by Mark Stille
The naval campaign of Guadalcanal in no way mirrored the expectation that battleships would play a decisive role. In fact, battleships clashed only once during the entire campaign, and then only in small numbers. The naval battles off Guadalcanal were primarily fought by cruisers and destroyers, with all combat occurring at night. Because of the Japanese emphasis on night combat before the war, they initially held the advantage in the campaign. However, making up for the deficient American night combat doctrine was their technological superiority in the area of radar. Guadalcanal forced both sides to adapt, but the Japanese advantage in night combat was still evident by the end of the campaign.
Adding to the challenge for the Americans was the overall balance of naval power in the Pacific at the start of the campaign. While Midway had reduced the Japanese advantage in carriers, it did little to reduce the IJN’s large surface force. At the start of the campaign, the Japanese held a clear advantage in surface force as indicated in this table:
Pacific naval strength August 1942
Carriers (heavy/light) Battleships (new/old) Heavy Cruisers Light Cruisers Destroyers (new/old)
Japanese 4/3 1/10 17 17 67/39
American 4/0 1/7 14 13 59/21
The overall size of the US Navy was larger when the Atlantic Fleet was factored in. Select units of the Atlantic fleet were transferred to the Pacific during the battle, and added to this were a growing number of newly built ships from American shipyards, some of which were already reaching the theater before the end of the campaign.
THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
Capital ships
Despite myth, the Japanese carrier force was not destroyed at Midway. It was in the process of reorganization when the Guadalcanal campaign started and by late August could throw a carrier division with two heavy and one light carrier into battle. The first carrier battle at Eastern Solomons resulted in heavy aircrew losses and the loss of the light carrier. The next major operation by the carrier force was not until late October when Yamamoto gathered four heavy and one light carrier. The resulting battle of Santa Cruz was a Japanese victory, but one heavy and one light carrier suffered battle damage and another heavy carrier was withdrawn back to Japan by Yamamoto. This left just two converted carriers to conduct the rest of the campaign, which proved insufficient to the task. The fragility of the Japanese carrier force placed the burden of the campaign on land-based aircraft operating primarily from Rabaul, and the IJN’s surface units.
Going into the Guadalcanal campaign, the Japanese battle line had suffered no damage. With the addition of the superbattleship Yamato in February 1942, a total of 11 battleships were available to Yamamoto. Of these, only four, the fast battleships of the Kongo class, were actively employed during the campaign. The high speed of the Kongos made them ideal for operations in the Solomons and since they had been a key component of Japanese nightfighting formations, they were familiar with Japanese nightfighting tactics. Of the six other older battleships, only one even deployed to Truk and it was never active off Guadalcanal. The Yamato was used as Yamamoto’s flagship at Truk and was never committed to the battles off Guadalcanal. If there was ever a point in the war where Japanese battleships could have been employed to good effect, it was Guadalcanal. The most successful Japanese battleship action of the war was not against American battleships, but against the airfield on Guadalcanal in October. Yamamoto did not consider repeating this bombardment on a larger scale, most likely because of his concern to keep the battle line intact for a possible future clash with their American counterparts.
Kongo was the lead ship of a class of four fast battleships. She is shown here in 1936 after her second reconstruction. Originally designed as battle cruisers, the Kongo class was modernized between the wars but still retained a relatively light scale of armored protection. These 32,000-ton ships were heavily used in the Guadalcanal campaign and participated in the October bombardment of Henderson Field that temporarily neutralized the airfield. (Yamato Museum, 071390)
Battleship Kirishima pictured in 1939 with carrier Akagi behind. The speed of the four Kongo-class units not only made them useful as carrier screening units, but also as the centerpiece of bombardment groups against Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. (Yamato Museum, 071228)
Cruisers
Since battleships were rarely committed to action off Guadalcanal, heavy cruisers were routinely the largest Japanese units deployed to the island. Of the 18 heavy cruisers with which the Japanese began the war, 16 were still available for operations at the start of the campaign. Japanese heavy cruisers were formidable fighting units, with a heavy-gun armament and a heavy-torpedo battery, and were designed to play a central role in Japanese nightfighting doctrine. The Japanese did not bother to adhere strictly to treaty weight limitations, so their ships were also generally better armored than their American counterparts.
