The view, thus vaguely stated, has a natural appeal, and might seem to be simply part of the obvious view that language is conventional: our words refer to what we take them to refer to, and our thoughts are about various things in virtue of our ability to, as Russell puts it, “describe” those things. A good deal of modern philosophy of mind and of language revolves around the question of whether, and if so in what sense, this basic idea can be right. The central line of argument against the Fregean view turns on the claim that reference is not determined exclusively by what’s explicitly represented by competent speakers, but is determined (in part) by other, non-represented relationships between speakers and those references. With respect to proper names, for example, it has been argued that speakers can refer via the use of names without knowing uniquely-identifying qualities of the names’ bearers; what’s required instead is intentional participation in a community-wide practice, one whose details need not be represented.25 A similar argument applies to natural-kind terms like “water” and “gold”; here the idea is that successful reference does not require explicit representation of features of the kinds in question, but something more like an appropriate spatial or causal relationship to instances of the kind.26 With respect to indexical terms like “I” and “yesterday,” it has been argued that the explicitly-represented information is insufficient to determine reference, and that non-represented features of the speaker’s context play an essential role in the determination of reference.27 In all of these cases, the argument against the central Fregean thesis is that if the sense of a singular term is just what the competent speaker understands, then sense is insufficient to determine reference.
Similar reasons have prompted some to disagree with Frege’s idea that there are two kinds of semantic value for each piece of language. Here the argument has been most pronounced with respect to proper names: the claim is that proper names have only a single semantic role, which is to refer to their bearers. Other features of names, it is argued, for example, the collection of things that the user knows about the bearer, are taken on this view to form merely collateral information, and not to serve as part of the semantics of the name. Definite descriptions, on the other hand, have on this line of argument just the relevant descriptive properties as semantic value, while the reference is merely collateral.28
Arguments in favor of something like the Fregean position turn on the kinds of considerations originally raised by Frege himself. That proper names have senses is argued for by noting that two co-referring proper names can play different semantic roles, as can be seen by the possibility of turning an informative statement into a tautology by substituting an instance of a proper name for an instance of a co-referring one. That sense (or: something explicitly represented by competent speakers) determines reference is argued for by noting, for example, that contextual features and the speaker’s relationship to them are part of what is, in the relevant cases, explicitly represented by speakers.29 And so on.
Current debates regarding the role of descriptive mental representation in successful reference, and the necessity of a two-tiered semantic theory, go well beyond Frege’s own relatively rudimentary views about mental content and semantics. But the power of those original views is still felt in these debates, with Frege’s central questions still very much alive, and his fundamental ideas about language and thought forming an important theoretical stronghold.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Main Works by Frege
Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle: Louis Nebert Verlag, 1879. English translation by Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg as Begriffsschrift, A Formula Language, Modeled Upon That of Arithmetic, for Pure Thought in van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gödel, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967, 5–82.
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl, Breslau: Wilhelm Koebner Verlag, 1884. English translation by J. L. Austin as The Foundations of Arithmetic. A Logico Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number, Oxford: Blackwell, 1953.
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik Band I, II Jena: Hermann Pohle 1893, 1903. Partial English translation by M. Furth as The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967.
Complete English translation by P. Ebert and M. Rossberg as Gottlob Frege: Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Oxford University Press, 2013.
Main Collections of Frege’s Work and Correspondence (German)
[1964] Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, Ignacio Angelelli (ed.), Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.
[1983] Nachgelassene Schriften (2nd revised edition), H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach (eds.), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
[1976] Gottlob Frege: Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, G. Gabriel, H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Thiel, and A Veraart (eds.), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
[1990] Kleine Schriften (2nd edition), I. Angelelli (ed.), Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.
Main Collections of Frege’s Work and Correspondence (English)
[1952] Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Peter Geach and Max Black (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell Press; 3rd edition 1980.
[1979] Posthumous Writings, H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Translation of most of Frege [1983].)
[1980] Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, G. Gabriel, H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Thiel, and A. Veraart (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Translation of most of Frege [1976].)
[1984] Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, B. McGuinness (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Translation of most of Frege [1990].)
[1997] The Frege Reader, Michael Beaney (ed.), Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Some Recent Books on Frege
Beaney, Michael and Erich Reck (eds.), Gottlob Frege—Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, London and New York: Routledge, 2005.
Blanchette, Patricia, Frege’s Conception of Logic, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Demopoulos, William (ed.), Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.
Dummett, Michael, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1981 (2nd edn.).
Dummett, Michael, The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.
Dummett, Michael, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.
