by Anam Zakaria
The dual names and personalities of these organizations have, however, also become necessary for their own survival. The ‘Azad’ Kashmir of the 1990s is in many ways quite different from the ‘Azad’ Kashmir of today. The passion for Kashmir in Pakistan has also begun to ebb. People who supported militancy both in and out of ‘Azad’ Kashmir, are now reluctant to do so. The militancy label has been tough to fight off. The repercussions of militancy for the ‘Azad’ Kashmiris, in terms of the losses they have had to bear, have been enormous. For the Pakistani state, the opportunity cost of supporting militant movements has grown exponentially. The country is at war with itself, the law and order situation in a dire state. Internationally, Pakistan is cornered, viewed in some circles as a nuclear power ‘controlled’ by Islamic fundamentalists that poses a continuous threat to the world. The public opinion on the way forward in Kashmir has thus begun to change, the nature of the organizations and their support changing colours alongside.
Gallup Pakistan conducted periodic studies in the country to gauge shifting Pakistani perceptions on the Kashmir conflict. A report from 2016 reveals that while in 1991, 23 per cent of Pakistanis felt that war with India was the best way to resolve the Kashmir issue, the figure dropped considerably by 2015, with only 5 per cent of the respondents believing so. Meanwhile, the option of resolving the conflict through negotiations with India has spiked, increasing from 24 per cent in 1991 to 37 per cent in 2015.10
Another significant change revealed by the national poll, conducted by Gallup Pakistan, shows that optimism regarding the resolution of the conflict has also begun to dwindle. In 1990, while 31 per cent of the respondents believed that Kashmir would be able to gain independence in one to two years, and another 16 per cent believed that freedom would be achieved even before the one- to two-year period, by 2015, a large percentage (41 per cent) believed that independence would take quite some time. Moreover, while only a small minority of 5 per cent respondents had stated in 1990 that Kashmir would not gain independence, the number of such respondents had risen to 24 per cent over the past twenty-five years. The report states, ‘Public opinion and expectation about the independence of Kashmir has changed since 1990, with increased negativity among Pakistanis about the issue.’11
I had sensed the same while working in ‘Azad’ Kashmir. The refugees who had crossed the LoC, leaving behind their homes, and often, half of their families, had held a strong belief that they would soon return. ‘It was a matter of a year or less,’ they told me. ‘The passion was so great that there was no doubt in our minds that Kashmir would be freed.’ The locals who had opened their homes to these refugees had believed the same. The women had told me that they had thought it was a temporary situation, a fleeting respite that they had to provide their brothers and sisters from across the LoC. They would soon return, to their Azad Kashmir. Their growing resentment, not only with Pakistan but with the refugee settlements, is a result of these hopes being dashed. More than twenty-five years after the crossover, the freedom of Kashmir seems more and more difficult to everyone.
