by Clay Blair
To the south at Safi, the least important of the American objectives, “everything clicked” American naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote. The battleship New York, the cruiser Philadelphia, and the greenest of the new light carriers, San-tee, provided offensive and defensive support for five troop transports and one cargo vessel. As at Algiers and Oran, two ships, the four-stack destroyers Bernadou and Cole, crammed with commandos, crashed the harbor to capture the waterfront and prevent scuttlings. Both slipped in undetected and successfully carried out this difficult mission with no losses. The Vichy submarine Méduse, southbound to Dakar, diverted to attack Allied forces, but an aircraft from Philadelphia drove her onto the beach. Owing to the inexperience of the pilots, to an unreliable catapult, and to insufficient winds for launching and recovering aircraft, Santee lost twenty-one of her thirty-one aircraft to accidents, the greatest Allied setback at Safi.
The six American fleet submarines assigned to Torch contributed little. Two, Gurnard and Gunnel, had newly designed diesel engines that proved to be defective. Gurnard was forced to abort with engine problems. Gunnel, commanded by John S. McCain, Jr., the son of an admiral, carried out the first part of her mission off Fedala. Later in the day, per plan, she and Blackfish and Herring set off to the south to establish a patrol line to intercept the battleship Richelieu or other Vichy warships that might sail north from Dakar. An Army Air Forces plane mistook Gunnel for a Vichy or Axis submarine and bombed her, knocking out all four temperamental diesel engines and causing other damage. By ingeniously rigging a small, reliable, auxiliary diesel engine to charge batteries, McCain was able to coax Gunnel at three knots on her electric motors all the way to Falmouth, England. Herring, commanded by Raymond W. Johnson, was the only one of the five American submarines to sink a ship, the 5,000-ton Vichy freighter Ville du Havre*
On the whole, the five Torch landings on November 8 were ragged but immensely successful. Allied naval losses to French or Axis forces on D day were slight: the British destroyer Broke; the ex-Coast Guard cutters Hartland and Walney, deliberately savaged or sunk at Algiers and Oran; and the American troopship Leedstown, badly bombed by Axis aircraft off Algiers after disembarking her troops, then sunk by a U-boat. No Allied ships were lost on D day at Casablanca, Mehdia-Port Lyautey, or Safi. Except for the loss of the commandos in the harbor attacks at Algiers and Oran, Allied army casualties were also light.
The Germans had long before drawn up a plan, Attila, for the occupation of the Vichy, or free, zone of southern France in an emergency. Believing the French fleet at Toulon might obey Darlan and defect to the Allies, on November 11 Hitler ordered plan Attila to be implemented. German forces quickly overran Vichy France; Italian amphibious forces, long in training to invade Malta, captured the Vichy French island of Corsica.
The Vichy French naval chiefs fell into dispute over what to do. Paul Auphan, who had succeeded Darlan as Minister of Marine, wanted the fleet at Toulon to sail out and defect to the Allies. Jean de Laborde, commander in chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, and a rabid Anglophobe, wanted the fleet to sail out and attack the Allies. To avoid provoking the Vichy French into scuttling the fleet, the Germans approached Toulon with olive branches extended and halted short of the city to negotiate. Nonetheless, on November 27, Laborde ordered the fleet to scuttle.†
During the thirty months that France had been divided, the chief of French codebreakers, Gustave Bertrand, and the refugee Polish codebreakers he had sheltered, had continued attacks on certain Enigma nets in hiding at a château near Avignon. When Hitler ordered Attila to commence, all hands fled for Spain or Gibraltar, intending to go on to Britain. The Gestapo caught some, including Bertrand; the chief engineer, Antoni Palluth; and one of the Poles, Guido Langer. Although all those captured were subjected to brutal interrogation, not one gave away the secret that Enigma had been broken.
AXIS SUBMARINES VERSUS TORCH INSIDE THE MEDITERRANEAN
The U-boat force commander in the Mediterranean, Leo Kreisch, first became aware on November 5 that the Allies were about to launch something big inside the Mediterranean. That evening, he logged, an Italian spy reported that a great congregation of ships at Gibraltar began sailing east at 8:00 P.M. Included:
3 Aircraft carriers
1 Battleship
7 Light cruisers
1 Monitor
17 Destroyers
11 Gunboats
1 Liner
40 Freighters
15 Tankers
Later that evening, the same or another Italian spy reported that sixty or more blacked-out ships, including two aircraft carriers and two battleships, had passed abreast of Tarifa, Spain, eastbound through the Strait of Gibraltar.
