by Mark Stille
CAMPAIGN • 255
THE NAVAL BATTLES FOR GUADALCANAL 1942
Clash for supremacy in the Pacific
MARK STILLE ILLUSTRATED BY HOWARD GERRARD
Series editor Marcus Cowper
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Origins of the campaign • The American response
CHRONOLOGY
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
Japanese commanders • US commanders
OPPOSING FLEETS
The Imperial Japanese Navy • The United States Navy
OPPOSING PLANS
Japanese plans • United States plans
THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN FOR GUADALCANAL
The battle of Savo Island • August and September interlude • The battle of Cape Esperance • The First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal • The Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal • The battle of Tassafaronga
THE AFTERMATH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTRODUCTION
Neither the United States nor the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) thought that the decisive battle of the Pacific War would be fought over an obscure island located in the southern Solomon Islands. Nevertheless, for six months from August 1942 until early February 1943, both navies found themselves locked in the most sustained naval campaign of the Pacific War, centered on the island of Guadalcanal. This campaign included seven major battles. Two of these were fought between carriers, but the other five, all at night, pitted the surface forces of the two navies against each other in a series of vicious, often close-quarter battles. Ultimately, the campaign was decided by the possession of the airfield on Guadalcanal. The Americans were able successfully to keep the airfield open throughout the campaign, making it difficult and ultimately impossible for the Japanese to move sufficient ground forces to the island to dislodge the Americans. At the conclusion of the campaign, both navies had suffered heavy losses. These were easily replaced by America’s growing wartime production, but, for the Japanese, the losses were crippling. Guadalcanal was the first stop on the long road to Tokyo.
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
Occupation of Guadalcanal was not envisioned in Japan’s prewar expansion plans. In the First Operational Phase, the Imperial Army and Navy jointly agreed to occupy the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, and Rabaul. This went largely as planned. Rabaul, on the island of New Britain in the South Pacific, was occupied in January 1942. Rabaul possessed a large harbor and several airfields and was an ideal jumping-off location for further expansion in the area.
After the easy successes in seizing the First Operational Phase objectives (with the exception of the Philippines, which were not entirely occupied until May), the Japanese faced the question of where to advance next. As always, the availability of shipping was the primary limiting factor, though Japan’s ground and naval forces were already being stretched. The goal of the Second Operational Phase was to provide strategic depth to Japan’s defensive perimeter. In addition to the Aleutians and Midway, much of the anticipated future expansion would occur in the South Pacific. Eastern New Guinea, the Fijis, Samoa, and “strategic points in the Australian area” were all targeted. However, the Japanese could not agree on the validity of these objectives or the sequencing of the operations. Within the IJN, the commander of the Combined Fleet, Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku and the Naval General Staff had very different priorities. Yamamoto wanted to move first into the Central Pacific with the goal of drawing the remaining units of the US Pacific Fleet into battle and destroying them. The Naval General Staff advocated an advance into the South Pacific to cut the sea lines of communications between the United States and Australia. For its part, the Imperial Army favored operations that required minimal numbers of ground forces. This ruled out an attack on Australia, but operations against smaller South Pacific islands remained possible.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 forced the war in a direction unexpected by both sides. Instead of a large clash of battle lines, aviation was paramount. When surface actions did occur, it was between cruisers and destroyers, like those off Guadalcanal. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-30550)
Though the Naval General Staff was the organization responsible for the formulation of Japanese naval strategy, Yamamoto’s views largely prevailed. Just as he had in the planning period before the Pearl Harbor operation, he used the threat of resignation to get his way. However, the decision reached in the first week of April was a compromise that called for an advance into both the South and Central Pacific in the span of two months. The first operation was set for May with the goal of seizing Port Moresby on New Guinea. Part of this operation was the occupation of Tulagi Island in the southern Solomons. Tulagi could be used as a seaplane base and was located some 20 miles north of Guadalcanal.
