Two rifle corps from reserves of the South-Western Front were moving into the area of operations of the Fifth Army as well. The XXXI Rifle Corps, consisting of three weak rifle divisions and some minor corps assets and marching on foot, was still over seventy miles east of Lutsk. The XXXVI Rifle Corps, of similar composition and moving in similar fashion, was even further away, its struggling units centered on Shepetovka. Both divisions were preparing to move out again at night. While the XXXI Rifle Corps was advancing roughly due west, the XXXVI Rifle Corps was aiming southwest towards Kremenets, on the left flank of the Fifth Army.
IX Mechanized Corps, Maj. Gen. K. K. Rokossovskiy Commanding
During June 23, Rokossovskiy’s corps continued moving towards Lutsk. Due to exhaustion of his troops during the first day of march, he was forced to reduce movement during consecutive days to approximately twenty miles.
Rokossovskiy’s motorized division, the 131st Motorized Rifle under Colonel Kalinin, was better supplied with wheeled vehicles and outpaced the rest of the corps, reaching the vicinity of Lutsk. There, Major General Potapov, commander of the Fifth Army, subordinated this division directly under his command. Kalinin’s new orders were to take up defensive positions along the Styr River between Lutsk and Mlynuv and prevent any enemy breakthroughs.7
Colonel Kalinin remembers:
[Lutsk] was on fire. The small local garrison was staunchly resisting the enemy, especially on the southwestern outskirts. Our forward detachment, after crossing Styr, immediately attacked a German unit. The Fascist antitank artillery knocked out several of our combat vehicles. The enemy was pressing hard towards the bridge we held. . . . The main body of the division after arriving at Lutsk took up defensives along the eastern bank of the river. The tank regiment provided fire support from beyond the river. To its right, by the river, was the 743rd, and to its left—the 489th Motorized Rifle Regiments. Each of them was reinforced by an artillery battery, two antiaircraft guns, and a tank company. Division command post deployed at the tree line, two kilometers east of the bridge across Styr. The reserves, the 3rd Battalion/743rd Regiment, deployed there as well. The firing positions of the artillery regiment were established two–three kilometers beyond the river. The front of our defenses stretched to almost twenty kilometers.8
Corps’ Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. A. G. Maslov sent ahead a platoon of combat engineers to set up a temporary command post along the route of advance of the 35th Tank Division. This division experienced a slight delay crossing Goryn River by ferries, and Rokossovskiy ordered part of it diverted through the town of Goscha to utilize the bridges there.
After ensuring that the crossing was being carried out in an orderly manner, Rokossovskiy with his command group moved ahead. As an afterthought, he ordered a battery of 85mm guns to accompany him.
Rokossovskiy’s convoy drove west alongside extensive wheat fields, with stalks as tall as a man. After a while, they began noticing strange individuals in the wheat fields. These people, single or in small groups, would hide upon seeing Rokossovskiy’s group. Some of these people were dressed in a mixture of military and civilian clothing, some only in underwear. After rounding up and questioning few of those men, Rokossovskiy’s staff found out that they belonged to the units who had already engaged the Germans and had been routed by them.
Rokossovskiy wrote that these panicked soldiers attempted to “masquerade” themselves as civilians. Those who could not obtain civilian clothes remained in their underwear, shedding the uniform and boots. He noted that this naive trickery did not fool the Germans—at a later time he encountered bodies of Red Army men executed in their underwear.9
Among this panicked group in the wheat fields, Rokossovskiy’s officers found two soldiers from the engineer platoon sent ahead by Maslov. They relayed that their platoon was ambushed by German motorcyclists and truck-mounted infantry and wiped out.
In those early days of the war, often whole large units would panic even at the slightest surprise attack by Germans and run. The panicked men would see German parachutists, panzers, and saboteurs around every corner and under every bush. Some officers attempting to stem the panic were shot down by their own men, afraid to return to the front. Some men committed suicide. Rokossovskiy recalled a suicide note left behind by an officer from his 20th Tank Division: “The feeling of fear that I would not measure up in combat drove me to commit suicide.”10 Rokossovskiy noted that when the newspapers wrote articles about increasing vigilance in spotting saboteurs dressed in police, army, and NKVD uniforms, they also spread fears and rumors.