Three heavy cruisers of Sentai 6, as seen from Kinugasa. Despite the fact that these were the oldest heavy cruisers in the IJN, dating from 1926, these ships were well- armed and manned by well-trained crews. Sentai 6 provided the muscle in the Japanese victory at Savo Island. (Yamato Museum, O-0003)
Takao, shown here in 1939, was among the most powerful heavy cruisers in the world at the start of the Guadalcanal campaign. Very heavily armed, she carried ten 8in. guns and 16 24in. torpedo tubes. Her first and only surface action during the campaign was at the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal where she pummeled an American battleship with her guns but scored no success with her torpedoes. (Yamato Museum, 070345)
The Japanese actually completed four heavy cruisers before the signature of the Washington Naval Treaty. These included two ships of the Furutaka class and two Aoba-class units. The Furutaka class set the tone for future Japanese cruisers. The design featured heavy gun and torpedo batteries and high speed. Protection was clearly secondary to firepower.
The next class of Japanese heavy cruisers, the four-ship Myoko class, was the best of the early Washington Treaty designs. In part because the design exceeded the 10,000-ton limit, the Japanese were able to give the ships ten 8in. guns and eventually 16 torpedo tubes. The next class represented the epitome of Treaty Cruiser designs. The four ships of the Takao class possessed the same heavy armament as the Myokos and also possessed increased armor protection. All four of these ships were active off Guadalcanal.
The final two classes of Japanese heavy cruisers actually began as light cruisers. With the expiration of the London Naval Treaty, the four units of the Mogami class were rearmed with 8in. guns in 1939. The ships were as heavily armored as a heavy cruiser. The final class of Japanese heavy cruisers was laid down in 1934 and completed in 1938–39. This was the two-ship Tone class, which had extensive aircraft handling capabilities. Despite the fact that these were the most heavily armored Japanese heavy cruisers and still carried a substantial torpedo armament, these ships were retained as carrier screening ships and never saw action off Guadalcanal.
Japanese heavy cruisers were the most potent nightfighting units in the world at the start of the Guadalcanal campaign. These ships were extremely well armed, with between six and ten 8in. guns and between eight and 16 torpedo tubes with as many reloads. The Japanese decision to retain torpedoes on their heavy cruisers, unlike the Americans, paid off at Guadalcanal.
Destroyers
Like their heavy cruisers, Japanese destroyers were designed primarily with night combat in mind. Destroyers played a prominent role in the attrition tactics that the Japanese planned in advance of the main fleet action between battle lines. Since they possessed minimal antiair and antisubmarine capabilities, Japanese destroyers were not as well balanced as their American counterparts, but they were superb torpedo boats, well suited for night combat.
To carry out their nightfighting duties, Japanese destroyers possessed high speed and heavy armament. The Fubuki class or “Special Type” were the most powerful destroyers in the world when introduced in 1927. This class carried a heavy gun armament of six 5in. guns in th
ree enclosed mounts and an impressive torpedo armament of nine torpedo tubes with reloads. This basic design was retained for the next five classes of Japanese destroyers. All of these had at least five 5in. guns and six to eight torpedo tubes with a comparable number of reloads.
Destroyer Fubuki was the lead ship in a class of “Special Type” destroyers that were the most powerful destroyers in the world when they entered service. Completed in 1928, Fubuki carried six 5in. guns in three twin-gun unarmored mounts and nine torpedo tubes in three mounts. Fubuki was sunk by gunfire at the battle of Cape Esperance. (Yamato Museum, 071898)
Torpedoes
The success of Japanese torpedo tactics was due in large measure to the extraordinary torpedo that they used. The Japanese desired a long-range torpedo to make their nightfighting tactics more effective. Accordingly, they put much effort into perfecting an oxygen-propelled torpedo which had the potential to increase range greatly, with the added attractions of allowing for a larger warhead and offering nearly wakeless running. Despite the risks of using oxygen as a propellant in a shipboard environment, the Japanese persevered and by 1932 had a workable weapon. Known as the Type 93 (the designation comes from the year of its official adoption – 1933 – which was the year 2593 on the Japanese calendar), it was eventually fitted on all modern destroyers, heavy cruisers, and select light cruisers. It was considered a top-secret weapon by the Japanese, and its existence was unknown to the Americans at the start of the Guadalcanal campaign. The table below shows the clear superiority of the Type 93 over its American counterpart.
