Yet maintaining discipline, the von Lossbergers headed down embattled King Street until the lieutenant colonel then wheeled his limping regiment to the right, or east, into the relative shelter of Church Alley, north of Pinkerton’s Alley, from where it had originally emerged with so much confidence that was no more. Here, the von Lossberg regiment, consisting of tougher fiber, rallied with less effort than the harder-hit Rall Regiment. During the grenadier’s confused withdrawal, for instance, the von Lossbergers gained possession of the Rall Regiment’s colors after they had been dropped on the ground when the color guard was unmercifully shot down in the street: a loss that revealed that they had advanced farther north than the Rall Regiment. Like a number of grenadiers before them, some surviving von Lossberg fusiliers continued farther south down King Street to escape the open killing ground, amid the steadily dropping snow that gently dusted the ever-growing number of prostrate bodies of wounded and dying friends and comrades.
Encouraged by Rall’s bloody repulse, Mercer’s and Haslet’s Delaware veterans now turned their wrath upon the gunners of the isolated two artillery pieces of Rall’s Regiment. Here, on King Street just north of the little Petty’s Run bridge, the two three-pounders yet stood on their own without infantry support after the von Lossbergers were hurled back. Now a high price had to be paid by the German artillerymen for “their bravery” and the audacity in holding open ground so close to Washington’s cannon. Clearly, a fundamental miscalculation and tactical mistake had been made in regard to the two gun’s placement. Indeed, in gambling to reverse the tide and not imagining that the assault of his two prized regiments, especially his own formerly invincible grenadiers, could possibly be repulsed by these amateur citizen soldiers, mere farmers, who proved unreliable in the past, Rall had ordered the two guns, now positioned around 260 paces north of Rall’s headquarters, set up far too close to Washington’s high ground position located only around 175-180 paces south of Forrest’s five and a half-inch howitzers and six-pounders.
After having been drawn by a team of four horses, the two German guns had been deployed just north of Petty’s Run in King Street. However, the field pieces of the Rall Regiment should have been initially placed south of the narrow watercourse for added protection and off the open street to evade the main field of fire of Forrest’s artillery. But the more advanced position had been most seductive to German ambitions to reverse the tide, because the two field pieces would have been in a more advantageous position just north of Petty’s Run had Rall’s counterattack not been repulsed in bloody fashion just south of Petty’s Run and had continued farther north as Rall had planned.
But most of all, the deployment of these two three-pounders just north of Petty’s Run revealed the full extent of Rall and Engelhardt’s overconfidence. Rall had never imagined or considered the possibility that his elite grenadier and fusilier regiments could possibly be repulsed to leave the two guns vulnerable and ripe for the taking, if Washington suddenly ordered a counterattack. In truth, Rall had needed all six cannon of his brigade in action at this advanced point for any chance of blasting Washington off the high ground and to have made a successful counterattack possible.
Here, just north of Petty’s Run and with their infantry support having faltered, German cannoneers started to fall hardly before the two guns could return fire. Nevertheless, eighteen Teutonic gunners now waged their own private war against the might of Forrest’s six-pounders in a no-win situation. Whinnying in fear and exposed in the open, additional frightened artillery horses fell in the hail of projectiles. Other panicked horses became uncontrollable, bucking and rearing, as if sensing the original sin of the Hessians’ tactical error: Engelhardt’s two three-pounders had simply advanced too far and were now completely vulnerable in the street, especially after infantry support had faded away. Despite the artillery duel’s inequity, Engelhardt returned a lively fire upon the Pennsylvania artillerymen while bullets, grape, and canister zipped by. But like the two earlier infantry volleys unleashed by Rall’s grenadiers, Engelhardt’s artillery fire inflicted no damage upon the exultant Americans on the high ground. With limited visibility in the falling snow and in the noisy confusion, excited German cannoneers aimed either too high or wide or both.
