Many hours were spent after midnight by Nesbitt, Detective Inspector John Fitzsimmons who worked in CID, and members of the murder squad such as Jim Reid, Cecil Chambers and John Scott, considering means of solving the cut-throat killings. It was Nesbitt who finally came up with a novel but dangerous scheme to trap the Butchers and he called it ‘Operation Knife Edge’. His plan was to place policemen on the streets in plain clothes and have them behave as drunks. He further planned covert surveillance at Forthriver in Glencairn. The evidence of Margaret McKee about the route taken by Rice after he left her on the fateful night convinced Nesbitt that he had to concentrate on the Library Street and Carlisle Circus area. He was aware of the risks to his men because a lone policeman could be shot from a passing car or set upon by ‘ordinary’ criminals. Although a policeman used for these purposes could be wired with a microphone, protection would necessarily be some distance away if the operation were to succeed. There was always the possibility that in this situation he might not have the chance to use his hidden microphone since a few seconds’ delay could lead to the killers escaping with a victim. Nesbitt’s scheme was given approval at the highest level within his own Division but he made a request that the role of playing the drunks should be given only to those who volunteered. In the event, both uniformed men and detectives made themselves available in large numbers. Others offered to be part of the back-up teams which would afford the best protection possible from a discreet distance. The prospect of many extra hours being involved in this work did not deter the large number of volunteers.
Nesbitt set about producing large maps on which he placed whatever information was available about the cutthroat killings. He insisted that everyone be briefed, including those men who would not be part of the finer workings of Operation Knife Edge, and he provided a separate register so that every policeman going on duty recorded that he had briefed himself on the available data on the killings. Any new information gathered while on duty, such as people or taxis observed to be behaving ‘suspiciously’, was added to the register at the end of duty. The register was then signed. Nesbitt examined this log daily in the hope that a pair of eyes might have seen something of relevance to the enquiry.
The central thrust of Operation Knife Edge was the use of policemen as decoy victims and it was undertaken on as many nights as available manpower permitted. The decoy was dressed shabbily, was wired with a hidden microphone to a hidden back-up team, and armed with the standard issue Walther PPK. Considering the speed with which Murphy snatched his victims, this was a daring and risky venture. It proved to be unsuccessful and was abandoned in favour of normal police methods after several months. D Division also co-operated in the project and made personnel available, but like C Division they finally jettisoned the scheme.
Nesbitt also sought to warn the public of the dangers of walking through troubled areas or unlit streets in North and West Belfast. He enlisted the help of Bill McGookin, Head of the RUC Press Office, and appeals were made through newspapers and the broadcasting media to create a public awareness of the dangers faced by late-night drinkers. Inevitably it was people walking home late at night from pubs and clubs who were most vulnerable. In some instances the absence of late-night buses or a lack of money to pay for a taxi from a reputable company gave victims no alternative but to commit the folly of walking through dangerous areas.
Another factor is that people in a war situation adapt and become anaesthetized. They are aware of danger but come to accept it as part of life, and thus, through lack of prudence they offer themselves as victims.
As for Murphy and his gang, they must have been constantly aware of the slightest increase in security force activity. There was a sufficiently large number of people involved in paramilitary activities in West Belfast to note the frequency of police patrols and pass on such information to every pub or club in the Shankill area.
One factor which I believe was missing in Nesbitt’s thinking at the time, though it may not have proven crucial, was a psychiatric evaluation of the crimes, together with a profile of the type of people most likely to be guilty of the killings. Dr Alex Lyons, who is familiar with the nature of political violence, has, since this period, continued to study the character of the conflict and the types of personalities involved. He works at Purdysburn Psychiatric Hospital on the outskirts of Belfast and has produced fascinating material on the subject. I found it interesting to note that in one of his papers he indicated that he did not have full access to material necessary for his studies and he hoped that in future the Northern Ireland Office might see its way to relax the rules on access to information about murderers and their crimes.
