The Crossing’s Greatest Challenge, Artillery
Midnight had already come and gone, and much faster than Washington had hoped. Although the perilous crossing was now hours behind schedule (Washington had planned to have all his forces in New Jersey by midnight) with far more difficulties having been encountered than anyone had originally imagined, nevertheless, Washington now possessed reason to feel a bit more optimistic for the first time. After all, no Hessians or British soldiers had been encountered or seen at either the crossing point or beyond, ensuring that Washington’s stealthy movements north of Trenton yet went undetected. Meanwhile, Captain Flahaven’s New Jersey vanguard and Captain Washington’s Virginia vanguard continued to move unimpeded farther inland, trudging over the snowy landscape. They advanced straight east through the blackened forests from Johnson’s Ferry on the initial mission of securing the strategic crossroads on the Bear Tavern Road and the Scotch Road several miles inland.
As if their previous task in transporting around 2,400 troops across the menacing river was only a warm-up exercise, Glover and Knox yet faced their greatest challenge during the entire crossing: the army’s outsized, but vital artillery arm now had to be ferried to the Jersey shore. Ironically, this over-achieving orphaned son of a hard-driving ship captain named Knox now needed to utilize some of his Bostonian father’s old seafaring skills to transport all of Washington’s artillery safely across the volatile Delaware. The near impossibility of this supreme challenge of simultaneously overcoming high water, strong northeast winds, and an ever-increasing number of ice floes in the pitch-blackness amid a raging storm had already caused considerable havoc to Washington’s delicate, overlycomplex battle plan.
South of McConkey’s Ferry, Cadwalader’s belated effort of attempting to cross at Dunk’s Ferry, after having been earlier thwarted by a heavy concentration of ice at Neshaminy Ferry just to the north, was way behind schedule. With the storm intensifying and the unruly river now dominated by a turbulence seldom seen, the popular Philadelphian, in charge of the southernmost crossing point, simply could not get the cumbersome guns and frightened artillery horses, and ammunition supplies of his militia brigade and a mostly New England Continental brigade across the river at Dunk’s Ferry, opposite Burlington. In addition, Ewing and his Pennsylvania militia, north of Cadwalader at the middle crossing point below McConkey’s Ferry, were experiencing even more trouble in attempting to cross at the South Trenton Ferry.
All of Washington’s artillery and horses, both cavalry and artillery animals, around 150 horses, which were in anything but good shape after the lengthy withdrawal across New Jersey and because of the lack of forage in eastern Pennsylvania this winter, now required Knox’s maximum effort and skill in successfully transporting his heaviest loads across the river. Washington’s main column’s eighteen cannon, artillery ammunition, and horses amounted to around a staggering four hundred tons in weight. And all of this had to be brought across the Delaware as quickly as possible: the most formidable challenge ever faced by Knox, who had already confronted a good many tough assignments. Quite simply, Washington’s greatest firepower, tactical asset, and advantage in weaponry had to be safety transported across the river if victory was to be secured at Trenton on December 26.
Indeed, everything now depended upon getting Washington’s sole remaining eighteen cannon, which were now even more precious after the loss of almost all of the Continental Army’s artillery during the past campaign, across the Delaware. Most of all, Knox fully realized the stern challenge of overwhelming Washington’s principal objective, knowing that Trenton was “the most considerable” of Howe’s winter cantonments. However, the harsh weather only continued to worsen, pushing Washington’s fragile timetable of attacking Trenton just before dawn even further behind schedule in the stormy early morning hours.
Thoroughly exhausted after their maximum effort, the Marbleheaders now faced even more hard work ahead under worsening conditions. No doubt, Glover’s worn seamen cursed their hard luck and fate, as when caught in an angry tempest beyond their control when far out in the Atlantic. Perhaps in weak moments under such severe adversity, some of Glover’s young fishermen and sailors now wished to have been back in a warm, cozy Marblehead tavern, where the rum flowed freely into the morning’s wee hours on such stormy winter nights, when everyone with an ounce of sense remained inside near warm fireplaces.
