by George Bruce
Over the hundred-yard-long Poniatowski and Kierbedz bridges across the Vistula he saw German military vehicles of all kinds flowing east to west in endless columns. Tanks, self-propelled guns, and armoured troop carriers with weary soldiers clinging to them clattered along both sides of the roads, interspersed with small groups of demoralized infantry, civilians, horses and carts.
Komorowski noted how the spectacle of the Germans actually beaten and running away in a chaotic rout caused Polish men and women whom the Nazis had terrorized for five years past to shake their fists or to break out in exclamations of joyful wonder. In a crowded tram he heard a conductor raise a laugh by shouting: ‘Ladies and gentlemen, please hurry up! The firm is departing, the firm is closing down and going into liquidation!’ Everyone was certain that these were the last days of the fiendish Nazi regime.
Komorowski’s intelligence reports claimed that the German armies had suffered still another major disaster in the east. But aware of the shortage of arms and uncertain when the Soviets would be entering the capital, he prudently rejected the next day, 22 July, General Okulicki’s and Colonel Rzepecki’s demands that the Uprising should be launched at once.
A sharp conflict of opinion now developed among Komorowski’s staff over the issue of when to launch the Uprising. Colonel Iranek-Osmecki, Chief of Intelligence remembers that a fierce argument developed during the 24 July (Monday) meeting, and that it went on during the next day’s meeting. In a talk before General Komorowski arrived, Okulicki and Rzepecki argued that that day, Tuesday, 25 July, was the last possible day for a decision in view of the German disintegration and the almost uncontrollable desire of the citizens to fight. They told Iranek-Osmecki that they wanted to persuade Komorowski to issue the order then, but Iranek-Osmecki urged extreme caution in view of the temporarily uncertain Russo-German military situation.
During the full-scale staff meeting that day these two officers again pressed Komorowski to give the order, arguing that the present, with the Germans in full retreat, was the right time. Once again he said no, but cautiously took one more step nearer the brink with a cryptic message to the Government in London:
We are ready at any time to launch the battle for Warsaw. The participation of the Parachute Brigade (then in Britain) in this battle would have immense political and tactical significance. Be prepared to bomb airfields around Warsaw at our request.[98]
The message overturned the accepted policy of avoiding fighting in the capital, yet General Komorowski and Deputy Premier Jankowski did not state their case. What were their objects in abruptly announcing that they ‘were ready to launch the battle for Warsaw’? Were they presenting the Government with a readymade decision to rise, a fait accompli in which only the timing had to be decided? Or abruptly forcing the Government either to rubber-stamp the decision taken in Warsaw or to countermand it? They knew that a refusal by the Government would inevitably raise again the Russian doubts of the Secret Army’s commitment to the struggle.
The Government and the C-in-C were now at logger-heads over the Home Army’s course of action. Komorowski’s telegram reached the C-in-C’s staff in London during the evening of 26 July. Sosnkowski was then visiting General Anders’ Polish II Corps in Italy; the message was sent on to him on 28 July.
But Sosnkowski had already decided upon a quite different plan, the details of which on 25 July he sent on to General Kopanski, his Chief of Staff in London, for onward transmission to Warsaw. In it Sosnkowski directed that when Soviet occupation of Warsaw was imminent the Home Army Command and Staff should divide into two groups.
The first should stay in hiding in Warsaw, together with Deputy Premier Jan Jankowski and the underground civil authority and ‘organize resistance to the Soviet policy of faits accomplis’. He said that it would be senseless for this group to come out into the open in the face of the presence of the Soviet-backed Committee for National Liberation. And he warned of the likely arrest of all declared Polish authorities by the Soviets.
The second Home Army Command group should withdraw in a south-westerly direction and continue to conduct the battle as a whole even if Warsaw were to be captured before the entry of Soviet forces. He said that these directions were to be sent on to Komorowski as soon as possible.