To assist his hard-pressed artillerymen in their desperate situation, Lieutenant Engelhardt personally manned one bronze three-pounder while Bombardier Westerburg and his gun crew worked the other field piece as rapidly as possible. Completely exposed in the open ground beside ice-covered Petty’s Run, the busy gunners put up a good and spirited fight. But this now-isolated position along the open slope just north of Petty’s Run was a death trap. Engelhardt knew that he was caught in a bad situation, especially after Rall’s badly punished infantry had melted away. Suffering from flank and frontal fires, the German cannoneers did not stand a chance. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Engelhardt and his courageous band of gunners now gamely waged a lonely, solitary, and doomed battle against the odds.
Therefore, even before the first half dozen shots from the German cannon were fired, eight Hessian gunners were swiftly cut down. They lay either limp in death or writhing in pain in the trampled-down snow across the slope just on the north side of Petty’s Run. Soon only four artillerymen were left standing around one bronze three-pounder, while half a dozen surviving German gunners rapidly operated the other cannon. Already too few Hessian cannoneers and horses remained standing to even safely remove the two three-pounders back down King Street, if ordered to do so, despite a handful of infantrymen from both the Rall and von Lossberg Regiments now assisting Engelhardt’s outgunned artillerymen.
Therefore, with the situation growing more precarious by the minute, Lieutenant Engelhardt dispatched a messenger back to Rall with an urgent request for “protection,” or infantry support, before it was too late. While Forrest’s Pennsylvania cannon roared above them on the snow-lined heights, the finely uniformed Engelhardt then shouted to Major Matthaus, who was yet attempting to regroup the Rall Regiment’s battered left on King Street just to the south and near Pinkerton’s Alley about a block away, that the two guns would be soon lost if infantry support was not hurriedly advanced to the endangered artillery position. But by this time, Rall had his hands full east of King Street in realigning his hard-hit grenadiers in the relative shelter of Pinkerton’s Alley.
Meanwhile, most ominous for Engelhardt’s ever-dwindling band of cannoneers by this time, the high split-rail fences around Potts’s tanyard were lit up by a sheet of crackling gunfire, which struck the left-rear of the surviving band of exposed Hessian artillerymen, situated just north of Petty’s Run. Seemingly Engelhardt and every remaining cannoneer were about to be slaughtered in the open expanse of the icy street where the ambitious Hessian dreams succumbed to an early death. Additional artillery horses of the two German guns were cut down while entangled in leather harness by well-placed bullets. Screaming horses panicked, rearing in their traces and attempting to break free. Veteran German gunners, including well-trained artillerists Rieman, Poland, and Heutzemann, lay dead and wounded in the blood-splashed snow.
Meanwhile, surviving artillerymen, down and wounded, called pitifully to their comrades for help, but the stalwart gunners continued to dutifully work their field pieces as ordered, numbing their consciences out of necessity and a higher sense of duty. Even more than the bitter punishment delivered by Forrest’s Pennsylvania artillery, the flank fire from Mercer and Haslet’s marksmen, especially those soldiers who unleashed loads of buck and ball, continued to wreck havoc among the unfortunate German cannoneers, who were sitting ducks in the open street. While the rattling peal of musketry rose higher in the pale morning sky, Engelhardt and his artillerymen ignored the danger, maintaining a spirited return fire.
To the south below the two bronze three-pounders and on King Street’s east side, one of Washington’s soldiers was positioned so close to the Rall Regiment’s left flank at the intersection of King Street and Pinkerton’s Alley that he watched in
amazement at Colonel Rall’s vigorous efforts to rally his men. He saw Rall riding back and forth to reorganize his grenadiers, hearing him frantically “shouting in Dutch [German].” Beginning to lose his nerve in his first battle because of the lack of infantry support, Engelhardt knew that he and his guns were doomed.