American and Japanese destroyer-launched torpedoes Mark 15 (USN) Type 93 (IJN)
Length 22ft 7in. 29ft 6in.
Diameter 21 in. 24in.
Weight 3,4381b 5,9401b
Warhead 4941b 1,0781b
Propulsion Steam Oxygen
Speed 28/34/46kts 36/40/48kts
Range 15,000/10,000/6,000yd 43,700/35,000/21,900yd
The Type 93 oxygen-propelled torpedo was the most capable weapon of its type during the Guadalcanal campaign. It was the basis for Japanese night combat tactics and proved an effective ship-killer throughout the campaign. Despite its many successes, American naval commanders remained ignorant of its true capabilities. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 94125)
Imperial Japanese Navy nightfighting doctrine
Unlike the US Navy, IJN nightfighting tactics revolved around the use of the torpedo. With the introduction of the Type 93 torpedo, the Japanese reworked their nightfighting tactics to take advantage of the long range of the new weapon. The new system called for “long-distance concealed firing” by heavy cruisers, after which the destroyer squadrons would close and complete the destruction of the enemy. Destroyers were trained to fire their first torpedo load, then disengage, reload within 15 minutes, and fire a second barrage.
The Japanese also put great thought and effort into developing all the tools required to conduct night fighting. One area of particular importance was in optics. In the period preceding the Pacific War, the Japanese developed and produced world-class optical devices. Among these were powerful binoculars with sophisticated magnification and light-gathering capabilities. The higher the quality and the bigger the lens, the more capable these optics were at night. The superiority of Japanese optics partially counterbalanced the Japanese lack of radar. The Japanese also developed star shells and flares, including a parachute-suspended type in 1935, and Japanese guns used smokeless powder to avoid disclosing the location of the firing ship.
Heavy cruiser Chokai firing an 8in. broadside in 1933. The IJN’s cruiser crews were extremely skilled in the use of gunnery as was evident at Savo Island, where gunfire was the principal form of destruction against the four Allied heavy cruisers that were sunk. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 73024)
All considered, the IJN entered the campaign as the most capable nightfighting force in the world. This was the result of superior doctrine, better nightfighting weapons and equipment and the fact that Japanese cruiser and destroyer crews were better trained than their American counterparts.
Light cruiser Sendai in 1939 with a Hatsuharu-class destroyer. Unlike American light cruisers, Japanese light cruisers were designed as flagships for destroyer squadrons and were relatively lightly armed, usually with seven single 5.5in. guns and eight torpedo tubes. Sendai was active off Guadalcanal and was a participant in the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal where she was targeted by 16in. radar-directed battleship fire but was undamaged. (Yamato Museum, 062578)
THE UNITED STATES NAVY
Capital ships
At the start of the campaign, the US Navy possessed five fleet carriers. One of these was in the Atlantic and was deemed unsuitable for combat operations in the Pacific. Since no more carriers would be available for the remainder of 1942, these few ships had to be used judiciously. This meant they were employed only during major operations, or in response to major Japanese offensives. The Americans had the supreme advantage of an airfield on Guadalcanal, which meant the carriers could be kept in readiness and committed only when absolutely necessary. A portion of the surface fleet had to be devoted to screening duties for the carriers, including the most modern battleships, which were very useful as antiaircraft platforms. The fact that so few carriers were available put the onus of operations at Guadalcanal on the surface combatants.
