CR: “I’m not leading you toward any specific number. The reason this one is being publicized is for the reason, of which I think you are all aware, as Secretary Shultz made very clear, at the Overseas Writer’s Club the day before yesterday. He says, ‘We’ve got to find the people who are doing it,’ and in this case, we have.”
Q: “It is intended to deter others, the public announcement?”
CR: “As you’ll see in my statement, I ended by saying, let me reiterate it—I didn’t commit that to memory—the Department will continue to deal strictly with any of its employees who have made unauthorized disclosures of classified information.”
Q: “I’m talking about the public announcement; is that intended as a deterrent?”
CR: “I have nothing else for you on that.”
Q: “Listen, could I just ask a quick question? I’m not clear. When you say that he is not the first that has left the Department because of unauthorized disclosures, is he the first that has left the Department because of unauthorized disclosures while Mr. Shultz has been secretary of state?”
CR: “I don’t have that.”
Q: “Could you give us more information on how many in the past have left?”
CR: “I’ll take a look in a very general sense.”
Q: “May I ask a question, please?”
CR: “Yes.”
Q: “You have said that there is no intent to penalize him further, but it seems to me that by making this public—and undoubtedly his name will be disclosed by someone—that he will have a stigma which will follow him all of his life. Will this not be a harsh penalty?”
CR: “That is part of the price that the individual would have paid for this case under any circumstance—”
Q: “Then, why has he been singled out instead of others too?”
CR: “—and whether or not I had made this announcement, I’m sure it would have been a matter of public record very shortly. And as a consequence, in the spirit of openness, you asked us to tell you what we can.”
Q: “I think since you raised this issue, and you’ve not given us any details, I think you really—”
CR: “I object to that, Bernie. I’ve given you a considerable amount of detail—maybe not all the detail you wanted.”
Q: “No. You’ve said it’s a diplomatic matter, not a defense matter.”
CR: “I’ve told you—”
Q: “Yes.”
CR: “—something about his status in the Department.”
Q: “Well—”
CR: “I’ve told you something about the investigation in response to several questions.”
Q: “But I think we have to have some sense of how serious this is because the Secretary has been blasting away in the last week or so about disclosures of covert activities and things like that, which a reasonable man could say could endanger national security. All you’ve said is it’s a diplomatic matter. And as we know, diplomatic stuff is discussed with reporters constantly; and almost all of it has some kind of phony or unnecessary classified label. How serious a matter—could you give us some sense, was some major agreement imperiled by this?”
CR: “No, I can’t.”
Q: “Chuck, this comes up at a very convenient time in the Secretary’s campaign against leaks. How long has this case been pending? It seems very convenient.”
CR: “I would not want you to believe that it was convenient in the sense that you’re implying at all.”
Q: “Chuck, can you give any indication—is there a special investigatory team or operation set up to do this? And do you know that there are going to be other people who will also be terminated?”
CR: “There is nothing special. It was investigated through the normal channels available to this department under the circumstances.”
Q: “Chuck, has the news organization which was involved in disclosing this information been made aware of this penalty?”
CR: “I don’t know.”
Q: “Chuck, was this information ever published? All you said was that it was disclosed to the news media. Do you know if the information was ever published? Was the information ever made public as opposed to disclosed to the media?”
CR: “As I say, all of this goes to helping everyone identify this in an ever more expeditious fashion, and as a consequence, I’d just as soon not reply to any of those stories from here.”
Q: “Let me follow that up by asking on what basis you are withholding. Is it classified information? Whether the information was published? Is his name classified information? Would disclosure of any of those details subject the disclosee, the discloser, to possible termination?”
CR: “These are policy decisions, Ralph.”
Q: “Is it the case that polygraph tests are being given now in the Department to try to ferret out news leaks even though this [inaudible]—”
CR: “I believe you’re all aware of the department guidelines on use of the polygraph and those remain fully in effect.”
Q: “So polygraph tests are being given regularly?”
CR: “That has not been Department guidelines. If you’re creating new Department guidelines, then you should read the old ones. And those were available in a Department notice, which was circulated throughout this building, which I had here a minute ago.”
Q: “Probably not for the news media, huh?”
CR: “The Department of State uses polygraph examinations on a voluntary basis in the course of counterintelligence, criminal, and special investigation.”
Q: “Does that cover news leaks?”
CR: “Pardon?”
Q: “Does that mean news leaks?”
CR: “Special investigations would cover that category.”
Q: “Most of the leaks that have gained some publicity recently have had to do with Libya or the West Berlin discotheque bombing. Would you be willing to rule out that it did not have anything to do with this?”
CR: “As I say, I would lead you toward a diplomatic matter.”
Q: “Chuck, can you say whether this was the result of a complaint from some country with which we had ongoing diplomatic negotiations or other contacts?”
CR: “No, I can’t give you any other details. OK? Any other subject?”
