In the summers of his teen years, D’Antoni, the son of a celebrated high school coach in West Virginia and the younger brother of an outstanding player who is now on his coaching staff, played six hours a day. That included three hours of solitary ballhandling and shooting drills—the hard part that he loved—before three hours of playing pickup games at night. Lewis D’Antoni never pushed his youngest son or gave him much instruction—that came from older brother Dan—but he did free him from summer jobs so he could play ball. When D’Antoni got to Marshall University, he was the one who rounded up every member of his team in the off-season and bugged them about showing up at three o’clock for pickup ball in the gym.
Twenty years later, that’s what Nash was doing at Santa Clara University. He and his buddies would be sitting around at night, chilling, talking sports, music, and women, and, when SportsCenter came on, that was the signal for Nash to get off his butt. “I felt uncomfortable being comfortable,” says Nash. “I’d call the team manager, get the key to the gym, call some teammates, and go shoot for a couple hours.”
The careers of player and coach hardly run parallel. Nash maximized his talents, hardened his body, toughened his mind, and, over the last two seasons, played point guard at a level at which only the pass-first greats of the game—Magic Johnson, Bob Cousy, John Stockton—were mentioned. D’Antoni, also a point guard, played in only 130 NBA games, and 50 more for the St. Louis Spirits of the old ABA, and always rued a certain lack of mental toughness, and a dubious outside touch, that kept him from really making it.
But in another time, perhaps, Nash would’ve been forced to follow the road less taken on which D’Antoni eventually traveled to basketball greatness. D’Antoni came into a league with only seventeen teams (there are thirty now) and precious few roster spots. He was a bit player for two seasons, went to the ABA briefly before the merger with the NBA, then came back with the San Antonio Spurs and got cut. A vision of his future pro basketball life passed before him—a career of splinters and garbage minutes and running the other team’s offense during practices, and that was only if he did make it back with a team.
So D’Antoni, about whom there was nothing Italian except his surname, packed up and went to Italy to recharge his basketball batteries. He came back for one more try at the NBA, then abruptly left again, and made this break final. He then spent the next ten years blazing his name across European basketball, the Magic Johnson of Philips Milan, the most famous team in the Italian League. He didn’t look or act anything like Nash—he has boyish features and a West Virginia aw-shucks approachable demeanor, none of that mysterious Canadian reticence—but, like Nash, he had that ineffable something known as style. Italy loved him. He loved Italy. And most of all he loved to play. His coach, Dan Peterson, coined the phrase sputare sangue—spit blood—to describe how he wanted his team to play. D’Antoni spat blood. Nash spits blood.
As much as they like and respect each other, and have interests outside of sports, basketball is the central—really the only—connection between D’Antoni and Nash. And when they came together for the first time in the 2004–05 season, the results were electric. Without Nash, the Suns had averaged 94.2 points during the 2003–04 season; with Nash running D’Antoni’s offense, they averaged a league-best 110.4. The Suns had won twenty-nine games in 2003–04; with Nash running D’Antoni’s offense, they won sixty-two. It was one of the most dramatic turnarounds in NBA history, engineered by a point guard from a hockey nation and a coach who had spent most of his professional life in a country known for pasta and ass-pinching.
When Stoudemire, who averaged almost twenty-seven points per game last season, went down with a knee injury in training camp last October, the supposition was the Suns could not possibly score at last season’s clip. D’Antoni insisted they were going to average 110 points, nay, needed to average that to be successful. His stated goal was to win fifty games and make the playoffs. They won fifty-four and had the fourth-best record in the NBA. And they came close to 110, too, leading the league with 108.4 points per game and setting all-time records in three-point shots taken and made.
It wasn’t as if D’Antoni had invented anything; rather, he had reimplemented a run-and-gun style that had been popular into the late 1980s. It is astonishing the degree to which the casual sports fan has it wrong about the NBA. As with the perception that coaching is little more than rolling out the balls, the casual fan perceives the NBA as a bunch of listless underachievers running around aimlessly, tossing up bad shots, ignoring the rudiments of dribbling and passing, and treating defense as if it were to be avoided like the chipped beef special at Denny’s. In point of fact, quite the opposite was going on—too little running, too much stodgy offense, too many defensive schemes, an overcoached product that had removed much of the spontaneity of the game and put a premium on isolation alignments designed to get one player the ball and turn his four teammates into statues.
