Randal: That's an interesting claim. Of course, this cuts both ways, so one should likewise withhold belief in God's nonexistence until considering all the evidence. From that, it follows that atheism could not be a rational default position.
Justin: I would agree.
Randal: Glad to hear it because many atheists today argue that atheism is the default position.
But setting that aside, let me raise two related objections to your claim or at least to how one might cash it out.
First, it seems to me that the Principle of Total Evidence, such as you’ve defined it here, is demonstrably false.
Justin: Now, wait just a minute!
Randal: I know, that seems harsh, but hear me out. Let's say that I get a call from my friend in London. “What's the weather like right now?” I ask. And he replies, “It's raining.”
Simple, right? Common sense would say that his testimony provides an adequate basis to believe reasonably that it is now raining in London.
Justin: Okay.
Randal: But not according to your Principle of Total Evidence.
Justin: Hmm. I'm not sure I follow you.
Randal: After all, there is much more available evidence to consider, including the testimony of all the other people presently in London, satellite data, inferential environmental cues (e.g., the present dampness of the ground in London), and so on. There are all sorts of additional evidences I could consider.
Despite this fact, it is also clear that I can reasonably believe it is raining based on my friend's testimony, without surveying all this other data. In fact, it would be unreasonable to withhold belief until I had surveyed all the evidence. And so, the Principle of Total Evidence, as defined, is false.
Justin: Okay, I think I see what has happened here. I’ll respond in a second, but maybe you should tell me your second objection before I do so.
Randal: Right, so back to it. Second, let's turn to your belief in the Principle of Total Evidence itself. Have you comprehensively surveyed all the data relevant to the truth or falsity of that principle, including a thorough engagement with the expansive field of philosophical epistemology that would be relevant to the evaluation of the principle? If you haven't, then your acceptance of the principle violates the principle.
Having said all that, I agree that there is a commonsense principle nearby. For example, when my graduate students write thesis defense papers, I always remind them to be sure to engage the arguments against their thesis. A one-sided case is no case at all. But while I agree with that point, it isn't the same thing as your Principle of Total Evidence.
Justin: Okay, I think I’ve been misunderstood, and it's probably my own fault. I certainly don't mean to suggest that we must consider all possible information that anybody, anywhere, and at any time might have had on the topic before reaching some tentative conclusion. That bar would be way too high for anybody to reach.
So, when I say that people must consider all the available evidence, I mean to suggest that they should consider all the evidence that they, themselves, are aware of—the evidence available to them.
And, yes, ideally, they will seek out additional evidence to consider regardless of whether it confirms their conclusion.
Randal: Okay, that's more plausible (or at least it's less implausible). However, in order for that principle to work you'd still need to define what it means to have evidence available to oneself. After all, every person who is connected to the Internet has access to a staggering degree of information. Must we consult all that information available to us before forming a belief? Am I obliged to corroborate my friend's testimony to London's weather with a comprehensive survey of weather websites? Can't I just take him at his word?
Justin: That's a good point and an interesting question that everybody needs to answer. As modern, privileged persons with access to the Internet, what exactly are our epistemic responsibilities in this regard? I don't know that there is an easy answer here. Obviously I don't think we are obligated to stay on top of all the latest research that remotely touches any aspect of our current beliefs. That would be a crazy time-sucker. Yes, it's good to stay informed, but our time is limited, and there are other important things to do and experience in life!
Randal: “Crazy time-sucker”—I like that!
Justin: Glad I could help. Now, with regard to the Principle of Total Evidence, I think we should at least consider all of those relevant facts whose justificatory reasons we are substantively familiar with.
Randal: Well, if you say so. But this is still vague: I'm not clear on what you would consider to be substantive familiarity, so it seems that the question of application remains muddled. I also worry that the principle doesn't require novel investigation. It only requires reflection on knowledge one already possesses. And this suggests the less thoughtful, aware, and experienced one is, the less one has an obligation to change.
Justin: I’ve construed the principle to be about what one should believe about a claim given the evidence they have. Obviously novel investigations are also valuable and one should put a good faith effort toward learning as much as one can (and updating their beliefs accordingly), but that is, I think, a separate issue.
Randal: Perhaps I should get down to brass tacks: if I can reasonably believe it is raining in London simply based on the testimony of a trusted source, as I clearly can, then why can't I reasonably believe God exists based on the testimony of a trusted source?
Justin: Hmm. Allow me answer that in a couple different ways.
Randal: Very well, you are allowed.
Justin: If I'm being asked whether or not testimony is sufficient for theistic belief then, obviously, my answer is that it will depend on the person. Not everybody will have access to the same information, and, as a result, some may rationally disagree about where the total available evidence points even after taking on board the additional evidence of testimony. For example, for the person who identifies as an agnostic, testimony about God's existence may be sufficient to finally tip the scales toward theistic belief.
Randal: At which point the angels in heaven will rejoice!