Fortunately, Washington now possessed a number of sturdy ferry boats and at least one “flat-bottomed scow” for transporting a massed array of cannon, artillery horses, and ammunition carts across a treacherous river. As Washington fully realized, Knox’s seven three-pounders, three four-pounders, six six-pounders, and two five and a half-inch howitzers were the key to any chance of securing victory over a full Hessian brigade at Trenton. To face this disproportionate amount of American firepower that included some cannon that had been transported by oxen-drawn sleds over the New England’s snow-covered hills by the ever-resourceful Knox from Fort Ticonderoga to Cambridge last year, all that Colonel Rall, even if he managed to get his cannon into position in time to confront Washington’s planned surprise attack just before dawn, possessed were six little three-pounders: Washington’s much coveted mismatch. Luckily for Washington, the Hessians’ heavy artillery, big eighteen-pounders from New York City, yet lingered rearward and far from Trenton, thanks to Howe’s rapid pursuit of Washington through New Jersey.
Most importantly, Washington was determined to possess not only more cannon but also larger caliber guns than his Hessian opponents at the most decisive moment. For the final showdown at Trenton, the “long-arm” savvy of a much-criticized former Virginia militia colonel and enthusiastic fox hunter of Virginia’s fields and meadows was destined to prevail and not that of the respected professional, highly educated German leaders, who had more thoroughly learned the most important Frederickan “long-arm” lessons from Frederick the Great, who was the Prussian master of massed firepower and the employment of larger caliber cannon, especially the howitzer and twelve-pounder. Even more, Washington now utilized some of the most cherished axioms later adopted so effectively by Napoleon, especially the golden rule that any infantry deficiencies, weaknesses, or limitations—either in quality, spirit, or quantity—could be best compensated for by an over-abundance of artillery. However, and fortunately for the upcoming battle’s outcome along the Delaware, Washington violated Napoleon’s axiom that too much artillery, especially large six-pounders, was theoretically detrimental for an infantry force in conducting a stealthy, long-distance raid, not to mention a river crossing amid a snowstorm, because too much speed, mobility, and flexibility would be sacrificed in consequence. Quite simply, the unorthodox Washington, acting on his natural instincts and well-honed experience from a meticulous management of Mount Vernon’s lands with a military-like precision, and a hefty dose of good American common sense instead of dry, scholarly military textbooks, was about to accomplish what even Napoleon would dare not attempt to do.
Nearly an impossibility, what Colonel Glover and his exhausted seamen now had to accomplish against the odds was to transport all of Washington’s remaining artillery of Knox’s Regiment of Continental Artillery across the Delaware as quickly as possible. Fortunately, after the Continental Army had lost nearly 150 cannons during the disastrous New York Campaign, primarily at Forts Washington and Lee, the army’s remaining artillery consisted of some of the best guns: Captain Alexander Hamilton’s two six-pounders of the New York State Company Continental Artillery; two six-pounders and two five and a half-inch howitzers of Captain Thomas Forrest’s Second Company, Pennsylvania State Artillery, which was Knox’s largest battery in number of guns; Captain Winthrop Sargent’s two six-pounders of the Massachusetts Company of Continental Artillery; Captain Sebastian Baumann’s three three-pounders of the New York Company of Continental Artillery; Captain Daniel Neil’s two three-pounders of the Eastern Company, New Jersey State Artillery; Captain Samuel Hugg’s two three-pounders of the Wes
tern Company, New Jersey State Artillery; and Captain Joseph Moulder’s three long French four-pounders of the Second Company of Artillery, Philadelphia Associators, which possessed the largest number of cannoneers at eighty-five.64
Because Washington’s artillery was so heavy, ungainly, and took up so much room, especially the teams of nervous horses assigned to each gun, Knox now benefitted from the relative luxury of Washington having utilized considerable foresight by collecting a flotilla of flat-bottomed ferry boats—much larger than the Durham boats and, more importantly, with level, relatively wide wooden surfaces—to transport the bulky guns and teams of horses, in full harness, across the river. Along with at least one ferry boat from McConkey’s Ferry, at least three other ferry boats from Johnson’s Ferry and Coryell’s Ferry, to the north, where Cornwallis had been frustrated earlier in December (when first reaching Trenton after Washington had just narrowly slipped across the Delaware to escape to the eastern Pennsylvania shore) in his attempt to find boats because of Washington’s prior orders to collect all boats, were now utilized to maximum benefit. Fortunately, Glover’s mariners already possessed solid experience with handling ferry boats, having employed these ungainly crafts in saving so many of Washington’s troops and artillery during the narrow escape across the East River from Long Island to safety on Manhattan Island.