Kreisch and other senior Germans, of course, did not know precisely what was afoot. It might be another convoy to deliver fighter aircraft to Malta, as did a Furious task force on October 28-29. Or it might be a large-scale amphibious landing behind (or west of) Rommel’s Afrika Korps. The German naval commander in chief, Mediterranean, Eberhard Weichold, and Kreisch leaned strongly to the latter possibility. Inasmuch as they believed the Vichy French would vigorously repel an Allied landing at Oran or Algiers and that the water was unfavorably deep right up to the North African coastline in most areas, they concluded that a landing probably would take place at Bougie Bay, about one hundred miles east of Algiers.
Berlin received the same spy reports. From Adolf Hitler came another exhortation:
To all [Mediterranean] U-boats: The existence of the Afrika Korps depends on the destruction of the Gibraltar force. I expect a ruthless, victorious operation.
By November 7, Leo Kreisch had deployed nine of his remaining force of eighteen boats to waiting positions in the narrow neck of the western Mediterranean. Of the nine, four (U-81, U-565, U-593, U-605) formed a “first wave” of defense, three (U-77, U-205, U-660) a “second wave,” and two (U-73 and U-458) backstopped the waves. Three others (U-331, U-431, U-561) were proceeding westward as fast as possible.*
In the afternoon and evening of D day minus one, November 7, five U-boats made contact with fast-moving British amphibious forces. The veteran U-77, commanded by Otto Hartmann, was first, but he reported that enemy forces bombed and gunned him under and inflicted personnel casualties. Another veteran, U-73, commanded by the new skipper Horst Deckert, attempted to attack several big ocean liner/troopships, but escorts depth-charged the boat and forced her off. Yet another veteran, U-205, also with a new skipper, Friedrich Bürgel, was the first to shoot. He fired a full bow salvo at an 18,000-ton liner/troopship, but the torpedoes missed or malfunctioned. A fourth veteran, U-81, commanded by the Ritterkreuz holder Friedrich (Fritz) Guggenberger, attempted to attack two aircraft carriers, Furious and Argus, but escorts foiled his setup and drove him off. One of the recent arrivals, U-458, commanded by Kurt Diggins, shot a two-fan at a light cruiser. He claimed one hit, but it could not be confirmed. Aircraft bombed the boat twice, and escorts drove her under with gunfire.
In the early hours of D day, November 8, London radio (BBC) announced that Allied troops would be landing in North Africa in a few hours. Fooled by British deceptive moves at sea and still believing that Bougie Bay was the likeliest landing area, Leo Kreisch directed eight U-boats to the bay at maximum speed. These were the veterans U-73, U-77, U-81, and U-205, one of the recent arrivals, Götz Baur in U-660, and three more veterans, newly sailed from La Spezia, U-331, U-431, and U-561. This movement to the east left only four U-boats in the Algiers area: the veteran U-565 and three of the most recent arrivals, U-458, U-593, and U-605.
By noon on D day, the Germans realized they had erred badly. Intelligence reported that there had obviously been a big amphibious landing at Algiers, certainly supported by heavy naval forces, and that there were no enemy forces east of Algiers at Bougie, where Leo Kreisch had sent the bulk of his veteran U-boat force. Inasmuch as Kreisch still believed Bougie Bay certainly had to be one of the main targets, he was reluctant to turn the boats around and sen
d them back to Algiers. However, the senior German naval officer at Rome, Eberhard Weichold, overruled Kreisch and ordered him to do exactly that.
This was easier said than done. To avoid enemy detection and attack, the U-boats heading east to Bougie in daylight were running submerged half the time. Some did not receive the new orders. The first to arrive at Bougie Bay, Hartmann in U-77, reported: “No enemy forces.” Kreisch, no doubt sheepishly, radioed all boats on the evening of D day:
Landings of strong enemy forces at many points, principally at Oran and Algiers. … Algiers apparently in enemy hands, stronger resistance at Oran. Innumerable transports in [Algiers area], covered by aircraft carrier and battleships. Go to it! All out! Dare everything.*
Fortuitously, Berlin had ordered seven U-boats (group Delphin) into the Mediterranean on November 4. In its early reaction to Torch, Berlin directed Dönitz to send another group of Type VIIs into the Mediterranean, but he demurred. The Allies were virtually certain to detect the passage of the seven Delphin boats through the Strait of Gibraltar from November 8 to 11. With the advantage of surprise, the Delphin boats might get through safely but the Allies would be on full alert for other U-boats thereafter. Moreover, by November 15 or 16, when the boats of a second wave could reach the strait, moonlight conditions would be unfavorable for a passage. Finally, Dönitz argued, the three Italian-managed U-boat bases (La Spezia, Pola, Salamis) could not efficiently handle the U-boats already in the Mediterranean, let alone another substantial increase. In the face of these objections, the OKM agreed for the time being that no more U-boats were to enter the Mediterranean.