The singular dimension to the cut-throat killings which called for psychiatric evaluation was the use of a knife in a political conflict, and the fact that there was no substantial history of similar murders within the general parameters of Ulster terrorism. There is, however, sufficient evidence to show that the knife has been used by those on the fringes of paramilitary organizations: people out of control and therefore not subject to the kinds of discipline imposed by the majority of terrorist groupings. This thesis, if accepted, would have led Nesbitt and his team to search for people who appeared to act independently of any paramilitary authority or exhibited an autonomy outside their known role within a particular organization.
In a study by Dr Lyons it is also pointed out that alcohol plays a large part in the lives of sadistic murderers. Murphy was not an exceptionally heavy drinker, though some of his companions were, in particular McAllister and Bates. Murphy’s actions were not the result of alcohol consumption, but the use of alcohol played a significant part in the lives of many of those within his unit. The pub was a constant feature of their daily lives and Murphy behaved as if he owned and controlled the Brown Bear Bar. The reason for such a defiant proprietorial attitude should have aroused suspicion and been investigated.
It is of value to note that a study by Dr Lyons and a colleague, Dr H. J. Harbinson, on the differing aspects of political and non-political murder in Northern Ireland shows that non-political murderers offend late at night and at weekends when most alcohol consumption occurs. This does not apply to political murderers who operate during daylight hours. The two psychiatrists also discovered that travelling, using a car or a motorcycle, is a method favoured by political murderers together with a choice of victim with whom they are unacquainted.
On the basis of their study and with the benefit of retrospective analysis, it is possible to categorize the Lenny Murphy unit killings as both political and non-political. In terms of their actions, I tend to favour the non-political definition, though I would not apply this definition to their attitudes, thoughts or conditioning.
8
The First Mistake
At 1.20A.M. on 2 March Lance Corporal John McIntosh was in charge of a mobile military patrol travelling in a Land Rover along the Shankill Road towards the city when he saw two men emerge from the Bayardo Bar. He decided to check them out and he did so with the assistance of three other members of his patrol. While he was questioning the two men as to why they were on the road at such a late hour Lenny Murphy emerged from the Bayardo with ‘Basher’ Bates and another man. The other man cannot be named here for legal reasons but will subsequently be referred to as Mr D. Lance Corporal McIntosh was informed by Murphy and the others that they were going to a club nearby and the lance corporal released them from questioning. However, he watched as they walked down the Shankill Road and into Downing Street which housed a Loyalist club. Half an hour later the lance corporal again saw Murphy, this time in the rear of a bronze-coloured Ford Cortina car heading up the Shankill Road towards the countryside. There were three other men in the car but the one who caught the soldier’s attention was Murphy. The Cortina was also observed by a member of an RUC mobile patrol who noted the registration number as AGE 6J.
About two minutes later another military patrol saw the Cortina stop in Crossland Street off the Shankill Road. Murp
hy got out of the car and went into a shop, a premises known to remain open until 2.00A.M., returning within three minutes. The windows of the Cortina were steamed up and the soldier was unable to identify the other occupants. Before the Cortina was driven away, Murphy and his gang shouted abusive taunts at the military. There were in fact four occupants in the car; the fourth man cannot be named for legal reasons but will be referred to as Mr E.
The Cortina was frequently used by Mr E. though it was the property of UVF Welfare Association in the Rathcoole housing estate. This estate is situated on the Belfast Lough shoreline, ten miles from Belfast. At 2.50 A.M. two Catholic women, twenty-five-year-old Mary Murray and twenty-eight-year-old Margaret McCartney were travelling along the Cliftonville Road in a car. They were both returning from a dance in the town of Ballymena in County Antrim and Mary Murray was the driver. Both women lived off the Cliftonville Road and knew the dangers present in the area but felt safe because they were in a car. As they reached a point close to where Ted McQuaid was shot, Mary Murray was startled by headlights from behind, which were being switched on and off in quick succession. This was a method used by police and Army patrols to signal cars to stop. Knowing this, Mary Murray slowed down to a stop. As she pulled into the side of the road she saw a bronze Cortina draw alongside. Suddenly shots were fired from the other car and Mary was hit by three bullets, one in the right shoulder and two in the lower chest region. As the Cortina sped away up the Cliftonville Road, Mary fought to remain conscious and drove the car to her friend’s house, from where she was taken to hospital. Margaret McCartney had a lucky escape because bullets had passed over her head and shattered the rear windscreen.