That’s what D’Antoni wanted to change. And so he became the prophet for the new version of run-and-gun, and Nash was the apostle taking the message to the masses. We have our best chance of scoring before the 24-second shot clock hits 17. That means they wanted to get a shot up in seven seconds or less from the time they got the ball.
Steve? You got anything?
A dozen pairs of eyes swiveled toward Nash, who was standing in front of his corner locker. He was shirtless, wearing only a pair of black compression shorts. It looked for a moment like he was going to say something, but then you saw the blink of the eyes, the purse of the lips, and, finally, the quick shake of the head. He was crying, and, if he had a platitude to offer, he couldn’t get it out. I looked over at one of the Suns’ assistants, Alvin Gentry, who, having seen the pain and sadness in Nash, began tearing up himself. Then Nash walked toward D’Antoni and his teammates gathered around. They put their hands together and then it was time for the same ritual that ended every practice and every game. “SUNS!” Marion said. “ONE-TWO-THREE…” and everyone shouted “SUNS!”
Nash slung a towel around his neck and kept on going toward the training room, his home away from home, slapping a few teammates’ hands along the way. He put his towel on a stool and climbed into the icy water, a procedure he follows religiously after every practice and game to reduce the swelling in chronically injured areas, which in Nash’s case means a large percentage of his body. He winced slightly as he lowered himself into the tub.
The water temperature was fifty-three degrees. Like always.
Chapter One
[The Second Season]
Phoenix, April 21……………….
“The Suns are built for the regular season. Every series is going to be tough for them because when you live by your offensive three-point shooting, then any off-night you could lose a game.”
It is generally believed, though not always elucidated, that NBA teams cannot suddenly change their essence when the playoffs come around. You are, to a large extent, what you have been for the previous eight months. But coaches and players are expected to offer the requisite chestnuts— We have a chance to turn this around. We’re starting to peak right about now. It’s time to make a fresh start —and broadcasters have to declare the official beginning to the Second Season.
After studying the Phoenix Suns at close range all season, I offer this projection about them:
Odds of beating the Los Angeles Lakers in the first round: 2–1.
Odds of beating either the Los Angeles Clippers or the Denver Nuggets in the second round: 5–2.
Odds of winning the Western Conference, probably by beating either the San Antonio Spurs and Dallas Mavericks, and making the Finals: 6–1.
Odds of winning the championship: 10–1.
Another thing that is generally believed—and always elucidated—is that fast-break teams like the Suns cannot go far in the playoffs. Tempo inevitably slows down, and that leaves transition teams playing an unfamiliar style. To the purveyors of that belief, which is a vast majority
of NBA pundits, the fact that the Suns advanced all the way to the Western finals last season before losing to the San Antonio Spurs proves only that a fast-break team can’t make it to the Finals. Had the Suns made the championship round and lost to the Detroit Pistons, the axiom would’ve presumably changed to: A fast-break team can’t win it all.
Hearing that premise is one of the few things that will turn Mike D’Antoni’s sunny disposition cloudy. (Another is a restaurant waiter mispronouncing bruschetta with a soft sound in the middle instead of the hard “K” sound, the way the Italians do it, “who, after all, only invented the damn thing.”) The coach does not dispute statistics that indicate, yes, scoring usually does go down in the postseason. Nor does he doubt that competitive intensity, which is associated more with defense than offense, goes up significantly, also. But he doesn’t see slow-down ball as inevitable. “Coaches hear it, start to believe it, then do it,” says D’Antoni, “and it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. My point is, it doesn’t have to be that way. It’s not written in stone.”
