by Jack Murray
By Christmas, the Germans, wearied and running low on materiel necessary to win the fight, were forced to retreat towards Tripoli. This stretched the supply lines of the Allies to breaking point and the attack petered out.
Crusader was a victory of sorts for the Allies, but the cost was great in terms of men and materiel. The operation succeeded insofar as it managed to clear the Axis from the eastern part of Libya (Cyrenaica). However, the objective went beyond moving the Axis from Libya. The original concept was to meet them head on and defeat them in detail. The fog of war prevented this from occurring. Instead, the Axis troops were able to retreat in a relatively ordered manner which allowed them to regroup and rebuild their strength.
The failure of the Allies was writ large in early 1942 as the DAK returned to fight and sent the Allies back to Egypt.
Axis Counter-Offensive, Operation Theseus (Jan-Feb 1941)
Following the "Crusader" battles, both sides settled into defensive positions. In particular, the British wished to reduce the supply burden and make ready for Operation Acrobat, a 1941 plan for a westward advance against Tripolitania.
Meanwhile, the Axis were receiving reinforcements and the Germans counter-attacked on 21st January 1942. The renewed German offensive took the British by surprise and defeated the 2nd Armoured Brigade in detail. Within two days, the brigade was down from around 150 to 75 tanks, against a German loss of 29 tanks out of 100. By 28th January, Benghazi had fallen followed by Timimi on 3rd February. By now the Germans and Italians captured a huge stock of petrol and ammunition that the British were preparing for Operation Acrobat, scheduled for mid-February. By 6th February, the Allies had been driven back to the Gazala line, a few miles west of Tobruk, from which the Axis had retired only seven weeks earlier.
The Allies had, once more, been guilty of dispersing units all over the desert, rather than concentrating their strength in one. Morale sank and arguments began over culpability. Lieutenant-General Alfred Reade Godwin-Austen (XIII Corps) resigned over differences with the Eighth Army commander, Neil Ritchie.
Battle of Gazala, the Fall of Tobruk and Mersa Matruh (May-June 1941)
By February, the front had moved eastwards through Libya arriving just west of Tobruk. Following their withdrawal, the Allies had been busy creating the "Gazala Line", a series of defended boxes running from Gazala south into the desert.
These boxes were defended by a full brigade, barbed wire and mines. Plugging the gaps between the boxes were roving armoured units. The most important of these "Boxes" was Bir Hacheim, manned by the 1st Free French Brigade consisting mainly of French Legionnaires. Other boxes, Knightsbridge and Retma, were manned by British or South Africans and reached towards the sea.
The Allies still outnumbered the Germans and Italians 2 to 1 in tanks, as the Axis had seven German and three Italian regiments versus fourteen armoured regiments. The Allies had also received the new American Grant Tanks which had thicker armour and a 75mm gun. These were a match for the previously superior Panzer Mark III and IV tanks.
Operation Buckshot was planned for June to destroy the Panzerarmee and re-capture Cyrenaica but in early May defensive measures on the Egyptian border were given priority, as it became apparent an Axis attack was imminent.
Early on 27th May, a swift German advance overran the 7th Armoured Division HQ. This scattered the 7th Motor Brigade. The 7th Motor Brigade withdrew to the Retma Box, fifteen miles east of Bir Hacheim. Meanwhile the 4th Armoured Brigade fought all day to halt the advance, but the 8th Hussars and 3rd RTR fared badly in the onslaught. The latter was reduced to just five Grants and eight Honeys. Other brigades were similarly overwhelmed. By the afternoon of the 27th the German attack had shattered the 7th Armoured Division and they were upon Knightsbridge Box.
The Germans overran the Box at Retma pushing the Allies back to east of Bir El Gubi. Following on from this success, the Panzers headed north, outflanking the Gazala Boxes. This stretched their supply lines so much that they took a direct route through the minefields and very heavy fighting took place an area which was to become known as "The Cauldron". On 28th May, the 3rd and 5th RTR offered stiff resistance. The tussle continued in The Cauldron over the next few days in the midst of sandstorms, without any clear advantage being gained by either side but with a severe impact on 5th RTR tank strength.