Gabriel, Gottfried and Uwe Dathe (eds.), Gottlob Frege. Werk und Wirkung, Paderborn: Mentis, 2000.
Heck, Richard, Frege’s Theorem, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Heck, Richard, Reading Frege’s Grundgesetze, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Kreiser, Lothar, Gottlob Frege: Leben, Werk, Zeit, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001.
Potter, Michael and Tom Ricketts (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Frege, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Russell, Bertrand, “On Denoting,” Mind 14 (56) (1905), 479–93.
Russell, Bertrand and Whitehead, Alfred North, Principia Mathematica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910–13.
Sluga, Hans, Gottlob Frege, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Press, 1980.
Weiner, Joan, Frege in Perspective, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.
Wright, Crispin, Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects, Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press, 1983.
* * *
1 See Lothar Kreiser, Gottlob Frege: Leben, Werk, Zeit, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001). Also see: Nikolay Milkov, “Frege in Context,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (3) 2001: 557–70; Gottfried Gabriel and Wolfgang Kienzler (eds.), Frege in Jena. Beiträge zur Spurensicherung (Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie, vol. 2) (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1997); Gottfried Gabriel and Uwe Dathe (eds.), Gottlob Frege. Werk und Wirkung (Paderborn: Mentis, 2000); Christian Thiel and Michael Bea
ney, “Frege’s Life and Work” in Michael Beaney and Erich Reck (eds.), Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers Vol. I, Routledge 2005.
2 Halle: L. Nebert, 1879. English translation by Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg as Begriffsschrift, A Formula Language, Modeled Upon That of Arithmetic, for Pure Thought in van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 5–82.
3 Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl (Breslau: Wilhelm Koebner, 1884). English translation by J. L. Austin as The Foundations of Arithmetic, A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953). (Hereafter, Grundlagen.)
4 Grundlagen §55.
5 Grundgesetze der Arithmetik Band I (Jena: Hermann Pohle, 1893). Partial English translation by M. Furth as The Basic Laws of Arithmetic (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). (Hereafter: Grundgesetze I)
6 “Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100, 25–50. Reprinted in I. Angelelli (ed.), Kleine Schriften (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1990) (2nd edn.) (hereafter, KS), 143–62. English translation by M. Black as “On Sense and Meaning” in B. McGuinness (ed.), Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy (Oxford and New York: Blackwell Press, 1984) (hereafter, CP), 157–77.
7 Funktion und Begriff, (Jena: Hermann Pohle, 1891). Reprinted in KS 125–42. English translation as “Function and Concept” in CP 137–56.
8 “Über Begriff und Gegenstand,” Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16 (1892) 192–205. Reprinted in KS 167–78. English translation as “On Concept and Object” in CP 182–94.
9 This is somewhat over-simple. For Frege also acknowledges higher-level concepts; these are functions not from objects to truth-values, but from functions to truth-values.
10 Grundgesetze der Arithmetik Band II (Jena: Hermann Pohle, 1893).
11 Russell to Frege June 16, 1902. English translation in Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, Gabriel et al. (eds.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) (hereafter, PMC) 130–31.
12 See the Appendix to Grundgesetze I.
13 See “Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung der Arithmetik,” dated by the editors at 1924/25, in Hermes et al. (eds.), Nachgelassene Schriften (2nd revised edition) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983), 298–302. English translation in Hermes et al. (eds.), Posthumous Writings (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) (hereafter, PW), 278–81.
14 David Hilbert, Grundlagen der Geometrie (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1900). English translation of the 10th edition: Foundations of Geometry, L. Unger (trans.), P. Bernays (ed.) (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1971).
15 Letters between Frege and Hilbert 1895–1903. English translation in PMC 32–52.
16 “Über die Grundlagen der Geometrie,” Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 12, 1903, 319–24, 368–75. Reprinted in KS 262–72. English translation as “Foundations of Geometry: First Series” in CP 272–84. “Über die Grundlagen der Geometrie,” Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 15, 1906, 293–309, 377–403, 423–30. Reprinted in KS 281–323. English translation as “Foundations of Geometry: Second Series” in CP 293–340.
17 “Der Gedanke,” Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I, 1918, 58–77, reprinted in KS 342–61; English translation in CP 351–72. (Hereafter, “Der Gedanke.”) “Die Verneinung,” Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I, 1918, 143–57, reprinted in KS 362–77; English translation in CP 372–89. “Gedankengefüge,” Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus III, 1923, 36–51, reprinted in KS 378–94; English translation in CP 378–94.
18 “Der Gedanke” 69 (KS 353; CP 363).
19 Letter to Alfred Frege of July 26, 1925, quoted by Hermes, Kambartel and Kaulbach in their historical introduction to Frege (PW ix).
