Precisely how Sarajevo propelled Europe into a global conflict remains a matter of debate, but there is little doubt that there were those within Austria-Hungary who saw Franz Ferdinand's demise as an opportunity to neutralise the threat of Serbia. Influence in Central Europe was lost to Germany after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and, having lost Venetia and Lombardy to Italy in 1871, Austria-Hungary's only opportunity to preserve the notion of great-power status lay in the Balkans. Here, however, the empire was confronted with the emergence from within the Ottoman Empire of new nation states with irredentist claims on her own imperial possessions. Serbia had doubled the size of its territory and increased its population by 1.5 million between 1912 and 1913 as a result of victories in the Balkan Wars. A more militaristic Serbian dynasty had taken power in Belgrade by a coup in 1903. Its aim was for a greater Serbia embracing Montenegro, parts of Macedonia and, ultimately, the two southern Slav provinces of the empire, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The latter had been occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878 and formally annexed in 1908. Dalmatia, Croatia and Slovenia also appeared to be in the sights of the Serb leadership. Vienna had mobilised its forces against Serbia both during the annexation of Bosnia and during the Balkan Wars, and influential younger policymakers in Vienna's Foreign Ministry all looked to solve the empire's problems through a preventative war against Serbia. The Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, for example, pressed for war against Serbia in 1906, 1908–09, 1912–13, and an astonishing twenty-five times between January 1913 and January 1914. The Foreign Minister, Leopold, Count Berchtold, shared Conrad's determination and the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 therefore seemed a gift. Indeed, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade was instructed as early as 7 July that war must be forced on Serbia.
Ironically, Franz Ferdinand had led those advocating a peaceful solution to the empire's relationship with Serbia. His idea of reconstructing the empire by giving the Slavs the same autonomy enjoyed by the Hungarians since 1867 was precisely what made him a target for the Serbian secret society known as the Black Hand, though its real title was Union or Death. The Black Hand's leader was Serbia's chief of the military secret service, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic (nicknamed ‘Apis’, or the Bull), but the Serb government was not actually involved in the Sarajevo assassination. Theoretically, the Black Hand was also distanced from the deed, since the assassins were members of the Young Bosnia movement and Austro-Hungarian subjects. Clearly, however, Conrad and Berchtold were determined to exploit the assassination from the beginning. No one mourned Franz Ferdinand, for all that mattered was to act decisively to preserve the empire and Austria-Hungary's status as a great power. The Austro-Hungarian leadership therefore consciously risked a general war, though without contemplating how war would achieve their objective. Only the Hungarian prime minister, Count Tisza, hesitated. Tisza, however, was sympathetic towards Germany. He accepted war once he was assured of German support and of Romanian neutrality, and that Serbia itself would not be annexed after its intended defeat, since he feared the consequences of incorporating more Slavs into the empire. German support, without which Vienna would not act, was secured as early as 5 July, a letter from Franz Joseph to the Kaiser receiving an unequivocal statement of support, known henceforth to history as the ‘blank cheque’. For its own reasons of securing the general war that it felt necessary to preserve Germany's status, the German military and political leadership were fully committed to backing Vienna and knew all too well the likely outcome. They were also fully aware of the weaknesses of the Austro-Hungarian army from the detailed reports of the German military attaché in Vienna.
Finalised on 19 July, the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was presented to the Serb government on 23 July. It was always intended to be unacceptable. It demanded the suppression of the Black Hand and of anti-Austrian propaganda, the dismissal of Serbian officers implicated in anti-Austrian activities, the arrest of named suspects, the tightening of border controls and the participation of Austrian representatives in an official inquiry to be carried out by the Serbs. The Serbs accepted the ultimatum on 25 July with the exception of allowing Austrian officials on Serbian soil, but this was still sufficient for Vienna to go to war. The draft declaration of war was put before Franz Joseph on 27 July, Berchtold having argued that a compromise might be found ‘unless a clear situation is created by a declaration of war’. Thus, Vienna was determined to seek a ‘final and fundamental reckoning’ with Serbia, as Berchtold informed the German ambassador, at all costs.9 War was declared on Serbia on 28 July, though not on Russia until 6 August, with Britain and France declaring war on Austria-Hungary only on 12 August 1914.