Japanese preparations for a major operation into the South Pacific did not escape the notice of the Americans. The Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, dispatched two carrier groups to contest the Japanese advance. This resulted in the first carrier battle of the war in the Coral Sea on May 7–8, 1942, and the first strategic Japanese defeat of the war since the invasion of Port Moresby was halted. However, Tulagi was occupied according to plan on May 3, which gave the Japanese a foothold in the southern Solomons.
Another result of the Coral Sea battle was the fatal undermining of Yamamoto’s clash with the American fleet in the Central Pacific. None of the three Japanese carriers committed to the Port Moresby operation was able to participate in the Midway operation in June. This significantly reduced Yamamoto’s carrier advantage over Nimitz, and, combined with weak operational and tactical planning, resulted in a disaster for the IJN. All four of Yamamoto’s fleet carriers committed to the operation were sunk. These losses blunted Japan’s naval offensive capabilities. Following the Midway debacle, the Japanese made no attempt to maintain the initiative they had held since the beginning of the war. But the Japanese were not entirely passive. On June 13, they decided to build an airfield on Guadalcanal. Accordingly, on July 6, a 12-ship convoy arrived with two construction units to start work on the airfield, which was expected to be completed in August. Possession of an airfield on Guadalcanal would give the Japanese control over much of the South Pacific.
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE
Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief US Fleet, had been focused on the South Pacific since the beginning of the war. He made the defense of the sea lines of communication to Australia a major priority. Even though overall American strategy called for the primary effort to be made in Europe, King did not think that meant he had to be totally passive in the Pacific. As early as March 1942, King admitted that he had no intention of remaining strictly defensive but envisioned an offensive up the Solomons to retake Rabaul. In the aftermath of the Midway victory, which removed the Japanese offensive threat in the Central Pacific, King moved quickly to grab the initiative and launch a limited offensive in the South Pacific.
Even with the prospect of gaining strategic surprise, King’s limited offensive operation in the South Pacific was a very risky operation. After Midway, Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet still outnumbered the Pacific Fleet in every combatant category except submarines. More importantly, the logistic foundation for major operations in the region was shaky. None of this deterred King. Shortly after the Japanese occupation of Tulagi on May 3, American planners were working on a plan to recapture it. The original date of the operation was set for August 1. After intelligence provided an assessment that Japanese construction troops were on Guadalcanal, the island was added as an objective on July 5.
The invasion force, centered on the 1st Marine Division, was quickly
assembled. Delays in loading the Marines in Wellington, New Zealand, forced a delay in the landings until August 7. On July 22, the Marines departed en route to Guadalcanal. Escorting the invasion force was the bulk of the US Pacific Fleet, centered around three carriers. The first American counteroffensive of World War II was under way.
The Japanese conducted a major operation into the South Pacific in May 1942, which resulted in the battle of the Coral Sea. The Japanese suffered a strategic defeat, losing the light carrier Shoho, shown here on fire. The Japanese did successfully occupy Tulagi Island in the southern Solomons, setting up the Guadalcanal campaign. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-17046)
CHRONOLOGY
August 7 Americans land on Guadalcanal.
August 9 Battle of Savo Island: four Allied heavy cruisers sunk for no Japanese losses.
August 20 First American aircraft arrive at Henderson Field.
August 21 Battle of the Tenaru River: first Japanese attempt to seize Henderson Field is repulsed.
August 24–25 Battle of the Eastern Solomons: Japanese attempt to destroy American fleet and to run a small reinforcement convoy to Guadalcanal is defeated.
September 12–14 Battle of the Bloody Ridge: second Japanese ground attack on Henderson Field repulsed.
September 15 Carrier Wasp sunk by Japanese submarine attack.
October 11–12 Battle of Cape Esperance: first Japanese defeat in a night battle during the war. Japanese lose one heavy cruiser and one destroyer.
October 14 Two Japanese battleships bombard and temporarily neutralize Henderson Field.
