Justin: Maybe that's where we disagree. Obviously, I do agree with you that a parent and child are capable of a mutual and meaningful relationship when there is mutual awareness (even a nonverbal one), but this capability is not there at all stages of fetal development.
Randal: If that were true then a mother's relationship to her anencephalic infant would literally be existentially meaningless. That's outrageous.
But at least you grant that a parent and child can have a meaningful nonverbal relationship. That was exactly my point. A fetus/infant is in a meaningful nonverbal or noncognitive relationship with her mother. In the same way, human beings could be in a meaningful nonverbal or noncognitive relationship with God. Indeed, if we understand the God/human relationship to be an analogue for parent/child relationships, then this is to be expected. (And in Christian theism it certainly is.) And in that case, (noncognitive) relationship with God may be far more widespread and common than your objection realizes, with its narrow focus on relationship mediated by correct doctrinal propositions.
Justin: Well, I think there is a morally relevant distinction between the relationship that might exist between a parent and their nonverbal toddler and a “relationship” that might exist between a parent and a preconscious fetus. I recognize that, while a parent may love their preconscious fetus, the relationship between them and the fetus is not a significant one until that fetus acquires the ability to be aware that it is actually in a relationship. Otherwise, as I said, the relationship is of no more value than a relationship with any other object that is not or is not yet a conscious participant.
Randal: To have awareness that one is in a relationship with another requires an awareness of the other, an awareness of oneself, and an awareness of the relatively abstract concept of relationship. If you demand all that, then you will be forced to deny the meaningfulness of relationships with infants, the severely mentally handicapped, and those with advanced dementia and other cognitive deficiencies. (As a dog lover, I also shudder to think what this means for our relationships with Rover, Spot, and Rex.)
Had we more time, I'd love to camp on this debate because I find it fascinating. But I think we need to keep focused on the main issue. An infant lacks propositional knowledge of her mother. Despite that fact, she can still be in a profound relationship with her mother. Don't you agree?
Justin: Well, yes. I think the value of the relationship is sensitive to the cognitive abilities of the persons involved. I think that relationships that are not mutually involved lack substantive value. That may not require propositional knowledge per se, but, in my view, it must involve some form of conscious awareness and appreciation of the other. However, our love for these persons or pets need not falter even if the substance of the relationship does.
Let's assume for a moment that the God of Christianity exists. A Muslim may be believing in a God, but their belief is without the proper theological understanding of how to relate to God. This limits the potential of relationship simply because of the theological confusion on the ground. Being maximally good, there seems to be no reason why God would not ensure that all capable persons open to a relationship with God would not also be in possession of the essentials for deep, meaningful, and conscious relationship with God. Just as there is no reason for the parent to allow confusion to persist among her children about how best to live, love, or relate to them, the same can be said of a divine parent.
Randal: It seems to me that you’re begging the question here by simply assuming that a particular set of propositions about an individual must be believed for one to be in a meaningful relationship with that individual. But the theist need not be bound by that assumption at all. And I’ve already provided good reasons, sourced in my Christian tradition, why one might question it.
Justin: I’ve got two things to say here. First, the question in this book is not whether certain historical attachments to theism are in trouble in the face of this argument. The question is what we would expect from basic theism relative to an atheistic hypothesis.
Secondly, the fundamental point here is that a loving God doesn't intentionally keep her loved ones in the dark as to important facts about how best to have a conscious and meaningful relationship with them. This will involve the correction of (or a preventing the acquisition of) false beliefs about God among us finite beings, especially as they can foster resentment among tribes with competing theologies.
If we cannot expect at least this of a divine parent, then perhaps the parent in question doesn't deserve the label in the first place.
Randal: Right, let me address those two points then. First, while you’re right to note that we are debating a minimal theism, one can defend minimal theism against objections by appealing to particular claims from within a specific theistic tradition. If I can show that theism is consistent with God being in meaningful relationship with folks despite doctrinal disagreement and even in the absence of any propositional knowledge, then that's relevant information to consider in response to the alleged problem of massive theological disagreement.
On the second point, I think you are way too quick to render a judgment. There are all sorts of reasons one might keep a loved one “in the dark.” For example, Marcie allows her husband, Joe, to think she's forgotten his birthday precisely because she has an elaborate surprise party planned for later.
Likewise, there are many reasons God may have for allowing current doctrinal disagreements, and I’ve already outlined some of them. So I just don't see that there is a problem here that need trouble any theist.
Justin: Right, you’ve previously suggested that one parent might keep their children in the dark as to relationship-relevant facts. This, you’ve argued, might be a way to address some underlying tensions that already existed between the children.
Randal: Yes, that was one possibility.
COULD GOD GIVE INCOMPATIBLE REVELATIONS?