Unable to take any more punishment, the first shaken German artillerymen finally took off, fleeing the death trap. However, most of the ever-diminishing number of Hessian gunners remained faithfully at their assigned stations in faithfully working their artillery pieces, performing their duties as if oblivious to their inevitable fates. Against the odds, Lieutenant Engelhardt and his gunners now made one of the day’s most courageous last stands on the field of Trenton, hurling back defiance from their little three-pounders as best they could under the most disadvantageous circumstances.5
At this key moment just after Rall’s and the von Lossberg Regiments had been so severely stung by not only blasts of grapeshot and canister from the north and the hot flank fire from the west by Haslet’s and Mercer’s troops to thwart the determined counterattack around forty to fifty yards up slippery King Street, Washington was yet saving one of his best tactical decisions for this key moment: exploiting the tactical opportunity presented by Rall’s repulse and the two three-pounder’s vulnerability by launching an infantry charge straight down King Street. Washington now demonstrated a high degree of tactical savvy and flexibility and an astute tactical sense of perfect timing in waiting for exactly the right time to unleash his own counterstroke. And now that golden opportunity was now presented to the tactically astute Virginian after the repulse of Rall’s two infantry regiments and the increasingly dire situation of the Rall Regiment’s artillery.
Washington’s uncanny ability to overcome obstacles, ignore initial setbacks, and then to yet maintain tactical flexibility and a heightened opportunistic sense to exploit any newly developed tactical opportunity suddenly presented on the battlefield were all hallmarks of Napoleon’s dynamic generalship. And by deliberate design, Washington now possessed some of his best fighting men, battle-hardened Virginia soldiers, in exactly the right place at the right time to lead the attack off the high ground and down King Street. Washington had been only waiting for the best opportunity to unleash a shock force of his finest infantry—lethal Virginia riflemen—to exploit the newly developed tactical situation to the fullest.
Despite being only in its initial stages, the battle of Trenton yet hung very much in the balance at this time. Both the Rall and von Lossberg Regiments had already demonstrated the rather remarkable ability to quickly rally and counterattack with considerable fighting spirit, which revealed a high level of discipline and inspired leadership: proven combat qualities which guaranteed that these veteran grenadiers and fusiliers could quickly rally and attack once again, despite the recent bloody setback on King Street. Indeed, by this time, Rall and other seasoned officers had once again organized their troops in the sheltering alleys, Church and Pinkerton’s, from north to south. Clearly, the Rall and von Lossberg Regiments, both now situated just east of King Street, could yet renew the attack with Colonel Rall at their head, unless a preemptive strike was almost immediately launched by Washington south down King Street.
Meanwhile, invaluably assisting their brigade commander, some of Rall’s leading subordinate officers performed exceptionally well under adversity. Despite the bloody repulse on King Street, Lieutenant Colonel Scheffer continued to demonstrate outstanding leadership ability. With his fighting spirit rising to the fore, he was determined to regain the initiative at any cost. Scheffer, consequently, ordered the crack von Lossberg fusiliers of the Scheffer Company, part of the Lieb Body Guard Company and half of the von Hanstein Company, all under thirty-nine-year-old Captain Adam Christop Steding, a confirmed bachelor born in Fischbeck, to advance a short distance to the northwest to drive out the most advanced of Stirling’s riflemen, who continued to inflict damage. Exploiting their advantage, these enterprising American riflemen delivered a scorching fire from the northeast—from backyards and behind fences—along the west side of Queen Street, after having crossed King Street north of Petty’s Run.
Most importantly by this time, Washington understood that the two fast-firing German guns now served as a potential rallying point for the ever-resilient, well-led Rall brigade, and they had to be eliminated as soon as possible. And the Rall and von Lossberg Regiments were yet in good positions, just east of King Street, to launch yet another counterattack north up King Street in a determined bid to take the high ground and Washington’s guns. As if anticipating as much, Engelhardt had already requested urgent infantry support from not only Rall but also from Major Matthaus, or the two three-pounders and their advanced position would have to shortly be abandoned. Despite seriously outgunned, nevertheless, Rall’s two field pieces now effectively barred the main route leading into the heart of Trenton. Packing a solid counterpunch, Englehardt’s two bronze three-pounders were larger in bore size than the standard British three-pounder and even the French four-pounder that seemed to remind the Americans that a victory had to be won to gain vital French recognition, support, and military assistance. As Washington fully realized, this last remaining Hessian obstacle to an attack down King Street must be eliminated as soon as possible, if the Rall brigade was to be defeated on this bloody morning that was so crucial to America’s survival.