20 That is not to say that here Frege was alone: the quantifier was also introduced at roughly the same time, though independently, by Giuseppe Peano and by C. S. Peirce.
21 Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, Principia Mathematica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910–13).
22 Kurt Gödel, “Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I” (“On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems I”) in Feferman et al. (eds.), Kurt Gödel Collected Works Volume I (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1986), 144–95.
23 Grundgesetze I, x (Furth 6).
24 See, for example, Crispin Wright, Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects (Aberdeen University Press, 1983) for a defense of what has come to be known as the “neo-Fregean” approach to logicism.
25 See Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980 (hereafter, Kripke).
26 See Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of Meaning,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1975), 131–93; also Kripke.
27 See John Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives,” Philosophical Review 86 (4) (1977), 474–97 and John Perry, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical,” Nous 13 (1979), 3–21.
28 See Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting,” Mind 14 (56) (1905), 479–93.
29 See John Searle, Intentionality, an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS
CHAPTER 12
IDEALISM
TERRY PINKARD
12.1 INTRODUCTION
WHEN we look back at the big picture of nineteenth-century philosophy, its first part (at least on the continent) largely consisted in elaborating idealism, whereas in the second half of the nineteenth century the continent widely rejected idealism. As the continent discarded it, in British and American philosophy idealism found a new life. However, idealism’s role in nineteenth-century Anglophone philosophy ultimately simply set the stage for the dogged Anglophone rejection of idealism in the twentieth century.
As a philosophical stance, idealism has an ancient provenance. In its most general form, the nature of idealism is easy enough to state: it generally amounts to the thesis that the empirical world is either not as real or is somehow deeply dependent on non-empirical structures or principles (“idealities”). One paradigmatic example of such idealism (to put it again in its most general form) would be something like a Pythagorean conception of the world in which numbers are real but the realities of the empirical world are at best manifestations of (or at least metaphysically dependent) on numbers and their relations. However, by the early modern period, “idealism” had come to mean something like the view that things are what they are only as they are experienced by or thought by some “ideal,” conscious thinker. Put even more economically: idealism came to be a thesis about the mind-dependence of the empirical, and perhaps even of the whole material world. Bishop Berkeley’s “to be is to be perceived” neatly sums up the stance of modern idealism by the eighteenth century.
12.2 KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM
However, once one ceases to fly at such a high altitude, it becomes much more difficult to state succinctly what “idealism” means. To get at what was at issue in the nineteenth century about “idealism,” one has to retreat a bit to the eighteenth century (or to what historians call the “long” nineteenth century, roughly the years between 1789 and 1918). In particular, on the continent, the interest in idealism focused on Kant’s description of his own philosophy as “transcendental idealism” in the Critique of Pure Reason, published in its first edition in 1781.1
In a story told now many times, Kant was incensed when one of the earliest reviews of the book accused him of being just another version of “Berkeleyan” idealism, that is, somebody who believed that the empirical world of things is in some appropriate way really just a set of subjective experiences or a construction put on subjective experience—tha
t “to be was to be perceived.” Kant aggressively asserted that his system was no such thing. Kant had argued that the world of our experience was limited to the subjective conditions under which we could experience that world and that what things were like in themselves, apart from the conditions under which we could experience them, was in principle unknowable. Nonetheless, our experience was not itself without a metaphysical structure. There were certain conditions of our experience—such as, among others, causality as necessary succession in time and substantiality as the idea of independent things persisting over time—that were the metaphysical, non-empirical conditions of the things of experience as experienced. However, it was simply a false inference to conclude from “we must experience independent substances as causally related” to “things in themselves, apart from our experience of them, must be substances that are necessarily causally related.”
One of the ways (but not the only way) we knew that this was a false inference was that if we actually detached ourselves from any possible experience and made claims about what things in themselves were like based on the way we had to experience them, we found ourselves necessarily involved in sets of antinomies, that is, contradictory assertions, each side of which had equally good evidence for themselves (such as “the world has a beginning in time” and “the world has no beginning in time”). Since the one thing we did know about the world in itself apart from the conditions under which we could experience it was that it was not self-contradictory, we therefore knew that our claims to know the metaphysical nature of things in themselves were not adequate. Nonetheless, we could still erect a thin metaphysics of experience—a metaphysics of the way the word necessarily had to appear to us—by looking at the conditions under which a human subject could become self-conscious only by bringing together within his self-consciousness the various “givens” of sensibility (including the spatio-temporal structures that Kant also claimed were valid only for our experience and not of things apart from the conditions under which we can experience them).
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