Randal: Good point. So now that we’ve got some definitions down, where do you want to begin?
WHAT ABOUT AN EVIL GOD?
Justin: Now, Randal, we seem to be in agreement that this traditional view of theism is the view that gets the most attention. Obviously, there are various other views ranging from polytheism (“There are many gods”) to pantheism (“The totality of existence is identical to God”). To be sure, I think there are good reasons to take seriously the traditional view of theism over these other views of theism. That said, are there any reasons, besides historical contingency, for this focus on considering the traditional view of God over, say, a God that is identical in every way but, instead of being perfectly good and loving, is perfectly evil?5
Randal: No offense, but I find the question confused, not unlike the “What caused God?” query. As Anselm famously observed, God is by definition that being than which none greater can be conceived. In other words, God is the greatest or most perfect being one can imagine. Needless to say, any concept of maximal greatness or absolute perfection includes moral perfection. This is absolutely essential to the idea of God in classical theism. Since we’ve agreed to work within the limits of that idea, the question “Why not think of God as perfectly evil?” really cashes out to “Why not think that a devilish maximally evil being—a being with the greatest amount of evil imaginable—exists instead of God?”
If one of us believed a maximally evil being exists, it would make sense to debate the reasons to believe such a being exists. Since neither of us believes in a maximally evil being, I think we can set that fanciful entity aside and get on with the discussion of God. Is that fair?
Justin: You’re certainly right that the traditional definition of God involves moral perfection. But I want to get prior to that. If the quibble here is just on the use of the word God, then that's fair. I guess I don't see a problem with entertaining non-Western views of God. It's true that neither of us believes in such an evil being, but that seems irrelevant to my question. My question is why we should take that traditional view more seriously than a view that suggests a maximally evil being.
Randal: I think you’re missing the point that the topic of a debate is determined by the views the participants think are plausible options for belief.
Look, let's turn the tables and imagine that the focus of our debate is naturalism rather than theism. In that case, we’re going to start with a mainstream definition of naturalism to which you’re committed and go from there. You’ll then present arguments that favor your thesis and I’ll present arguments against it. At the same time, that requires us to set aside literally dozens of competing definitions of naturalism. But that's the way it is: if we don't do that, we’ll never get started.
I'm not interested in defending pantheism, polytheism, henotheism, Manichaean dualism, process theism, or maximally evil beings. I take it you aren't either. So we can set all those concepts aside and get to the topic we both think is a worthwhile debate, namely classical theism vs. atheism.
Justin: It would definitely be crazy to expect us to address such a broad swath of ideas about the divine. We are but mere mortals!
Randal: True. Although people are often awestruck by my presence, I am indeed a mortal.
Justin: However, there are reasons we might want to examine the maximally evil being vs. God question. For example, nearly every argument that might be used to support the God hypothesis seems to provide equal support for the maximally evil being hypothesis!
Randal: Hold on a minute! I need to challenge your claim that “nearly every argument” supports the existence of a maximally evil being as readily as God. For example, arguments from moral value, moral accountability, moral obligation, and aesthetics clearly don't support the existence of a maximally evil entity.
Justin: While arguments for a traditional God using moral value, accountability, obligation, and aesthetics wouldn't strictly support a maximally evil being, a mirrored version of each seems perfectly capable. I suppose an example might help. An aesthetics argument that focuses on the amount of beauty in the world might support traditional theism to some degree or other, but an argument from the amount of ugliness in the world could support the maximally evil being hypothesis. See what I mean?
Randal: I understand what you’re thinking, but I don't agree that you can create a “mirrored version.” If you’re going to defend that claim you first need to provide an ontology that is, an account of the nature, of ugliness. On one mainstream view, ugliness is not a thing that needs to be explained. Let me give an analogy: the existence of light needs a source or explanation, but darkness doesn't need a source (or explanation) because it is merely the absence of light. Similarly, if ugliness is understood to be merely the absence of beauty, then the existence of ugliness doesn't need an explanation parallel to the existence of beauty.
Justin: But that's my point!
Randal: Huh?
Justin: These are the kinds of Western theological assumptions we should at least be wary of. The idea that ugliness is merely the absence of beauty or goodness is a cultural assumption. It's no more plausible than its mirrored version that states that beauty is just the absence of ugliness!
Randal: I don't think we’re tracking with each other here. I'm saying that you can't create a mirrored version because, on the definition I provided, aesthetic value is an existent thing that requires an explanation, but the lack of aesthetic value (in other words, ugliness) would not be an existent thing that requires an explanation. So your attempt at a mirrored argument supporting a maximally evil being doesn't work if one accepts this mainstream account of aesthetic disvalue (or ugliness).
Justin: Right, I'm just noting that there seems to be no essential reason to prefer this view over its opposite. The arguments certainly don't favor one over the other.