The essence of Sosnkowski’s plan was the involvement of the Home Army in anti-Russian as well as anti-German action, the ‘two enemies’ folly once more. But on 29 July Kopanski telegraphed the Government’s refusal of the plan, saying that it had given full freedom of action in Warsaw to Jankowski.[99]
Another event of importance influenced the Government. Prime Minister Mikolajczyk was about to visit Stalin in Moscow. It was a mission largely engineered by Winston Churchill and imposed upon Mikolajczyk in a last-moment desperate attempt to renew Russo-Polish diplomatic relations and establish military liaison. But it was vital for Mikolajczyk to arrive with some arrows to his bow. He must be able to refute Stalin’s argument that the Home Army was encouraging the Germans by taking too little part in the war; and to demonstrate that his Government, not the Communists, ruled Poland.
If he arrived having just ordered the Secret Army to rise against the Germans in Warsaw both these arguments would be won. Better still, if it had successfully captured Warsaw before the advent of the Red Army, or was then battling victoriously for it, he would have an argument that Stalin could not ignore. On 26 July therefore, before flying via Gibraltar, the Mediterranean and Persia to Moscow, Prime Minister Mikolajczyk ordered a message to be sent authorizing Vice-Premier Jankowski to allow the uprising to be launched when needful. It said:
At a session of the Government (Cabinet) of the Republic, it was unanimously decided to empower you to proclaim the insurrection at a moment which you will decide as most opportune. If possible let us know beforehand. Copy, through Army, to Home Army Commander. Signed ‘Stem’. Minister of the Interior.
Since Deputy Premier Jankowski usually accepted Komorowski’s decisions in the military field, the Home Army Commander was now effectively free to launch the Uprising at will. He hoped a few more days of Soviet victories and German defeats might cause the total disintegration of the German armies, so that the Uprising would be almost certain of victory.
It was the act of a prudent commander, which so far he had shown himself to be; but it was too late.
On the very day, 26 July, that the southern wing of Marshal Rokossovsky’s forces reached the Vistula between Deblin and Pulawy, 75 miles south of Warsaw, the German retreat through Warsaw ended. Governor Fischer and the entire Nazi administration began to stream back into the city. Home Army Intelligence did not know that Hitler had decided to defend Warsaw and that he had on 21 July ordered General Guderian to take over command of the Eastern Front, reorganize the defence and halt the Red Army offensive.
Guderian appointed General von Vormann to command the 9th Army, in the middle sector of the Vistula, including Warsaw. By 26 July these two commanders had stopped the German rout, while transports bringing the ‘Hermann Goering’ SS Panzer and Paratroop Division and the SS ‘Viking’ Panzer Division began to detrain south of the city. But Komorowski’s preparations for the Uprising continued.
On 26 July General Pelczynski,[100] Chief of Staff, informed Colonel Chrusciel (‘Monter’) Commander of the Warsaw Region, that ‘it might be necessary to begin the battle for Warsaw at any time’.
The HQ [he continued] will issue the order to start the struggle, perhaps at your command. You will have to be ready to attack within eight hours from the moment of decision…
To gain the information necessary to make the decision I instruct you immediately to undertake adequate reconnaissance in the direction of Modlin, Wyszkow, Tlusczcz, Minsk Mazowiecki, Garwolin, Gora Kalwaria-Warka (i.e. on the east, north-east and south-east approaches to Warsaw). You are required to find out:
1) If the Germans intend to defend Warsaw.
2) Which German forces from the above sectors are withdrawing to Warsaw.
3)
Where there is contact between Germans and Soviets.
This information is necessary to estimate the moment of German withdrawal from Warsaw.
Komorowski and the small group of senior officers surrounding him, now holding the whole future of the city and its inhabitants in their hands, were meeting twice daily so as not to be overtaken by events. Reports came that the Soviets were disarming Secret Army troops in eastern Poland and shooting officers who refused to join the People’s Army. ‘It will compel us to resort to self-defence,’ Komorowski warned, in a message to the Government on 27 July.
To this small group of officers an uprising seemed as much an act of self-preservation against Soviet ruthlessness as vengeance against the Germans — a gamble certainly, but one which offered a chance of saving the Secret Army from certain destruction and Poland from the Communism which they abhorred.
