“Special Agent Booth,” he said, “I am under no illusion but that BA 2888 was most likely in the hands of numerous Washington, DC-based reporters by April 5.”
This comment would later lead me to conclude that whoever leaked the document did so before the weekend of the April 5–6, less than sixteen working hours after BA 2888 was received in Washington. I asked Walker what the possible motive might be for leaking the cable, and he said two possibilities came to mind: to harm President Reagan’s foreign policy objectives or to embarrass CODEL members—or maybe both.
Special Assistant Kagan told me that Kritzberg had called him on April 9 and quoted to him from the last paragraph of BA 2888, asking Kagan if he wanted to comment on the substance of the cable. Kagan acknowledged that he had previous professional discussions with Kritzberg and would have welcomed an opportunity to put a positive spin on any forthcoming story involving his region of responsibility. But he said that he declined to discuss BA 2888 with the reporter. Kritzberg told Kagan that he obtained the document from a department source. Kagan suggested it was quite possible that the same person leaked the cable to all three media sources. I was not the least bit surprised by his comment since multitasking abilities were not unheard of in department circles.
James Michel, a young department South American specialist with whom I spoke, was unaware of the leak until an official meeting on April 10 and had not received any telephone calls from the press asking about BA 2888. Still he provided me with insight into the cable’s political fallout when he said, “The leak would harm President Reagan’s success on the upcoming Contra Aid vote and discourage President Alfonsín from being candid in forthcoming discussions with our ambassador.”
“What about the Speaker?”
“Embarrassment, for sure.”
Imagine that—an administration official going after House Speaker Thomas Phillip “Tip” O’Neill Jr., the man who once exclaimed that President Reagan was “the most ignorant man ever to occupy the White House.”
On April 17, I was ushered into the plush offices of A/S Abrams. After I introduced myself as investigating the unauthorized disclosure of BA 2888, he told me that he was aware of the ongoing inquiry.
“I was in Haiti on April 3, 1986,” he said, “and I cannot recall with any precision when I may have read BA 2888 before returning to Washington, DC.”
By consulting his daily planner, he told me with certainty that he had spoken with Evans at 3:50 p.m. on April 7. He pointed out a handwritten note from this day where he had written the name “Evans” and what appeared to be “BA 2888.”
“During the telephone conversation, Evans read me a portion of BA 2888,” Abrams said, “and then had the audacity to ask for a copy so that he could write a column about it.”
I asked why Evans felt comfortable placing the call and making the request.
“I am a professional friend of Rowland Evans, and while we have appeared together on his weekend television program, we do not socialize. And I told him I would certainly not provide him with a copy of BA 2888.”
Abrams then added that Robert Novak contacted him on April 8 and also attempted to obtain a copy of BA 2888, with the same results. Novak told Abrams that he could really help the administration’s position in Latin America if he could have a copy of the cable. After Abrams declined, Novak asked him to think it over. Abrams reviewed his telephone log sheets and noted that William Kritzberg had attempted to call him at 2:40 p.m. on April 8, but Abrams did not return his call.
Immediately after hanging up the phone with Evans on April 7, Abrams called Nicholas Platt, special assistant to Secretary of State George Shultz, telling him to alert his boss to the possibility of a forthcoming media leak. Platt later advised Abrams he had informed the secretary, who was none too pleased with the news.
“Special Agent Booth,” Abrams said, “I am sorry that I cannot offer any further assistance, but I hope you identify the leaker.” He stood up from behind his desk and did not offer his hand or tell me to call him if I had further questions, but I suspected his remark was genuine, for whatever that was worth.
I interviewed Nicholas Platt, Deputy Executive Secretary Brunson McKinley—with whom I would serve as his RSO while he was the US ambassador in Haiti later that year—and Kenneth Quinn, another deputy executive secretary. All the officers said that while the leak was a breach of security procedures, it was not particularly damaging or sensitive in terms of national security. Then why, I asked, was it classified at the “secret” level? To a man, they claimed that ambassadors must be candid in preparing reports on congressional visits to foreign countries and that public disclosure would harm the department’s relations with the Hill and, in this case, Argentina. Nicholas Platt commented that he had contacted Rod McDaniel at the National Security Council and was told that BA 2888 was kept within the NSC offices and was not passed to the West Wing of the White House.
In theory, an investigator should interview any and all persons who had access to the leaked information. But in practice, secretaries, low-level administrators, and the like were rarely interviewed because they simply were not stakeholders in the drama. By and large, they did not have any special interest in the subject matter. I could not recall a single instance when such department employees were suspected of leaking information to the press.
There is a standard litany of thirteen questions for unauthorized disclosure investigations, including asking the employee whether he or she leaked information or who might be responsible for the disclosure. So far, all of the interviewees denied being the source of the leak, but several of them had firm beliefs as to where I should concentrate my efforts. Every person to whom I spoke was a career FSO who, as he explained, would never wish to hurt or embarrass Ambassador Ortiz or harm the department’s relations with Congress by leaking the cable. That would be unseemly conduct and professionally counterproductive. To them, it made absolutely no sense that a career colleague would be a viable suspect.