The Cortina made its way to the top of the Cliftonville Road then to the Ballysillan Road and it was obviously the driver’s intention to make for Glencairn. Unknown to the gunmen, a military patrol was positioned on the Ballysillan Road. Murphy was prepared for any eventuality, and sat in the rear of the car reloading the automatic pistol which he had used to shoot Mary Murray. The military mobile patrol on the Ballysillan was in position due to the quick thinking of Gunner Michael Mallinson of J Battery of the 3rd RHA Regiment. While on patrol in the Cavehill Road area he heard the shots fired by Murphy and ordered his men to head for the Ballysillan area in anticipation of the gunmen making for Glencairn. This is his account of what happened after he established a vehicle checkpoint on the Ballysillan Road:
We had just set up the checkpoint when we saw a car travelling at speed towards us from the Cliftonville/Oldpark direction. Our Land Rover was sitting at an angle to the pavement, blocking the path of this car. The four flashers on our vehicle were indicating our presence. I was standing at the front-near-side of the Land Rover and I saw this car move across towards the centre of the road. Sergeant Davenport jumped into our Land Rover and moved it into the centre of the road to offer no opportunity for the oncoming vehicle to pass us. As the car approached, I stood in the centre of the road but the car passed, half on and half off the pavement I could see three or four dark shapes in the car at this stage. I ran round the back of the Land Rover to the front and as I did so I heard two shots being fired at us from the car. The car continued along the Ballysillan Road towards the Cavehill Road junction. I immediately took aim at the rear of the car which had regained its own side of the road and was approximately 100 yards from me. I fired one aimed shot. Another shot was fired by a second member of the patrol. The car continued on its way and we jumped into the Land Rover and followed in hot pursuit. The car disappeared out of sight along the North Circular Road and when we reached the Antrim Road it was not to be seen.
The two bullets fired by the patrol struck the Cortina but none of the occupants was hit and Murphy ordered Mr E. to drive to Lowood Park off the Antrim Road, which offered easy access on foot to Loyalist districts on the Shore Road. When they reached Lowood Park, Murphy set the Cortina alight, hid his gun in a hedge and made off on foot to the Shore Road. On the Shore Road he stole a Fiat car which was parked in the Mount Vernon housing estate. The four men drove back to the Shankill.
Meanwhile, residents of Lowood Park had been awakened by the sound of men running towards the Shore Road and telephoned the police, who arrived quickly to find the car still burning. Murphy and the others, it seemed from a first inspection, had left no clues. The fire in the car was put out and the surrounding area searched. Police on the spot decided to make a further search at daylight and residents were warned that if they noticed any suspicious objects they should avoid touching them and await the arrival of a police forensic team.
At 4.05 A.M. Corporal Frank Harnett, a member of a mobile patrol, was at the junction of Percy Street and the Shankill Road when he observed a red Fiat car approaching him. He stopped the Car and inside found Murphy, Bates and two other men. He ordered Private James Robertson Gunn to detain Murphy and released the others. No reason was ever offered as to why Murphy was immediately arrested and the others allowed to go free. An explanation which might explain this anomaly is that Murphy was known to the soldiers as a terrorist or his name was on a suspects list which all patrols carry with them. Private Gunn handed Murphy over to Constable Innes at Tennent Street, who kept him in custody but did not interview him. While Murphy was in Innes’s custody he made the first mistake of his career, which he recognized after the event. This is how Innes remembered the episode: ‘During the time I was guarding him he requested to go to the toilet. I went into the toilet with him but as the urinal was blocked he went into one of the cubicles. I heard the toilet being flushed. On hearing this I rushed over and looked into the cubicle and saw Murphy drying his hands which were still wet and he was also wiping the sleeves of his jacket with toilet paper. I immediately took him back into the Enquiry Office.’