Randal: Well, I don't think we’re in a position to make that judgment yet since we haven't begun to weigh the respective arguments for various theories of the nature of beauty and ugliness.
Regardless, at most all I see you doing here is pointing out the fact of underdetermination. (The term underdetermination refers to cases where the available evidence is not sufficient to justify a particular conclusion. For example, the fact that the driveway is wet underdetermines the conclusion that it is raining because the driveway could be wet due to other causes, like a sprinkler, for example.)
Christians are well familiar with this fact of underdetermination. After all, most arguments for God underdetermine the truth of specifically Christian theism (and thus, they could also be used by Muslims, Jews, and deists). So it isn't surprising that some of those arguments might also underdetermine the truth of classical theism in such a way that they are consistent with your maximally evil being. That's no problem for the theist, but it is a problem for atheism, and that's what you need to worry about.
By the way, the same point would apply if you were defending naturalism. In that scenario, much as I present an argument consistent with several versions of theism, so you could present an argument that would be consistent with several distinct versions of naturalism. But given that I reject all versions of naturalism, what I should be concerned about is the extent to which that argument contradicts theism.
Justin: That's true. Notice though, that the move from one form of naturalism to another is a relatively minor move, while the move from classical theism to the view that a maximally evil being exists is an impressive metaphysical chasm.
Randal: I disagree. Metaphysical chasms divide naturalistic theories as well. For example, one view of naturalism says all that exists are material atoms in a void. Another view of naturalism, on the other hand, says that reality also includes conscious minds and even an eternal, immaterial, Platonic good. Yet another view says that naturalism makes no claims about what exists at all but instead only addresses what can be known or what kind of knowledge is preferred (i.e., scientific or empirical). There are some formidable gaps separating all those vie
ws.
Justin: Granted. I just think it's interesting that classical theism gets all the attention, while the claim that a maximally evil being exists gets practically none at all, especially since they seem to enjoy the same support and neither is more complex than the other. This difference in air-time strikes me as more cultural than logical.
Randal: I don't think they have the same support. For one thing, I’ve already given you several examples of arguments for God's existence that would not constitute evidence for the existence of your maximally evil being. If you are really serious about defending the existence of this supremely malevolent creature, you should be writing another book since, last I checked, this book is devoted to debating theism.
The bottom line is that evil-being theories get no attention because nobody holds that a maximally evil being exists (unless, of course, somebody believes in the devil and believes the devil is that maximally evil being). It's really that simple. Once again, if you want people to take evil-being theories seriously, you need to present arguments for the view and win people over to it.
Justin: Perhaps you’re not as bothered by this as I am. For you, being a theist, it makes sense that an Evil God is not something you have much reason to think about. But for myself it's not that easy. I'd like some reason other than culture and history to take classical theism more seriously than a maximally evil being.
Randal: And you can apply that same point to naturalism. If you’re a naturalist, there are countless versions of naturalism you never consider seriously. And the limitation of culture and tradition is a big factor in which views you consider possible options. The fact is that whatever your views about the nature of the world, there is an infinite number of competing theories that you ignore without a second thought. That's true of everybody, not just the theist.
And let me add one more thing: from a Christian perspective, the fact that we naturally form beliefs in a good God rather than a malevolent being is not merely a matter of culture and tradition. Rather, we naturally form beliefs about God because we believe we are designed to function in this way. In other words, belief in God is natural, it's hardwired, while belief in a maximally evil being is not. So if a person is a theist they expect that belief in God would naturally arise and so be more common than belief in a maximally evil being.
Justin: I understand.
Though, it's worth noting that, while beliefs consistent with traditional monotheism are natural in the sense that they are very intuitive and easily acquired, those same beliefs are more consistent with animism and polytheism.
Randal: Yeah, that's true. But the critical question is whether careful reflection on these naturally forming beliefs in a god of some sort is best explained by the deity as described in classical theism. I believe it is.
Anyway, how about we move on, with my promise that I will discuss some moral arguments that explicitly support the existence of God rather than some evil being?
Justin: That's fair. Don't let me forget to bring it up!
Randal: You have my word.
But it looks like you still have something else you want to say. Speak up man! There are no secrets here!
A DEBATE ABOUT MERE (CLASSICAL) THEISM
Justin: Right, well, at this point, I think it's very important that we make it clear that theism as we’ve defined it says nothing about an afterlife, be it pleasant or dismal. It also says nothing about any grand salvation narrative and it doesn't suggest any metaphysical law that states that the spilling of blood has redemptive powers. These are certainly popular beliefs in the Western world, but they are better seen as cultural additions. One can be a theist in the sense we’re using here without being a Christian or an adherent to any of the other major Abrahamic Faiths.
Randal: That's a really important point. All those additional topics you mention certainly are worth discussing (though I wouldn't simply describe them merely as cultural additions). Bottom line: those doctrinal claims are not a part of this discussion. We’re debating the existence of God here. We can set specific theological particulars aside for another day.
