A small Soviet rear guard made up of a company of flame-throwing OT-26 tanks with several heavy KV-2s temporarily slowed down the Germans. In this tough fight, the Soviet rear guard was completely destroyed.
After returning to the starting positions, division’s chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Malygin, walked up to the last surviving KV-2 tank: “The tank resembled a wounded animal. The turret was gouged, the howitzer’s frontal plate had armor-piercing rounds stuck in them, the engine barely worked.”18
By the time 41st Tank Division finished falling back east of Rovno on June 29, it was a division in the name only:
Only the artillery regiment remained intact. The air defense battery had only two cannons. Tank regiments numbered around 20 T-26s each, number of dismounted tank crewmen increased to 500. Forming them into companies, we included in them crewmen from destroyed air defense weapons. These companies were armed with machine guns [removed from disabled tanks], mainly without bipods, revolvers, and rifles. The heavy tank battalion existed only on paper, consisting of one mangled KV-2, one mobile repair truck, and [several] fuel trucks.19
XIX Mechanized Corps, Major General Feklenko Commanding
During the previous day, the task of defending Rovno against German 13th Panzer and 299th Infantry Divisions fell upon Feklenko’s severely weakened XIX Mechanized Corps. Stretched to the breaking point, Feklenko’s corps was unable to contain German probes everywhere, and by afternoon on June 28, Germans began working through the gaps between him and Rokossovskiy’s corps northwest of town.
The final blow was the appearance of advance elements from 11th Panzer Division, which found their way across Goryn River in the evening. German troops now stood twenty miles southeast behind Feklenko’s units. Even though the 11th Panzer Division was not directly operating against the XIX Mechanized Corps, this created a threat to the XIX Mechanized Corps of being taken around the southern flank and being cut off from its own Goryn River crossings. Reluctantly, in the evening of June 28 Major General Feklenko was forced to abandon Rovno and began pulling back behind Goryn River. By the morning of the 29th, the 40th Tank Division took up positions in the area of Tuchin-Goscha, and the 43rd Tank Division, in the area of Goscha-Velbovo.20
Task Force Lukin, Lieutenant General Lukin Commanding
During June 28, the two Soviet battalions belonging to the 109th Motorized Rifle Division continued fighting surrounded in Ostrog. On the other side of Goryn River, Lieutenant General Lukin was frantically gathering any warm bodies he could find and throwing them against Ostrog: stragglers, retreating units, small garrison detachments, newly mobilized and untrained recruits, anything. The 404th Artillery Regiment, making up for its late arrival the day before, was subjecting the bridgehead of the 11th Panzer Division to significant and effective fire: “In the Ostrog bridgehead, there were constant and strong enemy attacks with artillery support.”21
During the day, the 213th Motorized Rifle Division, separated from Feklenko’s XIX Mechanized Corps, retreated towards Ostrog and linked up with Lukin’s group. However, it needed most of June 28 to reorganize.
Unbeknown to Lukin, German reconnaissance troops discovered an undefended gap between his task force and the right flank of the XXXVI Rifle Corps, which was resting on the Ikva River. During the night of June 28–29, the German units began shifting south of the town, ready to exploit the gap in the morning.
XV Mechanized Corps, Colonel G. I. Yermolayev Commanding
Throughout June 28, the XV Mechanized Corps continued its push to Berestechko. After reaching vicinity of this small town by the end of the day, Yermolayev’s corps was to prepare for possible enemy counterattacks and offer whatever help possible to the VIII Mechanized Corps.
During the previous several days, the Germans set up formidable antitank defenses along rivers Styr and Ostruvka, along with strong points in the villages of Okhladov, Kholyuev, and town of Radekhov.
Attack of the 10th Tank Division faltered at the Severuvka River, on the way to Lopatin. Germans set up strong antitank defenses on the north bank of the river, and the Soviet division could not cross the river over only one available ford in the face of withering artillery fire. Colonel Yermolayev, seeing this situation with his own eyes, sent a liaison officer to the 8th Tank Division, ordering it to support the 10th Tank Division from the west in its drive on Lopatin. However, while these orders were being delivered, the Germans were pressing the 10th Tank Division hard and were beginning to encircle it.
