From ‘British Politics after the War of 1940’ by Brian Garret, Gloucester University Press, 2001
The 1941 election was one of the most tumultuous in Britain’s history. It saw the political destruction of the Labour Party and a huge and unexpected revival in the fortunes of the Liberals. Politically, Britain was badly rattled after the signing of the Treaty of Leamouth and the dissolution of the National Government which had been formed in September 1939. At the close of 1940 the Labour Party still possessed a very slim overall majority in the House of Commons, but the government had barely survived a vote of no confidence, where only the frantic activities of the whips and support from minor parties in the House prevented the vote from being passed.
Militarily Britain was also shaken; she had proved unable to support an ally successfully, keep another in the war or restrain an aggressor and had often seemed almost wholly ineffective in the field. The decisive and very sudden end to the Battle of Britain and the apparently generous terms of The Treaty of Leamouth allowed the Government to present the public with the impression that the war had been bought to a successful conclusion. It was not long before this deceit was being reviled as a canard. The other political parties and their supporters seized on the issue and would not let it go. The Labour party were branded, often unfairly, as cowards and traitors and the results obtained by them in subsequent by-elections were cause for alarm among the leadership.
The confusion in British politics which characterised the period following Oswald Mosley’s resignation from the office of Prime Minister had continued until the shock of May 1940 and the surrender of November. The story of the Labour Party from Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s resignation on 10th May 1940 until the election of February 1941 is one of chaos, uncertainty and warring factions tearing the party to pieces, yet the fault lines that became so apparent in the wake of Dunkirk had actually existed for many years.
Oswald Mosley had moved Labour decisively to the right in political terms which enraged many in the party, most notably Aneurin Bevan. Bevan, like the other disgruntled members was only persuaded to stay with Labour by Mosley’s charm and by his unarguable success. With Mosley’s fall from grace in 1938, Bevan had joined the race to become leader of the party and while he subsequently lost to Attlee, his ambition was certainly not sated. Mosley’s deputies, Robert Forgan and Harold Nicholson also ran for the leadership but garnered few votes and eventually followed Mosley into his New Party. Attlee was seen as the compromise candidate, the steady hand who would guide the party, resolve the internal conflicts caused by Mosley’s de-facto reorientation of the party’s philosophy and guide Labour forward to continued electoral success. There were many however, who found the elevation of Attlee cause for great concern.
Throughout the twenties and until Mosley took over, the Labour Party’s stated policy had been to oppose rearmament. It sought security in internationalism and believed that collective safety overseen and mediated by the League of Nations was the way to ensure peace. This appeared on the surface to be similar to Mosley’s conception of international security, but the resemblance was only superficial. At the Labour Party Conference in 1934, Attlee, then serving as Home Secretary, gave a speech in which he said that “We have absolutely abandoned any idea of nationalist loyalty. We are deliberately putting a world order before our loyalty to our own country. We say we want to see put on the statute book something which will make our people citizens of the world before they are citizens of this country”.
This had bought a sharp rebuke from Mosley, but during a debate on defence in The House of Commons less than a year later, Attlee stated: “We are told (in the White Paper) that there is danger against which we have to guard ourselves. We do not think you can do it by national defence. We think you can only do it by moving forward to a new world. A world of law, the abolition of national armaments with a world force and a world economic system.”
Shortly after this, Adolf Hitler announced that German rearmament was not designed to threaten world peace. Attlee responded in a speech in the commons the following day saying that Hitler’s speech meant that there was “A chance to call a halt in the armaments race...” and “We do not think that our answer to Herr Hitler should be just rearmament. We are in an age of rearmaments, but we on this side cannot accept that position.”
In saying this he was certainly consolidating his own support on the left of the party (opposition to Mosley within Labour hardened as time went on) and this again bought rebuke from the party leadership, but in April 1936 when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, presented his Budget, one which increased the amount spent on the armed forces from 4% of GNP to 6% of GNP, Attlee opposed it in the house, saying the budget meant “... hardly any increase allowed for the services which went to build up the life of the people, education and health. Everything is devoted to piling up the instruments of death.” [98] The Chancellor expressed considerable regret that it was necessary to spend so much on weapons, but pointed out that it was advisable because of the actions of other nations.
Nevertheless Attlee, once he became leader, continued Mosley’s ‘Accommodation’ policy with regards to the dictators and he also continued to keep Britain’s armaments spending advancing as Mosley had done. [99] It is certain that his attitudes were challenged and then modified as the Nazi threat became more obvious. His logic, like Mosley’s, was one of deterrence; that a well-armed Britain would present too formidable an opponent to attack. The failure of this policy and Attlee’s internationalist stance were to haunt him and his party in the wake of military defeat.
In the beginning of 1939 however Attlee began to take a tougher diplomatic line towards Germany. On 17 March when the Germans occupied Czechoslovakia he attacked Hitler for breaking the bond of trust that he believed had been established between the German and British Governments and made it clear that Britain would oppose German domination of Europe. This seemed starkly different from Mosley’s policy. When at the end of March it became apparent that Hitler’s next victim would be Poland, Attlee responded by announcing that Britain had agreed unconditionally to come to Poland’s aid in the event of its being attacked. Coming from Attlee, who had avoided any binding commitment to the Czechs, the news was a shock. Britain was left asking how precisely the Prime Minister planned to back this change of policy.