With precious few leads, I accepted their insight and went back to check the notes from my interview with Elijah Kelly in which he explained where and how the cable was initially distributed within the building. If the old Foreign Service hands’ suspicions were correct, then the leaker could be a non-career department employee. I needed to focus on an office that received BA 2888 and was staffed with younger, perhaps indiscreet, Foreign Service officers, political appointees, and civil servant employees. To me, that would be the department’s Policy Planning Staff (S/P), an office responsible for formulating diplomatic policy initiatives, which works directly for the deputy secretary of state.
I had previously interviewed S/P Director Richard H. Solomon on April 11 and now revisited my notes. According to Solomon, he had not personally reviewed BA 2888 before he was informed of the leak during an April 10 senior staff meeting. He did advise that it was standard practice in his office for sensitive cables such as BA 2888 to remain in a safe where staffers could review them at their leisure.
While Solomon’s comments were helpful, it was Lloyd Richardson, a staff assistant in S/P, who provided traction for my investigation. During our interview on April 15, he explained that his office was responsible for preparing an internal distribution cover sheet for BA 2888.
Richardson said, “Although NODIS cables weren’t intended to have wide distribution, it’s S/P practice to keep such cables in the S/P ‘read file’ maintained in a safe in room 7311.”
“What are the rules regarding your read file?”
“The read file is a folder containing classified documents and telegrams that are thought to be of interest to all S/P staffers.”
“Do readers have to sign a sheet indicating they have read documents in the read file?”
“No, we use the honor system. It allows S/P personnel to peruse the file as they wish, and though they don’t have to sign any form when they read documents or cables, no documents can be taken out of the office space.”
“Mr. Richard
son,” I asked, “just how many individuals assigned to S/P would have access to the read file that had a copy of BA 2888?”
“Fifteen,” he answered immediately.
If my only clue was correct, I had just fifteen possible suspects. That was a more manageable number. I asked Richardson if he would walk me over to room 7311 and allow me to remove S/P’s copy of BA 2888 out of view from the office workers. From the front of the safe, and with Richardson’s assistance, I removed BA 2888 with my thumb and forefinger, gently clasping a corner of the 2-page stapled document, and eased the telegram into a manila envelope.
Thanking Richardson for his assistance, I returned to my office and had SA Michael Posillico personally deliver S/P’s telegram to the FBI Laboratory, Identification Division, Latent Fingerprint Section for analysis. I then gathered up all the official and security files for the fifteen suspects. The folders, just like Kendall Myers’s SY File, contained all the personnel, security, and administrative records of the employees from the time they applied for employment with the department. I was looking for someone who might give me some insights into the personalities and inner workings of S/P. I wanted to identify a cooperative source who could point me in the right direction. Within two hours of reviewing the SY Files, it was clear who that would be.
One file contained information about a young employee whom I identified as “Confidential Source A,” or simply CSA, who had previously worked with both print and electronic media before joining the department. I believed it likely that in one way or another CSA traveled in the same after-hours social circles that included reporters such as William Kritzberg of theWashington Times. Sometimes you have to be very lucky to be successful. My gut instinct, based on the SY File contents, was that CSA was not my suspect, but CSA knew the identity of the leaker. It was now time to close this case before memories started to fade. At my request, Richard Solomon arranged for me to have a private room, close to the S/P executive offices, in which to interview CSA inconspicuously.
On April 15, at my instruction, a very young CSA was escorted by a senior S/P officer into a tiny office containing two chairs and a desk. After the pro forma introductions, only CSA and I remained in the cramped quarters.
Sitting across from CSA, I displayed my department credentials. “Good morning, I am Special Agent Robert Booth in the Special Investigations Branch, and I am currently conducting an unauthorized disclosure investigation.”
CSA displayed no emotion as he stared back at me.
“I am attempting to determine how a State Department NODIS cable, which I think is BA 2888, may have been compromised to correspondents Robert Novak and William Kritzberg in less than seventy-two hours of having been processed inside the State Department.”
Without any hesitation, CSA advised that he had a prior professional relationship with William Kritzberg when they both worked in New York City. “When I started work in Washington, DC,” he continued, “Kritzberg had transferred down to Washington, and as a professional courtesy, I wanted to help him expand his contacts in S/P.”
I could not believe what I was hearing. I might actually be onto something here. As we talked, CSA identified two of Kritzberg’s contacts in S/P, one of whom I had already interviewed and a new individual—“Mr. Penn.”
“Have you ever read or seen BA 2888?” I asked.
“I have never seen S/P’s read file copy of BA 2888.”
“I need to remind you that you must be entirely truthful during the course of an official investigation, that any false statement during the course of this interview could be used against you in either an administrative or judicial hearing.”
To bolster my admonishment, I advised CSA that I had asked for all the department telephone records for individual S/P office phones. Those telephone records, normally reserved for administrative and budgetary reasons, would give me the numbers of every single incoming and outgoing department telephone call. They had been a gold mine for me in the past, and I knew they were an incredible investigative resource. Many department employees had given me dagger eyes when I pushed these records across the interview table after they had already answered—incorrectly—one of my questions about a specific telephone number received or dialed by their office telephone.
