by Dee Brown
We did not fight like white men with one officer; we all shot as we pleased. The plan of rushing into the buildings was given up, and we shot at the windows, mostly at the big stone building, as we thought many of the whites were in there.
"We could not see them, so were not sure we were killing any. During the shooting we tried to set fire to the buildings with fire arrows, but the buildings would not burn, so we had to get more powder and bullets. The sun was about two hours high when we went around to the west of the fort, and decided to go back to Little Crow's village and come and keep up the fighting next day. .
"There were about four hundred Indians in this attack; no women were along. They all stayed at Little Crow's village.
The cooking was done by boys ten to fifteen years of age, too young to fight."
That evening in the village, both Little Crow and Big Eagle were low in spirits because they had not been able to take the Soldiers' House. Big Eagle opposed another attack. The Santees did not have enough warriors to storm the soldiers'
big guns, he said. They would lose too many men if they made another attack. Little Crow said he would decide later what to do. Meanwhile everyone should go to work making as many bullets as possible; there was plenty of gunpowder left from the agency storehouse.
Later in the evening the situation changed. Four hundred Wahpeton and Sisseton warriors came in from the Upper Agency and offered to join the Mdewkantons in their war against the white men. Little Crow was elated. The Santee Sioux were united again, eight hundred strong, surely enough warriors to take Fort Ridgely. He called a war council and issued strict orders for the next day's fighting.
This time they must not fail.
"Early on August 22 we started," Lightning Blanket said, "but the grass was wet with dew, more than on the day of the first attack, so the sun was quite high before we traveled very far and it was just before the middle of the day when we reached the fort. . . We did not stop to eat this time, but each carried something to eat in his legging sash and ate it in the middle of the day, while fighting."
Big Eagle said the second fight at Fort Ridgely was a grand affair. "We went down determined to take the fort, for we knew it was of the greatest importance to us to have it. If we could take it we would soon have the whole Minnesota Va1ley."
This time, instead of approaching the fort boldly, the Santee warriors fastened prairie grass and flowers to their headbands as a means of concealment and then crept up the gullies and crawled through the brush until they were close enough to fire upon the defenders. A shower of blazing arrows set roofs afire; then the Santees rushed the stables. "In this fight," said Wakonkdayamanne, "I came up on the south side to the stables and tried to get a horse. As I was leading it out a shell burst in the stable near me and the horse sprang over me and got away, knocking me down. When I got up I saw a mule running and I was so mad I shot it." For a few minutes there was hand-to-hand fighting around the stables, but again the Sautees had to give way before fierce blasts of the soldiers' artillery.
Little Crow was wounded, not seriously, but the loss of blood weakened him. When he withdrew from the field to regain his strength, Mankato led another assault. Double-charges of canister shot cut down the rushing warriors, and the attack failed.
"But for the cannon I think we would have taken the fort,
"Big Eagle said. "The soldiers fought us so bravely we thought there were more of them than there were." (About 150 soldiers and twenty-five armed civilians defended Fort Ridgely on August 22.) Big Eagle lost the most men in the fighting that day.
Late in the afternoon the Santee leaders called off the attack. "The sun was now setting low," Lightning Blanket said, "and after we saw the men on the south and west driven back by the big guns, and could see Little Crow and his men going to the northwest, we decided to join them and see what to do. . . . . After joining them we supposed we were going back to Little Crow's village for more warriors. . .
. Little Crow told us there were no more warriors, and a discussion followed. Some wanted to renew the attack on the fort the next morning and then go to New Ulm; others wanted to attack New Ulm early the next morning and then come back and take the fort. We were afraid the soldiers would get to New Ulm first." "
The soldiers that Lightning Blanket referred to were 1,400
men of the Sixth Minnesota Regiment approaching from St.
Paul. They were led by a soldier chief quite well known to the Santee Sioux. He was the Long Trader, Colonel Henry H.