The seven U-boats of group Delphin commenced the transit of Gibraltar Strait on D day night, November 8-9. To throw off the British ASW forces, the skippers were under orders to delay a report of a safe transit (“Yes”) until they had reached wide open seas east of Algiers. However, Weichold and Kreisch decided to deploy the Delphin boats against the Allied amphibious forces at Oran. Hence they were directed to report “Yes” when they reached the meridian of 1 degree west. Jürgen Quaet-Faslem in U-595 spoke up from there shortly after midnight on November 9, but there was no word from the other six reinforcements from the Atlantic.
Kreisch continued to micromanage the U-boats. Since Axis reconnaissance aircraft had been unable to pinpoint the exact location of Allied landing sites and other naval forces, in the early hours of November 9, he assigned the dozen boats between Algiers and Bougie Bay to search for the enemy task forces. These orders sent some boats east of Algiers and some boats west of Algiers along the coast, futile missions all.
At noon on November 9, Kreisch again reversed himself and issued yet another set of orders. By that time, a second Delphin boat, U-617, commanded by Albrecht Brandi, had reported in off Oran, but no others. As a result, Kreisch decided to send six of the boats off Algiers to Oran. He therefore formed all the boats into two named groups:
Hai (Shark) at Algiers (6)Delphin (Dolphin) at Oran (8)
U-77 U-561 U-73 U-593
U-205 U-660 U-81 U-595 (new)
U-331 U-458 U-605
U-431 U-565 U-617 (new)
Toward evening on November 9, two U-boats shot torpedoes at targets. Fresh from La Spezia, Ritterkreuz holder Hans-Dietrich von Tiesenhausen in the veteran U-331, who had sunk the battleship Barham a year past, sank the 9,100-ton American freighter Leedstown, which was anchored, already damaged by air attack. The big ship settled to the bottom, but almost all of her cargo and gear was saved. The recently arrived U-605, commanded by Herbert-Viktor Schütze, shot at an “escort” and claimed a sinking, but it could not be confirmed.
Schütze’s shots caused controversy. A petty officer in Götz Baur’s recently arrived U-660 remembered that while his boat was maneuvering submerged to fire at the carrier Furious, Schütze’s U-605 “shot four torpedoes” at one of the destroyers screening Furious, and that all four passed directly over U-660’s conning tower. After dark, Baur surfaced and berated Schütze by radio: “Schafskopf!” (“Fool!”). Leo Kreisch chimed in from Italy to reprimand Baur for breaking radio silence with “stupid remarks.” Still later, the petty officer in U-660 remembered that when Baur reported missing a destroyer with four torpedoes, Kreisch castigated him for attacking such “insignificant” targets when so many battleships and carriers were present.
While searching close along the coast between Algiers and Oran in the early hours of November 10, the veteran U-81, commanded by Ritterkreuz holder Fritz Guggenberger, came upon a small convoy and attacked. He hit and sank the 2,000-ton British freighter Garlinge and thought he got a hit on an escort. The Garlinge was the first merchant ship of the Allied invasion force to be sunk at sea by a U-boat and one of the very few. The supposed hit on the escort could not be confirmed.
Two hours later another veteran, U-431, commanded by Wilhelm Dommes, newly arrived from La Spezia, came upon a convoy farther out at sea. He shot a full bow salvo at what he believed to be a 7,200-ton British cruiser. The torpedoes hit solidly, and the target—actually the modern (1941) 2,000-ton British destroyer Martin—sank swiftly beneath the waves. Martin was the only Allied warship to be sunk in the Mediterranean by a U-boat in the early days of the invasion. A mechanical failure compelled Dommes to withdraw to the north.
Still later that day, four other U-boats shot at British warships, but all the torpedoes malfunctioned or missed.
• The recently arrived U-458, commanded by Kurt Diggins, fired a three-fan at an unidentified “large destroyer.”
• The veteran U-561, commanded by Heinz Schomburg, fired a four-fan at the ancient carrier Argus.