Rokossovskiy relayed a sad anecdote from those hectic first days of war. One day a general was brought to Rokossovskiy’s command post. He was in a shredded uniform blouse, tired, and without weapon. This unnamed general was a liaison officer from the staff of South-Western Front to Fifth Army’s headquarters. West of Rovno this general encountered several truckfuls of Red Army men driving at breakneck speed east to Rovno. The liaison officer attempted to stop one of the vehicles to find out what was going on. When one vehicle did stop, he was unceremoniously pulled into the truck and roughly interrogated by soldiers who decided that he was a saboteur. The men took away his pistol and his ID and decided to execute him at first opportunity. Luckily, the general managed to jump out of the truck and duck into the thick rye field. He was not chased by soldiers intent of getting away themselves. There were many similar cases.11
During the day, Rokossovskiy and Maslov continued sending out reconnaissance parties and liaison officers to find out situation ahead and around them. Many times Major General Maslov would himself jump on a motorcycle and speed off to find news.
Despite their best efforts, only meager unconfirmed news filtered in through the chaos. They heard that Kondrusev’s XXII Mechanized Corps already entered the battle north of Lutsk. Feklenko’s XIX Mechanized Corps was heading towards Dubno.
Maslov reported that he briefly established communications with General Purkayev. South-Western Front’s chief of staff had enough time to inform him that IX Mechanized Corps was being subordinated to the Fifth Army. It was to continue concentrating around the town of Klevan, roughly fifteen miles northwest of Rovno.
In the evening Rokossovskiy’s convoy traveling just east of Zdolbunov, less than ten miles south of Rovno, encountered a German reconnaissance element of several armored cars and truck-mounted infantry. As Rokossovskiy’s 85mm howitzer battery began deploying for a fight, the German scouts exercised the better part of valor and withdrew without engaging the Russians.
Cautious about blundering into Germans in descending darkness, Rokossovskiy set up his command post for the night in the immediate vicinity south of Rovno.
VIII Mechanized Corps, General Ryabyshev Commanding
Throughout the night and into late morning of June 23, the VIII Mechanized Corps covered almost seventy-five miles to their designated area east of Lvov. During the night, German aircraft found the corps on the road. Aided by airdropped flares, German planes strafed and bombed the strung-out Soviet columns. While the casualties from air attacks were not significant, valuable time was lost. After men would scatter for cover, it would take some time to round them up and account for them. Corps Commissar Nikolai Popel remembered that on many occasions, the men, newly subjected to the howling death from above, would be reluctant to leave whatever shelter they found and mount up again.12
After each attack, the rate of march kept decreasing. The drivers, most of whom had not slept for day and a half, kept falling asleep at the wheel. This was the time before power steering, and it took significant physical effort on part of drivers to handle their heavy tanks and trucks. Forced to observe strict light discipline, the vehicles were driving into ditches and ramming each other in the dark. Before nightfall, many officers had their men draw a large circle in white chalk on the back of their vehicles in order to see the preceding vehicle in the dark. This trick worked while the drivers were awake.13 Sometime during the night, the VIII Mechanized Corps mo
ved through Drogobych, the town they left the morning before, and a lifetime of road marches ago. Those officers who were stationed in town had a chance to briefly visit their families and grab a bite to eat. Popel was grateful for the opportunity to check on his wife and two daughters. He was immensely relieved to see that his wife, who suffered a concussion during the bombing morning before, was feeling better.
The main body of the corps left Drogobych with the break of dawn. Its commander, General Ryabyshev, accompanied the 7th Motorized Rifle Division. Commissar Popel went with the 12th Tank Division. The route of this division went through the town of Striy, the very town where division was stationed. Now for the second day in the row, the town was subjected to heavy German air attacks, and large parts of it were burning. Popel recalls how difficult it was for the men of the 12th Tank Division to maintain their disciple and keep driving in convoy through town while not knowing the fate of their families who lived just a few blocks away. After moving through Striy, the 12th Tank Division halted in the woods east of it. While men rested, those officers who lived in town were given an hour’s break to run back to town and check on their families.
