Germany had no apparent territorial ambitions in Turkey, and had been more sympathetic to resurgent Turkish nationalism than the other great powers, seeing the advantage of opening markets in the Ottoman Empire for German goods. Germany had secured the contract for building a new railway line to Baghdad in 1903. In turn, the CUP had willingly sought the German military mission's help in reforming the army, though it should be noted that the gendarmerie remained under the command of a French officer, and the Ottoman navy had been under the command of a British officer, Rear Admiral Sir Arthur Limpus, since 1908. In 1914, indeed, two new battleships, the Readiye and the Sultan Osman, were being completed for the Turkish navy in British yards. It was also the case that France held 62.9 per cent of Turkey's foreign debt, and that Britain was the next largest overseas investor, holding 22 per cent of the foreign debt. Any approach to Turkey by the Entente, however, was hampered by Anglo-French indifference, coupled with Russian ambitions. The Turks were also mindful of the possibility that their neutrality in any confrontation between the great powers might give Russia the pretext to seize the straits. Nevertheless, some agreements were concluded with Britain, France and Russia on outstanding disputes, at a moment when the Germans seemed to be cooling towards an alliance with Turkey based on an assessment of Ottoman military weakness that was generally shared by all the great powers. In any case, the CUP leadership was more concerned with an escalating confrontation with Greece over two of the Aegean islands – Chios and Mytilene – which the Greeks had seized in the First Balkan War. The CUP even pursued the possibility of an alliance with Bulgaria, notwithstanding Bulgarian occupation of Thrace, in recognition of the new hostility between Greece and Bulgaria.
As Europe lurched towards war in July 1914, it appeared the opportunity might arise to revisit the Balkan Wars settlement, especially as Bulgaria had grown closer to Germany through acceptance of a large German financial loan. The imminent delivery of the new battleships would give Turkey naval supremacy over Greece. In addition, the public mood favoured revision of the existing status quo, and would be further mobilised behind the government if it succeeded in challenging foreign financial and legal immunities such as the despised Capitulations. In mid-July, therefore, Said Halim, Enver and Talât approached the German and Austro-Hungarian ambassadors in Constantinople, seeking their support for a Turkish alliance with Bulgaria. Neither Liman, nor the German ambassador, Baron Hans von Wangenheim, believed the Turks were unlikely to prove anything other than a liability as an ally. As recently as March 1914, the Chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, had described the Ottoman Empire as ‘militarily a nonentity’ and dying rather than sick.9 Nevertheless, Kaiser Wilhelm II insisted upon a favourable response, for he had long been attracted to the idea of posing as a liberator of Muslim populations under British, French and Russian rule. Said Halim proposed a formal alliance on 27 July outlining the conditions upon which Turkey would enter a war between Germany and Russia. Enver then met Wangenheim and Liman on 1 August to discuss a war strategy, it being agreed that the Turkish army would mass on the Russian frontier while remaining dependent upon Bulgarian and Romanian actions. Said Halim and Wangenheim signed the secret treaty of alliance on 2 August 1914. It was concluded with the knowledge of only a handful of Unionist leaders: Cavid and Cemal were not informed. Meanwhile, all factions were then satisfied by the simultaneous decision on 3 August to mobilise and to declare neutrality, the latter being publicly declared on 5 August. The alliance was concluded on the assumption by at least Said Halim that the war would be over quickly, that both Bulgaria and Romania would join the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and that Turkey could fight a war with Bulgarian assistance only against Greece and Serbia. In fact, Bulgaria did not enter the war until October 1915.