Unleashing Captain Washington’s Virginians On Rall’s Cannon
With his tactical astuteness, aggressive natural instincts, and own eternal vigilance in having kept an eye open for a long-awaited opportunity from the commanding ground at King Street’s head never so keen, Washington made one of his boldest and best tactical decisions. Besides concerned that the two Hessian guns held an advanced position and sensing a good tactical opportunity with the sight of additional Hessian artillerymen falling to the blistering fires pouring from multiple directions, Washington realized that now was exactly right time to deliver a decisive counterpunch before Rall could either bring additional artillery into action or launch another counterstroke up King Street with his seasoned grenadiers and fusiliers.
Washington, consequently, had already planned for one of his own Virginia Regiments of battle-hardened Continental troops to spearhead the infantry attack down King Street. With an acute sense of timing, Washington was going for broke, after correctly ascertaining and judging just the right psychological moment to deliver his master counterstroke. Clearly, Washington’s perceptions and eye were never keener, his tactical sense sharper, and instincts more heightened than at this time.
Like Napoleon, Washington had stacked the odds in his favor by relying primarily upon a heavy concentration of artillery firepower at the forefront to smash the enemy’s morale, inflict casualties, and reduce resistance capabilities while simultaneously bolstering his own troop’s spirits and confidence, to now set the stage and create the key opportunity that could now be exploited to the fullest by his best infantrymen at exactly the right moment. As he had so masterfully orchestrated his artillery arm this morning, Washington was demonstrating careful coordination and perfect timing in deciding that it was now time to order an infantry charge down King Street.
First and foremost, therefore, it was no coincidence that explained why the veteran Third Virginia Continental Regiment, on the right-center of Stirling’s brigade, was now the lead regiment poised at the head of King Street to lead the attack south. Indeed, Washington had carefully placed the Third Virginia Continental Regiment in an ideal position to spearhead his counterstroke down King Street to smash Rall’s loftiest ambitions, whenever the tactical opportunity presented itself. And as demonstrated throughout the past, Washington could trust these seasoned Old Dominion soldiers and their experienced commanders to the utmost. On another memorable day that he yet recalled fondly, the commander-in-chief had skillfully employed these same tough Virginia riflemen to strike into the redcoats’ rear at the battle of Harlem Heights to teach the Britons a ra
re lesson for having openly mocked the American’s withdrawal with the fox-hunt bugle call of “Gone to Earth” that had brought shame upon the proud Washington.
As in having earlier placed some of his largest and best guns, with ample supplies of canister and grapeshot to repel any counterattack, at the head of King Street for the maximum defensive advantage, so Washington now possessed an ace in the hole for his upcoming offensive thrust to regain the initiative in the battlefield’s most decisive sector: dependable Virginia veterans, armed with deadly Long Rifles and with well-honed combat capabilities who were known for their tactical skill, flexibility, and aggressiveness.
During the dramatic showdown at Trenton, Washington’s timely and wise decision to now adhere to the tactical offensive was yet another example of the Virginian’s more thorough utilization of a masterful adaptability and tactical flexibility—an unique and balanced mixture of both offensive and defensive—than he had ever demonstrated on any previous battlefield. Enjoying his finest hour as a battlefield commander now revealed that Washington had significantly matured as a tactician, exactly when and where needed the most. At this key moment when the battle had only begun and yet hung in the balance, Washington was about to utilize his most reliable, finest, and seasoned soldiers, including his own trusty cousin, Captain William Washington, of considerable tactical ability and aggressiveness, for unleashing a hard-hitting attack off the high ground exactly when the Hessians were least prepared to meet it.
Therefore, after having been directed to do so by Washington, Knox rode up to Colonel “Old Joe Gourd” Weedon, who stood like a benevolent guardian in supervising his fast-firingThird Virginia veterans, who blazed away at lucrative targets on King Street with their deadly Long Rifles. Washington knew Weedon quite well. Weedon had long shared invigorating hot-buttered rums with Washington at his own Rising Sun Tavern in Fredericksburg on just such cold winter days. Resting heavy in the leather saddle on his war horse while heavy snowflakes tumbled down from black skies, Knox urgently asked “Old Gourd” almost rhetorically, “Can some of your men take those guns?”
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