At another full-scale staff meeting on 26 July, General Pelczynski emphasized that they still had insufficient data upon which to base a decision to take up arms, but that it was essential to remain in constant readiness. There were disagreements on the timing. Colonel Pluta-Czachowski, Chief of Signals, pointed out the lack of operational liaison with the Red Army and argued that the Uprising should only be launched when it was known to be actually forcing the Vistula at Warsaw.
Colonel Iranek-Osmecki, head of Intelligence, emphasized that the Germans had reinforced the Warsaw sector with three Panzer divisions during the last three days. He knew furthermore that the Germans were concentrating a powerful force at Wyszkow, thirty miles north-east of Warsaw on the Bug river, for what appeared to be a possible counter-attack in a southerly direction against Rokossovsky’s forces. He argued that they should be prudent indeed about a decision to fight, because the Soviets could well be temporarily pushed back from their present positions near the Vistula. Colonel Bokszczanin and Lieutenant-Colonel Muzyczka supported him. Several others, including Okulicki and Rzepecki, argued forcefully for an uprising without delay.[101]
Colonel Chrusciel then gave the meeting a report of their weapon-strength. This, according to Colonel Jan Rzepecki, had an obviously depressing effect. In silence they listened to the pathetic list of weapons with which they were to begin war against Germany’s armoured divisions… Thirty-nine machine-guns, 130 light machine-guns, 608 sub-machine-guns, four Piat anti-tank weapons, twenty-one anti-tank rifles, four mortars, 36,429 hand-grenades, 5,000 petrol bombs. There were no heavy weapons — recoilless guns, heavy mortars or artillery — so essential for an attack on the well-fortified German objectives.
Lack of ammunition was even more discouraging. Chrusciel argued that there was enough to keep on the offensive for three to four days, after which he counted on using captured German arms and ammunition and air consignments dropped by the Allies or the Soviets. By going on to the defensive he could last up to fourteen days. He said that German discoveries of arms caches during the last few days, and the unexpected dispositions of German troops near to others accounted for the low weapon and ammunition strength.
He explained that his plan of action was to launch surprise attacks simultaneously at all German-held objectives, his main effort being directed at seizing the city centre, the railway stations there and the Vistula bridges. He would keep strong reserves in hand and deploy them as the situation demanded.[102]
In August, the Secret Army in Warsaw numbered 600 platoons, or about 40,000 men, and the Communist People’s Army some 400 men. Sublimely disregarding the alarming fact that he had arms, small arms at that, for barely 6,000 men, apart from hand-grenades, Chrusciel had improvised an operational plan which four infantry divisions fully equipped with heavy weapons and supported by field and anti-aircraft artillery would have found a hard test against the city’s German forces.
Meanwhile, tension in the city was rising almost hourly. Crowds of half-starved Warsaw citizens, anticipating the enemy collapse, began looting German-owned food shops and warehouses,[103] and were shot down by the military police. Units of the ‘Hermann Goering’ Division marched across Warsaw in full battle order in an obvious attempt to impress the population with the renewed German strength. The German 73rd Infantry Division detrained outside the city and manned the Praga defences.
In a message to London on 27 July Komorowski[104] informed the Commander-in-Chief, who was then still in Italy, that he had decided to fight in Warsaw pending the outcome of the Russo-German battle on the Vistula’s east bank. ‘After the panic evacuation of Warsaw from 22 to 25 July, the Germans have recovered. German administrative authorities have returned and have started to function again,’ he added, in what must have seemed an ominous tone to the Government, which had authorized him to begin the fighting when he wished.
