Shah Reza died on 26th July 1944 and was succeeded by his son Shah Mohamed Reza. He was only 27 and more easily manipulated by the British Foreign Office than his father. The trade with the Soviet Union was good for Iran. The Soviets paid for the oil and goods they received with gold mined from the vast deposits at Muruntau in the Uzbeck Soviet Socialist Republic. These had been discovered in 1938 when Stalin had ordered a search for more deposits of precious stones and metals with a view to exporting them to improve the Soviet Union’s trade balance. The Muruntau area had been a source of turquoise since the days of the Silk Road. However, until the late 30s the area had not been systematically explored. Mining had commenced in 1942. [123]
As well as oil, the trains were soon carrying many types of goods that were aid from Britain and the United States. Food and raw materials were transported into Soviet territory in this way and while the amounts were small, the assistance was put to good use. Still, the build-up was slow. Although partisan activity was constant, the Red Army did not begin major operations against German forces until 1947. By this time most of the renegade post-Soviet polities had been once more bought under the control of the rump USSR and the trickle of goods coming over the Iranian border had become a flood. From 1944 onwards, with the growing influx of oil, the idle Soviet factories began once more to produce munitions though in volume the amount produced was limited compared to the country’s productive capacity before November 1942.
*
The German invasion of Switzerland in August 1943 ran concurrently with a raubzug (raid) into the territories of what had been the USSR. Objectives were limited, although some twenty divisions were involved. The operation was named ‘Hedda’ and the advance used the axes of the Kazan-Sverdlovsk and the Kuiybishev-Chelyabinsk railway lines. The operation was not designed to hold new territory but to raze villages and spoil crops in a 200 km wide ‘buffer zone’ between German-controlled areas and partisan-controlled areas. The operation was a complete success and met only limited resistance.
In the summer of 1944, a second Raubzug Ost, christened Operation ‘Emmeline’ and designed to bring Chaklov and the entirety of the North-West Caspian coal-mining region under German control took place. It went ahead in conjunction with Operation ‘Magda’ which was hurled against Kotlas. The Germans met a surprising amount of resistance from irregular forces before returning to their start lines.
A large operation in southern and central Russia planned before the declaration of war on the United States took place in July and August 1945 and was designed to provide useful experience for some of the newer German formations. This was named ‘Adelheid’ and pushed 450 km into southern and central Russia, again destroying villages and burning crops. Once more, while the operation was a success, there was great surprise at the amount of resistance encountered. This included attacks by armoured formations in Company strength.
Discussion in the German High Command about what the hardening of Soviet resistance might mean was biased by underlying assumptions about the nature of ‘The Slavs’. The Germans found difficulty accepting that their belief that the Soviet Union must have utterly collapsed, leaving a mish-mash of unconnected and essentially tribal polities behind, did not die easily. The Luftwaffe’s failure to provide adequate reconnaissance of the rump Soviet Union, also premised on the assumption of collapse, meant that the Germans were essentially blind to the recovery that was gathering strength on the Reich’s eastern border.
In fact, the Soviet Union was once again stirring. Lazar Kaganovitch had taken over Stalin’s role, was supported by Bulganin (Beria had been assassinated in late 1943 on Kaganovitch’s orders), and was consolidating his power from the de-facto capital at Sverdlovsk.
From ‘The Path to War in Asia’ by Michael Stravinski, Halifax University Press, 2001
Although they had fought sporadically since 1931, total war between China and Japan began in earnest in 1937. Before this, the war consisted of small, localized engagements, which were referred to as “incidents”. For the Chinese however, the war began almost a decade before it did for the Americans.
In 1939 the war entered a new phase with the defeat of the Japanese at Changsha and in Guangxi. Encouraged by their success, the NRA (National Revolutionary Army, the military branch of the Kuomintang) launched their first major counter-offensive against the Japanese in early 1940. However, the operation was poorly planned, poorly executed and under-resourced and defeat was perhaps inevitable. Afterwards Chiang Kai Shek did not risk any more all-out offensive campaigns until after 1945, opting for a defensive strategy, but opposition to his leadership both within the KMT (Kuomintang) and in China in general saw a sharp upturn.
By 1941, Japan had occupied much of north and coastal China, as well as the coastal areas of Indochina. The Kuomintang had withdrawn to the western interior making their capital at Chungking, while the Chinese Communists remained in control of the rural areas of Shaanxi. In the occupied districts, Japanese control was limited to major cities and the railways, but they simply lacked the manpower to subdue the Chinese countryside, which was a hotbed of partisan activity most of it sponsored by warlords of one sort or another.
Chinese troops administered another resounding defeat to the Japanese in the Second Battle of Changsha in January 1942. In the wake of this, Chiang Kai Shek felt secure enough to go on a tour of Germany, the UK and the USA in March and April, hoping to drum up support for the KMT. He took Madame Chiang (Soong Mai Ling) with him, a decision that was to have significant diplomatic repercussions.