Instructing General Mishanin to get his division moving as soon as possible, Popel set off for Lvov, accompanied by his driver and an adjutant. On the way there, his car was strafed several times by German aircraft, which were hunting down even individual Soviet vehicles. Popel credited his driver Mikhail Kuchin’s skills for saving their lives.
Ryabyshev was already waiting for him at the command post of the Sixth Army, in a small forest northwest of Lvov. Lieutenant General I. N. Muzychenko, commander of the Sixth Army, gave Ryabyshev and Popel their immediate mission. They were to support the VI Rifle Corps under Maj. Gen. I. I. Alekseyev at Yavorov in its attack on June 24. A messenger has been sent to Ryabyshev already, but, obviously, he did not find Ryabyshev while still on the road.
By noon, the forward elements of the 8th Mechanized arrived at their staging areas near Lvov, with the bulk of the corps was still strung out along the roads. In order not to lose time concentrating his divisions near Lvov, Ryabyshev attempted to intercept his straggling units on the march and turn them towards Yavorov. He sent out his senior staff officers to ensure that the majority of his units received new directives. Corps commissar N. K. Popel went to the 34th Tank Division, and corps Chief of Counterintelligence M. A. Oksen to the 7th Motorized Rifle Division. One of the tank regiments from the 12th Tank Division was already at its designated area near Lvov, and Ryabyshev gave its commander new instructions in person. After arranging to meet Popel in Yavorov, at the command post of the VI Rifle Corps, Ryabyshev himself set off to find the main body of 12th Tank Division.14
They managed to divert the main body of VIII Mechanized Corps while still on the march and sent them along the dirt roads to Yavorov. The roads leading away from the borders were now chocked with multitudes of refugees, on foot and in vehicles, by trucks evacuating property, by wounded. Mixed in with the wounded and refugees, apparently able-bodied soldiers could be spotted.
At one road intersection, Popel spotted a team of draft artillery horses, without cannon, with soldiers mounted on them. The panicked soldiers told Popel about how their 45mm artillery battery was overrun by German panzers. These few men abandoned their weapons and threw away most of their gear. Popel ordered these men arrested and turned over to military police.
Around 1700 hours, Popel arrived in Yavorov at the command corps of the VI Rifle Corps under Maj. Gen. I. I. Alekseyev and began getting acquainted with the situation. Shortly thereafter, Popel and Alekseyev received a disturbing report that the highway, which Popel just used to get to Yavorov, was cut off by German motorcycle troops. Popel became concerned that Ryabyshev might blunder into Germans while attempting to reach him in town.
The situation in Yavorov was quickly becoming chaotic. As nearby explosions rocked the command post, reports came in that German tanks were already in the city. Popel decided to make a break for it and rejoin the VIII Mechanized Corps at their designated staging area. After spending most of the night driving around the unfamiliar town and its vicinity, Popel and his two companions managed to find their corps south of Yavorov. Ryabyshev was already there.
Popel could not believe the news Ryabyshev had for him. Around 2200 hrs, while Ryabyshev was en route to Yavorov, his chief of intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel Losev, caught up with him. Losev brought new orders from headquarters of the South-Western Front. Not believing his eyes, Ryabyshev read that he was to turn east yet again and concentrate in the area of Brody by the end of June 24. He was to establish contact with the commander of the XV Mechanized Corps and, after ensuring close cooperation, attack together in the morning of June 24 in general direction of Berestechko and destroy enemy tank forces there “as situation develops.”15 Not wanting to use up any time, Ryabyshev drove directly to his corps’ assigned staging area south of Yavorov, instead of checking in with the VI Rifle Corps and linking up with Popel there. There was no way to inform General Alekseyev that the VIII Mechanized Corps would not be supporting him on the morrow, and the beleaguered infantrymen were left on their own.
Once again, Ryabyshev and his staff officers had to search for their scattered units at night along the dirt tracks. Only two tank battalions, one from 12th Tank Division and the other from the 34th, were within immediate reach. Ryabyshev ordered them to make haste to Brody after refueling in Lvov. These two battalions were to take up defenses along the west, north, and east outskirts of Brody, establish communications with any Soviet force already there, and conduct reconnaissance.