Wangenheim himself was far from sanguine at Turkish readiness for war, and urged on Berlin the benefits of keeping the Turks as benevolent neutrals. A tall, burly man, Wangenheim was physically imposing, but, according to Lewis Einstein, lacked sufficient diplomatic dignity for he was ‘far too nervous, mercurial, and journalistic in his methods’.10 For his part, Enver, who became deputy commander-in-chief on 2 August – the Sultan was nominally commander-in-chief – kept repeating his promise to enter the war as soon as possible. On 3 August he ordered mines laid at the entrances of the Straits. Enver, though, was not quite the hawk usually depicted, for he also held out against actually initiating action for some time in anticipation of reaping the full benefits of a German alliance without risking war. His own estimation back in February 1914 had been that the Turkish army would not be ready for a war for five years, and by that he meant only a localised war in the Balkans.
The Germans were certainly anxious to bring the Turks into the war against Russia as soon as possible. Part of the requirement for a successful war against Russia was naval supremacy in the Black Sea, but on 3 August the British government had unilaterally seized for the Royal Navy all foreign warships being built in British yards, though financial compensation was promised: the Readiye and the Sultan Osman became respectively HMS Erin and HMS Agincourt. Limpus had been expecting to sail out to greet the two ships in late July, and arrangements had been made for a week of celebration. The posting of British guards over the vessels on 29 July then alerted the Turks to the British seizure of their vessels in advance, and the Turkish ambassador had been told two days later that they would be detained temporarily. On 1 August, therefore, when Enver offered the Sultan Osman to the Germans as additional enticement, it was in the knowledge that the offer was worthless. With the apparent knowledge of only Said Halim, Enver had already invited the Germans and Austro-Hungarians on the same day to send their own warships through the Straits in clear violation of international law, which prohibited neutral powers from harbouring belligerent warships. On 3 August the German Admiralty accepted the invitation for two warships under the command of Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, the battlecruiser Goeben, and the light cruiser Breslau, which had been cruising in the Mediterranean. Souchon was described as ‘a droop-jawed determined little man in a long, ill-fitting frock-coat, looking more like a parson than an admiral’.11
Despite appearances, Souchon proved an energetic and skilful seaman. The German ships were sighted by British battlecruisers off the North African coast the following morning, before a state of war formally existed between Britain and Germany. Despite failing boilers in the Goeben – four seamen were scalded to death and many others collapsed from exhaustion – Souchon outpaced the shadowing British ships. His force was sighted again off the straits of Messina on 6 August, but Rear Admiral Troubridge felt unable to risk engaging the two German ships with inferior armoured cruisers, and Admiral Sir Berkley Milne, sailing with his battlecruisers, concluded that watching the Austro-Hungarian fleet was a greater priority and, in any case, fully expected Souchon to double back to the western Mediterranean. Souchon passed the Straits on 10 August, after Enver personally authorised their admittance to Turkish waters. Milne was never employed again. Though Troubridge was acquitted by the court martial he had demanded, he did not command at sea thereafter, eventually commanding naval guns landed in support of the Serbian army.
The arrival of the two German ships brought considerable internal debate, Said Halim having previously told Wangenheim that they would not be permitted to enter the Straits. Meanwhile Cavid and Cemal had raised their objections to the secret treaty of alliance of which they were now aware. On 4 August, therefore, Said Halim and Talât had proposed a revision to its terms, tying Turkish entry to the war to that of Bulgaria, and to Romanian neutrality. Germany would also be required to support abolition of the Capitulations; to support Turkey's attempts to conclude agreements with Bulgaria and Romania; to guarantee the return to Turkey of the Aegean islands if Greece came into the war; to redraw the Balkan frontiers; to restore the 1878 frontiers in the Caucasus; to forswear any separate peace while any Turkish territory lost during a war remained in enemy hands; and to provide
