by Mark Stille
Heavy cruiser Chicago anchored in Iron Bottom Sound the day after the battle of Savo Island. Sailors are cutting away damaged plating to enable the ship to get under way. The ship was struck by a single torpedo on her starboard side on the extreme forward part of her bow. The damage forced the ship out of action until early 1943. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-34685)
The submarine S-44, commissioned in 1925, achieved more than the entire Allied surface force during the battle for Savo Island when she torpedoed and sank Japanese heavy cruiser Kako on the morning of August 10, as the Japanese cruiser force was returning to its anchorage at Kavieng north of Rabaul. This was the most successful American submarine attack of the entire campaign. S-44 survived the campaign, but was sunk in September 1943 in the North Pacific. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 19-N-41382)
For the Americans, there was little to view favorably. American nightfighting doctrine had been found wanting and American warships were simply not ready for night combat. The most important factor leading to the Savo Island debacle was the total surprise gained by the Japanese. This stemmed from command and control problems at every level, Turner’s assessment of Japanese intentions, and his resulting faulty deployments. The potential technological advantage offered by radar was entirely squandered since commanders did not understand the capabilities and limitations of the new equipment.
AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER INTERLUDE
Savo Island assured the Japanese control of the waters around Guadalcanal at night, but the presence of the American carrier force meant it was too dangerous for Japanese ships to operate during the day in the same waters. What developed was a strange situation in which control of the key waters around the island changed every time the sun went down. The Japanese immediately put their nocturnal advantage to use. On August 16, the first Japanese destroyers arrived at Tassafaronga Point with the first reinforcements for the Japanese garrison. This was followed on the night of August 18–19 when six destroyers delivered the first echelon of the Ichiki detachment. The attack by Colonel Ichiki and his battalion-sized unit on the eastern side of the Marine perimeter during the early hours of August 21 was repulsed with the near destruction of his entire unit. Not for the last time, the Japanese had thoroughly underestimated what it would take to wrest control of the island from the Marines.
As the Japanese were preparing for their first ground offensive to retake the island, on August 20 the first Marine aircraft arrived. The initial echelon was small – 19 F4F fighters and 12 SBD dive-bombers – but their arrival fundamentally changed the situation in the entire campaign. The waters around the island were now too dangerous for Japanese ships during the day, whether or not the American carriers were within range. Fundamentally, the struggle for the island was dictated by control of the airfield. If the Americans held it, they forced the Japanese to rely on inefficient destroyer transport to reinforce their garrison. Control of the waters during the day made possible regular resupply for the Marines. The Japanese quandary was clear – unless they could suppress the airfield, they could not move sufficient troops to the island to capture it. If they could not capture or neutralize the airfield, surface ships could not operate around the island to cut off the flow of American reinforcements.
Yamamoto was slow to react to the American offensive, but by late August he had assembled a considerable portion of the Combined Fleet to mount a major operation. This operation was centered on getting a small convoy to the island, carrying Ichiki’s second echelon and some Special Naval Landing troops. Supporting the convoy was the rebuilt Japanese carrier force with three carriers. These had the critical mission of eliminating the American carrier force should it attempt to intervene. (See Campaign 247 Santa Cruz 1942 for a detailed treatment of the carrier battles around Guadalcanal.)
The Japanese operation was poorly coordinated and failed to achieve either of its two primary objectives. The carrier battle on August 24, known as the battle of the Eastern Solomons, was indecisive. Aircraft from the carrier Saratoga sank the light Japanese carrier Ryujo. In return, the heavy Japanese carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku succeeded in damaging the carrier Enterprise. The next day, the Japanese convoy was attacked by American aircraft and lost one of its transports and a destroyer. The first major Japanese efforts to retake Guadalcanal, both on land and at sea, had failed.
Unable to move reinforcements to the island with slow transports vulnerable to air attack, the Japanese resorted to increasing the number of troops moving to Guadalcanal by destroyer. The next unit committed to recapture the island was the 35th Infantry Brigade. Each destroyer could carry only some 150 men and 30–40 tons of supplies, but timing their movement down “the Slot” could arrive at Guadalcanal during the night, unload, and then use their high speed to clear the island and get out of range of air attack by morning.