• The veteran U-77, commanded by Otto Hartmann, fired a four-fan at the aircraft carrier Furious.
• The veteran U-73, commanded by Horst Deckert, fired a four-fan at the fast-moving battleship Rodney from a range of five thousand meters (nearly three miles). His nonsuccess report drew a rebuke from Kreisch for shooting at such extreme range.
By D plus three, November 11, Kreisch had seventeen U-boats in the Algiers/Oran area. The new German tactical plan was: (1) blockade Algeria with group Hai (five boats); (2) blockade Oran with group Delphin (five boats); (3) position a mobile “attack group,” Wal (seven boats), in the narrow neck of the western Mediterranean between Oran and Cartagena, Spain (near the zero meridian). On second thought, Kreisch canceled group Hai’s blockade of Algiers and sent it seaward to operate as an attack group like Wal.
That day, November 11, six U-boats attacked Allied shipping. Deckert in U-73, Bürgel in U-205, and Walter Going in the newly arrived Delphin boat U-755 all missed or were driven off. However, three newly arrived Delphin boats achieved noteworthy successes:
• The U-407, commanded by Ernst-Ulrich Brüller, sank the 20,000-ton British liner/troopship Viceroy of India. Brüller hit her with a four-fan, but she sank slowly, and he polished her off with a finishing shot. Fortunately for the Allies, the loss of life was slight.
• The U-380, commanded by Josef Röther, sank the 11,000-ton Dutch liner/troopship Nieuw Zeeland.
• The U-595, commanded by Jürgen Quaet-Faslem, sank the 5,300-ton British freighter Browning. In return, British escorts depth-charged U-595 for sixteen hours.
British forces intensified ASW measures, and by November 12, six boats that incurred heavy battle damage or mechanical failures had been compelled to abort.* These were three veterans (Fritz Guggenberger in U-81, Heinz Schomburg in U-561, and Wilhelm Franken in U-565), two boats recently arrived (Kurt Diggins in U-458 and Gerd Kelbling in U-593), and a newly arrived Delphin boat (Günter Jahn in U-596).
On D plus five, November 13, the U-boat force operating against Torch forces was reduced by another abort. Wilhelm Dommes in the veteran U-431, who had sunk the British destroyer Martin, but had been forced by mechanical difficulties to withdraw northward off the coast, came upon an enemy convoy and attacked. He thought he sank a big British Tribal-class destroyer. In fact, it was the old 1,600-ton Dutch destroyer Isaac Sweers. In this same attac
k, Dommes claimed he hit a tanker and set it afire, but that hit could not be confirmed. A Hudson of British Squadron 500, piloted by New Zealander Mike A. Ensor, attacked U-458 with four depth charges, one ASW bomb, and machine-gun fire. Dommes reported casualties and very extensive damage as well as mechanical failures and aborted to Messina, then Pola, where he received a Ritterkreuz.†
That same day, November 13, Fritz Guggenberger in the aborting veteran U-81 came upon a convoy. He claimed torpedo hits on two ships for 11,000 tons. One of these, the 6,500-ton British vessel Maron sank; the other hit could not be confirmed. This was Guggenberger’s second success against Torch merchantmen, a total bag of about 8,500 tons. For this achievement, Hitler awarded him Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz. Detached from U-81 at La Spezia, he returned to Germany to commission a new U-cruiser.*
In the early days of Torch, Allied forces destroyed five U-boats.
• In the wee hours of November 12, Götz Baur in U-660 carried out a submerged attack on a convoy off Oran, firing a full bow salvo at four different ships. The British destroyers Wescott, Verity, and Wivern and corvettes Starwort and Lotus pounced on U-660. Baur ejected Bolde† noisemakers and went deep—to 656 feet, one crewman said—but Starwort and Lotus clung to the sonar contact, dropping depth charges, which caused severe damage and flooding. After four hours, Baur conceded defeat and surfaced to scuttle. The British fished out Baur and forty-five others. Two Germans were killed by British gunfire in the sinking. The survivors bitterly criticized U-boat force commander Leo Kreisch for his poor leadership and professional ineptitude.
• On the next afternoon, November 14, a Hudson of British Squadron 233, piloted by New Zealander John W. Barling, sighted a U-boat north of Oran. Barling attacked and sank the recently arrived U-605, commanded by Herbert-Viktor Schütze. There were no survivors. The Admiralty credited the kill to the corvettes Lotus and Poppy, but after a more thorough postwar analysis, gave it to Barling’s Hudson.