Justin: Hold off on sounding the heavenly trumpets. After all, what about an extremely confident atheist, who is only aware of the arguments against God? For that person, learning this new evidence about testimony will, at best, raise his view of the probability of God only slightly. Clearly then, he would still be a long way from rationally believing that God exists, given the total evidence available to him.
Another interpretation is that you are asking if testimony can, in principle, constitute some evidence in support of the conclusion that God exists. If that is your question, then my answer is yes.
Randal: If I hear you right, you agree with me that a person can gain a rational belief that God exists through testimony, just like a person can gain a rational belief that it is raining in London through testimony.
Justin: Yeah, so it all depends on the circumstances. If somebody is not terribly confident in their atheism, then, yes, even relatively weak evidence could bring them to theistic belief.
Randal: Okay, great! Now we’re getting somewhere!
So just to be clear, you agree that rational belief in God can come about through testimony?
Justin: You’ve compared the value of testimony for the question of God's existence and the value of testimony for the question of whether it is raining in London.
In the case of hearing from a trusted friend over the phone that it is currently raining in London, I agree that it seems perfectly fine to take that claim at face value if that's the only information you’ve got. After all, it's not a particularly extraordinary claim. Mundane claims like that only rarely require more information.
But, what if we were to add to the story and say that you also are in London but the sky is clear? Well, it would seem then that your observations of a beautiful, cloudless London sky during that phone call must also be counted among the relevant evidence and factored into
your conclusion.
If I were in that situation, I'd be, to say the least, highly skeptical. I’ve experienced rain before, so I know what it feels, smells, and looks like. I also know the conditions under which it usually occurs. Because of that background evidence, I'm likely to think my friend is under some misapprehension when they give their weather report. Of course, there is always the possibility that we’ll soon be having a laugh upon realizing we are in entirely different cities named London!
Randal: Oh, you meant London, England?! And here I was thinking London, Ontario!
Justin: But, I agree with you that, in most cases, these rather ordinary claims are reasonable to believe without any powerful contrary evidence.
Randal: Of course, I agree that our acceptance of testimony is provisional. It is always possible that new evidence can arise that could be sufficient to undermine it. But, if I understand you correctly, that means that you do concede that a person can in principle rationally accept belief in God based on the testimony of others just so long as they are not aware of any strong evidence to the contrary. In that sense, testimonial belief in God is very much like any other belief gleaned from testimony.
So then the question is this: are there any people who do believe in God in this manner? And I suspect there are many.
FAITH IN THE EXTRAORDINARY
Justin: Well, let's not get ahead of ourselves here. Of course I agree that it is possible in principle for somebody to move rationally toward a theistic position by taking on board evidence that supports theism, just as I agree that it is possible for anybody to move to some position by way of additional evidence so long as the observation actually counts toward the claim.
But, for anybody who doesn't already believe in God, the claim “God exists” is likely be an extraordinary claim. Mere testimony, if it is to count as evidence at all, is unlikely to be anything other than very weak evidence. That said, if I'm wrong and there is a good argument from religious testimony, I'd be interested in hearing it.
Randal: You say that the claim that God exists will seem extraordinary to those who don't accept it. But that unqualified statement is just not true. Whether it seems extraordinary will surely depend on the person. Certainly, some people who are nontheists will find that claim extraordinary. However, others will find it plausible, even if they are not compelled by it. (To borrow William James's famous phrase, they will count it a live option for belief.) Nontheists of that sort, who are open to God's existence and who hear persuasive testimony to God's existence from a trusted authority, could be rational in becoming theists based on that testimony.
Justin: That's certainly true. That's why I said that persons who don't already believe in God are likely to find it an extraordinary claim. But people who think the evidence is ambiguous or close to ambiguous would be an exception here. These persons could be moved to theism even by relatively weak evidence.
Randal: Here I go nitpicking again, but I just can't help myself. You’ve talked here about what seems likely to you. But it seems to me that you can only say what is likely here if you know the approximate ratio of those who find this belief extraordinary as opposed to those who don't.
Justin: I think that, of the total possible positions that one could have about their atheism, most will think theism extraordinary, at least in the sense that I'm using it.
Randal: I dunno, Justin. That seems like nothing more than a speculative opinion. I'm not sure I can accept that based on your testimony.
The fact is that we can come to believe things that are otherwise extraordinary based on testimony if we accept the authority of the testifier on that topic. For example, at first blush it is extraordinary for Mr. and Mrs. Smith to accept the claim that their oak kitchen table consists largely of vibrating packets of energy and empty space. And yet, when their son the physicist comes home for Christmas dinner and informs them that this is indeed the composition of their kitchen table, they could reasonably believe it based on the faith they have in their son and his knowledge and competency about such matters.
Needless to say, this point obviously isn't limited to the composition of oak tables. In other words, you can't preclude the possibility that some people could have an equivalent status as witnesses such that their testimony could be sufficient to overcome the prima facie incredulity that an atheist might otherwise have to the claim that God exists.
Justin: Well, allow me to interject here to make what I think is an important point.
Randal: What if I say no?