An even more significant shift in public opinion can be seen when it comes to the militancy. When the initial national survey was conducted by Gallup Pakistan in 1990, 78 per cent of Pakistanis believed Pakistan should supply arms to aid the Kashmir struggle. When the same question was put forward in 2015, that figure had dropped to 57 per cent. Moreover, 42 per cent of the respondents stated that Pakistan should not supply arms to Kashmiris. According to the report, ‘Public opinion has undergone significant change in the past twenty-five years. Whilst in 1990 an overwhelming majority supported the provision of arms to the Kashmiri struggle… there has been a 30 per cent increase in the percentage of respondents who believe that Pakistan should not supply arms to support the Kashmiri struggle, and a 21 per cent decrease in those who believe that Pakistan should provide arms to support the struggle.’12 Furthermore, the study also concludes that there is increasing knowledge among the Pakistani public that ‘a military solution for Kashmir’s independence is not viable anymore’.13
There are a number of reasons for the changing perceptions. As India and Pakistan are both nuclear powers, armed action poses a potentially fatal threat. An open supply by Pakistan of arms to militant groups, particularly those not hidden under the garb of relief work, could thrust it into a nuclear conflict with India. However, if nuclear threat was the sole reason behind the desire to curb militancy and thereby prevent an overt war-like situation, the Kargil conflict of 1999 might not have occurred. After all, both nations were on the brink of war, despite having tested their nuclear weapons by then.14 The 9/11 attacks and the resulting War on Terror against jihadist movements is another major influencing factor, changing the mindset regarding militancy as a whole. In 1990, Pakistan had emerged on the victorious side after having trained and armed the mujahideen to fight the erstwhile Soviet Union. The victory had inspired a similar movement in Kashmir. The public perception had mirrored the establishment’s sentiments. If armed insurgency could defeat a superpower, why couldn’t a similar result be drawn against the eastern ‘enemy’ state? However, over the years, Pakistan itself has borne the brunt of militancy. In 2014, just before the 2015 Gallup Poll, at least 141 people, including 132 children, were killed by militants in an army school in Peshawar.15 The army, the most powerful institution in the country, had also not been spared by religious extremists. Army operations against militants, such as Operation Zarb-e-Azb, have found support amongst the public. At least in the popular imagination, the space for supporting militancy had considerably shrunk.16 Times had changed, as had the international climate and the resulting priorities.
Moreover, it should be noted that while organizations like the JuD continue to enjoy popularity based on their humanitarian work, amidst the changing local and global backdrop even these ‘relief’ organizations are slowly starting to come under some public scrutiny, particularly in the light of international condemnation regarding their activities. This growing scrutiny has necessitated action on the part of the Pakistan government on some of these whitewashed versions of militant groups too. In January 2017, ‘the government launched a crackdown against the JuD and a heavy contingent of police was deployed around the JuD headquarters and offices in Muridke and Lahore’.17 The JuD chief, Hafiz Saeed, was placed under house arrest thereafter (until November 2017). While certain militant groups may still enjoy state patronage, at least in the public eye staunch government policies against their activities have become necessary to appease citizens as well as international and regional allies. As Pakistan embarks on large-scale development projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—to be discussed further shortly—it needs to show the world that it is cracking down hard on militant movements and is working towards regional stability, a prerequisite for all investors.
Moreover, under Trump’s presidency, there has been increasing international pressure on Pakistan. Suspending military aid to isolate Pakistan, the Trump administration has been pushing the state to crack down on militant groups. Although Hafiz Saeed was released from house arrest in November 2017 and has stated that he will contest the next general elections (in 2018) from the platform of the Milli Muslim League,18 a political party launched by the JuD,19 there is international as well as local resistance. The US and India have urged Pakistan to prosecute him ‘to the fullest extent of the law’.20 Meanwhile, in January 2018, the Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), ‘prohibited the collection of donations by (Hafiz Saeed’s) JuD.’21 The notification states, ‘The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan hereby prohibits all companies from donating cash to the entities and individuals listed under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions committee’s consolidated list… In addition to the JuD, the UNSC’s list also includes the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) itself and the Falah-i-Insaniat (FIF, the welfare wing of the JuD)…’22 Reuters also reported in January 2018 that the Pakistan government is planning to ‘seize control of
