by Clay Blair
The first nine boats of the Atlantic force to reach the Strait of Gibraltar-Morocco area were designated group Schlagetot (Death Blow). Seven of the nine were Type IXs, ill suited for attacking the fast, heavily guarded Allied invasion convoys or for operating in those waters, which are very shallow out to twenty or thirty miles. Three of the IXs had only just been released from group Streitaxt, which had attacked convoy Sierra Leone 125 near the Azores. The other four IXs, recently sailed from French bases, were diverted from missions to distant waters. The two VIIs, U-572 and U-752, both veteran boats, also had only just been released from group Streitaxt.
The first boat of group Schlagetot to reach Moroccan waters was Heinz Hirsacker in U-572. He encountered intense surface and air ASW patrols. Even so, he had several opportunities to attack Allied shipping, but, according to his officers and crewmen, he cravenly shied off. Counting his balk at the Strait of Gibraltar in January 1942, this was the second time Hirsacker had failed the Afrika Korps. As a consequence, when the boat returned to France on November 22, Dönitz directed that Hirsacker be arrested and tried for cowardice. Found guilty, he was condemned to death. Reinhard Hardegen, the celebrated shipper of U-123, famous for his Drumbeat patrols, remembered that, in order to avoid the disgrace of a Nazi execution, close friends slipped a pistol into Hirsacker’s jail cell and he committed suicide on April 24, 1943.
The other Type VII was the U-752, commanded by Karl-Ernst Schroeter, who had patrolled successfully in the Arctic, in American waters, and in the Freetown area. Hounded and harassed by Allied ASW forces before he could mount an attack, Schroeter incurred heavy depth-charge damage. Granted authority to withdraw to safer waters to make repairs, Schroeter headed west. After patching up the boat, he found—and chased—a high-speed convoy, but before he could vector in other boats or attack, it got away. Still leaking oil, Schroeter was again granted authority to withdraw to a “remote” area for repairs. Unable to stop the leak, he aborted and returned to France on December 3, having inflicted no damage on Torch forces.
The failure of the two Type VIIs of group Schlagetot left the anti-Torch job to the seven less suitable Type IXs. The three that came from the attack by group Streitaxt on convoy Sierra Leone 125 were U-103, U-509, and U-510. Commanded by the new skipper Gustav-Adolf Janssen, the aging IXB U-103 had sunk one ship and was low on fuel. Commanded by the new skipper Werner Witte, the IXC U-509 had sunk four ships and damaged three, but she still had plenty of fuel and eight torpedoes. The IXC U-510, commanded by Karl Neitzel, had damaged one ship and had plenty of fuel and nearly a full load of torpedoes. These three were joined near the Azores by the newly sailed, aging IXB U-108, commanded by a new skipper, Ralf-Reimar Wolfram, age thirty, who had hoped to join group Streitaxt for the attack on Sierra Leone 125 but had arrived too late.
Prior to the Torch crisis, Dönitz had planned for U-509 to give U-103 and U-108 much of her surplus fuel and then come home. Then the replenished U-103 and U-108, together with the U-510, were to rake southward as far as the Freetown area in search of other Sierra Leone convoys. Per plan, the U-509 refueled U-103 and U-108, but upon learning of the Torch landings, Dönitz redirected these three IXs as well as the U-510 to Moroccan waters.
Werner Witte in U-509 boldly closed on the Mehdia-Port Lyautey area on November 11, cruising in waters less than two hundred feet deep. For the next three days, he reported, he was hunted, depth-charged, and bombed by swarms of surface ships and aircraft. During one encounter with the enemy, Witte—and everyone else on board U-509—heard what was believed to be a mine cable scraping down the entire length of the hull; then a terrifying explosion close under the stern. In this or another encounter, depth charges cracked a fuel-oil tank and caused a leak, which forced Witte to pull out to the west, then abort to France, where he arrived—to great praise for his attacks on Sierra Leone 125—on November 26. He also had had no opportunity to attack Torch forces.
By November 13, two squadrons of U.S. Navy amphibious Catalinas, comprising twenty-two aircraft, had arrived in Morocco.* Squadron VP 73 (from Iceland) based at Port Lyautey; VP 92 (from the States) based at Casablanca. On November 14, Navy pilot A. S. Allbritton of VP 73 was the first to attack a U-boat. The results were uncertain.