Q: “Does the Department have any comment with regard to the culpability of the news media in particular, not only with regard to leaks in particular, the NBC case of interviewing a terrorist who threatened the life of the president of the United States, and then refused to identify the location of that interview, and the whereabouts of this terrorist, Abu Abbas?”
CR: “Are you asking for an instant replay?”
Q: “I’m looking for a comment from the State Department with regard to the culpability of the news media not only publishing what they know to be leaks and classified information but also engaging in activities like NBC was guilty of just last week.”
CR: “On that case, I had comment at that time, and I don’t have anything that would go beyond that. In this case, I’ve said nothing about the news media, its culpability, or otherwise, and I don’t have any comment to offer.”
Q: “Chuck, you said that the person didn’t take a polygraph test. Did they refuse to do so?”
CR: “As I said, I have nothing else to that.”
Q: “Could I just ask one question? Did we inform any government of this action?”
CR: “No comment. I’m not sure what the relevance of it is, but—”
Q: “Well, I mean, has it come as a complaint from a country—”
CR: “I had that question before—”
Q: “—and did we notify a country that, in fact—”
CR: “—at which point I said I had no comment.” (Laughter)
Q: “Can I follow up on that last question on the polygraph? If we put your answer that no polygraph was taken together with your answer on the policy of polygraphs and your steering us in the direction that special investigations cover this sort of case, it’s pretty hard not to draw the conc
lusion that he was asked to take the polygraph test. Can you offer us any guidance on that score beyond what you’ve already said?”
CR: “No. You can draw your own conclusions.”
Q: “Chuck, George wants to know if this is your last briefing.” (Laughter)
CR: “At this level—I’m sure we can look it up, but would this cover, like, a Deputy Assistant Secretary? You said ‘middle-level political appointee.’ What would, say, a Deputy Assistant Secretary—”
Q: “I gave you his rank.”
CR: “Would that be, say, a Deputy Assistant Secretary? A GS-15?”
Q: “Yes.”
CR: “I’m to tell all of you what a GS-15 is?”
Q: “Well, just what, a Deputy Assistant Secretary, Assistant Deputy, or what?”
CR: “Deputy Assistant Secretaries outrank GS-15s.”
Q: “Do you have any other announcements?”
Q: “Could you give us an example of a GS-15?”
CR: “That’s all the announcements I have.” (Inaudible) (Laughter)
Q: “How many GS-15s are there? OK. You’re finished?”
CR: “I’m finished.”
For the next couple of minutes the press and the press spokesperson discussed issues in Paraguay, Syria, and the Jewish Knesset and problems in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. But shortly it was back to the question of the leaker.
Q: “Chuck, could I just ask you a quick question back on this employee? Do I understand that he is employed by the Department of State here in Washington, or can he be a Department of State employee in any other country?”
CR: “He was employed by the Department of State here in Washington.”
Q: “Can I ask you also on that question, because on diplomatic relations there is so much dialogue between the press and officials of this Department, at least until today, in which clearly material which has not been made previously public knowledge is discussed, such as exchanges on various subjects. Is there some guideline you have on what a State Department official is authorized to discuss with a newsman?”
Q: “Or not?”
CR: “I can’t help you on that beyond saying that this was an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.”
Q: “But that happens probably all the time, because classified—I mean, can you give some sense to how classified?”
CR: “If it happened all the time in the sense you are speaking about, we would probably have many more dismissals than we’ve had.”
Q: “Chuck, can I just follow one thing? Could you say—can you recall any similar announcement of such a dismissal from the Department—public announcement? Not a case but an announcement?”
CR: “I can’t recall any.”
Q: “How long have you been here?”
CR: “Since July of last year. Any other questions?”
The journalists took a break from this issue and asked questions concerning Soviet problems, Saudi arms sales, and bilateral relations between the United States and Mexico. But they could not let it go.
Q: “Secretary Shultz in his speech at the Overseas Writers Association the other day, when the question of leaks came up, said that anyone who was leaking should be fired, but he said that he would defer to the Justice Department with regard to any action on it.”
CR: “With regard to prosecution.”
Q: “OK. So is there any indication that the Justice Department is pursuing this in agencies other than the State Department? For example, is there something that’s going on which is also covering the Pentagon, the White House, and so forth? As an administration-wide—”
CR: “I’m not sure why I should have any information on that or why you are referring to this as something new in terms of administration-wide policy. We here in this Department as well as other Departments have said that unauthorized disclosures have to be stopped.”
Q: “I’m just wondering—”
CR: “Prosecution in any specific case is a call for the Justice Department to make. In this case I said that there would be no prosecution.”
Q: “I’m just talking in terms of individuals from the Justice Department being invited in to conduct investigations in these various agencies with regard to this particular problem.”
CR: “These investigations are conducted as always, and that’s with the—at least for the large part—with the internal resources of the Department. But one can only presume that in investigations the total resources are available if necessary.”