There is, to be sure, an extra buzz about this opening round, given the historical weight of the opponent. Though the Lakers finished in seventh place in the Western Conference, thereby drawing the second-place Suns, they had finished strongly, one of their final victories a 109–89 win over Phoenix on April 16 in Los Angeles. The Suns believe that the Lakers’ transition defense is close to nonexistent and will provide an open highway for the Nash-led fast break, so this was the matchup they wanted. D’Antoni couldn’t precisely orchestrate it—not in an eighty-two-game season—but the coach had benched Nash and Raja Bell for that late-season game, all but assuring a Laker win that would help them beat out the Sacramento Kings, who were in eighth place.
At the same time, the Suns assume that the Lakers, despite having lost three of four regular-season games to Phoenix and seven in a row before that victory on April 16, also wanted to play them. As hard as the Suns are to defend, there is the general impression that, perhaps, they will let you outscore them—that is more likely to happen in the fox-trot pace of the postseason—and, even if they don’t, they won’t beat you up physically. Since Kurt Thomas, the Suns’ only interior player with a physical presence, went out with a stress fracture in his foot on February 22, the Suns had struggled to an 18-11 record and given up an average of 107.6 points per game, near the bottom in the NBA. Phoenix’s further aversion to contact could be demonstrated by the fact that it set an NBA record for both fewest free throws made (14.5) and attempted (18.0). The Suns were deadly accurate from the line but didn’t get there much.
Todd Quinter, the Suns’ lead scout, feeds this perception in the fifty-page loose-leaf notebook he has prepared for the coaches before each playoff series. (He is already at work on one for the Los Angeles Clippers and Denver Nuggets, one of which Phoenix will be playing should it move on.) The book contains all relevant Lakers statistics, individual tendencies of the players, and even a pie-chart breakdown of the Lakers’ offense. (They run “ISO’s,” which stand for isolations, 30 percent of the time, “side p/r,” pick-and-rolls on one side of the court or the other, 22 percent of the time, etc.) To make sure the message gets across, Quinter writes:
While watching their last broadcast & postgame shows it was amazing to me how absolutely they dismissed us. They talked about getting home court advantage in the next round already like it was a done deal. For whatever reason their team and staff do not respect us at all!
Phoenix has in fact become rather the popular upset pick among the scores of seers who lay out their playoff grids in newspapers and cyberspace. Ex–point guard Mark Jackson of ABC, former NBA coach Bill Fitch (picking for NBA.com), and David Dupree, USA Today’s respected NBA writer, all pick the Lakers. So does ESPN’s Greg Anthony, a particular irritant for the Suns; during a memorable brawl with the New York Knicks several years ago, Anthony came off the bench in street clothes to attack Phoenix point guard Kevin Johnson from behind. “He’s a Republican,” Alvin Gentry says in dismissing Anthony.
A greater source of irritation is TNT commentator Charles Barkley, whose shadow looms over the franchise. (Insert weight joke here.) Barkley was the star of the 1992–93 team that made it to the Finals and lost in six games to Michael Jordan and the Chicago Bulls. He still lives in Phoenix but harbors some resentment toward the Suns, who traded him to Houston two seasons after that near-championship run. Barkley goes out of his way to praise Nash—“Man, I would’ve loved to have played with a point guard like Nash”—and even wrote a short essay for Time when the magazine picked Nash as one of its “100 Most Influential People.” (You think essay, you think Charles Barkley.) But Barkley doesn’t buy into the D’Antoni up-tempo style.
“The Suns are built for the regular season,” says Barkley. “Every series is going to be tough for them because when you live by your offensive three-point shooting, then any off-night you could lose a game. I think the Suns are always going to struggle just because they don’t rebound and they don’t play good defense. The game always comes down to rebounding and defense. Your flaws don’t show until you play a real good team. I think the Suns are too small to win it all.”
The presence of Kobe Bryant adds to the buzz. With the possible exception of hockey, where a hot goalie can win a series himself, in no other sport does one superstar player make such a difference as basketball. Great players rarely win an entire series themselves, but they can win one or two individual games, and the Suns are hardly a mortal lock to begin with. The longer the series goes, the more Bryant can exert his considerable will upon it, especially considering that he averaged 42.5 points against Phoenix in four games during the regular season.