Finally, Ritchie ordered a counter-attack, Operation Aberdeen on 5th June. The battle further reduced the Allies tank strength and when the Axis attacked again, they scattered the 7th Armoured Division once more.
The Allies were in some disorder. Resistance continued over the next few days against the intense Axis assault. On the evening of 10th June, the Germans finally forced the Free French to withdraw from Bir Hacheim. This left the Axis free to focus on the other boxes of the Gazala Line.
On 12th June the 22nd and 4th Armoured Brigades with caught between the 15th and 21st Panzer Division and were forced to withdraw from the Knightsbridge Box, albeit in good order. This left the Gazala battlefield to the Axis.
This remaining boxes north of Knightsbridge were cut off and the road to Tobruk was open. By now most of the 8th Army was in retreat to the El Alamein line.
By the evening of 15th June, the 4th Armoured Brigade was reduced to 24 Honeys and 12 Grants. By16th June they were back at Sidi Rezegh and El Adem. A day later, the 4th Armoured Brigade withdrew to the Egyptian border following a fierce battle with the Axis tanks. Tobruk fell on 20th June 1942. This was final confirmation of the Allied defeat.
The cost to both sides of this period of fighting was high. The Germans were reduced to under 50 tanks and with around 2,500 infantry fit to fight. The two Italian Divisions (Ariete and Trieste) had about the same number of infantry and around 14 tanks.
General Ritchie was effectively fired and General Auchinleck took personal control of the 8th Army. He could not halt the advance of the wearied and depleted Axis troops who took Mersa Matruh on 27th June.
This Allies were in a retreat that became known as the 'Gazala Gallop'. This was a confused and mixed-up affair with both sides using captured equipment of the other. By 1st July 1942 all the units of the Armoured Division were on or behind the Alamein Line.
First Battle of el Alamein (July 1941)
An attempt to drive the Eighth Army out of the Alamein position took place in the First Battle of El Alamein (1–27 July 1942). The operation took place following the fall of Tobruk when British morale was low. Tobruk would now provide the Axis with a forward port, therefore shortening their supply lines. Rommel was keen to maintain Axis momentum despite being weakened by the battles at Gazala and the Cauldron. The plan was to attack the new British line at Alamein as soon as possible.
The attack began on 1st July. However, things soon started to go awry for the Axis who had underestimated Allied strength. German 90th Light and 15th Panzer Divisions became pinned between the two boxes held by the South Africans and Indians. Meanwhile the 21st Panzer Division became involved for the battle for the box at Dier-el-Shein held by the 18th Indian Brigade. This halted the German attack long enough for the British Armour to attack the flank of 15th Panzer on 2nd July.
By 3rd July, the Germans could only muster 26 serviceable tanks. This was still sufficient to inflict significant damage on the 1st Armoured Division. However, the Axis was now surrounded by the Allies, physically and spiritually exhausted with only a limited number of serviceable tanks. This was an opportunity for General Auchinleck, now in sole command following the departure of Ritchie, to deliver a potentially mortal blow to Rommel.
The plan was to pin the Germans down with 30 Corps and cut across their rear with 13 Corps, which included what was left of 7th Armoured Division. The advance of 13th Corps was resisted by 21st Panzer and no advantage was gained. Even with 15th Panzer now down to 15 tanks and 200 men, the Germans were then able to withdraw west in a relatively orderly manner.
By 5 July, the number of serviceable German tanks fell to around thirty. After a lull, the Axis p
lanned to attack again, but the Eighth Army attacked first at Tel el Eisa which exhausted both sides. More Allied attacks followed before the battle drew to a close. German casualties were about 10,000 men; Italian casualties are unknown but 7,000 Axis prisoners were captured. There were around 13,250 Eighth Army losses.
A lull in the fighting followed while both sides repaired, reequipped and reinforced. Undaunted by the initial failure, Rommel launched an attack with 200 tanks and 2,000 infantry on 8th July. However, it was not a concerted effort and ended up with sporadic and uncoordinated fighting around the Alamein line for most of the month.