a post-war indemnity. In return, the Goeben and Breslau would be admitted through the Straits. Wangenheim agreed on 6 August, since the Germans anticipated that the arrival of their ships would accelerate Turkish entry to the war and, as he informed Berlin, most of the provisions were dependent upon a decisive German victory. As soon as the ships arrived, Enver certainly pressed to unleash them against Russian targets, but his colleagues would not act while Bulgaria remained neutral. On 9 August the Turkish Cabinet had also agreed to maintain neutrality until the course of events elsewhere became clearer. Wangenheim was also informed that, to maintain the pretence of neutrality, there should be an immediate (but fictional) announcement that the Goeben and Breslau had been purchased by Turkey. It was announced by the Turks that the purchase had taken place for 80 million marks on 11 August, before the Germans had actually agreed to it: Goeben became the Yavuz Sultan Selim, and Breslau the Midilli. The British and French were informed that the German crews would be replaced as soon they could be replaced, an assurance accepted by the British prime minister, Asquith, who was content that ‘Turkish sailors cannot navigate her [the Goeben] – except on to rocks or mines’.12 In reality, Souchon and his crews simply put on fezzes, but Asquith proved partly right in the long run. The German ships did not emerge into the Mediterranean again until 1918, when they might have made a significant difference to the naval balance had they joined the Austro-Hungarian navy in the Adriatic. Meanwhile, the German Military Mission extended its control over the Turkish army, and began preparations for campaigns against Egypt, and against Odessa on Russia's Black Sea coast. Wangenheim was told, however, that the Goeben and Breslau must stay within the straits until an alliance was concluded with Bulgaria.
To a greater or lesser extent, Said Halim, Cemal and Talât were now all happy to delay matters for the foreseeable future, though Talât and Halil were sent to open negotiations with Bulgaria, Romania and even the Greeks. Bulgaria finally signed a treaty of alliance with Turkey on 19 August, but one without any obligation to enter the war. It was also clear that Bulgaria would not act without a guarantee of Romanian neutrality. Increasingly, Said Halim was inclined towards Cavid's preference for strict neutrality, to which Cemal also appeared attracted. Cavid and Cemal, indeed, opened discussions with the British, French and Russian ambassadors, seeking various guarantees for the future integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and for the return of territory lost to Bulgaria should the latter join Germany. The Entente powers were prepared to guarantee Turkish territorial integrity if Turkey remained neutral, but the CUP leadership felt this an empty promise given Russian ambitions. Enver, however, was now pushing ahead with his own preparations for war regardless, but Souchon counselled caution until more war supplies were received from Germany, and until the outer defences of the Dardanelles had been strengthened.
The initial German military successes, which had encouraged Enver to pressure his colleagues into intervention, looked less impressive by early September 1914, with the Germans retreating from the Marne and the Austro-Hungarians suffering defeat against the Russians in Galicia. Though Talât had now swung his support behind Enver, the other CUP leaders believed that greater concessions could be won from the British, French and Russians. On 9 September, therefore, to increase leverage on the Entente powers, the Turkish leadership unilaterally abrogated the Capitulations, and raised customs duties. Wangenheim and his Austro-Hungarian opposite number publicly joined the ambassadors of Britain, France and Russia in their formal protest. Wangenheim in particular believed it simply a further ruse to delay Ottoman entry to the war, but was also worried about the position of Europeans in Turkey without the former legal safeguards. There was little he could do, however, and he was forced to indicate, albeit in private, that the issue would not be pressed. It had the desired effect, with the Entente ambassadors all indicating a willingness to negotiate. In turn, the Germans now upped the pressure, Wangenheim and Souchon both urging that the fleet be allowed to enter the Black Sea. Their expectation, of course, was that Souchon would be able to manufacture a suitable incident at sea with the Russians to force war. A game of cat and mouse ensued within the CUP leadership, with Enver authorising a naval foray on 14 September, but being forced to cancel it when Said Halim threatened to resign as Grand Vizier. Cemal had also reacted violently to the authorisation. A furious Souchon threatened to go ahead on 19 September on his own authority. On Berlin's instructions, Wangenheim then reluctantly ordered Souchon to make a brief excursion on the following day, on the grounds that Germany was entitled to use its own ships as it pleased: so much for the fiction that they were Turkish. Enver and Talât argued that sending the ships into the Black Sea would deter Romania from joining the Entente, a patently absurd suggestion. On 21 September, Souchon then did take the Breslau briefly into the Black Sea, despite an equally absurd threat by Cavid and Cemal that the forts guarding the Bosphorus would be ordered to fire on it.