October 15 Two Japanese heavy cruisers bombard Henderson Field.
October 15 Japanese reinforcement convoy arrives on Guadalcanal; three of six transports sunk by air attack but 4,500 troops land.
October 15–16 Two Japanese heavy cruisers bombard Henderson Field.
October 18 Ghormley relieved by Halsey.
October 24–25 Japanese ground attack on Henderson Field fails.
October 26 Battle of Santa Cruz: Japanese carrier force gains a tactical victory against its American counterpart, but carrier Enterprise escapes to play a key future role in the campaign.
November 13 First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Americans suffer heavy losses but turn back Japanese attempt to bombard Henderson Field with battleships.
November 13–14 Two Japanese heavy cruisers bombard Henderson Field but fail to neutralize it.
November 14 American aircraft sink one heavy cruiser and six of 11 transports in a convoy bound for Guadalcanal.
November 14–15 Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Halsey commits two battleships to defeat another Japanese attempt to conduct a battleship bombardment of Henderson Field. One Japanese battleship is sunk.
November 15 Last four Japanese transports are sunk. Yamamoto’s final attempt to recapture Guadalcanal is defeated.
November 29–30 Battle of Tassafaronga: Japanese lose a single destroyer but sink one heavy cruiser and heavily damage three more.
December 31 Japanese finalize plans to evacuate Guadalcanal.
January 29–30 Battle of Rennell Island results in the sinking of one American heavy cruiser by Japanese torpedo aircraft.
February 1 First evacuation run to Guadalcanal by 20 Japanese destroyers picks up 4,935 personnel; one destroyer is lost to mines.
February 4 Second evacuation run with 20 destroyers picks up another 3,921 personnel against no opposition.
February 7 Last evacuation run by 18 destroyers picks up final 1,972 personnel.
February 9 Organized Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal ends.
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
JAPANESE COMMANDERS
The Commander of the Combined Fleet during the Guadalcanal campaign was Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. Despite the disaster at Midway, Yamamoto’s reputation was still high. Reputation aside, Yamamoto was a mediocre strategist. His greatest victory, the Pearl Harbor operation, was an act of strategic folly which severely undermined any hope the Japanese had of securing a negotiated peace with the United States. His fatal compromise with the Naval General Staff in April set the stage for defeat in both the Coral Sea and Midway.
Yamamoto made Midway his personal battle, and in the aftermath of that smashing defeat he was caught off balance by the American offensive into the Solomons. In response, Yamamoto was slow to respond. Though the Combined Fleet still possessed a margin of strength over the Pacific Fleet, Yamamoto always seemed one step behind during the Guadalcanal campaign. Not until late August did he assemble a force to retake the island. The first attempt was ill-conceived and achieved neither of Yamamoto’s goals of destroying the American fleet or landing reinforcements on the island. The fact that the entire operation was mounted to move a reinforcement convoy with only 1,500 troops (when the Americans already had over 10,000 troops on the island) shows how muddled Japanese operational planning was.
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku led the Combined Fleet throughout the Guadalcanal campaign. His half-hearted commitment to the campaign resulted in a series of under-resourced efforts to gain victory, which resulted in eventual defeat. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 63430)
At no point in the campaign did Yamamoto bring his superior force to bear. The result was to turn the battle into a grinding battle of attrition which the Japanese could not afford. In mid-September, the Americans were down to a single operational carrier. Though Yamamoto had four, he did not seize this chance. In October, Yamamoto stepped up efforts to regain the island. At one point, he even threatened to bring his flagship (the superbattleship Yamato) alongside Guadalcanal. This was exactly what was needed – total commitment. In the end, he did commit battleships to bombard Guadalcanal’s airfield, but Yamamoto always seemed more concerned with maintaining the Imperial Fleet for a decisive battle than fighting the battle he had at hand.