Justin: Right, so I have a worry here. Allow me to explain what that worry is.
In the various religious traditions in the world, the adherents, or at least the sources from which they draw the content of their beliefs, are said to be divinely inspired. In some sense, they believe that God, through some divine method or other, has revealed to them these spiritual truths. That is to say, there is thread attaching their beliefs to their source—God herself. They all believe this to be the case in some fashion.
Am I right to assume you do not think that God has given incompatible revelations to various people groups?
Randal: No, you would not be right to assume that.
Justin: Ah, well, that's a surprise!
Randal: It shouldn't be.
Justin: Could you go into that a bit more?
Randal: Sure, all one needs to do is keep in mind how any good teacher adjusts their instruction differently for different audiences.
Imagine a science teacher educating a range of students from preschoolers to postgraduate students across a dizzying range of diverse cultures. Do you think that teacher might communicate propositions about nature to a preschooler in one culture that are incompatible with the teaching she provides to a postgraduate student in another culture? Of course, this is exactly what you'd expect because every teacher accommodates and contextualizes to their audience.
Likewise, you can expect that God would accommodate and contextualize to various diverse audiences.
Justin: I certainly agree that teachers need to be sensitive to and customize curriculum to the capabilities or culture receiving the information. For example, the teaching metaphors used for a first grade geology class will be very different from those used in classes where students are pursuing a Masters in geology. But I think that is quite different from giving incompatible information. It's not as though the ancients of one religion would be intellectually inferior to the ancients of another (like a child compared to an adult) such that they would require fundamentally different revelations from God.
Randal: Sorry, but I don't think that is
correct. Back in first grade, my English teacher taught me “i before e, except after c.” Only later did I learn that there's more to that rhyme: “or when sounding like a, as in neighbor or weigh.” And any good grammarian knows that even further exceptions apply. These different statements constitute incompatible information. This is one relatively trite example of the movement from technically incorrect accommodation to a more correct understanding, and this kind of movement is common in education. So why couldn't God do something like this in his self-revelation?
Justin: So, Randal, I don't think that any of the ancient cultures who claim to have experienced these revelations were more cognitively advanced than any other. I don't think you do either. Because of that, I don't think that these differences can be explained by way of a comparison between the kinds of oversimplifications we do when teaching children and the more thorough and nuanced teaching we might provide for an adult college student.
Randal: In fact, I think you’re wrong here. Different cultures provide access to different concepts and as a result different understandings of God, each with its requisite strengths and weaknesses. So, for example, the Hebrew understanding of God in the Bible is very different from the Greek understanding and from that of the contemporary analytic philosopher. Each culture has provided access to a different range of concepts, and in each case God has accommodated to that culture as any good teacher would.
Justin: I understand that the world as we know it has varied understandings of God. The question I'm after is why these concepts were allowed to persist in the first place rather than being corrected.
In any case, you can probably tell that my point in bringing this up is that, in the story of the parents allowing disagreement to persist in hopes to address underlying tensions, the disagreement had to come from somewhere. If the story is to be relevant to the argument at hand, the conflicting information had to come from the parents themselves. In other words, there is misinformation being given in order to address an underlying tension. There seems to be something less than morally perfect about that kind of problem-solving strategy. I think the same problem applies to any God who tells various ancient cultures conflicting information (lying) and allows the disagreement to persist for some end.
Randal: Accommodating instruction to an audience is not “lying.” The English teacher who instructs her grade one students “i before e, except after c” as if this were an exceptionless norm does not thereby “lie” to them.
Justin: Perhaps not. That said, revealing to one ancient tribe that Jesus died and rose on the third day while revealing to another that Jesus was but a mere prophet would be lying. It seems remarkably improbable that an omnipotent being wouldn't be able to find a better way to address whatever underlying issue needs addressing without lying to and confusing his children for thousands of years.
Randal: I think the issues with pedagogy and truthful witness are far more complicated than you’re recognizing. Anyway, I don't believe God revealed to anybody that Jesus is a mere prophet, so people who come to believe that are mistaken. The bottom line here is that God acts as a master teacher who reveals aspects of himself and his will in different ways and to different degrees in accord with the myriad of distinct cultural contexts, individual capacities, and particular needs of the target audience.
Justin: We’re talking about an omnipotent and morally perfect God here. It seems to me that, if God could accomplish this task without thousands of years of deception and confusion, she would.
Randal: Once again, it isn't deception. To show that it is, you'd need to have independent knowledge that God was intending to deceive rather than contextualize information to a particular audience.