By early September, the lifeline provided by Japanese destroyers was in high gear. Occasionally, dive-bombers from Henderson Field would find the destroyers late in the evening or early the next morning, but these targets were very difficult to hit. The Americans made no move to impede these nocturnal operations with surface ships.
What few naval engagements there were during August and early September reinforced the Japanese sense of superiority in night combat. On August 22, a small destroyer action confirmed the verdict of Savo Island. Two American destroyers, Blue and Henley, were ordered into Iron Bottom Sound to protect a small convoy bringing supplies to the Marines. The Japanese had only a single destroyer, Kawakaze, to intercept. Though the American destroyers possessed radar, Kawakaze was able to get off the first shot and torpedoed Blue at 0359hrs. The Americans never got a shot off against the elusive Japanese destroyer and Blue was scuttled later that day.
A repeat performance was given on September 5 when three Japanese destroyers on a bombardment mission against Guadalcanal encountered two American destroyer transports, Little and Gregory. The American ships were World War I destroyers converted into transports, and carried only two 4in. guns and no torpedoes. The Japanese ships were all fleet destroyers and though totally surprised by the appearance of the two American ships, quickly turned their guns on the new contacts and made short work of both.
Using mainly destroyer runs, the Japanese moved an entire brigade to the island beginning in late August through September 7. The Americans made no attempt to interfere with these regular runs. The next Japanese ground assault was conducted by the 6,200 men of the 35th Infantry Brigade. The Japanese were facing a Marine garrison twice as large, but the Japanese did possess the element of surprise and the potential to mass overwhelming numbers at a single point along the Marine perimeter. The Japanese attack was finally launched on the night of September 12–13 against a thinly manned portion of the perimeter south of Henderson Field. The attack was poorly coordinated, and Marine firepower and tenacity crushed the attack with heavy losses. The outcome was that the Japanese finally realized that a more determined effort would be necessary to gain victory.
On September 15, a Japanese submarine sank the carrier Wasp and damaged the modern battleship North Carolina with a well-placed salvo of six torpedoes. This single action reduced the number of operational American carriers in the Pacific to one, making Ghormley even more reluctant to commit his carrier force. With North Carolina out of action, only two fast battleships were available for operations off Guadalcanal. On September 18 the Marine garrison on the island received some good news when Turner ordered a convoy through to land the 7th Marine Regiment.
Ghormley finally decided that he had to contest the continuing Japanese reinforcement runs to the island. On September 20, he created Task Force 64 and initially assigned it three cruisers and some seven destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Scott. This move was none too soon and coincided with the Japanese decision to up the ante on Guadalcanal by sending in the 2nd Infantry Division and parts of the 38th Infantry Division. These 17,500 men, they judged, should be sufficient to crush the Marines.
HMAS
Australia under way as the Allied task force leaves the waters around Guadalcanal on August 9 after the disaster at the battle of Savo Island. Australia was the flagship of Allied forces in the battle, but saw no action. Australia and Canberra were both County-class heavy cruisers built in Great Britain and armed with eight 8in. guns, but with a generally inadequate level of protection. (Naval History and Heritage Command, 80-G-13492)
THE BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE
Scott had two missions for his new command. First, he had the responsibility of getting the convoy carrying the 164th Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division to Guadalcanal. This was accomplished on October 13. More importantly, his force of four cruisers and five destroyers had orders to prevent any Japanese reinforcement of the island or to stop any attempt to bombard Henderson Field.
BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE ORDER OF BATTLE
UNITED STATES NAVY
Task Force 64 Rear Admiral Norman Scott
Heavy cruisers Salt Lake City, San Francisco
Light cruisers Boise, Helena
Destroyers Buchanan, Duncan, Farenholt, Laffey, McCalla
IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
Bombardment Group Rear Admiral Goto Aritomo
Heavy cruisers Aoba, Furutaka, Kinugasa
Destroyers Fubuki, Hatsuyuki
Reinforcement Group
Seaplane tenders Chitose, Nisshin
Destroyers Asagumo, Natsugumo, Yamagumo, Murakumo, Shirayuki, Akizuki
Scott had attempted to incorporate some of the lessons learned at Savo Island while formulating his battle plan. He was handicapped by the scratch nature of his command and the continuing proclivity of American naval commanders to dismiss the offensive potential of their destroyers. The tactics he devised reflect both these realities. Scott opted for a simple column formation with destroyers deployed ahead and astern of the four cruisers. The destroyers were ordered to illuminate targets with star shells after gaining radar contact. He did make provisions for destroyers to use their torpedoes against large targets and to engage smaller targets with their 5in. guns. The centerpiece of Scott’s plan was to use his cruiser gunnery to decimate the Japanese. Scott wanted his cruisers to engage as soon they had a target and intended to use the cruiser floatplanes for target illumination. Placing his destroyers at the front and end of his formation gave the cruisers clear fields of fire and reduced the problem of identifying friend from foe, always a difficult feat at night.
Scott’s tactics for the upcoming battle were an intelligent attempt to make up for the lack of a proven nightfighting doctrine. However, Scott’s plan did have several flaws. The first of these was the aforementioned negligence to the offensive use of his destroyers. He also did not maximize the use of his biggest potential advantage – radar. While his two heavy cruisers both carried radar, these were the unreliable and short-ranged SC version. His two light cruisers carried the much superior SG radar. Sticking to tradition, Scott selected one of the heavy cruisers as his flagship. This unfortunate choice had great ramifications in the battle. Scott was also unaware of the true capabilities of the Japanese Type 93 long-range torpedo, so his assumption that cruiser gunnery would out-range Japanese torpedoes was another fundamental flaw. He did make allowances for Japanese torpedo tactics by planning to break his force into smaller sections if the torpedo threat was assessed to be significant. To be fair to Scott in this regard, no other American admiral showed true respect for the Type 93 until well after the Guadalcanal campaign.
Following the formation of Task Force 64 on September 20, Scott had the opportunity to run his command through several battle drills. He did not have to wait long to see if his tactics worked. On October 9 and 10, he lingered south of Guadalcanal but did not receive word of any Japanese activity. On October 11, a B-17 sighted the Japanese Reinforcement Group heading to the island, but the Bombardment Group was not sighted. The reported contact was due to arrive at the northwest tip of Guadalcanal at 2300hrs on the 11th.
Scott’s pre-battle intelligence was correct – the Japanese did plan a major operation for the night of October 11–12. A reinforcement group with two high-speed seaplane carriers carrying artillery and five destroyers loaded with troops (a sixth carried no troops) were on their way to the island. Trailing behind was a bombardment group of three cruisers and two destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Goto Aritomo. The cruisers were loaded with specially fused shells designed to cause maximum destruction of aircraft and personnel on Henderson Field. The fact that the Reinforcement Group preceded the Bombardment Group was evidence that the Japanese expected no challenge from the Americans.
The battle opens
As Scott reached a point west of Savo Island, American technology began to weigh in. The SG radar aboard light cruiser Helena picked up a contact at 27,700 yards at 2325hrs. This contact was not reported to Scott. Unaware that action was pending, Scott ordered his ships to reverse course at 2332hrs. The movement was not executed smartly, with some of the cruisers executing an immediate turn instead of the entire column pivoting on a single point and maintaining formation. The net effect was that Scott’s column was thrown into confusion with the three lead destroyers moving to the starboard flank of the cruisers. Unfortunately for Scott, the battle broke out as the three destroyers were racing down the starboard side of the cruisers to take their designated place in the front of the formation.