Karl Neitzel in U-510 patrolled off Mehdia-Port Lyautey as well. On November 15, he spotted a fast convoy of transports, escorted by “a battleship, a carrier, and ten destroyers.” Neitzel bravely but futilely chased the battleship submerged, then in desperation fired three torpedoes at her from “extreme” range, his sole attack on Torch forces in Moroccan waters. All torpedoes missed. Later an aircraft bombed U-510, causing “a serious oil leak,” forcing Neitzel to withdraw well to the west to attempt repairs. He did not inflict any damage on Torch forces either.
After taking on fuel from Witte in U-509, the new skippers Janssen in U-103 and Wolfram in U-108 closed on Morocco. Janssen reconnoitered Safi; Wolfram, Casablanca. Other than numerous “destroyers” and aircraft on ASW patrol, neither skipper saw a thing. On November 11, a destroyer detected and aggressively hunted Wolfram in U-108, dropping depth charges nearby. The explosions damaged his “diving gear,” forcing him to withdraw well to the west for repairs. On November 16, when he reported the damage could be only “partly repaired,” he was ordered to abort to France. He arrived there on November 26, having done nothing to repel the Torch landings.
Of the other three recently sailed Type IXs that were hurriedly diverted from missions in distant waters to group Schlagetot, yet another failed. This was the IXC U-511, commanded by Friedrich Steinhoff, the older, onetime merchant marine officer who had made one disappointing patrol to the Caribbean. By November 8, Steinhoff had refueled from the tanker U-462 and was west of Freetown en route to Brazil. Directed to about-face and run for Morocco at the highest possible speed, Steinhoff reached Agadir in southern Morocco on November 15. There, he fell “ill” and U-511 was forced to abort to France without having fired a shot. Steinhoff left the boat to become a staff officer in a combat flotilla, then later returned to Germany to commission a U-cruiser that was under conversion to a cargo-carrier.
The other two IXs recently sailed from France were the only boats of group Schlagetot to mount successful attacks on Allied forces in Moroccan waters, but one of these was lost.
The U-173, which had made one unsatisfactory patrol to the Caribbean under Heinz-Ehler Beucke, sailed from France on November 1 with a new skipper, Hans-Adolph Schweichel, age twenty-seven. On the night of November 11, Schweichel adroitly—and bravely—slipped through the ASW screen protecting the fifteen transports and cargo vessels anchored in Fedala. The transports had put all their troops ashore, but others were still laboriously unloading supplies and equipment. Schweichel shot first at the 9,400-ton U.S. Navy transport Joseph Hewes. The torpedo hit in Number 2 hold and the ship sank bow first, taking the lives of her captain, Robert McL. Smith, and several crewmen, plus “over 93 percent” of her cargo.
Schweichel next put his sights on the 10,600-ton U.S. Navy tanker Winooski and the new destroyer Hambleton, which was anchored nearby, awaiting clearance to refuel. Luckily for the Allies, the torpedo hit Winooski in a tank emptied of fuel and ballasted with seawater. Although the hole was twenty-five feet square, the crew was able to patch it temporarily, and by the following morning Winooski was back in business. The torpedo aimed at Hambleton hit in the forward engine room, killing or fatally injuring about twenty men. Remarkably, Hambleton remained afloat, and the redoubtable oceangoing tug Cherokee was able to tow her into Casablanca. There, Navy SeaBees ingeniously cut away forty feet of the damaged hull and patched the two halves together. Months later, Hambleton, escorted by another tug, sailed to Boston, where she was properly rebuilt in time to participate in Overlord.
Of the numerous radar-equipped American destroyers in or off Fedala that night, only one, the new Bristol detected U-173. However, Bristol’s skipper, concerned that the contact might be a friendly landing craft, hesitated and turned on his searchlig
ht to make a positive identification. That delay gave Schweichel time to dive U-173 and avoid Bristol’s belated gunfire. Even though the water was very shallow and Bristol delivered two salvos of depth charges, Schweichel was able to slip away undamaged.