Sibley. Of the $475,000 promised the Santees in their first treaty, Long Trader Sibley had claimed $145,000 for his American Fur Company as money due for overpayments to the Santees. The Santees believed the fur company had underpaid them, but their agent Alexander Ramsey had accepted Sibley's claim, as well as the claims of other traders, so that the Santees received practically nothing for their lands. (Ramsey was now the governor of Minnesota, and he had appointed the Long Trader to be the Eagle Chief of the Minnesota regiment.)
At midmorning of August 28, the Santees attacked New Ulm. They streamed out of the woods in bright sunlight, formed an arc across the prairie, and swept toward the town. The citizens of New Ulm were ready for them. After the abortive attack by the young braves on August 19, the townspeople had built barricades, brought in more weapons, and secured the help of militia from towns down the valley. When the Santees came within a mile and a half of the forward line of white defenders, the mass of warriors began spreading like a fan. At the same time, they increased their speed and began yelling war cries to frighten the white men. Mankato was the war leader on this day (Little Crow lay wounded in his village), and his plan of attack was to envelop the town.
The firing on both sides was sharp and rapid, but the onrush of Indians was slowed by the citizens, who used loop holed buildings for defensive positions. Early in the afternoon the Santees set fire to several structures on the windward side of New UIm in expectation of advancing under a smoke screen. Sixty warriors, mounted and on foot, charged a barricade, but were driven back by heavy volleys.
It was a long and bitter battle, fought in the streets, dwellings, outhouses, and store buildings. When darkness fell, the Santees departed without a victory, but they left behind them the smoldering ruins of 190 buildings and more than a hundred casualties among the stubborn defenders of New Ulm.
Three days later the advance column of Long Trader Sibley’s regiment reached Fort Ridgely, and the Santees began withdrawing up the Minnesota valley. They had with them more than two hundred prisoners, mostly white women and children and a considerable number of half-breeds known to be sympathetic toward the whites. After establishing a temporary village about forty miles above the Upper Agency, Little Crow began negotiating with other Sioux leaders in the area, hoping to gain their support. He had little success. One reason for their lack of enthusiasm was Little Crow's failure to drive the soldiers from Fort Ridgely. Another reason was the indiscriminate killing of white settlers on the north side of the Minnesota River, a bloody slaughter carried out by marauding bands of undisciplined young men while Little Crow was besieging Fort Ridgely. Several hundred settlers had been trapped in their cabins without warning. Many had been brutally slain. Others had fled to safety; some to the villages of the Sioux bands that Little Crow hoped would join his cause.
Although Litt1e Crow was contemptuous of those who made war on defenceless settlers, he knew that his decision to begin the war had unleashed the raiders. But it was too late to turn back. The war against the soldiers would go on as long as he had warriors to fight them.
On September 1 he decided to make a scout downriver to test the strength of Long Trader Sibley's army. The Santees divided into two forces, Little Crow leading 110 warriors along the north side of the Minnesota, while Big Eagle and Mankato scouted the south bank with a larger force.
Little Crow's plan was to avoid a frontal meeting with the soldiers, and instead slip around to the rear of Sibley's lines and try to capture the arm
y's supply train. To do this he made a wide swing to the north, bringing his warriors close to several settlements which had withstood attacks from marauders during the previous two weeks. The temptation to raid some of the smaller settlements brought on dissension among Little Crow's followers. On the second day of the reconnaissance, one of the subchiefs called a war council and proposed that they attack the settlements for plunder. Little Crow was opposed. Their enemies were the soldiers, he insisted; they must fight the soldiers. At the end of the council, seventy-five warriors joined the subchief for plundering. Only thirty-five loyal followers remained with Little Crow.
On the following morning Little Crow's small party unexpectedly met a company of seventy-five soldiers.
During the running battle which followed, the sound of musketry brought the defecting Santees of the previous day rushing back to Little Crow's rescue. In bloody close-in fighting, the soldiers used their bayonets, but the Santees killed six and wounded fifteen of their enemy before the latter escaped in a hasty retreat to Hutchinson.