A majority of combat units of the corps did not receive their instructions while on the march and concentrated near Yavorov by morning of June 24. As quickly as possible, Ryabyshev briefed division commanders on their new mission and ordered them to make haste preparing to move out as soon as possible. The two tank divisions were to lead off, followed by corps support elements. Corps headquarters was to set up on the west outskirts of Brody. The 7th Motorized Rifle Division was to stay in reserve in the woods two miles southwest of Brody.
Meanwhile, straggling units of the VIII Mechanized Corps continued crawling into Yavorov. It took until 1000 hours on June 24 before the main body of the corps set out to follow their lead two battalions.
XV Mechanized Corps, Maj. Gen. I. I. Karpezo Commanding
Approaching Radekhov from the southeast, Major General Karpezo’s XV Mechanized Corps marched to the sound of the guns. This small, dusty town became the sight of the first significant tank battle in Ukraine. Since the previous day, Radekhov was occupied by a task force of two tank battalions and one motorized rifle battalion from the IV Mechanized Corps. This scratch formation was headed by commander of the 323rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, Lt. Col. Georgiy E. Lysenko. North of Radekhov, between it and the equally small and insignificant town of Stoyanov, was the leading two-battalion element of 10th Tank Division from XV Mechanized Rifle Corps.
Continuing its progress south and east towards Radekhov at 0330 hours, the leading battalion from the 15th Panzer Regiment of the 11th Panzer Division briefly traded shots with several of 10th Division’s tanks south of Stoyanov. Brushing the small Soviet detachment aside, the regiment continued south to Radekhov and approached it around 0530 hours. As the panzers drew near the small town, German aerial reconnaissance reported approach of significant numbers of Soviet armor advancing from the east. This was the main body of Soviet 10th Tank Division. The whole of 15th Panzer Regiment halted and deployed into line, supported by strong elements of divisional field and air-defense artillery. This pause allowed the forward detachment from the 10th Tank Division to fall back into Radekhov and join Lysenko.
As the panzer regiment and its supporting elements were finishing taking up their positions, the hum of multiple aircraft engines was heard approaching from the west. Soon, approximately a regiment-worth of heavy bombers flew over the German unit. Believing them to be their own aircraft, the German flak g
unners did not even unlimber their cannon. However, very soon red stars became clearly visible on the wings of the large aircraft. Fortunately for the surprised Germans, they were not the intended target of the Soviet bombers, who continued droning on towards the east as if not even noticing German forces concentrated directly below them.16 It was also possible that the Soviet bomber force was returning to their home airfield after expanding their entire payload on other targets.
Advancing with its two battalions abreast in line, the 15th Panzer Regiment moved on to Radekhov. As the German panzers crept closer, they were met with intense defensive fire of several batteries of Soviet artillery, drawing out the noise of tank engines. Supporting their infantry, a dozen Soviet tanks entered the fray:
Overall, majority of [15th] Regiment for the time being had only the hostile infantry opposing it; however, part of the 1st Battalion . . . had to contend with the Russian tanks. Soon, three enemy vehicles went up in flames. Unfortunately, a [tank] of the 1st Kompanie had its turrett shot away. Feldwebel Hans Albrecht was mortally wounded during this incident.17
Still, despite spirited opposition, the Germans broke into Radekhov. Under mounting German pressure, the survivors of the Soviet force abandoned town and retreated south and southwest.
Pursuing the Soviets out of the town, the main body of the 15th Panzer Regiment halted between Radekhov and a hill to its southwest. Schrodek picks up the story:
The area to the south continued to rise gently and was visible for a couple of kilometers. A group of volunteers went forward to scout out the intentions of enemy forces. Lieutenant von Renesse, Commander of 2nd Platton/5th Company led the scouting party composed of all five [tanks] of the 2nd Plt, three of them armed with 5cm (Short) cannons, and the other two with 3,7cm cannons. One of the 3,7cm KwK cannons was non-operational, but to participate was everything. They formed up in wedge and moved forward. . . .
The Bloody Triangle Page 17