“You need to know,” I told CSA, “I have both William Kritzberg’s private home and office telephone numbers. All I have to do is run our State telephone logs to see if those two numbers were called from a State phone or vice versa during the time frame in question.”
After a quiet pause, CSA said that he received a telephone call in his office from Kritzberg on April 7 asking him to confirm the existence of BA 2888. When CSA said that he had no idea of what BA 2888 was about, Kritzberg quoted from the cable and said that “it was a State Department source” who had provided him with the document. CSA related that he felt uncomfortable discussing BA 2888 any further with Kritzberg and ended the telephone conversation quickly but amicably.
“And that was it?” I asked. “No more calls from Kritzberg to S/P staff?” I continued to probe gently about times and telephone calls. Finally my patience was rewarded.
“I do remember that during the first week of April, I heard that Kritzberg had left a message for Mr. Penn to call back urgently,” CSA said. “I am not revealing any secrets here, but it is well known in the office that Mr. Penn is in full support of the White House’s stance in Latin America and that if Mr. Penn leaked the telegram it would have been to bolster the administration’s position and embarrass Speaker O’Neill.”
I could not believe it. Talk about good luck. If CSA’s comments and opinions were even half correct, my universe of suspects had just dropped to one!
“One final question, if I may,” I inquired. “Is there anybody else in S/P that you think may be able to assist me with this investigation?”
After about a minute CSA said, “I would be happy to introduce you to a colleague of mine who might be able to help.”
Ten minutes later “Confidential Source B” (CSB) entered the tiny, windowless office, and we started to talk across a small wooden table.
CSB confirmed that Mr. Penn would have had access to BA 2888 by April 4 and that he (CSB) had always had some concerns about Mr. Penn’s contacts with the press. On one occasion, during an after-hours social event hosted at a private residence in Washington, DC, he had witnessed Mr. Penn and an Australian journalist, Peter Samuels, engaged in deep conversation during dinner in which CSB overheard Mr. Penn say, “Well, if you read the traffic [cables] between Washington and Europe. . . .” CSB had been present at similar social functions with Mr. Penn and believed Mr. Penn was very indiscreet in his discussions with private citizens.
As a final comment, CSB said, “I believe there is an ideological affinity between Mr. Penn, Kritzberg, and the Washington Times.”
“Thank you for your insight and candor,” I said.
Mr. Penn was a GS-13, “Schedule C” official assigned to the Office of the Secretary, Policy Planning Staff (S/P) as a speechwriter since February 15, 1985. The moniker “Schedule C” comes from the US government’s personnel regulations identifying non-career personnel working for the department at the pleasure of the administration, or in more colloquial terms, a political appointee. Given his rank and title, I knew he would not have any Black Dragons protecting him. Without that shield, Mr. Penn would have to submit to a confrontational interview under my control. I had always been a firm believer in Sir William Blackstone’s overarching premise that truth can be determined through the cross-examination of witnesses. I was so proud of myself that I could not wait to inform my boss of the status of the investigation.
Later that evening, I was ushered into Director Dittmer’s office. I could barely contain my excitement. After years of investigating unauthorized disclosures, I had finally gotten to the point of requesting authority from Director Dittmer to conduct a confrontational interview.
“Director Dittmer,” I announced, “I am confident I know wh
o leaked BA 2888!”
Imagine my dismay when Director Dittmer appeared aghast. It took me a few seconds to guess why. First, he probably thought I was exaggerating (strike one). Second, if my assertion was true, the result must have been due to “unnecessarily aggressive” interviews on my part that would have to be justified up the bureaucratic Black Dragon line (strike two). Third, and worst of all, if I was right and had actually fingered a department official, like a Black Dragon, he or she would now have to be punished, and DS would have hell to pay for actually having done its job (strike three). In the world of leaks, no one is ever caught, and if caught, rarely punished.
Relief immediately spread across Director Dittmer’s face when I said, “My suspect is a Schedule ‘C’ political appointee.”
“Robert, schedule the confrontational interview as quickly as possible.”
I told him I would wait for the FBI’s fingerprint analysis results from the original S/P copy of BA 2888 before scheduling the interview. Director Dittmer readily agreed.
The FBI gave me my answer five days later—Mr. Penn’s fingerprints were all over it.
Chapter Ten
Days before my talk with Mr. Penn, I sat down with Special Agent Mark McMahan, a former Arlington County police officer who had joined DS as a SA in 1984, to discuss how best to frame and conduct the interview. Agents must consider various factors such as the age, department position and title, rank, gender, education, and employment history of the interviewee—all contained in the SY File—to determine the order and structure of the questions. I have always been of the opinion that, within the first few minutes of an interview, it is important to ask a question or two that you are confident the suspect will lie about so that, when appropriate later on, he can be confronted and have his confidence shaken. Lying to federal investigators is simply a reflexive, self-preserving act for those who leak classified information to the press. And, as Vice President Dick Cheney’s aide “Scooter” Libby discovered in 2007, lying, as opposed to leaking, is the act that most often gets an individual in trouble unless, of course, you have a presidential intervention to spare you jail time.
State Department Counterintelligence: Leaks, Spies, and Lies Page 19