Q: “Chuck, has the Secretary of State or any other official in this Department had to either apologize or explain this case to any particular government?”
CR: “No, I don’t have anything on that, Ralph.” One unrelated question and back to the leak.
Q: “Chuck, did the fact that he’s a political appointee limit his or her right of appeal or any kind of—does it make it easier to terminate them? Is there a difference between—”
CR: “I don’t have an answer to that, Matt.”
Q: “—between career and political?”
CR: “Every political appointee, obviously, serves at the pleasure of the Secretary.”
Q: “Was there any deal struck about the secretary not naming this person in exchange for this person keeping quiet later on and not having further conversations with the press?”
CR: “I said earlier this was a policy decision, and I said it was not my intent to publicly embarrass the person in specific terms.”
At this point in the daily press briefing, around 1:04 p.m., the press stopped questioning Charles Redman about the dismissal of the unidentified department employee who had leaked information. The press did not know if the leaked information was actually published or if it was provided as a basis for a larger story. The press, in a rare instance, became the subjects of a breaking news story, and they were obviously uncomfortable. The thrust of the questions suggested that the unofficial relations they enjoyed with senior State Department officials at the deputy assistant secretary level might be in jeopardy. Why? Because many of the journalists’ stories concerning foreign policy issues in which senior government officials were quoted depended on those deputy and assistant secretary officials. The journalists’ probing questions were clear indications of the anxiety they suffered that afternoon as they tried to determine who among their treasured, unnamed sources had been dismissed. Not to fear; the burned GS-13 was, in fact, of no ultimate consequence to the ongoing hidden relationship between State Department officials and the media. Despite the firing, leaking by senior and midlevel department officials would continue unabated.
On June 3, 1986, Mr. Penn and his new lawyer, Seymour Glanzer, presented themselves for a prearranged interview in room 2422. The room’s bleak décor had not changed one iota. We sat down and reviewed the agreement that our prime suspect’s lawyer had crafted with L, in which Mr. Penn agreed to cooperate with the investigation. It seemed that he would answer any and all questions that I had in relation to his involvement in the unauthorized disclosure of BA 2228. What considerations, if any, had he received in return from the legal advisor’s office? I was not told, but I would learn in short order. I glanced at his lawyer, then to Mark, and finally told Mr. Penn, “Tell me the whole story.”
Mr. Penn said that when he read the cable from the American embassy in Buenos Aires on the morning of April 4, he was angered by Speaker O’Neill’s conduct in Argentina. He said, “I think it is highly improper for members of Congress to go overseas and publicly criticize the administration.”
“But the cable’s contents are properly classified and restricted and you are obligated to protect that information,” I said.
“Well, I believe that by having pertinent contents of BA 2888 in the public domain, the public would better understand the administration’s critic’s tactics.”
Our suspect—now an admitted liar and potential felon—initially telephoned the offices of Evans and Novak and, unable to talk to them directly, was told to mail the information directly to
their office. He typed an anonymous letter, which disclosed the contents of the telegram, and mailed the letter later that day. When he was not contacted in return, he called William Kritzberg on the morning of April 7 and left a message to call him back. They were not able to confer until 11:00 that night when Mr. Penn disclosed parts of the cable to Kritzberg. The next time he spoke to Kritzberg was during a lunch on April 15 when they had a general discussion about unauthorized disclosures. The conversation was telling for many reasons.
Kritzberg warned Mr. Penn that there would be an investigation of the leak because Robert Kagan had told Kritzberg that there would be an investigation. I do not know why Kagan tipped the journalist off about my investigation, and I was not authorized to ask him. Kritzberg also told Mr. Penn not to worry about his latent fingerprints being on the BA 2888 telegram as these would “wear off.” That statement was hard to hear without laughing out loud. Mr. Penn also disclosed telling White House presidential speechwriter Anthony Dolan about the cable and its contents (so much for Nicholas Platt’s comment that his colleague at the NSC was sure the cable was not passed to the “West Wing”).
I asked Mr. Penn why he leaked confidential information to journalists who had no business reading privileged correspondence.
Without hesitation, he said, “A senior congressman should not be criticizing and undermining the president of the United States before a foreign leader.”
I bit my tongue to keep from asking—if the Speaker of the House had been a Republican and the president a Democrat pushing a policy he objected to, would he have leaked that cable? Instead I asked, “How do you square your unauthorized disclosure with your security acknowledgement form that you signed, in which you agreed not to provide classified information to unauthorized individuals, which I have here in front of me?”
I pushed his signed security form across the table for Mr. Penn to scrutinize. He did not look at it and slid the form over to his lawyer. Glanzer read it with interest for the rest of the interview.
Mr. Penn was unable or unwilling to answer the question. It is my belief that he felt badly only because he got caught and would have continued to leak as future opportunities presented themselves.
State Department Counterintelligence: Leaks, Spies, and Lies Page 21