On 27 July came an event which added to the city’s tension and the state of nerves beginning to wear down the resilience of this group of generals and colonels who held in their hands the fate of so many. The Germans announced that Warsaw would be defended against the Soviets and Governor Fischer issued a proclamation over the loud-hailer system that one hundred thousand Warsaw citizens aged seventeen to sixty-five must report next day at 8 AM in six places for work digging defences. Colonel Chrusciel interpreted this as the start of a German move to evacuate Warsaw and to destroy the Secret Army. It spurred him into issuing at 1900 hours, without consulting Komorowski, a potentially dangerous order: ‘Alert! On account of today’s German orders, issued over the loud-hailers, I hereby order: 1) All troops must assemble at readiness posts and there await the announcement of X-hour. 2) Action against the Germans may only be undertaken before X-hour (the order to start fighting) in exceptional circumstances.’[105] By dawn on 28 July the mobilization of some thousand Secret Army troops had been almost completed without catching the eye of the Germans.
General Komorowski’s morning meeting of the military staff on 28 July was faced with both Chrusciel’s unauthorized mobilization and Governor Fischer’s demand for 100,000 able-bodied people. Tension was now worsened by confusion.
Chrusciel said that he thought immediate action was needed both to prevent spontaneous fighting by Secret Army troops and to stop the Communist People’s Army ordering an uprising. But by midday, when nobody turned up it was clear that the citizens had ignored Fischer’s order. Komorowski therefore ordered Chrusciel to countermand his mobilization, which was done. This ignominious outcome testified to the measure of disorganization and tension prevailing at GHQ which was now spreading to the rank-and-file. Awaiting the long-expected order, many of the troops stayed instead in their assembly areas in a state of prolonged nervous alert.[106]
The Staff finally agreed during the meeting that the Uprising should be launched when the Soviets were known to be in Praga, the Warsaw suburb on the Vistula’s east bank, and had also attacked from their newly-won bridgehead near Deblin, south-east of Warsaw. The decision was a setback for General Okulicki, who had called for it while the Germans were retreating, and who still wished for it at once.
Henceforward Komorowski and his staff waited and watched for the right moment. Then on 28 July, as the thunder of artillery in the east echoed over Warsaw, they changed the hour of the Uprising to 1700 hours on any given day, instead of dawn, when the German guards were often relaxing before handing over to the day guard and were less quick and less aggressive in their reactions. It was a fateful decision.
Chrusciel ordered it[107] on the grounds that it would be easier during this rush hour for the troops to rendezvous at their assembly points without being noticed; and that after four hours’ fighting in daylight he would expect them to have cleared the Germans from the city centre. They could then reorganize their positions, form a perimeter and distribute arms captured from the enemy, so that by the next morning an organized army would be ready for another day’s fighting. And this, despite their initial lack of arms. The defects of this new plan were to become painfully clear when the shooting began.
On the same day, 28 July, Komorowski received a message from London
stating emphatically that Deputy Premier Jankowski was to decide precisely when the rising should be launched. It was a last-moment ineffectual attempt to take the initiative out of the hands of the generals.
Colonel Jan Rzepecki noted on 29 July in his diary:
Bursts of firing echo sporadically throughout the city, mainly caused by secret army men, who noting their lack of arms are trying to seize them from the Germans. In houses in several parts of Warsaw the Germans discovered groups of them which led to a number of local gun fights. German infantry, motorized and Panzer units patrol the city day and night. Tanks and machine guns have been sited at all crossroads and we are expecting reprisals for the total disregard of Fischer’s order to report for defence works, as well as an attempt to forestall any kind of uprising by a great combing through of the city.
The lack of reprisals, far from calming us, leads us to suppose that Warsaw might suddenly face forced evacuation as the Russo-German battle for it explodes. And in these conditions it seems likely that if we do not keep a tight rein a spontaneous outbreak of our battle may occur.
Komorowski decided on 29 July that General Okulicki should be his deputy and should take over in the event of his becoming a casualty, or being arrested by the Russians on their entry into the city.
Every event of which it was aware now pulled or pushed the Home Army Command nearer the abyss. In a message sent from London on 26 July which arrived on the 29th they learnt of Mikolajczyk’s journey to meet Stalin. The need to support him by an uprising weighed heavily with them. They felt that Mikolajczyk could not face Stalin empty-handed.
On the same day, at 8.15 PM over the Moscow radio station named after the Polish national hero Kosciuszko came the first of those fateful broadcasts in Polish calling on the citizens of Warsaw to rise.[108]