Perhaps it is time to underscore the point that one can be in a propositional relationship with another individual despite believing some incorrect propositions about that individual. For example, a husband and wife may have a profound relationship despite the fact that the husband is a government spy rather than the carpet salesman that his wife had been led to believe. One might believe the husband had morally sufficient reasons (e.g., national security, the safety of his spouse) to allow his wife to hold those false beliefs. That does not change the fact that their relationship is real and important.
Justin: Right, but notice that nothing about that scenario you’ve presented keeps substantive relationship out of the reach of the wife and husband. Theists all over have very different and incompatible views about the nature of God, how best to relate with God, how best to please God, and how best to live. The wife and husband don't have those kinds of problems.
Now, if the actual world is in fact a theistic world, most theists are just dead wrong about many of these questions simply because, statistically, they have subscribed to the wrong theology—a false theology that God, if she exists, has allowed to persist among her children for thousands of years. A loving parent would want all their children to know the basic facts about how best to enter relationship with their parent at all moments in which the child is capable of such relationship.
Theologically, I should think you'd agree with me here. It's widely held that God, if she exists, would never force a relationship on any resistant person. This is because the most meaningful relationships (like those we'd expect to exist between God and a willing finite creature) are entered into freely by willing and aware participants.
Randal: I agree that God wouldn't force a relationship. But I find it interesting that you understand the most meaningful relationships to be those that maximize personal autonomy. It seems to me that the mother/child bond I’ve described is among the most profound and meaningful of relationships. And yet, it is a relationship into which one of the parties always enters without any free assent. (No child chooses to be conceived and born.) But it is no less existentially meaningful for that fact.
Justin: Like I said, I think the most meaningful relationships are those in which both persons are aware of the other and capable of interacting intentionally with each other. I also think that, all else being equal, relationships entered into freely by both parties are better than those that exist by default.
I'm beginning to see that our respective intuitions about what a morally perfect God would or would not do with respect to theological disagreement are in radical opposition. I hope that I’ve at least shown that arguments of this sort, which appeal to facts-on-the-ground about theistic belief, can be serious arguments.
DOCTRINE AND SALVATION
Randal: At the very least, I think you’ve done that. You have shown that these arguments are serious. Though I’ve done my best to limit your success in that regard! But there is no doubt that this is a family of arguments that presents a very serious prima facie objection to theistic belief.
That said, before we move on perhaps I can say a brief word about the first of your final two concerns, namely the fact that many people, perhaps billions, have died with a lack of theological understanding. While I'm inclined to agree with you, I believe that from a Christian perspective there's even more confusion than one might initially think. But I also suspect that may not be quite as bad as it looks.
Justin: Interesting. Go on.
Randal: Consider the case of Thomas Aquinas. Widely considered the greatest of medieval theologians and author of such monumental academic treatises as Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles, one would think that if anyone knew God, it'd be Thomas. However, while attending Mass on December 6, 1273, Thomas underwent some sort of mystical experience, after which he resolved never to write another word of theology. As he explained to his assistant, Brother Reginald, “I can't go on…. Everything seems as so much straw in comparison with what I have seen and what has been revealed to me.”6
The lesson here is not that theological theories are worthless, but rather that they utterly pale in comparison with the reality they purport to describe. To consider an analogy from natural science, imagine a crude model of the solar system comprised of various foam balls hung on wires
in a grade-school classroom. A child might think they understand the solar system well because they understand that model. And the model does have value, as it offers a map, however crude and limited, of our cosmic backyard. But imagine now that the same child boards a spaceship with Neil deGrasse Tyson and takes a tour of the solar system. After she gets back to the classroom, she’ll never look at that model the same way again! Useful though it may be, when compared with the solar system it is “so much straw.”
Justin: In all honesty, Randal, there are much easier ways of revealing to me that my amazing second-grade science project won me a spaceship tour of the solar system with Neil deGrasse Tyson. I mean, really, that was needlessly elaborate.
Randal: What can I say? I do love spinning a good tale!
Here's the thing: on that December day in 1273, Thomas may have come to terms with the gap between his models and God. But along the way, he also experienced God in a new way that transcended his inadequate straw models.
I suspect that much of the massive theological disagreement that exists across various conceptions of God is borne by the inadequacy of our models. But, like Thomas, the path is open to every person to experience God in a way that transcends their theology. The massive theological disagreement that drives your argument is not the final word.
Justin: Well, that's an interesting story. I just worry that it doesn't interact much with the main thrust of my argument. We’ve gone back and forth discussing how likely or unlikely the massive range of theological disagreement among those who self-identify as theists is on our competing hypotheses of theism and atheism. I still think that it's just obvious that the fact of massive theological disagreement provides significant support to the hypothesis that there is no loving God to keep her children from widespread confusion of the sort relevant to deep, meaningful two-way relationships.
An Atheist and a Christian Walk into a Bar Page 10