For the next two days the Santees reconnoitered around Hutchinson and Forest City, but the soldiers remained within stockades. On September 5 runners brought news of a battle a few miles to the southwest. Big Eagle and Mankato had trapped the Long Trader's soldiers at Birch Coulee.
During the night before the battle at Birch Coulee, Big Eagle and Mankato had quietly surrounded the soldiers' camp so they could not escape. "Just at dawn the fight began,” Big Eagle said. "It continued all day and the following night until late the next morning. Both sides fought well. Owing to the white men’s way of fighting they lost many men.
Owing to the Indians, way of fighting they lost but few. . . .
About the middle of the afternoon our men became much dissatisfied at the slowness of the fight, and the stubbornness of the whites, and the word was passed around the lines to get ready to charge the camp. The brave Mankato wanted to charge after the first hour.
"Just as we were about to charge, word came that a large number of mounted soldiers were coming up from the east toward Fort Ridgely. This stopped the charge and created some excitement. Mankato at once took some men from the coulee and went out to meet them. Mankato flourished his men around so, and all the Indians in the coulee kept up a noise, and at last the whites began to fall back, and they retreated about two miles and began to dig breastworks. Mankato followed them and left about thirty men to watch them, and returned to the fight at the coulee with the rest. The Indians were laughing when they came back at the way they had deceived the white men, and we were all glad that the whites had not pushed forward and driven us away.
"The next morning General Sibley came with a very large force and drove us away from the field. We took our time getting away. Some of our men said they remained till Sibley got up and that they fired at some of his men as they were shaking hands with some of the men of the camp.
Those of us who were on the prairie went back to the westward and on down the valley. . There was no pursuit.
The whites fired their cannons at us as we were leaving the field, but they might as well have beaten a big drum for all the harm they did. They only made a noise. We went back across the river to our camps in the old village, and then on up the river to the Yellow Medicine and the mouth of the Chippewa, where Little Crow joined us. . At last the word came that Sibley with his army was again on the move against us. . He had left a letter for Little Crow in a split stick on the battlefield of Birch Coulee, and some of our men found it and brought it in. ."
The message left by the Long Trader was brief and noncommittal:
If Little Crow has any proposition to make, let him send a half-breed to me, and he shall be protected in and out of camp.
H. H. Sibley, Col. Com'd Mil. Ex'n.
Little Crow of course did not trust this man who was sharp enough to get away with so much of the Santees' treaty money. But he decided to send a reply. He thought that perhaps the Long Trader, who had been up at the White Rock (St. Paul), did not know why the Santees had gone to war. Little Crow also wanted Governor Ramsey to know the reasons for the war. Many of the neutrals among the Santees were frightened at what Ramsey had told the white Minnesotans: "The Sioux Indians must be exterminated or driven forever beyond the borders of the state."
Little Crow's message of September 7 to General Sibley: For what reason we have commenced this war I will tell you, it is on account of Major Galbraith. We made a treaty with the government, and beg for what we do get, and can't get that till our children are dying with hunger. It is the traders who commenced it. Mr. A. J. Myrick told the Indians that they would eat grass or dirt. Then Mr. Forbes told the Lower Sioux that they were not men. Then Roberts was working with his friends to defraud us out of our moneys.*
If the young braves have pushed the white men, I have done this myself. So I want you to let Governor Ramsey know this. I have a great many prisoners, women and children. I want you to give me an answer to the bearer.
General Sibley's reply:
Little Crow-You have murdered many of our people without any sufficient cause. Return me the prisoners under a flag of truce, and I will talk with you then Iike a man.
Little Crow had no intention of returning the prisoners before the Long Trader gave some indication of whether he meant to carry out Governor Ramsey's dictum of extermination or exile for the Santees. He wanted to use the prisoners for bargaining. In the councils of the various
* Thomas J. Galbraith was the reservation agent. A. J. Myrick, William Forbes,and Louis Roberts were post traders at the Lower Agency.
bands, however, there was much disagreement over what course the Santees should take before Sibley's army reached the Yellow Medicine. Paul Mazakootemane of the Upper Agency Sissetons condemned Little Crow for starting the war. "Give me all these white captives,” he demanded. “I will deliver them up to their friends. . . . Stop fighting. No one who fights with the white people ever becomes rich, or remains two days in one place, but is always fleeing and starving.”