In late October 1942, Yamamoto fought a major carrier battle with the Americans off Guadalcanal. It was his greatest victory over the American Navy, but he was unable and unwilling to follow up. Convinced that three American carriers had been sunk (only one had been, with another escaping), he withdrew part of his carrier force from the campaign, leaving the burden on the Japanese surface forces. When the Guadalcanal campaign came to a climax in November, Yamamoto attempted to bombard the airfield again with battleships. Even now, he did not commit all available forces. The Americans did, and it proved enough to turn back the Japanese. Yamamoto never realized that Guadalcanal was the decisive battle he had been seeking. In the November battles, the Japanese were not so much outfought as undermined by timid leadership. Yamamoto oversaw the evacuation of the remaining Japanese garrison from the island in February 1943. In April, an aircraft he was riding in was shot down and he was killed over the northern Solomons. Ironically, the American fighters responsible came from Guadalcanal.
Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi commanded the Rabaul-based 8th Fleet throughout the campaign. He gave a superb performance at the opening battle of Savo Island, but then failed to exploit his victory. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 63697)
The commander of Japanese naval forces in the Solomons was Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi. He was a 1910 graduate from the IJN academy at Eta Jima and placed third in his class of 149. He was identified early in his career as an officer of promise, and held several important overseas and staff positions. In his fleet positions, he became an expert in navigation and commanded heavy cruisers Aoba and Chokai and battleship Kirishima. Mikawa was promoted to flag rank in December 1936. Following command of cruiser and battleship squadrons, he was promoted to vice admiral in November 1940. When war came, he was commander of Sentai (Squadron) 3 composed of the four Kongo-class battleships and was assigned as the commander of the screen of the IJN’s carrier force.
In July 1942, Mikawa was placed in command of the new 8th Fleet (also known as the Outer Seas Force) based at Rabaul and responsible for operations in the Solomons. This was seen as a backwater command, as was shown by the fact
that his fleet consisted of mainly older units. Even so, these units, led by Mikawa, rendered the US Navy its worst defeat of the war at the battle of Savo Island. He continued in command of the 8th Fleet throughout the campaign and personally led the cruiser bombardment of Henderson Field on the night of November 13–14, 1942. He was charged with the responsibility of moving Imperial Army troops to Guadalcanal and keeping them supplied. He was largely successful in this effort until late in the campaign, despite the fact that he did not have command of the air and thus had to conduct all movements at night, which forced the use of destroyers as transports, a mission for which they were ill suited. He was relieved as commander of the 8th Fleet in April 1943.
Because of his failure to attack the American transport fleet after his victory at Savo Island, Mikawa was one of the most controversial Japanese naval leaders of the war. It is significant that his failure to attack the transports was not seen by the Japanese as a fatal blunder at the time. In destroying the enemy’s naval strength, he was simply adhering to the classic Japanese precepts of naval power. The inability to seize the unique opportunity after Savo Island was a manifestation of the inflexibility of Japanese naval leadership in general. Mikawa performed well for the remainder of the Guadalcanal campaign and, following Japan’s defeat at Guadalcanal, he continued to hold important commands.
Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake was the loser of the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, where his tentative tactics allowed a smaller American force to thwart his bombardment of Henderson Field. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 63696)
An often-overlooked IJN command figure was Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake. He graduated from Eta Jima in 1907 and spent his entire career on surface ships until being promoted to flag in 1933. As a vice admiral at the start of the war he was the commander of the 2nd Fleet, which was charged with the important task of covering the invasion of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Kondo conducted this mission successfully, and then commanded the invasion force in the abortive attack on Midway. At the start of the Guadalcanal campaign, he was Yamamoto’s principal seagoing commander. In this capacity, he performed well at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. When the battleships were committed to the actions around the island, Kondo was drawn in as well. He was in command of the Japanese naval forces at the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November, but his poor tactics resulted in defeat and he lost a battleship in the process. Despite this, he was treated gently and was later promoted to admiral but never held another seagoing command. Kondo was by all accounts a capable officer, and was known for his aggressiveness.