At 1400 hours, the 37th Tank Division under Colonel F. G. Anikushkin launched its attack towards Berestechko. Advance of its 74th Tank Regiment started off well, and it was able to cross over to the north bank of Styr River in the vicinity of Stanislavchik village. On the other hand, its sister 73rd Tank Regiment could not cross the river in its assigned area near Bordulyaki village and around 1830 hours began crossing at Stanislavchik, following the rear elements of the 74th Regiment.
Thus, instead of advancing over a broad front, both regiments became stacked up one behind the other. While maneuvering to expand the attack frontage, the 73rd Tank Regiment found itself in a swampy area along the small Ostruvka River, a tributary of Styr. One of the battalions from the 74th Tank Regiment followed the 73rd and also foundered in the marshy terrain.
These units were in completely exposed positions when German antitank artillery began firing practically point blank upon them from surrounding woods. Their situation worsened when German heavy artillery from Lopatin added its weight to the fray. As the losses mounted, the Soviet tankers were forced to give up the offensive. What’s worse, German artillery fire destroyed the two bridges across the Ostruvka River, trapping the 73rd Tank Regiment and the 3rd Battalion from the 74th Regiment on the wrong side of the river.
The 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment, following in their wake, crossed the Styr River in vicinity of Bordulyaki-Stanislavchik. However, poorly supported by Soviet artillery, it suffered casualties around 60 percent. Both commander of the regiment Major Shlykov and his deputy Major Shwartz were killed. “Positions occupied by 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment along the southern bank of Styr River in area of Bordulyaki-Stanislavchik are littered with dead and wounded. The 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment is severely demoralized.”22
In his report on the events of the day, Colonel F. G. Anikushkin, commander of the 37th Tank Division, wrote:
I ordered Captain Kartsev, temporary in command of the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment, to evacuate all the wounded during the night and offer them necessary help, to pick up the dead and bury them in the area of Zbroye, take detailed head count of the regiment, collect all weapons and ammunition, reorganize the regiment, and hold river crossings at Bordulyaki and Stanislavchik, not allowing the enemy to cross to the southern bank of Styr River.23
Summarizing the events of the day, Colonel Anikushkin requested one pontoon-bridging battalion to assist him in river crossings, over-optimistically stating that while the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment was no longer combat capable, the division overall could still carry on its mission. He sent up a word of caution: “The combat materiel, due to its incorrect employment from 22nd to 28th of June, 1941, is beginning to fail in large numbers due to its technical condition and requires evaluation.”24
By nightfall, positions of the 10th Tank Division, raked by enemy fire from three directions, became untenable, and Colonel Yermolayev shifted it east to link up with the 37th Tank Division. Both divisions became bogged down between the two rivers, Ostruvka and Styr. Around midnight, Colonel Yermolayev permitted them to return to their starting positions.
The 8th Tank Division, fighting on the left flank of the XV Mechanized Corps, was not able to take Okhladov village, suffering heavily from concentrated German artillery fire. Despite not being able to make any headway in its own sector, this division allowed the 10th and 37th Tank Divisions to pull back to their original morning positions on the Radostavka River.
The 212th Motorized Rifle Division of the XV Mechanized Corp
s not only was not able to attack, it was even pushed back by Germans.
Task Force Popel, Southwest of Dubno
Daybreak of June 28 found Commissar Nikolai Popel’s task force spread out from Ptycha village on the Brody-Dubno highway to the Dubno suburbs, a distance of approximately ten miles. Popel spent a restless night preparing his unit for inevitable counterattacks. While he seemed quite sure in his memoirs about occupying Dubno, most likely Popel’s force was in possession of some outlying suburb of the town, possibly the Maliye Sady township, roughly three miles from Dubno. The city itself was solidly under German control.
During the previous day’s fighting, his forces severely depleted their ammunition and fuel stocks. Some of the men defending positions around Ptycha village were down to ten to fifteen rounds per rifle. The tank crewmen from disabled vehicles were almost completely unarmed. Some of the Soviet riflemen gave up their bayonets so that tankers would have at least a modicum of weapons. A makeshift Dubno militia company formed from the town’s Communist Party and civil officials was likewise poorly armed.