Wabasha, who had been in the battles at Fort Ridgely and New Ulm, was also in favor of opening a road to peace by freeing the prisoners, but his son-in-law Rda-in-yan-ka spoke for Little Crow and the majority of the warriors: "I am for continuing the war, and am opposed to the delivery of the prisoners. I have no confidence that the whites will stand by any agreement they make if we give them up. Ever since we treated with them, their agents and traders have robbed and cheated us. Some of our people have been shot, some hung; others placed upon floating ice and drowned; and many have been starved in their prisons. It was not the intention of the nation to kill any of the whites until after the four men returned from Acton and told what they had done. When they did this, all the young men became excited, and commenced the massacre. The older ones would have prevented it if they could, but since the treaties they have lost all their influence. We may regret what has happened, but the matter has gone too far to be remedied. We have got to die. Let us, then, kill as many of the whites as possible, and let the prisoners die with us.” On September 12 Little Crow gave the Long Trader one last chance to end the war without further bloodshed. In his message he assured Sibley that the prisoners were being treated kindly, “I want to know from you as a friend," he added, “what way that I can make peace for my people."
Unknown to Little Crow, on that same day Wabasha sent Sibley a secret message, blaming Little Crow for starting the war and claiming that he (Wabasha) was a friend of the
“good white people." He did not mention that he had fought them a few weeks earlier at Fort Ridgely and New UIm. "I have been kept back by threats that I should be killed if I did anything to help the whites," he declared, "but if you will now appoint some place for me to meet you, myself and the few friends that I have will get all the prisoners we can, and with our family go to whatever place you will appoint for us to meet."
Sibley answered both messages immediately. He scolded Little Crow for not giving up the prisoners,
telling him that was not the way to make peace, but he did not answer the war leader's plea for a way to end the fighting. Instead Sibley wrote a long letter to Little Crow's betrayer, Wabasha, giving him explicit instructions for using a truce flag for delivery of the prisoners. "I shall be glad to receive all true friends of the whites," Sibley promised, "with as many prisoners as they can bring, and I am powerful enough to crush all who attempt to oppose my march, and to punish those who have washed their hands in innocent blood."
After Little Crow received the Long Trader's cold reply to his entreaty, he knew there was no hope for peace except abject surrender. If the soldiers could not be beaten then it was either death or exile for the Santee Sioux.
On September 22 scouts reported that Sibley's soldiers had gone into camp at Wood Lake. Little Crow decided to give them battle before they reached the Yellow Medicine.
"All our fighting chiefs were present and all our best fighting Indians," Big Eagle said. "We felt that this would be the deciding fight of the war." Again as they had done at Birch Coulee, the Santees silently prepared an ambush for the soldiers. "We could hear them laughing and singing.
When all our preparations were made Little Crow and I and some other chiefs went to the mound or hill to the west so as to watch the fight better when it should commence.
"The morning came and an accident spoiled our plans. For some reason Sibley did not move early as we expected he would. Our men were lying hidden, waiting patiently. Some were very near the camp lines in the ravine, but the whites did not see a man of all our men. I do not think they would have discovered our ambuscade. It seemed a considerable time after sun-up when some four or five wagons with a number of soldiers started out from the camp in the direction of the old Yellow Medicine agency. We learned afterwards that they were going without orders to dig potatoes over at the agency, five miles away. They came on over the prairie, right where part of our line was. Some of the wagons were not in the road, and if they had kept straight on would have driven right over our men) as they lay in the grass. At last they came so close that our men had to rise up and fire. This brought on the fight, of course, but not according to the way we had planned it. Little Crow saw it and felt very badly. . . .