THE BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE (pp. 50–51)
Furutaka (1) was the first Japanese heavy cruiser sunk in a surface action during the war. She was part of Rear Admiral Goto’s Bombardment Force which was headed into Iron Bottom Sound on the night of October 11–12 to conduct the first bombardment of Henderson Field by heavy naval guns. For the first time since the battle of Savo Island, the Americans decided to contest the nighttime waters around Guadalcanal. A task force under Rear Admiral Scott had the mission of stopping the bombardment. The Americans gained first contact with radar, but largely squandered this advantage by not immediately opening fire. Nevertheless, when they did open fire, the gained complete surprise and began to pummel the unsuspecting Japanese. Furutaka is shown in this view under heavy fire. During the battle, she took some 90 hits from American 8-, 6- and 5-in. shells, as well possibly as a single torpedo, which caused fires (2), knocked out her armament, and eventually brought her to a halt. Her response against Scott’s ships was ineffective. During the morning of October 12, the ship sank due to progressive flooding; 258 of her crew were killed in this action. This encounter, named the battle of Cape Esperance, was the first time during the war that the IJN lost a night battle.
Furutaka was a member of the first class of Japanese heavy cruisers. She displaced 8,100 tons and carried six 8in. guns and eight 24in. torpedo tubes. After being victorious at Savo Island, Furutaka was sunk at the battle of Cape Esperance. (Yamato Museum, 070337)
A key part of Scott’s battle plan was the expectation that the cruisers would open fire when they gained contact. Despite these standing orders, Helena continued to track the Japanese on radar without taking action. The movement of the lead American destroyers probably increased the hesitation to open fire. At 2345hrs, the range had closed to only 3,600 yards and the approaching Japanese were visible to American lookouts. Finally, at 2346hrs following a confusing exchange with Scott, the captain of the Helena gave orders to open fire. Scott, aboard heavy cruiser San Francisco, which did not have SG radar, never had a clear picture of the battle area and remained concerned about the location of his destroyers.
As Scott struggled to piece together the contact reports that were flooding in, Goto refused to believe that he was about to be challenged by the Americans at night. When he received a report at 2343hrs of three ships at 11,000 yards, Goto ordered that recognition lights be flashed to the contacts, which he assumed to be the Reinforcement Group. Even after his lookouts identified the contacts as American ships, Goto failed to act. Just as the Japanese had gained surprise at Savo Island, at Cape Esperance they lost it, and now they were about
to pay the price.
Following their turn and in spite of the opening confusion, Scott’s force began the action in a very favorable tactical situation. After their turn, the American cruisers were steaming on a southwesterly course, which meant they were “capping the T” of Goto’s force. While the American cruisers could employ their entire broadside, the Japanese could reply only with their forward guns. The lead ship in Goto’s formation was his flagship, heavy cruiser Aoba. Boise, both heavy cruisers and a destroyer took Aoba under fire which knocked out the Japanese cruiser’s two forward 8in. turrets, destroyed her fire control equipment and killed Goto on his bridge. As gunfire rained down on the surprised Japanese, their formation broke up. Aoba, Furutaka and a destroyer made a turn to starboard. Kinugasa and Hatsuyuki turned to port, which almost certainly saved them from destruction.
Hatsuyuki was another Special Type destroyer. She participated in the battle of Cape Esperance and the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, surviving both. She was sunk by aircraft in July 1943 while on a transport run from Rabaul. (Yamato Museum, 064113)
Convinced his ships were firing on his own destroyers, Scott ordered a largely ignored ceasefire at 2347hrs. Four minutes later, Scott rescinded his order after he assessed that his targets were all Japanese. However, by this time two of his van destroyers had already been struck by 6in. American shells, confirming Scott’s fears. The second destroyer in line, Duncan, made radar contact on the Japanese after she executed her turn at the start of the battle. Her captain immediately changed course toward the contact, which was four miles away. This placed her between the two sides when the battle opened. Only 1,000 yards away from the Japanese force, Duncan was engaged by the enemy and radar-directed 6in. gunfire from Helena. In response, she fired five torpedoes at Furutaka. According to the Japanese, one of these hit the cruiser at 2358hrs making it one of the few American destroyer torpedo successes of the entire campaign. Duncan was set afire, forcing the crew to abandon ship; the destroyer sank the next day. Farenholt was also struck by American 6in. gunfire and suffered three dead and 40 wounded. The destroyer was forced to withdraw. The last destroyer in the van group, Laffey, was undamaged and she moved to a position of relative safety in the rear of the American column.