And, by the way, perhaps I can add that this point works for atheism, too. These days folks often lump the rejection of God in with a rejection of all sorts of other things: ghosts, crystals, ESP, mediums, dowsing rods, near-death experiences, and who knows what else. But our concern here is simply with God, not every belief you might encounter at some esoteric occult convention.
Justin: I think that's a good point. It's important to keep the concepts relatively bare on both sides. There are certainly atheists and theists on all sides of other metaphysical questions, but we shouldn't unfairly burden everybody in a group with these assumptions.
Randal: Exactly. We should always be careful about the baggage of added assumptions. For example, I'm Canadian, but don't assume that means that I like hockey (I don't) or that I'm polite (I'm not, especially in heavy traffic).
As for the popular association between atheists and the rejection of crystals, ghosts, and dowsing rods, the idea, presumably, is that the same skepticism that leads a person to reject God will lead them to reject all these other things. And that's fair enough; I get that. But we should keep in mind that one can be an atheist and still believe in things like dowsing rods and an afterlife. Granted, that might be surprising, much like a rude Canadian who doesn't care for hockey. But it isn't impossible.
So, as we proceed, let's just focus on that biggest of questions: God. We can set aside our heated debate on dowsing rods for another day.
Justin: We agree. One of my favorite philosophers, J. L. Schellenberg, writes, “Our job as philosophers, faced with the question of God's existence, is to fight free from the distractions of local and historical contingency, to let the voice of authority grow dim in our ears, and to think for ourselves about what a God and a God-created world would be like.”6
Randal: Hmm, without wanting to nitpick here, I find myself saying yes and no.
Okay, I admit it: I do want to nitpick.
Justin: Pick away, Randal.
Randal: On the one hand, I say yes, where possible we should look into matters for ourselves. This reminds me of the spirit of the European Renaissance, which was captured with the famous Latin phrase ad fontes, meaning “back to the sources.” In other words, don't just give in to tradition. Don't just accept something because everyone else does. Take a look and discover for yourself.
That sentiment also gained pivotal significance in the Enlightenment. Immanuel Kant made the point in his famous 1784 essay, “What Is Enlightenment?” where he challenges the reader to use their own reason.
That spirit of individual inquiry applies to the study of the natural world, of course, and there we find the seeds being sown for modern science. And it's also what drives people to think about theological and philosophical questions without falling back on tradition.
Justin: I can agree here.
Randal: And yet, I also want to add a no, or at least a serious qualification to the yes. I fear that Schellenberg is a bit too hard on those voices of authority. My point here is that sometimes we can be naive and cavalier as we reject the long-established wisdom that has gone before us in favor of what just seems to us to be right.
It seems to me that it's all about balance. We should be willing to question and look for ourselves, but we should also be willing to consider carefully the well-established positions that come before us, for there is a lot of wisdom in the past. And to borrow a phrase from Isaac Newton, if we can see far it is only because we stand on the shoulders of giants.
Justin: That's true. Though, I think Schellenberg is not suggesting we outright dismiss prior conclusions, which themselves have been culturally reinforced over time. Rather, I read him as expressing the importance of being mindful of how cultural assumptions can sometimes inject bias into our investigations, possibly even preventing us from asking more fundamental questions. I think we can agree that that is something to avoid.
Randal:
I hear you! I'm reminded of the story of one particular Crayola crayon. Up until 1962, that crayon was labeled flesh color.
Justin: Oh, boy. That's awkward.
Randal: Heh, yeah. Then pressure from the civil rights movement led Crayola to relabel that color peach.
Looking back, it's hard to believe how people could have failed to see how offensive and patently ridiculous it would be to label one color of crayon as the flesh color. But it just didn't seem that obvious in the 1950s. That's a valuable lesson for us all as we ask to what degree does our cultural background and limited experience shape the way we see the world? And where do we need to critique those assumptions?
Justin: Absolutely. These are all essential questions for those interested in examining their own beliefs.
SHOULD YOU HOPE THAT GOD EXISTS?
Justin: Well, it seems we’ve now defined how the words theism and atheism are being used in this book, but we haven't yet addressed specifically why the question of God's existence is one of significant weight. Why should we bother?
It seems to me that if, for the sake of the argument, we assume that God exists and has created finite creatures7 (like those whose eyeballs are following this line of text), then there exist benefits potentially available to us that would not be available if God did not exist. Here I refer to the increased access to moral goods, particular kinds of profoundly spiritual and life-changing experiences, and the occasional divine helping hand. There are perhaps other benefits as well.
Randal: I agree that God's existence would make a difference in terms of providing goods for creatures that would not otherwise be available. But God's existence would not only produce goods relative to the well-being of creatures. It would be a good in itself. Indeed, by definition, God's existence would be the very greatest good possible. After all, God is defined as a maximally good being.
An Atheist and a Christian Walk into a Bar Page 3