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Clement Attlee resigned as Britain’s Prime Minister on Friday the 10th May 1940 because his party had lost confidence in his ability to lead the country through the war. The candidates to replace him were the Chancellor, Hugh Dalton, Stafford Cripps, Herbert Morrison and Aneurin Bevan. Bevan and Cripps were perceived as too left-wing, Morrison was tainted by his conscientious objection and the fact that he had never held any senior government post. Hugh Dalton was an economist and had served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1932. [100] He had helped shape Labour Party foreign-policy in the 1930s, opposed pacifism, promoted rearmament against the German threat and it was known within the party that he had quietly opposed the Accommodation strategy of both Prime Ministers Mosley and Attlee while following their policy faithfully and maintaining a loyal silence on the issue in public for the good of the party. It was Dalton who became Britain’s Prime Minister as the German campaign against the west was unleashed.
Despite having a new man at the helm, the defeat of 1940 had left Government policy in tatters and Labour clinging to vastly reduced credibility and a miniscule majority. Part of the problem was the way in which Mosley had run the party. The whips under Mosley carried enormous power and were extremely aggressive. [101] The rank and file were certainly cowed, but with Mosley’s resignation, the restraints that had held it together were removed causing a storm of dissent. Attlee reduced the power of the whips hoping the party would return to its more consensual pre-Mosley character. He was completely wrong.
In desperation, even the right of the Labour Party embraced the proposals of the Beveridge report which was p
ublished in November 1940. The report had been initiated by the government in June 1939 [102] as part of its efforts to find a new post-Mosley direction. The report was seen as a way to return Labour to its roots and draw it away from what many in the party felt had become too right-wing a stance. It was hoped that with the promise of across the board increases in all types of benefits, medical and dental care and enhanced pensions and social services the British public would be persuaded to grant Labour a third term in office.
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None of the parties could face the 1941 election with any confidence. The political situation in the United Kingdom after the Treaty of Leamouth was highly charged. The opposition Conservative Party also suffered schisms with a pro-peace faction forming around Lord Halifax (who was sixty), the shadow foreign secretary. Halifax won the leadership in June 1940 after Neville Chamberlain was forced to step down because of illness. His only opponent for the leadership was Sir Samuel Hoare (who was sixty-one). There was an air of ‘Buggins turn’ about the appointment of Halifax and the more unkind commentators made the cruel but fair observation that the party leadership consisted solely of out of touch old men.
The Labour government’s willingness to embrace the tenets of the Beveridge report had caught the Conservatives on the back foot. At a stroke what appeared to be a lame duck party, ravaged by leadership crises and tarnished by Britain’s performance in the war, had seized the political initiative. Although the Liberals and Conservatives loudly warned that the Labour Party’s plans were financially unworkable they had difficulty inspiring the voting public with their own platforms, Labour’s promises, questionable though they might be, proved far more seductive to the working class.
However, both the Tories and Liberals knew that an election was imminent and the opinion polls showed that the Beveridge Report’s proposals had across the board support throughout Britain and if that support were reflected in the ballot it would mean defeat. Consequently when the election date was announced the Conservatives published their manifesto which included a commitment to enhanced social services, welfare and health spending that was almost as comprehensive as those put forward by the Liberals though fell well short of Labour. The crucial difference, the manifesto argued, was that the Conservative proposals were affordable whereas the other parties’ were not.
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Labour’s majority had been too small in September 1939 to avoid the formation of a National coalition government, but the only member of the Liberal Party given a post in the cabinet was its leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair. His first major political speech as a cabinet member came on 24th February 1940, he used it to remind the country that the Liberals had warned of the dangers of both economic nationalism and Fascism. Though warnings had been sounded by individuals in many parties, it was the Liberal Party alone that had both opposed the folly of appeasement and had supported measures to rearm as party policy. Sinclair also took the opportunity to re-emphasise what he saw as the basic liberal values of British civilization. These were; liberty, justice, mercy, tolerance, the search for truth, the sanctity of contract, the rule of law and the brotherhood of man. He went on; “For make no doubt about it – it is those ideals which Herr Hitler is determined to destroy. He hates and despises them all.” Sinclair had to admit that “...the old Liberal truths have become platitudes” but insisted that they “still remain truths”. They needed to be given prominence precisely because they had been side-lined for almost twenty years (the last non coalition Liberal government had left office in 1922). Sinclair emphasised that the war highlighted the fact that the Liberals had been right, whereas the other parties had been wrong, but he realised that the British people did not want high ideals or sanctimonious artificiality. They wanted a workable plan for Britain once the war was over.