Murphy’s intention in washing his hands and his jacket was to remove lead residue, which accumulates on hands or garments which have been close to a gun being fired. Here was another example of the important details Murphy had learned during the time he spent listening to the evidence in terrorist trials in Crumlin Road courthouse. This time he was observed attempting to rid himself of evidence and Constable Innes was well aware of what he was trying to do. Innes put a call through to Nesbitt who told him to hold Murphy in custody until he arrived at the station. He also told Innes to contact the Forensic Department to have Murphy’s clothing tested and swabs taken from his hands. At 7.00 A.M. Reserve Constable Roy Suitters assumed the role of guarding Murphy and was present when a member of the Forensic Team arrived. Roy Suitters told me: ‘Before the chap from the Forensic Team addressed the accused, Murphy told him, “I’ve washed my hands”. Murphy was then asked by him if he had been wearing the same coat that day and Murphy replied that he had. When the chap from Forensic left the room Murphy turned to me and said, “That’s the first mistake I’ve made”.’
Immediately after Murphy’s arrest instructions were issued from Tennent Street for the arrest of Bates, Mr D. and Mr E. who had earlier been released by the military patrol. As with Murphy, swabs were taken from their hands and their jackets were removed. They, however, had more time than Murphy in which to consider their position and had changed clothes. Nevertheless, each of them washed their hands in Tennent Street. They were not observed doing this but admitted to having done so when questioned by members of the Forensic Team.
A member of the RUC Scenes of Crime Team told Murphy that his jacket was being removed for forensic testing, to which Murphy replied, ‘I was working with batteries and lorries when I was wearing that coat.’ Even at such a late stage, and knowing the mistake he had made, Murphy tried to concoct an explanation for the presence of lead residue. The reference to lorries and particularly batteries, which contain lead, was a shrewd piece of thinking on the part of a professional terrorist such as Murphy.
When Nesbitt and Detective Inspector John Fitzsimmons arrived at the station that morning they discussed the presence of Murphy. There was, however, a further development to the saga which intrigue
d them both: the discovery of an automatic pistol in the hedge at Lowood Park. It was found at 8.30 A.M. by Sergeant John J. Darnbrough, a member of J Battery of the 3rd RHA Regiment. The search had begun at 7.00 A.M. and it had taken forty-five minutes to recover the gun from inside a hedge behind a six-feet-high concrete wall. Sergeant Darnbrough concluded that the gun had not been thrown there but carefully concealed.
News of the find was relayed to C Division and in particular to Nesbitt and Fitzsimmons who, at this time, were discussing with others the manner in which to approach the interrogation of Murphy. They knew they had the right man from the reports of sightings of Murphy and his gang, the evidence of the soldiers at the roadblock and the two women on the Cliftonville Road. Murphy was questioned briefly but, as John Scott says, ‘He was a man who never gave you an alibi in case you might break it. He gave you nothing.’ Nesbitt and his men concluded likewise after a short interview with him because he simply told them that they would have to prove any allegations they wished to make.
When news reached Nesbitt of the find of the 9mm Llama pistol he decided that there was an alternative way of cornering Murphy. He ordered that the pistol find should be properly recorded but the discovery should not be made known to Murphy. Murphy, he told the others, should be released. Nesbitt was well aware that there was no prospect of breaking Murphy under questioning. There was no guarantee that the forensic evidence would be sufficient to link him to the gun and the shooting of Mary Murray. So Nesbitt and Fitzsimmons decided to postpone Murphy’s release for several hours until certain other factors were established, such as: would the three bullets taken from Mary Murray match the rifling on the Llama pistol and, if so, would Murphy’s clothing provide a positive test?
Even if all these factors came together, Nesbitt knew it might not be enough to sustain a strong case. What he needed most was to link Murphy to the pistol in a way that strengthened the evidence against him. There was little prospect of bringing a conspiracy case and no chance of getting Bates, Mr D. or Mr E. to admit guilt. The prospect of releasing Murphy intrigued Nesbitt because he believed Murphy was likely to return to Lowood to retrieve the weapon from its hiding place.
The Shankill Butchers Page 16