The role of Franz Joseph himself in the crucial decision-making that summer was a peripheral one. The emperor still enjoyed unchallenged authority but, at eighty-four, understandably, there was not the same vigour as of earlier years, though he had continued to attend the annual military manoeuvres on horseback until 1912. Moreover, he was still recovering from a severe attack of bronchitis in April 1914. Back in 1881, Crown Prince Rudolf had written of his father's perceived isolation, ‘Only those people now in power have access to him, and they naturally interpret matters in the way that is most satisfying to them.’ Rudolf concluded that his father was ‘kept from any purely human contact, from any non-partisan, truly thoughtful advice’.10 Nonetheless, in earlier imperial crises, Franz Joseph had been firmly at the centre. During the run-up to the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, for example, Franz Joseph had presided over five conferences in twelve days, but he had attended none of the thirty-nine Common Ministerial Conferences in the three and a half years leading up to war in 1914. Now he did not return to Vienna for three weeks, remaining on holiday at Bad Ischl, some five hours’ travelling distance from Vienna, until 30 July, forcing Berchtold to travel there on five occasions to consult him. With Franz Ferdinand's alternative circle of advisers at the Upper Belvedere Palace effectively dissolved by his death, Berchtold and Conrad had considerable freedom of action, though their decisions still required the emperor's formal written agreement. According to his aide, Albert von Margutti, Franz Joseph was reluctant to go to war and came under pressure from Conrad and Berchtold. Franz Joseph seems to have expected any war to be localised and, though apparently surprised by the harshness of the ultimatum to Serbia, made no effort to alter it. Nor, apparently, did he believe breaking off diplomatic relations would necessarily mean war. Certainly, he was aware of the risks of the ultimatum, remarking to the joint Finance Minister, Leo von Bilinski, ‘Yes I know, Russia cannot possibly tolerate such a note.’ Nonetheless, there was the honour of the dynasty to consider, Berchtold suggesting that the issue for the emperor was that ‘it was clear our role in world history would be over if we feebly allowed fate to do what it willed’. Thus, in remarkably similar terms to Czernin's fatalistic judgement, Franz Joseph told Conrad, ‘If the monarchy has to perish, then it shall perish honourably.’ In signing the mobilisation order, in ‘a muffled, choked voice’, the emperor remarked only, ‘So, after all’.11
Fatalism had always been part of Franz Joseph's make-up. Back in 1866 he had written, ‘When the whole world is against you and you have no friends, there is little chance of success, but you must go on doing what you can, fulfilling your duty, and, in the end, going down with honour.’ Again, despite early, relatively good news from the front, Franz Joseph remarked to Karl's wife, Zita, on 17 August 1914, ‘My wars have always begun with victories only to finish in defeats. And this time it will be even worse and they will say of me, “He is old and cannot cope any longer”.’12 Fatalism appears to have been the predominant mood.
The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia had been held off because Conrad, after such frequent demands for preventative action in the past, had to admit that it was not possible immediately to recall men furloughed for the annual harvest. To do so would also alert Europe's diplomats to Austro-Hungarian intentions. Thus mobilisation of between 2.5 and 3 mil
lion men would be delayed. Conrad was another complex personality and by no means a conventional soldier. In 1915 he was able to marry his long-term mistress, the married Gina von Reininghaus, bypassing difficult Austrian divorce and remarriage laws through having her convert to Protestantism, and becoming a Hungarian national in being adopted by a compliant friend. Gina was then installed in Conrad's headquarters at Teschen in Silesia for the remainder of his wartime command, which at least meant that he no longer devoted the hours he had previously in writing a long daily letter to her. At one point before the war he had said that his best chance of marrying Gina was to return home a victorious war hero, as her husband would then divorce her, and some have even suggested that this was an additional motivation for his bellicosity in 1914. Conrad dabbled in philosophy and, as a convinced Social Darwinist and fatalist, believed in the inevitability of war. In the past, his search for a likely enemy had often bordered on fantasy: he had contemplated war against both Japan and China. He had been dismissed as chief of staff in December 1911 for his aggressive stance, only to be reinstated in December 1912 during the diplomatic crisis arising from the outbreak of the First Balkan War. The volatile Conrad had also resigned in September 1913 when Franz Ferdinand had insisted he attend Mass on manoeuvres. Espousing scientific materialism rather than the archduke's ardent Catholicism, Conrad testily replied that he was there ‘to conduct manoeuvres, not to go to Mass’.13 The emperor ordered Conrad to retract his resignation. For all his warmongering, however, Conrad feared war on different fronts simultaneously, with Russia, Italy and Serbia all posing threats. But, if he was apprehensive of the outcome, war had to be waged ‘since an old monarchy and a glorious army must not perish without glory’.14 Isolated in his headquarters at Teschen, Conrad visited the front only three times, yet was ultimately the longest-serving director of any belligerent's war effort, only finally being dismissed by Karl in February 1917.