Germany had provided the KMT with assistance in the 1930s, but was a member of the Axis pact along with Japan and ambivalent to the progress of the Sino-Japanese War. Chiang was not well received there, being granted meetings with only low ranking officials. Humiliated, he cut short his visit but got a better welcome from the British who were mindful of the threat posed by Japan to their far eastern possessions and realised that China might be an ally in any future war. Chiang was able to get a promise from the British that the Burma Road – the only supply route into areas of China controlled by the Nationalists – would not be closed and was delighted to learn that the rail line was being extended 100km from Lashio to Muse on the Yunnan border.
Better yet, the British had stocks of surplus military equipment left over from the leap in production during 1940 which they were willing to sell at fair prices and for reasonable credit terms. Payment for these weapons would come from the Nationalist-controlled gold mines in Sichuan, Hunan and Hubei.
By far the most successful part of the Chiang’s tour of Europe and America was in the United States. They were feted in Washington where President Willkie, a profoundly humanitarian man who was sickened and appalled by Japanese atrocities, was determined to support the Chinese in their struggle. Willkie promised both financial and diplomatic support and while it must be said that the disorganised Willkie administration failed to provide very much of either, his successor, President Truman, continued the policy with significantly more success. By 1945, the flow of American military equipment to the KMT had greatly increased.
One bizarre aspect of the visit was that the President had a brief affair with Madame Chiang. This was much to the annoyance of her husband and some have speculated that this was the main reason for Willkie’s support of the Nationalists! [124]
The only major Japanese operation undertaken in China in 1942 was the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign which ran from May to September and was an attempt to subdue the countryside in the two provinces. [125] This was unopposed by the NRA proper whose base of operations was too far to the west for them to intervene, but it was sporadically opposed by various warlord factions which took over once more as soon as the Japanese withdrew their armies. This was typical of the entire course of the Second Sino-Japanese war until the battles of Huaning and Quijing in 1944. Japanese attacks were often successful, but as soon as the forces involved withdrew, all the ground gained tended to revert to control
of the Chinese.
This frustrating situation for the Imperial Japanese Army was partially masked by Japanese success against the Soviets in 1942 but, unbeknown to them, the KMT were now building up their forces with the help of surplus British war equipment supplied via the Burma Road or flown over the Eastern Himalayas. This included medicines, food, trucks, artillery, small arms, gas masks, Valentine tanks (transported in pieces), Hurricane fighters and even a few Wellington bombers. [126]
The KMT was a corrupt and dishonest organisation, and at least half of the equipment and particularly the medicines and food found their way all over China through theft and the black market. Some items even ending up being sold to the Japanese! Wei Lihuang, who commanded the Nationalist Chinese XI Group Army based in Yunnan, though one of the less corrupt Chinese Army officers, managed to hoard large quantities of war materiel and provisions (sometimes by ignoring direct orders to send them elsewhere) and this had the effect of making Chinese forces in Yunnan far better equipped than the rest of the NRA. [127]
By 1942, China was increasingly becoming a thorn in Japan’s side. The inability to finally destroy all Chinese resistance was an embarrassment. The Imperial Japanese Army tended to become less and less effective the further it moved from China’s limited railway net. Despite the stalemate, a decisive victory did not seem impossible to the Japanese. In fact it concentrated Japanese attention away from The Southern Resources Zone (Malaya, Borneo and The Dutch East Indies) and towards China.
From ‘Thai Diplomacy 1940-45’ by Sombat Retanurang writing in the Historical Review Volume 1, 1981
To ensure the success of the invasion of Malaya and Burma, the Japanese needed Thai ports, railways and airfields, and while the Japanese had no compunction about invading Thailand, the Thai army was comparatively well-equipped, well-led and well-trained. If delay in attacking the British was to be avoided, it was imperative that Thailand should be willing to permit the passage of Japanese forces through its territory unopposed.
The Japanese opened secret negotiations with the Thai government in October 1940 directly after they annexed Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos – formerly French Indochina. The Thai Prime Minister, Field Marshal Plaek Phibun Songkhram, who headed a military dictatorship, verbally gave his assent to the Japanese plan to use Thailand as a stepping stone to the invasions of Malaya and Burma. In return for this, the Japanese guaranteed to give back Thai provinces in Malaya which were ceded to the British in 1909, Thai provinces in Cambodia ceded to the French in 1907 as well as give Thailand Burma’s Shan State. [128]
However, Phibun realised that Thailand was in an extremely difficult position. The country had remained independent despite being entirely surrounded by British and French territory, but the Japanese takeover of French Indochina placed a dangerous, acquisitive and ruthless state in alarmingly close proximity to his country.
Having bought time by telling the Japanese what they wanted to hear, he then contacted both the British and Americans in January 1941 looking for guarantees of effective support if Thailand were invaded by Japan. The Willkie administration did not respond and the British seemed willing only to give assurances of limited support, including giving a public warning to Japan that an invasion of the South East Asian kingdom could result in a British declaration of war.
Phibun was by no means satisfied at this and in late 1942, as the world situation worsened. With a new British Government in power, he decided to try again. The response he now got was somewhat different. At this time the ongoing plan for British defence in South East Asia was called Operation Matador which included the placing of British troops on Thai territory in the event of an attack on Malaya by Japan. While the British did not trust Phibun sufficiently to acquaint him with details of the plan, they did furnish him with a secret guarantee of direct British military support in the event of a Japanese invasion of Thailand.