The critical situation at Alamein with the Axis around 60 miles from Cairo brought Winston Churchill to North Africa. Changes were made. Auchinleck had never fully gained Churchill’s confidence and was replaced by General ‘Strafer’ Gott. However, Gott was killed after returning to his plane which had been shot down by German fighters, to rescue the men trapped inside, having initially escaped himself.
His replacement was Lt-General Bernard Law Montgomery. "Monty" took over command of the 8th Army on 13th August 1942. With him came Lt-General Sir Oliver Leese to take over 30 Corps and Lt-General Brian Horrocks who took over 13 Corps.
Battle of Alam el Halfa (Aug 1941)
There was a lull in the fighting during the height of the summer. However, Rommel was acutely aware that it would be important to destroy the Allies and reach Cairo before Allied reinforcements, due in September, made an Axis victory in Africa impossible
The Alamein Line presented an enormous challenge for the Axis. The quaking sands and salt flats of the Qattara Depression meant that a southern flanking attack was out of the question. Allied flanks were secure for the first time. Therefore, General Montgomery was well dug in and intended building up his forces for his expected offensive in autumn. Rommel decided to attack Alam Halfa, in the south, at the end of August.
The Alamein Line was formidable. Defensive boxes were occupied by full divisions. from around the Commonwealth. A new strategy was emerging as Montgomery decided that the 8th Army divisions would fight as divisions and not go "swanning about in the blue" (the nickname for the desert). He formed an armoured Corp comprising the 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions. Ad hoc formations and columns were brought to an end as he felt they diluted strength.
The Axis now consisted of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions along with the 90th Light and a brigade of Parachute infantry. The Italians had the XX Corps in the field consisting of the Ariete and Littorio Armoured Divisions, the Trieste Motorised Division, plus the Trento, Bologna and Brescia infantry Divisions, as well as the Folgore Parachute Division.
Rommel still had supply problems thanks to the work of the RAF based in Malta. They prevented the Italian High Command supplying anywhere near enough petrol for the Axis forces. By now Rommel was ill, suffering from jaundice, stomach ailments and circulation problems that occasionally led to fainting fits.
He was not alone in feeling ill after two years in the field. Many of his senior officers were worn out. The physique of many of the Germans had declined due to the climate and battle exhaustion. 19,000 German troops had been in Africa since March 1941. Reinforcements had brought the four German divisions up to 90,000 men (34,000 fighting troops) and 12,600 vehicles.
The Axis had around 400 front line tanks (200 Panzers and a further 200 Italian tanks), versus the Allies 800+. More worrying for Rommel was the fact that his Mark III tanks were much less effective against the British Sherman, Grant and Valentine tanks and, in the case of the Mark III, outgunned.
The Axis plan was to envelop the Eighth Army by a march around its southern flank. The British were forewarned by decoded German radio messages, so they concentrated their armour at Alam el Halfa Ridge, which blocked the Axis advance 20miles (32km) behind the front).
The Panzers attacked on the night of 30th/31st August. Progress was hampered both by the minefields they encountered as well as by shelling. Dawn on the 31st revealed that they had advanced only eight mile past the mines and came under fire from artillery and 1st/5th RTR. The Panzers exacted a heavy toll on the Allied tanks during the day. However, the RAF bombed the Germans all night, forcing them to withdraw.
The usual problem was beginning to impede the Axis attack – lack of petrol. Low fuel stocks led to an orderly withdrawal from the field by the Panzers. The Rifle Brigade then harried the Germans all the way back through the minefields.
The Battle of Alam el Halfa saw the Allies successfully fight a static defensive engagement, rather one of movement, which had previously been the mantra of British tank warfare. Hindered by Allied aircraft bombing, the Axis attacks on the ridge failed, supplies ran dangerously low and Rommel had to order a retreat. The Eighth Army lost 1,750 men and 68 tanks; the Axis lost 2,900 men, 49 tanks, 36 aircraft, 60 guns and 400 lorries.
Aside from the morale-boost the victory provided to the Allies, it revealed to the senior commanders the value of coordinating the various strands of the military rather than have them fighting separately in isolation. The Germans had been fighting in this manner since the very start. The lesson had been learned and was now ready to be applied in the next engagement.