charities and financial assets linked to Islamist leader Hafiz Saeed’.23 Further, ahead of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) meeting in Paris in February 2018, the Pakistani president, Mamnoon Hussain, amended the anti-terror law, extending the ban on groups and individuals banned through the UNSC resolution, thereby placing JuD and FIF on the list of proscribed groups. Analysts suggest that the decision had come in view of the FATF meeting, where it was feared that Pakistan would be put on the watchdog’s ‘international money-laundering and terror-financing “grey list”’.24 Meanwhile, the interior ministry has asked the Election Commission not to register the Milli Muslim League as a political party.25 There is thus growing heat on activities of organizations like the JuD. However, a systematic and sustained approach will be required to dismantle the popular support the organization enjoys, particularly in the garb of a humanitarian relief agency, stepping up in times of natural disasters like it has time and time again in ‘Azad’ Kashmir. As Reuters reported after the ban, ‘The sheer scale and diversity of charities founded by Hafiz Saeed… show how difficult it will be for the government to even run the network, let alone track and take control of all their sources of income and funding.’26
Certainly, as discussed in detail in the earlier chapters, the resistance towards militancy is also coming from local ‘Azad’ Kashmiris, particularly the women from Neelum Valley, who are sick and tired of militancy and its repercussions. Under no circumstances do they want to be caught in the crossfire. Peace is important for the locals also because development projects and tourist attractions in the region provide an important revenue source. Neelum Valley and Gilgit-Baltistan are two of the most popular tourist destinations in the region today. Gilgit-Baltistan boasts some of the world’s highest mountain ranges, including K-2 (the second highest in the world) and Nanga Parbat. Glaciers, lakes and historic forts welcomed as many as 600,000 tourists to Gilgit-Baltistan in the summer of 2015.27 It is estimated that more than one million tourists visited the northern areas in Khyber Pukthunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan in 2016.28
In ‘Azad’ Kashmir, tourism is one of the fastest-growing sectors. ‘In 2010, nearly half a million tourists visited AJK, while in 2016, figures crossed one-and-a-half million.’29 Many people in Neelum Valley have converted their homes into guesthouses to benefit from the bustling tourism industry. It is estimated that tourism’s share in the local economy is about 40 per cent.30 Neelum Valley drew in approximately 500,000 visitors in 2016 (the highest number to date),31 and 312 rest houses have come up to accommodate them.32 Private tour operators offer hiking trips, rafting, camping and boat rides. Schools and colleges in Pakistan bring their students to ‘Azad’ Kashmir during summer vacations. Families from all over Pakistan drive up to seek respite from hot temperatures. However, the escalated exchange of firing at the LoC since 2016 has had an adverse impact on tourism. Local Kashmiri journalist Jalaluddin Mughal, who spoke to police officials who record the entry of tourists into Neelum Valley, confirms that there has been a 70 per cent decrease in the number of tourists who visited Neelum Valley in 2017 as compared to 2016 due to shelling and the resulting security concerns. Overall, he tells me that there has been a 50 per cent reduction in the number of tourists who entered ‘Azad’ Kashmir in 2017.
With increasing Chinese investment in ‘Azad’ Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, stability in the region also becomes important for the establishment. China is already under pressure from India to withdraw its investment in the region. The Indian external affairs ministry spokesperson, Vikas Swarup, stated in May 2016, ‘Pakistanoccupied Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India… we have asked them (China) to cease all activities (there).’33 China, however, seems to have no intentions of backing off because of its vested interests in Gilgit-Baltistan and Neelum Valley. As The Sunday Guardian reports: ‘By increasing investments and sponsoring various “development projects” in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of PoK, the activities, involving several thousand Chinese personnel belonging to the construction corps of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), seem to point towards an expansionist Chinese geo-strategic agenda in the region. China’s Western Highway, also known as the Lhasa-Kashgar/Xinjiang Highway, connects Xinjiang to Tibet. From Quilanaldi, the road branches off to the Khunjerab Pass and, subsequently, becomes the Karakoram Highway right up to Gilgit.’34 The significance of the Karakoram Highway, The Sunday Guardian points out, lies in the fact that it cuts through the zone between Asia and the Indian subcontinent, wherein China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan come within 250 kilometres of each other. The 1,300-kilometre-long Karakoram Highway, the newspaper adds, remains the only all-weather road linking Gilgit-Baltistan with the rest of Pakistan, besides connecting China and Pakistan at an altitude of 4,693 metres, through the Khunjerab Pass. ‘Upgrading the Karakoram Highway is of critical significance to China, since this region offers Beijing a window to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.’35