This promise caused Phibun to take a much firmer line with the Japanese and the sharp curtailment of co-operation was noted by the Japanese planners as they unsuccessfully tried to iron out the details of the passage of their forces through Thai territory. Suspecting that some arrangement had been made with the British (and possibly the Americans as well) General Count Terauchi, who was in charge of the planning of the invasion of South East Asia, took the decision for Japanese forces to enter Thailand at the start of any hostilities with or without permission.
The British however demanded something in return from Thailand. Oil from the Dutch East Indies was reaching Japan through Thai middlemen. Oil would be bought by Thai businesses, transported to Thailand, then sold to the Japanese for transport to the home islands by tanker or to Japanese forces in French Indo China by train and pipeline. The British insisted that Phibun put an end to this trade. Although he moved slowly in bringing it to an end, by early 1945 the supply of oil from the Dutch East Indies to Japan had at last been stopped.
From ‘A Concise History of China’ by Stephen Malthus, Pelham House, 1989
Whether the allegations that Wendell Willkie had an affair with Madame Chiang are true or not, the strategic situation of 1942-43 meant that it was in American interests for China to begin to more effectively resist the ongoing Japanese invasion. However, the incompetence and corruption of the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek caused despair in the American State Department.
Like that of the British, American aid was not limited to moral support but included shipments of food and obsolete or obsolescent American weapons. This, of course, enraged the Japanese Government whose relations with both Britain and the United States continued to deteriorate. The Americans gave the Japanese protests short shrift, declaring that the United States was entitled to sell whatever it liked to whomever it liked at whatever price it cared to charge. This response was in no way satisfactory to the Japanese who pointed out that the US was attempting diplomatically (though admittedly unsuccessfully) to inhibit imports of oil to Japan from the Netherlands East Indies.
By 1943, China had already endured seven years of warfare with the Japanese. Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-shek had evolved a strategy to fight them that was perfectly suited to the ill-equipped but numerous Chinese armies. The Japanese had many critical advantages: their control of the tactical air space over the battlefields; their ability to mount air raids deep inside Chinese territory and their overall superiority in artillery, logistics, communications and armour. Despite this, the Chinese would not give up, even mounting major counter-attacks which frequently achieved localised success; but generally, the Kuomintang was forced to concede ground and the front tended to stabilise at the point where Japanese logistics reached the limits of their reach.
Much to the annoyance of the Japanese, the British temporised when they received their request to cut off supplies to the Chinese along the Burma Road. In fact the British were undertaking a programme of extending the railhead from Mandalay to Muse and improving the road on the Chinese side as well as the storage facilities in Rangoon and the riverine ports that fed them. The amount of material that could be delivered along the route was quite small, averaging only 3,500 tonnes a month. It was hoped to raise this to 5,000 tons.
This had the added, unforeseen effect, of making the Japanese reluctant to commit all their forces to China, regarding war with Britain and the United States as increasingly likely due to what they perceived as their diplomatic intransigence. Another major supply route, the Haiphong-Kunming rail line, had been cut in 1940 by the Japanese occupation of French Indochina. In 1941, Japanese landings in the Pearl River delta took Canton and surrounded the British colony of Hong Kong, cutting off riverine communications to the KMT.
The British, preoccupied with the German threat, had no reason to antagonise Japan at that time and indeed wished to avoid conflict with them until they were better prepared. However, this policy proceeded concurrently with a growing understanding in London that renewed conflict with the entirety of the Axis was inevitable.
&nb
sp; By mid-1943, the Imperial Japanese Army was heavily extended in China. 1942 had seen only limited operations on the Chinese mainland due to the Japanese attack on the Russian Far East. The Chinese had used the time to build up their forces. The Japanese were planning new offensives but one of their major problems was the lack of Chinese infrastructure. Their advances tended to be successful along the axes of the Chinese railway lines, but usually petered out the further from the railheads the Japanese army went.
War with the British and the Americans was put off; in 1942 by the need to consolidate Japan’s gains in far eastern Russia; then in 1943 by the Japanese offensives in Changde and Hubei and in 1944 by operation Ichi-Go. This was the Japanese offensive designed to open a land route from Kwangsi to Indochina and bring all of Eastern China under Japanese over-lordship.
For Operation Ichi-Go, the IJA mobilized over 550,000 men, [129] their largest offensive to date. The first part (Operation Ko-Go) was launched in April and May 1944 to consolidate their hold on Hunan and Hupeh. The second, third and fourth parts (Operations To-Go 1, 2 and 3) struck south into Hunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung during July, August and September, taking Guilin for the first time. The fifth part (To-Go 4) was a pincer movement into Kweichow and Yunnan begun in October using the axis of the Chinese railway for the push towards Kweiyang and that of the Hanoi-Kunming Railway from Indochina for the advance on Kunming which was a vital strategic nexus for the Chinese nationalists as it was the terminus of the Burma road. [130]
The Peace of Amiens Page 25