The area south and southwest of Dubno became a quagmire of small groups of men from various formations blundering from one confused fight to another. In the early morning, commander of the 27th Rifle Regiment, Col. Ivan N. Pleshakov, stumbled in, accompanied by an aide and a commissar from a cavalry battalion from 14th Cavalry Division. This unidentified commissar informed Popel that during the night, a column of trucks bearing ammunition, fuel, and lubricants attempted to get to Dubno from Kremenets. It was turned back by some well-meaning cavalry officer, who did not know that Popel was near Dubno.
Despite Popel’s fears, no serious efforts were undertaken against his force by Germans throughout the day. The Soviet attack was more effective than they realized. According to Gustav Schrodek: “Situation at Dubno became critical in the evening of June 28. Utilizing the available forces, including drivers and clerks, Russian attacks were repelled on the outskirts of town. . . . Until the situation in the rear was resolved, naturally, there was no thought of further advance by 11th Panzer Division.”25
VIII Mechanized Corps, Lt. Gen. D. I. Ryabyshev Commanding
In the early morning of June 28, the 7th Motorized Rifle Division under Colonel A. V. Gerasimov again tried to break through the German defenses along Plyashevka River, but was unsuccessful. By noon, Mishanin’s 12th Tank Division joined the 7th, but all attempts to link up with Popel’s group failed.
Around 1300 hours, the 7th Motorized Rifle Division, under Ryabyshev’s direct control, now only six miles from Popel, reached Plyashevka River. However, they could go no farther. German antitank defenses stopped the depleted Soviet units cold, and in some places they undertook successful local counterattacks.
German historian Werthen described an episode of this battle from the viewpoint of the 16th Panzer Division:
The main body of the enemy continued moving towards Kozin, later turning east. Only the 2nd Bn from 64th Motorized Infantry Regiment, reinforced by 11th Company of the same regiment; one company from 16th Antitank Battalion; and one battery of 88mm gun were destroying the enemy in the woods north and south of Tarnovka. The infantry companies took up initial positions on the edge of Tarnovka. 8th Company of 64th Motorized Infantry Regiment under Oberlietenant Muus attacked towards Ivani-Pusto village, with the objective to catch the enemy in a “vise” from the east. The soldiers from this company had a tough time fighting against a heavy Russian tank. These tanks constantly moved from one firing position to another, suppressing infantry and postponing the capture of the village. Still, approximately a battalion of Russian forces were caught in a “vise” and thrown back. However, they soon counterattacked with tanks, and the 64th was forced to return to initial position. Tarnovka was shaking from explosions of anti-tank grenades, homes were burning, all possible weapons were turned to destroying the tanks. The wind was spreading smoke and soot. One heavy infantry gun managed to knock out two medium tanks. The 5cm anti-tank guns were useless even at distance of 400 meters. More and more steel columns were entering Tarnovka, but soldiers of 16th Panzer Division held on tenaciously. One 88mm anti-tank gun in half an hour destroyed four tanks. When the attack was repelled, dead and wounded picked up, and smoke cleared, we could count 22 knocked-out tanks on the battlefield.26
Ryabyshev’s scouts reported the arrival of additional German units. Besides the 16th Motorized and 16th Panzer Divisions, the 75th and 111th Infantry divisions were now committed in the area of operations of Soviet VIII and XV Mechanized corps.