Justin: The Sherpa commands it.
Randal: So first you scold me for overdoing the Sherpa bit and now you’re going to play the Sherpa card? That's merciless.
Justin: Now, I want to be clear in that I agree that Mr. and Mrs. Smith are rational to accept their son's testimony, even though it initially seemed extraordinary to them given the commonsense background knowledge they had to work with.
One of the reasons they would be rational to accept their son's testimony about what would otherwise seem to be an extraordinary claim, is that they have a background or preexisting trust in the reliability of an institution of learning from which their son has acquired a degree, its vetting capabilities, and the broader body of scientific knowledge that is serving as its source.
To see my point, imagine that Mr. and Mrs. Smith were atheists and their son comes home from seminary to visit with the family. Over dinner, he starts telling them about the Holy Trinity. In this scenario, they are unlikely to be moved because they place no trust in the claims, methodologies, or traditions of the seminary their son is attending.
Both stories have the parents hearing an extraordinary claim from their son. And yet their reactions differ because of the origin of that claim.
Randal: Great, so then if Mr. and Mrs. Smith are Christians who have a preexisting trust in the reliability of the institution of the church, you’re okay with them accepting their seminarian son's testimony to the Trinity?
Justin: Yes. If Mr. and Mrs. Smith are already Christians, I suppose I'm fine with them being Trinitarian Christians, so long as they can defend the coherence of the doctrine.
Randal: Hey, we’re definitely making some good progress here. However, I will say your added requirement that they must be able to defend the coherence of the Trinity seems rather unfair since they presumably don't need to defend the coherence of quantum physics to accept their son's testimony in the science scenario.
That point aside, you’ve agreed that people can come to have rational beliefs about God through testimony, potentially including rich doctrines like the Trinity. Having gotten that far, let me up the ante here a bit. If we accept the standard philosophical definition of knowledge as “justified true belief,” then it follows that, if God does indeed exist, the person who accepts that belief based on the trusted testimony of another person could also know that God exists based on that testimony. Right?
Justin: With most claims, even those that seem profoundly implausible given our current beliefs about the world, it's quite easy to imagine epistemic situations in which the relevant evidence available to some other individual was such that it would be rational for her to accept them as true.
Randal: As in…?
Justin: Imagine a child perceives, as most do, their parents as testimonial authorities. In such a context, testimony from her parents about a magical Santa Claus could be rationally met with her assenting to belief in the gift-bearing man in a red suit capable of freezing time on Christmas Eve.
Randal: Ahh, a common misunderstanding. You see, Santa doesn't actually freeze time. He just moves really fast, kind of like the Flash. Other than that, I'm tracking with you. Can you give another illustration?
Justin: Imagine a curious child who has surveyed arguments for and against garden fairies and has, as a result of his investigation, concluded that the total evidence of which he is aware fails to discriminate between fairyism and afairyism. He might then call himself an agnostic about fairies. In this context
, too, even relatively weak additional evidence could kindly escort a middle-of-the-epistemic-road agnostic to a fairyist position once taken aboard.
Randal: Okay, I have to ask. Are you aware of any fairy arguments that might tip the balance?
Justin: Don't worry, I'm not aware of any such arguments. I'm simply drawing out a hypothetical comparison. Admittedly, it's a bit fantastical.
Randal: For you maybe, but not for the five-year-old devotee of Tinker Bell!
Justin: Haha, true enough. The fact is that, given that most unbelievers (about God) do know about the variety and conflicting nature of testimony regarding supernatural entities in general and God in particular, most have good reason to not grant mere testimony very much weight—if any at all. For not only is massive theological testimonial disagreement—disagreement among believers about theological concepts—and their associated testimony wildly surprising on theism, it also gives us reason at least to look closer at the source and motivation behind the testimony rather than just factor it in unquestioningly. Perhaps the one giving the testimony is just repeating the words of a rather credulous individual.
Being on the tail end of a game of testimony telephone is rarely a safe place to be.
Randal: I agree that many unbelievers will be aware of evidence that they believe is sufficient to undermine testimony for God's existence. For example, Jim the atheist returns home for Thanksgiving. As the family sits down for their turkey, his grandmother says, “Jim, I know that my redeemer liveth. He's real, Jim!” That testimony probably won't be enough to overcome Jim's disbelief.
Justin: Right. Unfortunately, the fact that an atheist is unlikely to be moved by bold assertions of God's existence from close family members hardly ever renders such familial assertions less frequent. This holds especially true during holidays!
Randal: But, even so, my point is that there is nothing wrong in principle with Jim encountering testimonial evidence of sufficient strength to overwhelm his objections. Imagine, for example, that Jim's father, a world-famous atheist philosopher, follows up grandmother's testimony like this: “Jim, I agree with your grandmother. I just had an extraordinary experience with the living God that has transformed my perspective. I'm not an atheist anymore!” His father then goes on to relay an amazing personal experience that changed him from being an atheist to being a theist.
An Atheist and a Christian Walk into a Bar Page 6