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will strengthen Chinese involvement in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, not least because the corridor will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan itself.36 The CPEC involves investments of over $60 billion, in a ‘series of roads, railways, pipelines, hydropower plants and other development projects, being built from the restive Xinjiang province in China to Gwadar in southwestern Pakistan… the corridor is intended to connect the world’s second largest economy, China, with the Middle East and Central Asia, reducing the alternative sea route—via the Malacca Strait—by 10,000 kilometres’.37
The connection between Kashgar (also known as Kashi) in China’s western Xinjiang region and Gwadar in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province will greatly benefit China for ‘a railroad and oil pipeline linking Gwadar with Kashi in western China provides Beijing with the shortest possible route to the oil-rich Middle East, avoiding the (unsafe) Strait of Malacca and the dangerous maritime routes through the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea’.38 Whereas it currently takes China about three months and a journey of 16,000 kilometres to transport approximately 80 per cent of its oil by ship from the Strait of Malacca to Shanghai, the Gwadar port will allow for the same transportation in less than 5,000 kilometres.39
For Pakistan, the successful completion of the CPEC will result in a significant economic boost. According to a report published by Deloitte, ‘It is estimated that if all the planned projects are implemented, the value of those projects would exceed all foreign direct investment in Pakistan since 1970 and would be equivalent to 17 per cent of Pakistan’s 2015 gross domestic product. It is further estimated the CPEC project will create some 700,000 direct jobs during the period 2015-2030 and add up to 2.5 percentage points to the country’s growth rate.’40 Planned infrastructure projects include a 1,100-kilometre-long motorway between Lahore and Karachi, reconstruction of the Karakoram Highway between Rawalpindi and the Chinese border, upgrading the Karachi-Peshawar main railway line, extending Pakistan’s railway network to connect with China’s Southern Xinjiang Railway in Kashgar and laying ‘a network of pipelines to transport liquefied natural gas and oil… including a $2.5 billion pipeline between Gwadar and Nawabshah to transport gas from Iran’.41 In addition, the energy-deficit country will also reportedly benefit from investment in energy generation projects. ‘Over $33 billion worth of energy infrastructure will be constructed by private consortia to help alleviate Pakistan’s chronic energy shortages, which regularly amount to over 4,500 MW, and have shed an estimated 2-2.5 per cent off Pakistan’s annual GDP… power generation assumes an important role in the CPEC project.’42 Aside from infrastructure and energy projects, a particular focus will be on agriculture-based initiatives, fibre-optic connectivity and tourism and recreation.43
However, while this looks rosy for Pakistan and China, India has asserted that Pakistan and China cannot undertake such an investment in an area that is still contested. Seshadri Chari, a national executive member of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) party in India, has denounced the project,
stating that ‘China is using Indian land area illegally occupied by Pakistan.’44 To silence the talk about Gilgit-Baltistan’s disputed status, Pakistan has considered elevating it to be a fifth province of the country. According to news reports, ‘a committee led by (the then) prime minister’s adviser, Sartaj Aziz, has conducted several rounds of consultations with major stakeholders, including Hafizur Rehman, the chief minister of Gilgit-Baltistan’.45 If Gilgit-Baltistan were to be absorbed into Pakistan, the CPEC would proceed unhindered for it would no longer be a disputed territory. However, such talks instigated Kashmiris on both sides. Prominent leaders from Indian-administered Kashmir, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Muhammad Yasin Malik, issued a joint statement asserting that ‘any proposal to declare Gilgit-Baltistan as a fifth state of Pakistan is unacceptable… it will have a damaging impact over the disputed status of state… unless and until people of J&K are provided an opportunity to decide the future course of the state through a referendum, no division, alteration and changes are acceptable.’46 ‘Azad’ Kashmiris further explained to me that integrating Gilgit-Baltistan into Pakistan would signal to India that the latter too can legitimately absorb Indian-administered Kashmir as its territory.