Battle of El Alamein (Oct – Nov 1942)
Following Alam el Halfa, the 8th Army spent five weeks in training, at Montgomery’s insistence. Reinforcements were arriving increasing strength to 1,350 tanks, 195,000 men, 908 guns and 1,451 anti-tank guns. Axis strength increased more slowly, limited by the relentless attacks on shipping by the RAF. The Panzerarmee had 104,000 men, (50,000 Germans, of whom only 24,000 were front line troops). There were 496 Axis tanks, 290 of which were Italian, 500 guns and 850 anti-tank guns.
Montgomery’s insistence on training resulted in a delay for the push out from Alamein until the October full moon. The plan was to begin an artillery bombardment on the night of 23rd October prior to the assault. Delaying until October also had the benefit of diverting attention away from landings in Tunisia (Operation Torch) scheduled for 8th November.
The plan was to create gaps in the minefields and the Axis defences to allow armour to come through. This "crumbling phase" was expected to many days. It would wear down the enemy allowing Montgomery to take full advantage of his materiel superiority.
Aware that they were probably outgunned, the Axis dug in, laying mines and building up tank strength. When the attack finally began, Rommel was actually in Germany recovering from jaundice. He left the aging General Stumme in charge.
‘Sappers’ were tasked with creating four gaps in the minefields the night before the battle was due to start. Infantry, then armour, would follow. Although the attack was planned for the north, a second, diversionary, assault was planned for the south to keep the 21st Panzers busy.
The barrage at El Alamein began at 21:40 on 23rd October 1942. Around 1,000 guns rained down hell on Axis positions. This was the biggest artillery barrage since the Great War.
Operation Lightfoot began as the Sappers cleared the way through the 'January' minefield. Around 178 men were killed, wounded or missing in this part of the operation. Behind the Sappers, Signallers were laying cables to ensure communications back to the rear areas. Gaps in the minefields became heavily congested and a target for Axis machine guns, anti-tank guns and artillery. Losses on both sides were immense with prisoners being taken by both sides. Rather like the Great War, the initial stages of El Alamein were very much a war of attrition. However, the Allies were slowly making progress, albeit at great cost.
By the night of 24th/25th October, a bridgehead, west of the second enemy minefield, had been secured so that tanks could follow. Progress was slow and many tanks were lost. The battle was relentless, taking place day and night. This was deliberate on the part of Montgomery who saw this as an essential element of his plan to wear down the enemy.
By 27th October, the Axis was down to around 114 German tanks. The battle raged on and by 2nd November the Axis were running low on ammunition. Around 32 German and 120 Ital
ian tanks were left. On 3rd November it seemed certain that the Axis front was about to crack. "Operation Supercharge" began that night.
At this point, Rommel realised he risked losing not only the battle but his whole army. He decided on a retirement, but Hitler ordered him to fight to the last. On 4th November, the Eighth Army broke through the Axis defences. Rommel had no choice but to order a retreat. They abandoned the non-motorized units, leaving the Italians to cover their retreat. This effective abandonment of the Italians would lead to the destruction of their remaining divisions as a fighting force.
The Afrika Korps suffered 37,000 casualties, lost 450 tanks (320 completely out of action), and 1,000 guns. The Eighth Army suffered 13,500 casualties, around 500 tanks (only 150 were destroyed) and about 110 guns (mainly anti-tank guns). This left Rommel with around 5,000 men, 20 tanks, 20 anti-tank guns and 50 field guns
As ever, their retreat was ordered, and the remainder of the Afrika Korps had escaped by 7 November. They retreated along the coast road but were unable to stand and fight due to lack of men, tanks and ammunition. This meant the Allies were able to retake Tobruk (13 November); Benghazi (20 November).
The pursuit of Rommel and the DAK ended in a resounding victory for the Allies. It freed the continent of the Axis and provided a southern springboard into Europe for the Allies who now counted the Americans in their ranks. For many, the battle at El Alamein was the single most important victory of the war. Its significance was appreciated even then as Churchill ordered church bells to ring for the victory in North Africa.
"Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat.'" - Winston Churchill.