D’Antoni has his history with Bryant, too. Kobe grew up in Italy where his father, former NBA player Joe “Jellybean” Bryant, was enjoying an expatriate career. The star of Italian basketball at that time was none other than D’Antoni, the dashing Milan guard, who wore number 8. Lacking American role models, young Kobe wore 8 in honor of D’Antoni. Before most Suns-Laker games, Bryant stops by the Phoenix bench, and he and D’Antoni exchange a few pleasantries in Italian, which both speak fluently. (Bryant, though, has petitioned the league to allow him to change his number to 24 in the following season. It’s no slight to D’Antoni, but, rather, Bryant’s homage to what he considers his 24/7 work ethic.)
Raja Bell had his history with Bryant, too. Bell first gained a small measure of fame in the NBA when, as a member of the Philadelphia 76ers, he helped limit Bryant to 7-of-22 shooting in Game 1 of the 2001 NBA Finals. The Sixers won that game in L.A., 107–101, though the Lakers swept the next four to win the title. Early in the season, Bryant, reacting to what he considered Bell’s overaggressiveness, elbowed Bell in the mouth and shoved him, drawing a technical foul. Later in the season, on April 7, with two weeks remaining in this regular season, Bryant had come to US Airways Arena and scored fifty-one against the Suns, the majority of them with Bell as his defender.
The game actually presented a template for how to conquer the Lakers—Bryant got his share, but his teammates never got involved, and the Suns won 107–96—but that gave Bell meager consolation. After saying all the right things to the press, Bell stood in front of his locker, doing well to contain the fury he felt inside. “Way to go, Rah-Rah,” he said aloud. “You held him to fitty.” (He deliberately used the street pronunciation of “fifty.”) Eddie House and Brian Grant, two of the Suns always willing to lift a teammate up, were standing by.
“Rah-Rah, it was like B.G. said about that guy the night that Jordan went off on his ass,” said House. “What was his name, B.G.?”
“Keith Atkins,” said Grant, naming a former journeyman guard.
“Yeah,” says House. “Keith Atkins says, ‘Michael got sixty-nine on me, but he earned every one of ’em.’ ”
Plus, when Bryant was asked about the sometimes contentious scrums between him and Bell, Bryant scrunched up his face, as only Bryant can do, and said, with requisite contempt, �
�Raja Bell? I got bigger fish to fry than Raja Bell.”
I asked Bell for his reaction. “I know exactly what he’s doing,” says Bell. “He’s saying, ‘How dare you mention his name in the same sentence as mine?’ I understand that. That’s how he thinks.”
Bryant, meanwhile, has utterly dominated the preplayoff planning of the coaching staff, which is meeting, as is its custom, in the central office on the fourth floor of US Airways Center. A day earlier, the discussion had even turned physical when Dan D’Antoni suggested, half-kiddingly, that he could guard Bryant, or at least keep him off the baseline.
“You could guard Kobe?” Marc Iavaroni asked.
“Yep,” said Dan.
“Well, what do you do if Kobe does…this!” said Iavaroni, lunging his six-foot-eight-inch, 240-pound body forward, inadvertently knocking D’Antoni off his feet and into a wall, as the other coaches collapsed in laughter.
As the defensive guru, Iavaroni is tasked with coming up with a plan. Plus, the Lakers are “his team.” The assistants (with the exception of Dan, who is in his first year) divvy up the opponents during the year for careful scrutiny, and the Lakers belong to Iavaroni, meaning that he has already watched them on tape for countless hours. His intelligence will then be combined with Todd Quinter’s more detailed scouting report.
It is, however, difficult to out-detail Iavaroni. His father was for many years the supervisor at Kennedy Airport, a man with an organizational mind who made sure the runways were kept clean, and the son has that kind of mind, too. He had a seven-year NBA career as a cerebral, overachieving forward and cut his coaching teeth on Pat Riley’s uber-prepared staff in Miami. Phrases such as “Indiana’s 42 Fist is our quick curl pinch” tumble easily out of his mouth. “I think even Marc would agree that, left to his own devices, he would spend more time in the room than any of us,” says Gentry.
Seven Seconds or Less Page 3