The near panic that followed enabled Enver to persuade his colleagues that Souchon should be allowed to take Goeben and Breslau into the Black Sea in pursuit of German interests, provided he did not provoke war. Paradoxically, he also managed to persuade them that, if Souchon formally accepted command of the Ottoman navy, then he could take the whole fleet. Limpus had resigned the appointment as soon as the German vessels had passed the Dardanelles, and, not surprisingly, Souchon accepted the invitation on 24 September. The British promptly withdrew the remainder of their naval mission and, on 26 September, indicated that Ottoman ships passing into the Mediterranean would now be regarded as hostile. In retaliation, on 29 September, Enver declared the Straits closed to shipping. Characteristically, he did not consult his colleagues. Meeting Said Halim after a Cabinet meeting at which Enver's decision had been reported, Henry Morgenthau described the Grand Vizier as white faced and trembling, ‘a picture of abject helplessness and fear’.13 Enver's colleagues, however, still had sufficient resolve to refuse to allow him to despatch Souchon's fleet into the Black Sea, and even elements within the army were questioning whether war preparations should continue. Touchy and short-fused at the best of times, Liman had been pressing for Turkish entry to the war for some time: he had even threatened at one point to withdraw the German military mission unilaterally if the Turks did not act. The German war minister, Erich von Falkenhayn, had also lost patience, having refused on 10 September to send any more war supplies to Turkey until the promise to enter the war had been honoured. It was increasingly clear that Turkey could no longer avoid commitment without risking abandonment by Germany.
Enver and Talât resolved to break the deadlock within the CUP leadership by securing a German financial loan. Cavid did not expect the Germans to respond but, on 6 October, the Germans duly offered a loan of the equivalent of 5 million Turkish pounds in bullion. Initially, the Germans had insisted that 95 per cent could not be released until Turkey actually entered the war, but Wangenheim was persuaded on 11 October that at least 40 per cent should be advanced. Halil had now been won over by Enver and Talât. Cemal was also brought on side on 9 October, possibly by the promise of command of the proposed advance on Egypt and the Suez Canal, since he harboured ambitions to rule a conquered Egypt, an ambition he shared with Said Halim. The German gold arrived in two instalments, on 16 and 21 October, being routed through Austria-Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria by special train. On 22 October, Enver notified the Germans of his intention to attack Russia at sea without declaration of war, and to attack into both the Caucasus and Egypt. Souchon was also given sealed orders to proceed to attack the Russian fleet, to be opened upon receipt of a radio message from Enver, once the Cabinet had finally agreed on war. Talât and Halil seem to have had second thoughts, but Enver and Cemal were resolved on action. Apparently without the knowledge of Said Halim and Cavid, Souchon went to sea on 27 October.
In fact, no message was received from Enver, and Souchon resolved to act himself. As he described it, Souchon went to sea in anticipation that he ‘would not, so to speak, prevent the ca
nons from discharging by themselves’ if he met the Russians.14 He was meant to provoke a Russian reaction but, instead, two days later, he bombarded Sebastopol, Odessa and two other Russian Black Sea ports, laid mines and sank some merchant ships, claiming that the Russians had attacked him first. Said Halim and Cavid staged a rearguard action to try to avoid war, and a conciliatory note was sent to Russia on 1 November. It was too late. Russia formally declared war on Turkey on 2 November, followed by Britain and France on 5 November. Cavid resigned that same day, as did three further ministers, though Said Halim and two others were persuaded to remain. Within the CUP Central Committee, the vote for war had been 17 to 10. The formal Turkish counter-declaration on 11 November 1914 duly invoked a jihad against the infidel.
The Making of the First World War Page 6