Sinclair was respected on all sides of the House. He was an excellent speaker and regarded by those who worked with him as thoroughly competent, devoted to duty and a consummate gentleman. He delivered several speeches in the House of Commons during the summer of 1940 that were widely broadcast and seemed to embody Britain’s defiance of the Axis threat. None of the other party’s leaders were able to summarize the reasons for Britain’s resistance to the Germans or inspire it so eloquently. Because of his history of Appeasement (or ‘Accommodation’ as he preferred to call it), even Mosley, who could be a mesmerising speaker, failed to inspire the people of Britain as thoroughly as Sinclair, nor were Mosley’s speeches broadcast as widely.
In a speech Sinclair gave to the Liberal Assembly in January 1941 [103] about the improvements in Social Services advocated by the Liberal parliamentary party, he specifically praised the Beveridge report and was able to present the country with the coup that William Beveridge himself had joined the Liberal Party. [104] Thus gilded by association, the Liberal party emphasised that it wanted to establish a basic minimum standard of living for every citizen in Britain. Sinclair guaranteed the country that “The many and varied problems, social, financial and economic, at home as well as those of world reconstruction abroad, are already being closely studied by groups of Liberals.” But he also inserted a note of caution: “The conditions of their study are hard because it is so difficult to forecast the limits of what will be practicable...”
Sinclair could not ignore the public outcry for ‘New Jerusalem’ as it came to be known, but tackled it in terms consistent with Liberal doctrine and economic realism. He was at pains to emphasise that a growing welfare state must not hamper “…that private enterprise and initiative which is the mainspring of the economic life of the country and which gives to industry and commerce much of its adaptability and virility.” It was vital to “respect and preserve the dignity of man.”
In contrast with Labour, the Liberal Party’s new stance did not support nationalisation, and perhaps the weak point in the party’s platform was its vagueness about how the new measures would be paid for. Labour wanted nationalisation of public utilities, a measure that was unacceptable to both the Liberals and the Tories. But the Liberal position proved to be nearer to what the British people really wanted than were the agendas of either of the two main parties.
While the link between the Liberal Party and the Beveridge Report was firmly established, Beveridge’s membership also brought disadvantages. He was not a committed party member, had no interest in party politics and expected to become the party’s leader. At the very least he expected a ministry from which to supervise the execution of the tenets of his report.
What the Liberal Party and the country urgently required was deft and inspiring leadership. The situation called for a leader with moral power and diplomatic skill, respected by all sides of British politics, one who could bring the discord in the Liberal Party under control while simultaneously harnessing the energy it created. Sinclair’s long stated opposition to appeasement stood in sharp contrast with either of the other two parties. His basic philosophy was that: “The Liberal Party is the people’s party, for it represents the life and liberty of the individual and his family. It will always support measures which aim at an improved standard of life for all.” He spoke of the need to eradicate the evils identified in the Beveridge Report, those of ‘ignorance, squalor, idleness and want’. He gave support to a raft of programmes to enhance the wellbeing of the people and he was careful to ascribe an international aspect to the reforms. By broadening its perspective, he narrowed its focus and was careful to emphasise that reform at home would be constrained by the imperative of managing Britain’s engagement with the outside world in terms of diplomacy and defence. He was careful to point out that the British could not hope for more than was realistic.
Sinclair was also able to show that he could lead the party without crushing its impetuous soul. He was unquestionably patrician, but his politics were not authoritarian. He argued that the politics of class was a dead end and believed that social improvement was essential. He was able to argue persuasively that radical Liberalism, not Labourite
Socialism, was the best method of realising that goal. Free trade was his ideal, but he understood that there were now many practical obstacles to making it a reality. The challenge was to present to the country a philosophy that was essentially liberal, one that united the nation. Archibald Sinclair rose to that challenge. [105]
Victory would go to the party that could persuade the electorate of its ability to put into action the recommendations of the report. Doubts about the Conservative commitment were strong. The Tories were unfairly identified with resistance to Beveridge. The Liberals were ideally placed to benefit from the situation; the report was in every way a Liberal document and built on the foundation of the Edwardian welfare reform that the Liberals had championed.
Inspired by Sinclair’s leadership, the Liberal Nationals began to embrace the idea of rejoining the Liberals. Leadership of the group had passed from the discredited and detested John Simon to the insipid Ernest Brown. The group had little purpose and a weak leader. A number of defections and the general uncertainty of British politics in late 1940 convinced Brown to approach Sinclair in December about the prospect of reunion.
Despite these positive developments, there were obstacles. Sinclair himself was somewhat out of touch with modern British life. A high Victorian in outlook, he usually wore a wing collar. He was a principled man, his reasoning was subtle and academic in an age that was impressed by the glib. But most damaging of all to the Liberal’s prospects was their penury.
The Liberal Party in the 1920s and 30s was not wealthy and had therefore been hostage to the whims of its wealthiest member, former Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. In January 1941, this formidable and mercurial politician was 77 and believed strongly that he should again lead the Liberal Party and the country. Sinclair’s success and popularity did nothing to endear him to the wily Welshman but fortunately the Liberals found the support of a new and very powerful friend.
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