all the war there is perhaps no action which gives deeper cause for reflection on the conduct of operations at sea… Two of the most efficient and powerful British squadrons, having bought the enemy to action, then failed to greatly damage him or impede his escape despite repeated hits by our guns.” [16]
Beatty, in a letter to Jellicoe, wrote; “There never was a more bitterly disappointing day. We were within an ace of bringing about the complete destruction of the enemy cruiser force – and failed. I cannot help but feel that there is some serious materiel defect in our heavy shell.” [17]
A month later, the battle of Dogger Bank reinforced a growing feeling of dismay in the fleet at the inadequacies of British shell and the spur for action eventually came from the fleet itself. In early February 1915 at a luncheon party held on HMS Lion in honour of Vice Admiral Frederick Sturdee who had led the British force at the Battle of the Falklands and had just been appointed to command the Fourth Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet.[18] Captain Chatfield and Lion’s other senior officers learned from Sturdee the unwelcome news that the German prisoners interrogated after the Battle of the Falklands considered British naval shell ineffective to the point of being laughable. Not only had British shell failed to penetrate German armour it had frequently broken up on contact. [19]
Chatfield immediately made the connection between this information and the disappointing results of the Flamborough and Dogger Bank actions. This was very bad news for the Royal Navy and confirmed the worst fears about British projectiles. Chatfield went to see Beatty that afternoon and obtained his blessing to travel at once to London to inform the Admiralty.
The Peace of Amiens Page 4