That same night, November 11, the Ritterkreuz holder Ernst Kals in U-130, who had sailed from France on October 29, approached Fedala. Rather than attempting to slip through the radar-equipped destroyer screen from seaward, Kals elected to hug the coastline submerged in sixty feet of water, barely enough to conceal his top hamper. Grazing bottom, Kals reached the anchorage undetected and while submerged in daylight on November 12, he boldly fired five torpedoes, four from the bow tubes and one from a stern tube. His torpedoes hit and sank three large American transports: the 9,400-ton Edward Rutledge, the 12,600-ton Tasker H Bliss, and the 12,500-ton Hugh L. Scott. All three ships (for 34,400 tons) sank. About 115 men of the 1,607 crew and others on the three ships were lost. Rutledge also lost “97 percent” of her Army supplies and equipment; Bliss and Scott, “about 65 percent” each. Undetected, Kals slipped away submerged, still hugging the coastline.
In view of the loss of four valuable transports at Fedala, the Allies shifted most of the unloading to Casablanca. On November 13, five big ships from Fedala entered Casablanca. Two days later the other six big ships from Fedala and about five from Mehdia-Port Lyautey got under way for Casablanca. Early that morning off Casablanca, Schweichel in U-173 intercepted and torpedoed one of the American ships, the 8,100-ton Electra. Although badly holed, the ship managed to beach near Casablanca and was later salvaged and returned to service.
The next day, November 16, three American destroyers, Quick, Swanson, and Woolsey, patrolled off Casablanca. At about noon, Woolsey reported a good sonar contact close aboard and immediately fired two depth charges by eye. Her target was U-173. In two more carefully executed follow-up attacks, Woolsey dropped eight more depth charges, bringing up oil and air bubbles. She then had to break off to refuel in Casablanca, leaving her quarry to Swanson and Quick, both of which were highly skeptical about this “contact.” Nonetheless, Swanson fired two depth-charge salvos at the rising bubbles and Quick let go a special single charge, set to explode on the bottom. If U-173 was not already fatally holed, these attacks destroyed her. There were no survivors.
The second wave of sixteen U-boats of the Atlantic force congregated in the dangerously confined and shallow waters immediately west of the Strait of Gibraltar. The aim was to create a “wall” to block completely all Allied ship traffic going in and out of the strait. It was an impossible mission. In anticipation of a strong U-boat assault, the Allies had saturated that area with radar-equipped aircraft and surface ships. One U-boat skipper reported that Allied ASW measures were so intense that he was forced to remain submerged twenty hours a day and could not properly air the boat and charge batteries.
These sixteen boats included three that had sailed directly from France on November 7: two Type IXs and one Type VII. All three tangled with Allied forces.
The first to contact the enemy was Werner Henke in the Type IXC U-515, who had made an outstanding maiden patrol to the Caribbean. On the night of November 12, while about 180 miles due west of the Strait of Gibraltar, Henke spotted what he believed to be two big British cruisers, escorted by three fleet destroyers. In actuality, it was one British cruiser, Vindictive, and the big British destroyer tender Hecla, escorted by two destroyers. One of the destroyers, Venomous, which had Type 271 centimetric-wavelength radar, got a contact on U-515 at four thousand yards but inexplicably failed to inform the other vessels.
After an arduous five-hour chase at full speed, Henke gained a good shooting position. He fired a full bow salvo at the “Birmingham-class cruiser,” but two of the four torpedoes went astray. The cruiser Vindictive saw the wakes of these or the other two torpedoes and zigged to avoid. She had time to warn the destroyer tender Hecla, but, inexplicably, she failed to do so. As a result, two torpedoes slammed into Hecla but did not sink her. Vindictive fled the area; the destroyers Venomous and Marne commenced a U-boat hunt, but Marne soon broke off to stand by Hecla. Closing in, Henke fired two more torpedoes at Hecla. One hit her with a violent explosion; the other hit Marne and blew off her stern. Hecla sank, but Marne remained afloat. Of the 847 men on Hecla, 279 perished.
The destroyer Venomous gave up her U-boat hunt and took Marne in tow, stern first. Mistaking Marne for the “cruiser” he had been attempting to sink, Henke closed for yet another attack. When Venomous reported a radar contact, both destroyers opened up on U-515 with main batteries. Venomous then cut the towline and chased U-515 under, dropping five depth charges. The Admiralty later concluded that Venomous’s attack doubtless saved Marne. Inasmuch as the depth charges knocked out her sonar, Venomous again broke off the U-boat hunt and commenced rescuing the survivors of Hecla. Henke, meanwhile, mounted yet another attack, firing two torpedoes at Venomous, which evaded and speeded up to ram U-515. Henke dived to avoid Venomous, which dropped ten depth charges. He then slipped away in deep water. Since Venomous was low on fuel, a corvette in the area, Jonquil, took over the escort of Marne. Venomous went on to Casablanca with Hecla’s 568 survivors; Marne was eventually towed to Gibraltar.