In pre-war talks with the German General Staff, Conrad had formed the erroneous impression that Germany would support Austria-Hungary by an early offensive against the Russians. The Germans had formed the equally erroneous impression that there would be Austro-Hungarian help in defending East Prussia against the Russians through an immediate Austro-Hungarian offensive. Thus, in 1914, Conrad had his conscript army divided into three groups, one opposite the Russians in Galicia, one opposite Serbia, and one as a reserve. Conrad assumed he could safely attack Serbia in the expectation that Russia would not intervene and decided to commit the reserve to this front as well. In order to redirect the reserve to the Russian front, Conrad had to do so no later than five days after mobilisation began, for all Austro-Hungarian military trains moved at the speed of the slowest – about 10 miles per hour. Conrad knew that the Russians had mobilised on 31 July, but did not choose to order the recall of his reserves from Serbia until 6 August. The head of the Russian section of his Railroad Bureau had assured him that there would be no transportation problem but, in any case, Conrad had determined on destroying Serbia. As a result, the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Serbia failed, despite the shortcomings of a Serbian army badly affected by losses in the Balkan wars. Bizarrely, the Serbian commander-in-chief, Radomir Putnik, was taking the waters in Austria-Hungary when war broke out and had the only set of keys with him to the safe containing Serbia's mobilisation plans: Franz Joseph's old-world courtesy allowed Putnik's return to Belgrade. In the oft-quoted words of Winston Churchill, Conrad's reserve left the Serbian front ‘before it could win him a victory. It returned to Conrad in time to participate in his defeat’, for the Austro-Hungarian front in Galicia collapsed at Lemberg between 3 and 10 September.15 The Austro-Hungarian army lost 300,000 men – a third of its combat effective – in the first three weeks of war and 750,000 men in the first six months. Among the dead was Conrad's son, Herbert. Belgrade was taken on 2 December 1914, but a Serbian counter-offensive soon forced its abandonment.
Failure was due to poor leadership, inadequate equipment as a result of a long-restricted defence budget, and a resolute opponent. Like much else in the multinational empire, the army was also hampered by problems of nationality. In 1914, by one calculation, 26.7 per cent of the army was German, 22.3 per cent Hungarian, 13.5 per cent Czech, 8.5 per cent Polish, 8.1 per cent Ruthenian, 6.7 per cent Croat or Serb, 6.4 per cent Romanian, 3.8 per cent Slovak, 2 per cent Slovene and 1.4 per cent Italian. German officers and NCOs stiffened non-German units and, overall, more than 78 per cent of officers were German, resulting in considerable problems when officer casualties proved heavy. Other than Germans, the Croats, Slovenes and Bosnian Muslims were deemed most reliable and, proportionally, the latter were the most conscripted during the war. Not all nationalities were equally committed to the war effort and the list of those regarded as unreliable steadily grew. One Czech regiment unfurled the Bohemian flag upon mobilisation in Prague in August 1914 and another surrendered en masse to the Russians in April 1915. It soon became the practice to station Italian units in the Balkans or on the Eastern Front. Croats, Slovenes and Serbs were generally content to fight the Italians once they came into the war against Austria-Hungary in May 1915. By 1917, nationalities were increasingly being mixed rather than allowed to serve in separate units.
During the war 2.7 million Austro-Hungarian troops became prisoners. After the collapse of Russia in 1917, 500,000 Austro-Hungarian prisoners were repatriated. Though relatively few had volunteered to fight for the Entente, they were all regarded with considerable suspicion and kept under close supervision, causing yet further resentment. About 60,000 Czechs formed a Czech Legion for the Provisional Government after the fall of the Tsar in March 1917, and subsequently the Bolsheviks recruited between 85,000 and 100,000 prisoners, the majority Magyars. Most joined, however, from hatred of their officers rather than out of ideological sympathy with the cause, though the best-known defector, Béla Kun, went on to lead the short-lived communist republic in Hungary in 1919.
The defeats of 1914 had been a heavy blow and it was said that the surrender of the fortress of Przemysl to the Russians in March 1915 reduced Franz Joseph to tears. Austro-Hungarian success thereafter depended largely on German reinforcements and German commanders, Paul von Hindenburg becoming supreme commander in the east in 1916. After Hindenburg became Chief of the German General Staff in August 1916, Kaiser Wilhelm II became supreme commander on all fronts with Hindenburg acting in his name. Thus, the overrunning of Serbia in October 1915 and of Romania, which entered the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary in August 1916, were essentially German victories. By 1918, the Austro-Hungarian army was falling apart. At least 400,000 men deserted between June and September 1918. By October 1918, many appeared to be just waiting for an allied advance to which they could surrender, as a British and Italian offensive on 24 October broke through at Vittorio Veneto. Indeed, some 500,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers surrendered between 26 October and 3 November 1918, with only some 30,000 men becoming casualties in the same period. The war as a whole cost Austria-Hungary 1.2 million dead.
German military domination raises the question of the relationship within the alliance generally. It has often been said, reflecting a remark by Conrad in early 1915, that Germany was effectively a ‘secret enemy’ rather than an open ally of Austria-Hungary.16 Germany continued to pursue expansion when Austria-Hungary had essentially achieved its own war aims by 1916 with the defeat of Serbia, the containment of Italy and the pushing back of the Russians. Austro-Hungarian ambitions with regard to Poland and Romania clearly rested on German largesse. Vienna was forced to agree to a public commitment to a post-war independent monarchy in Russian Poland in November 1916, rather than achieving its preferred solution of unifying Russian Poland and Austrian Galicia as an autonomous kingdom with a Habsburg sovereign. In May 1917 Germany agreed to offer Romania to Austria-Hungary (though with a substantial German interest in Romania's oil fields) by way of compensation for the loss of Poland, but subsequently demanded part of Austrian Silesia.
The Making of the First World War Page 15