Germans began pressing their attacks harder, and the two weak Soviet divisions of the VIII Mechanized Corp were forced to go on the defensive. While German artillery pounded the forward Soviet positions and panzers and infantry pressed frontally, the German aviation was working over Soviet rear echelons. Taking advantage of the absence of virtually any interference from the Soviet air forces, the German aircraft pounded Soviet positions. Ryabyshev wrote:
Often up to ten vultures, formed up in a closed circle, would dive on our positions, dropping bombs and strafing troops with machine guns. Our aviation still did not make its appearance, while we had very little of air defense artillery. It could not cover all of corps’ positions. The Fascist fliers knew that and with almost complete impunity bombed our rear echelons, destroying ammunition trucks and fuel tankers.27
The 12th Artillery Regiment received the full brunt of German un-tender mercies. Regiment’s commander, Maj. I. I. Tseshkovskiy, and his deputy, Captain N. F. Ozirniy, were both wounded. Losses of command personnel were such that a Senior Lieutenant Klinka took over command of one of the battalions. Still, despite severe losses, this regiment, armed with 122mm and 152mm howitzers, gave a good accounting of itself in the face of German tanks. Several times when the German tanks broke through the forward Soviet defenses, fire brigades composed of two to three KV-1s would be sent forward to plug the gap.
When, by the end of the day, the Germans broke off their attacks, Ryabyshev remembers hearing cannonade coming from northeast. He was hoping that this was the sound of the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps attempting to link up with him at Dubno. He said, “Everything was quiet behind the left flank of our divisions, where the units from Maj. Gen. I. I. Karpezo’s XV Mechanized Corps were supposed to operate. We still have not received any instructions from Gen. R. N. Morgunov, who was supposed to have been coordinating actions of VIII and XV Mechanized Corps.”28
What’s worse, when the VIII Mechanized Corps shifted northeast against Dubno, it opened an undefended gap between the left flank, the 7th Motorized Rifle Division, and the right flank, XV Mechanized Corps’ 212th Motorized Division. The 7th Motorized Rifle Division became surrounded from three sides; by German 75th Infantry Division from the north, 11th Panzer Division from east and now the 57th Infantry Division, which got into the unoccupied gap, from the west. In order to prevent his division from being completely cut off, Ryabyshev ordered its retreat through the narrow corridor to the southeast.
After the main body of the VIII Mechanized Corps ceded the blood-soaked ground, the 16th Panzer Division finally had a chance to consolidate gains, rest, and reorganize.
While the 16th Panzer Division was slowly grinding down Ryabyshev’s corps, its sister 11th Panzer Division was having a tough time in Ostrog. This division moved far forward, and when Task Force Popel cut its resupply line, it began experiencing difficulties. Its lead elements were being bloodied just beyond Ostrog in a tough contest with Task Force Lukin, while its rear echelons found themselves pressed hard by Commissar Popel’s group at Dubno: “At the same time, it had to deal with constant strong enemy attacks against Ostrog bridgehead, while behind them, in the area of Dubno, the German troops had to contend with strong enemy motorized forces with tanks.”29
Disruption in supply caused severe concerns for 11th Panzer Division, especially with fuel and ammunition. A temporary airlift by several He-101 squadrons attempted to resupply division’s forward units, but the amount d
elivered was insufficient to cover the expenditure of vital supplies.
The Soviet Air Force, despite being much-maligned in recollections of many Soviet memoir writers for its conspicuous absence, nonetheless made a significant impression on Gustav Schrodek. While not always extremely effective in delivering their payloads on target, it had a demoralizing effect on soldiers of the 11th Panzer Division. Recollections of Gustav Schrodek attest to that:
It started raining during the night, raising hopes that today it would cause the Russian fliers to cancel their activity. But it was not to be. The rain stopped at daybreak, and the Soviet airplanes again emerged immediately afterwards, falling upon column after column of rolling units from 11th PD, which continued arrived at Ostrog during the day. . . . For their part, the tank crews, in order to protect themselves from attacks from the air, would dig foxholes, over which they would position their well-camouflaged tanks. They weathered these air attacks in these pits. Unfortunately, further personnel loses could not be avoided. It can not be denied that the Soviet opponent, here at least, has the absolute air supremacy. . . . Never in its history did the 15th Panzer Regiment experience so many air attacks as here, in and around Ostrog [emphasis added].30
This last sentence would come as a great surprise to majority of Soviet servicemen who survived the first stage of the war, being left to the un-tender mercies of the Luftwaffe without their own air force’s interference. Overall, the limited Soviet aviation assets still available to the South-Western Front conducted almost four hundred sorties during the day in the face of overall German air superiority.
The Bloody Triangle Page 28