Meanwhile, as part of his three-pronged crossing of the Delaware at three different points, Washington’s other two columns, under the Scotch-Irish Pennsylvania commanders Ewing and Cadwalader, continued to encounter more trouble in attempting to cross at two ferries, South Trenton and Dunk’s, respectively, from north to south. Ewing and Cadwalader also employed ferry boats, but even the use of these crafts was not sufficient in accomplishing their respective tasks, which were simply overwhelming. Because Cadwalader could not transport his artillery and frightened horses across at Dunk’s Ferry, he cancelled the risky operation because of the intensifying storm. Assuming that Washington had also cancelled operations under such appalling conditions, Cadwalader ordered around six hundred of his light troops, who had already reached the opposite shore, back to the safety of the Pennsylvania shore, just after midnight. Meanwhile Ewing, whose primary mission was to secure the Assunpink bridge in southern Trenton to cut off the Rall brigade’s escape south by the time that Washington attack from the north and then to link with Washington’s main force, likewise aborted his own efforts without a single soldier ever reaching the New Jersey shore.
Because the Americans had earlier taken possession of a number of Delaware River ferries along as much as a seventy-five mile stretch of the river that had been thoroughly scoured for boats on Washington’s orders, they had already secured a sufficient number of ferry boats for the transport of all of Knox’s artillery across the river. In addition, at least one, flat-bottomed scow, but very likely additional such vessels that hauled heavy freight, was also utilized for carrying horses, cannon, and artillery powder carts over the Delaware. Before the later-day standard use of artillery caissons and limber chests, Knox possessed at least eighteen powder carts, one for each gun. Whereas the individual infantryman carried sixty musket cartridges, tons of artillery ammunition had to be transported across the Delaware. Some artillery ammunition supplies was stored in the twin side boxes located in a bracket wooden carriage located on each side and just below the cannon’s barrel.
With more than a sufficient number of wide, flat-bottomed ferry boats at Glover’s disposal from McConkey’s and Johnson’s Ferries as well as those ferries located farther north up the Delaware, all eighteen of Knox’s cannon, teams, and ammunition carts now could be easily accommodated. Thoroughly soaked, ill-clad artillerymen pushed, grunted, and cursed in the arduous labor of pushing artillery pieces aboard the ferry boats safe and sound, while the icy rain and snow poured down to make hard work even more miserable. The iron and bronze guns were heavy and awkward, requiring the most strenuous efforts just in pushing cannon from the shore and onto the ferry boats. Footing for the poorly-shod loaders was slippery along the muddy bank and then the wooden floor of the ferry boats in the wet blackness. No doubt some of Knox’s artillerymen of his Continental regiment, wearing distinctive artillery buttons—with an exquisite cannon and flag design—made by a Concord, Massachusetts, manufacturer stemming from Knox’s early 1776 purchase order, slipped or fell while pushing the heavy cannon to the ferry landings, and then manhandling the guns onto the water- and ice-slick ferry boats.
If Washington had not possessed the luxury of so many sturdy ferry boats at this time, then the Durham boats would have been only able to take one gun across at a time, or one per boat, at most, because of the vessel’s relatively narrow, steep, and canoe-shaped hulls. Therefore, eighteen separate trips would have been required for transporting each gun—a single six-pounder with ammunition stored in wooden boxes mounted on the gun carriage weighed more than a ton—across in Durham boats, promising to waste more precious time. Clearly, the Durham boats were entirely unsuitable for carrying cannon and ammunition carts, because of their overall narrowness, deep hulls, and cross support eight-foot wooden beams stretching from side to side across the hull’s rim.