The next boat of the second wave to make contact with the enemy was the new Type VII U-413, commanded by Gustav Poel, who was still on his maiden patrol from Kiel. While southbound on November 14, he ran into a northbound convoy, MK 1, consisting of British troopships returning from the Mediterranean to the British Isles with the new “jeep” carriers Biter and Dasher in company. In his first attack as captain, Poel hit and sank the valuable 20,000-ton troopship Warwick Castle.
In the early hours of November 14, several boats of the second wave found another homebound British convoy, Mediterranean-United Kingdom Fast Number 1 (MKF 1), about eighty miles due west of Gibraltar Strait. It was composed of eight big, fast transports and cargo vessels, escorted by five British destroyers, including the old (1918) but modernized Wrestler. The new “jeep” carrier Avenger and the small, old carrier Argus, both returning to England, sailed in company.
The British destroyer Wrestler picked up a surfaced U-boat on radar, five miles ahead. Wrestler raced in to ram, but at seven hundred yards, she aborted the attempt and the U-boat crash-dived, merely one hundred yards ahead. Wrestler fired fourteen depth charges “by eye” at the swirls and, while the convoy made an emergency turn, she lagged behind to hunt the U-boat. The official Admiralty assessment was “U-boat probably sunk,” and, in fact, Wrestler had destroyed U-98, commanded by a new skipper, Kurt Eichmann, age twenty-five, who had sailed from France on October 22. There were no survivors.*
When the convoy made its belated emergency turn to starboard, the maneuver greatly helped another U-boat. This was the Type IXC U-155, commanded by the Ritterkreuz holder Adolf-Cornelius Piening, who had sailed from France on November 7. Upon making contact, Piening fired a full bow salvo into the dense convoy formation. His torpedoes blew up and sank the 13,800-ton “jeep” carrier Avenger and the 11,300-ton British troop transport Ettrick, and damaged the 6,700-ton U.S. Navy cargo ship Almaak. The loss of life on the “jeep” carrier Avenger was horrific. Only twelve of the crew were rescued. The British withheld news of her loss.†
Nearby was the VIIC U-411, which had left France on November 7, commanded by a new skipper, Johann Spindlegger, age twenty-seven. A Hudson of Squadron 500, based at Gibraltar and piloted by another Ensor of the unit, John B., spotted U-411 on the surface about five miles distant. From an altitude of fifty feet, John Ensor dropped four depth charges on the boat, which crash-dived. She was never heard from again. Since the results of this attack were not known at the time, the Admiralty wrongly credited others for sinking U-411, but in recent years, it gave the kill to Ensor and his crew.
Only two other boats of the second wave—both new Type VIIs—had any success. On November 16, Adolf Oelrich in U-92, who had made one luckless North Atlantic patrol, sank the 7,700-ton Briti
sh freighter Clan Mactaggart. On November 20, Kurt Nölke, age twenty-eight, in U-263, still on his maiden voyage from Kiel, sank two heavily laden freighters from Gibraltar-bound convoy KR-S 3: the 7,200-ton Norwegian Prins Harald and the 5,100-ton British Grangepark.
Throughout the deployment of these U-boats directly west of Gibraltar, Allied ASW measures—particularly air patrols—remained intense. In addition to the loss of the Type VIIs U-98 and U-411, five boats incurred such severe damage that they were forced to abort.
• On November 15, Allied aircraft and surface ships teamed up on the Type VIID (minelayer) U-218, commanded by Richard Becker, who was attempting to sink a British destroyer. The damage inflicted was so great that Becker was forced to abort to France, concluding a fruitless patrol of twenty-seven days.
• On November 17, the veteran Type VII U-566, commanded by Gerhard Remus, which had been severely damaged in August, again incurred heavy damage. This time her nemesis was a Hudson of British Squadron 233, piloted by a sergeant, Eric Harold Smith. As a result of the air attack, U-566 developed an irreparable oil leak that forced Remus to abort to France. Repairs kept the boat out of action for over two months.