Despite myth, the American battle line was not destroyed at Pearl Harbor. Though five battleships were sunk in the attack, by the early months of 1942, seven old battleships were available for operations. These were reinforced by the two modern units of the North Carolina class and the first units of the South Dakota class. King kept pressing Nimitz to employ the older battleships in the campaign, but Nimitz declined because of concerns about their underwater protection, and the large fuel requirements needed to send them to the South Pacific. However, the modern North Carolina units (North Carolina and Washington) were employed in the campaign, serving primarily as screening units in the carrier task forces. American admirals did not think it advisable to use them in the constrained waters around Guadalcanal, especially at night, owing to the extreme torpedo threat. These ships were designed for long-range gunnery duels with their 16in. rifles in daytime, not for night combat. However, when pressed into service around the island in November, their radar-controlled gunnery proved devastating.
Enterprise, shown here in November after the Naval Battles for Guadalcanal, played a central role in the campaign. She was damaged at both the battle of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, but she survived until the climactic battles in November when her aircraft played a key role in destroying the large Japanese convoy heading to the island. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 19-N-47849)
North Carolina was the lead ship of a class of two battleships, which in 1942 were arguably the most powerful in the world. After being assigned carrier screening duties early in the campaign, North Carolina was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine on September 15 and missed the decisive phase of the campaign. (Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 80988)
Cruisers
The US Navy’s prewar-built cruisers carried the primary burden of combat during the Guadalcanal campaign. The number and characteristics of American cruisers were shaped by the series of naval treaties in effect during the period between the wars. The Washington Naval Treaty, signed in 1922, did not limit the numbers of cruisers that could be built, but did limit their maximum size (10,000 tons) and maximum gun size (8in.) that could be carried. The London Naval Treaty of 1930 dictated the total cruiser tonnage allocated to the major naval powers. The effect of these treaties was to limit the US Navy to 18 heavy cruisers and nine large light cruisers with 6in. guns. Most of these saw action off Guadalcanal.
Heavy cruiser Salt Lake City pictured in the early 1930s. The lightly armored ship was damaged by three hits at the battle of Cape Esperance and was under repair until the following March when she returned to service at the battle of the Komandorski Islands. (Naval Hist
ory and Heritage Command, NH-85083)
The 10,000-ton limit forced American naval designers to make choices between protection, firepower, and speed in the so-called “Treaty Cruisers.” The design of the early American Treaty Cruisers clearly showed a preference for firepower over protection. The two ships of the Pensacola class, Pensacola and Salt Lake City, each carried ten 8in. and eight 5in. dual-purpose guns. The ships were actually 900 tons underweight and overall armored protection was deficient. Also, before the war, these ships, and every other American heavy cruiser, had their torpedo tubes removed.
Construction work on the next class attempted to remedy some of the weaknesses of the Pensacola class. The five ships of the Northampton class (Northampton, Chester, Louisville, Chicago, Houston and Augusta) were more heavily armored, and still carried nine 8in. guns in three triple turrets. The next two classes of cruisers were more balanced designs. The two-ship Portland class (Portland and Indianapolis) was better armored and carried the same main battery as the Portland class. The best American prewar heavy cruiser design was the six-ship New Orleans class. These ships had a good mix of protection, firepower and speed, with the emphasis placed on protection. Five of these ships saw service in the campaign (Astoria, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Quincy and Vincennes), with three being lost. Each ship carried nine 8in. guns in three triple turrets and eight single dual-purpose 5in. guns. By the time of the Guadalcanal campaign, all heavy cruisers carried radar.
Construction of prewar heavy cruisers ceased after the completion of the last New Orleans-class ship and the unique Wichita. Having filled their allotted heavy cruiser tonnage, the Americans turned to construction of light cruisers which were restricted to having guns no larger than 6in. The new 6in. gun cruisers, known as the Brooklyn class, were as heavily armored as the latest heavy cruisers and carried a large battery of 15 6in. guns. This new gun used semi-fixed ammunition that permitted a very high rate of fire. All these ships carried radar. Of the nine Brooklyn- and near-sister St Louis-class units, three, Boise, Honolulu and Helena saw service in the South Pacific during the Guadalcanal campaign.