In addition, eighteen teams of artillery horses for each gun—nearly seventy-two horses (four per artillery piece) in total—had to be transported across the river, which would have been impossible, if only Durham boats were available. Thanks to Washington’s prior farsighted decisions, the ferry boats, at forty-feet long and about twelve feet wide, were now ideal for transporting so many iron and bronze cannon, horses, and ammunition carts across the river. A French officer noted how the ferries of America’s eastern waters were nothing more than “a flat boat with oars.” After all, these much-used ferries usually transported local farmer’s large Conestoga wagons, with heavy loads, and their four-horse teams in harness and small herds of cattle or sheep to market. As important, the ferry boat’s width, which bestowed greater stability in rough waters along with the flat bottom, could not only easily accommodate Knox’s artillery pieces, but also a good many skittish horses, especially if they balked or became frightened on choppy waters filled with chunks of ice.
Always eager to accept a new challenge–seemingly the more arduous the better—young Colonel Knox, at only age twenty-six, was the perfect choice for the task of orchestrating the hazardous crossing of so much artillery. Of large stature and weighing around 280 pounds, Knox possessed not only tireless energy but also a powerful will to succeed, regardless of the obstacles. Knox’s sense of optimism proved an invaluable asset in this crisis situation. And despite his hulking size, he was “very active, and of a gay and amiable character.” On this darkest and most miserable of all nights, teenage Major Wilkinson never forgot the unmistakable sound of Knox’s “stentorian lungs” in directing the complex movements and intricacies of the tricky river crossing.
Knox’s “great booming voice” continued to serve as a “public address system” that echoed across the river, while carefully orchestrating the crossing in the hope of getting all of the artillery across as quickly as possible. The bulky, intellectual Bostonian looked as affectionately upon his remaining eighteen cannon as his artillerymen’s welfare, fretting over their safety and well-being. Knox had already commanded Washington’s artillery for a year and a half, and he knew more about artillery than any officer in the army. If anyone could get all of Washington’s artillery safety across the Delaware, and especially when assisted by Glover and his hardworking mariners, it was Knox, who stood more than six feet in height to tower over most of his smaller, wiry cannoneers, especially the many beardless teenagers in the ranks.
Growing doubts had earlier risen about the wisdom of transporting so many artillery pieces across the river with the storm’s increased fury, until Knox had personally assured the anxious commander-in-chief that the task could be accomplished against the odds. Washington needed to hear no more. With time of the essence, Knox’s good-natured, gregarious disposition was transformed by the
stormy crossing into a strict efficiency and business-like focus of getting the job done as soon as possible.
In part because of his youth and lack of a military education, Knox had much to prove at this time, fueling his determination to succeed in his toughest mission. He had proposed the formation of an entire “Corps of Continental Army” instead of only a single artillery regiment, with himself at the helm, to Washington on December 18. Knowing well the supreme importance of a more powerful artillery corps, Washington had readily agreed with Knox’s wise concept.
Washington had already requested a timely enlargement of Knox’s artillery regiment on November 14, and Knox’s proposal significantly bolstered his case. When Congress granted Washington almost complete power as a military commander without civilian interference on November 12 thanks to sagging American fortunes, Washington had smartly ordered the recruitment of “three Battalions of Artillery,” taking full advantage of this unprecedented opportunity to strengthen his army.
For the arduous task of transporting all of Washington’s artillery and its horses and ammunition carts across the river, the dynamic team of Knox, the large-sized “beachmaster,” and small-sized Glover, the gifted son but humble descendant of carpenters, exceeded even Washington’s lofty expectations. Most of all, Washington was determined that his main strike force possessed a high ratio of guns per the total number of infantry that was unprecedented. Indeed, the usual ratio was only two or three cannon per every thousand soldiers. To support his around 2,400 infantrymen, Washington’s eighteen guns equated to more than three times the normal ratio. This ratio was closer than the equation utilized with remarkable success by Frederick the Great. The legendary Prussian leader’s faith in the accompaniment of six cannon per every one thousand Prussians during the Seven Years’ War had paid handsome dividends on one battlefield after another: an exceptionally high ratio unmatched even by the greatest of all artillery masters, Napoleon. By comparison, Napoleon attempted, and often failed, to achieve a much-coveted artillery ratio of five guns for every thousand soldiers. As he envisioned with clarity, consequently, Washington now planned to out-gun the Trenton garrison by three-to-one.65 Significantly, Washington was faithfully adhering to one principal secret of Napoleon’s amazing successes on hard-fought battlefields across Europe: a commander “could never have too many guns” on the field of strife.66
George Washington's Surprise Attack Page 9
